fix: block private-IP webhook URLs to close SSRF on caller-controlled URL (open-webui#24587)

* fix: block private-IP webhook URLs to close SSRF on caller-controlled URL

post_webhook(url, ...) in utils/webhook.py forwards the URL straight to
aiohttp.ClientSession.post with no SSRF gate. The URL is caller-controlled
on two surfaces:

- User notification settings under ENABLE_USER_WEBHOOKS=true — any
  authenticated user can set the URL their notifications POST to.
- Automation notification triggers (calendar alerts, etc.).

Without a gate, the URL can target cloud metadata (169.254.169.254 /
fd00:ec2::254), localhost-bound services, RFC1918 internal hosts, or any
other private address reachable from the server process. Blind SSRF — no
response body returned to the caller — but enough to enumerate internal
services via response timing / status codes, and on cloud deployments
enough to issue requests against IMDSv1 if available.

Call validate_url() at the top of post_webhook. The function blocks
private/reserved IPs when ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH is False (the
default), is the project's chosen SSRF gate, and is already applied to
the equivalent fetch surfaces (retrieval, image-load, OAuth profile
picture). Operators who legitimately need to webhook to private IPs
(internal monitoring, self-hosted Slack alternatives, etc.) can set
ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH=True — same opt-out as the other gated
surfaces.

Scope intentionally limited to webhooks. The OAuth discovery and
external reranker paths cwanglab also flagged are admin-configured with
intentional private-IP defaults (reranker defaults to
http://localhost:8080/v1/rerank) and are out of scope per Rule 9 — the
admin owns the URL choice and the operator opt-out exists for them too.

Reported by cwanglab in GHSA-5x9f-85cg-w3hf (cluster canonical with six
closed siblings: g36v-23gj-j69x, 6j8f-h58v-xgmw, xpwv-52pm-p8hj,
v9gp-hv2c-9qv8, fw7w-jrw7-p3v9, x7xq-74rg-m8mf).

Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: also pass allow_redirects=False on webhook post_webhook session.post

Companion to the previous commit. validate_url() only validates the
initial URL; aiohttp's default allow_redirects=True would still follow
a 302 to a private-IP target. Same redirect-bypass class as the rh5x
cluster's five call sites, sixth call site to receive the same gate.

Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>

Author: Classic298

backend/open_webui/utils/webhook.py

@@ -3,7 +3,13 @@
 
 import aiohttp
 from open_webui.config import WEBUI_FAVICON_URL
-from open_webui.env import AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL, AIOHTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT, VERSION
+from open_webui.env import (
+    AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
+    AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL,
+    AIOHTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT,
+    VERSION,
+)
+from open_webui.retrieval.web.utils import validate_url
 
 log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -13,6 +19,10 @@
 async def post_webhook(name: str, url: str, message: str, event_data: dict) -> bool:
     try:
         log.debug(f'post_webhook: {url}, {message}, {event_data}')
+        # Block private-IP / loopback / cloud-metadata targets — the URL is
+        # caller-controlled (user notification settings under
+        # ENABLE_USER_WEBHOOKS, automation notification triggers).
+        validate_url(url)
         payload = {}
 
         # Slack and Google Chat Webhooks
@@ -53,7 +63,12 @@ async def post_webhook(name: str, url: str, message: str, event_data: dict) -> b
         async with aiohttp.ClientSession(
             trust_env=True, timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT)
         ) as session:
-            async with session.post(url, json=payload, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL) as r:
+            async with session.post(
+                url,
+                json=payload,
+                ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL,
+                allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
+            ) as r:
                 r_text = await r.text()
                 r.raise_for_status()
                 log.debug(f'r.text: {r_text}')