Merge pull request #611 from AztecProtocol/cb/merge-public-next-fix

fix: resolve public-next → next merge conflicts

Author: PhilWindle

docs/docs-developers/docs/resources/migration_notes.md

@@ -9,15 +9,6 @@ Aztec is in active development. Each version may introduce breaking changes that
 
 ## TBD
 
-<<<<<<< HEAD
-### [Protocol] `PrivateCircuitPublicInputs` and `PrivateContextInputs` gain a `tx_request_salt` field
-
-The init kernel now always injects the protocol nullifier (`H(tx_request)`) as the transaction's first nullifier and binds the entry-point proof to the tx request's salt. To support this, `PrivateCircuitPublicInputs` and `PrivateContextInputs` each carry a new `tx_request_salt` field (set by the framework), and the `first_nullifier_hint` input to the init kernel is removed. This is handled automatically by the framework and PXE; contracts using the standard entrypoint need no changes beyond recompiling against the new protocol circuits.
-
-The salt serves two purposes. It keeps `H(tx_request)` (the protocol nullifier) unpredictable, preventing a dictionary attack that guesses the tx-request preimage to recompute the nullifier. It also lets the init kernel bind the proof to a specific tx request: the kernel asserts `tx_request_salt` equals `tx_request.salt`, so a third party holding the proof cannot rebind it to a different request (and thus a different protocol nullifier).
-
-Because `tx_request_salt` is now part of the private function's public inputs, an app or account contract can read it. Together with the other public inputs (the call context, `args_hash`, `tx_context`, and the function selector), an entrypoint can reconstruct the full `tx_request` and verify a signature over `tx_request.hash()`, instead of over a separate payload. This lets an account authorize the complete, kernel-checked transaction request rather than just the calls it contains. Building on that, the protocol nullifier can be made to provide a transaction's replay protection and cancellation directly, reducing the number of nullifiers an account needs to emit. This is not done by the standard entrypoint today; see issues #461 (the protocol/design direction) and #462 (the Aztec.nr account-layer work) for the full picture.
-=======
 ## 5.0.0
 
 ### [PXE] Local PXE database is reset on upgrade
@@ -115,7 +106,6 @@ This affects contracts that implement a custom message handler (registered via `
 +     // ...resolved_tx.tx_hash...
   }
 ```
->>>>>>> origin/public-next
 
 ### [PXE] `pxe.updateContract` removed and `pxe.registerContract` no longer takes an artifact
 
@@ -144,10 +134,7 @@ Registering classes and instances are now separate, unvalidated operations. `reg
 
 - `pxe.getContractInstance(address)` and `wallet.getContractMetadata(address).instance` now return the contract's **address preimage**, which no longer includes `currentContractClassId`.
 
-<<<<<<< HEAD
-=======
 
->>>>>>> origin/public-next
 ### [Aztec.js] `AccountWithSecretKey` removed, read account keys from the `AccountManager` or PXE
 
 `AccountWithSecretKey` was a thin wrapper that bundled an account's transaction signer with its master secret key, used mainly to print or export the secret. It has been removed, and `AccountManager.getAccount()` now returns the plain `Account` signer. The wrapper's extra methods are no longer available on that value:
@@ -172,8 +159,6 @@ The PXE never receives the seed nor the message-signing and fallback secret keys
 
 **Impact**: Importing `AccountWithSecretKey`, or calling `getSecretKey()`/`getEncryptionSecret()` on the result of `getAccount()`, no longer compiles. The signer `getAccount()` returns is otherwise unchanged, and passing a single `Fr` or a `MasterSecretKeys` to `wallet.registerContract` keeps working.
 
-<<<<<<< HEAD
-=======
 ### [CLI] `aztec-wallet` `--secret-key` is renamed to `--signing-key`
 
 `aztec-wallet` accounts are now rooted on their signing key rather than on a privacy secret. The `--secret-key` option (on `create-account` and `simulate`) is renamed to `--signing-key`, and the `SECRET_KEY` environment variable to `SIGNING_KEY`. When creating an account, a random signing key is generated by default and the privacy secret is derived from it.
@@ -192,7 +177,6 @@ The PXE never receives the seed nor the message-signing and fallback secret keys
 The transaction bot previously derived its account's signing key from the configured `senderPrivateKey`. That value is now used directly as the signing key, with the privacy secret derived from it.
 
 **Impact**: The bot's account address changes for a given `senderPrivateKey`, so the account must be re-funded at its new address.
->>>>>>> origin/public-next
 
 ### [PXE] Unconstrained delivery defaults to a non-interactive handshake for external recipients
 
@@ -393,17 +377,13 @@ while i > 0 {
 }
 ```
 
-<<<<<<< HEAD
-## 5.0.0-rc.1
-=======
 ### [Protocol] `PrivateCircuitPublicInputs` and `PrivateContextInputs` gain a `tx_request_salt` field
 
 The init kernel now always injects the protocol nullifier (`H(tx_request)`) as the transaction's first nullifier and binds the entry-point proof to the tx request's salt. To support this, `PrivateCircuitPublicInputs` and `PrivateContextInputs` each carry a new `tx_request_salt` field (set by the framework), and the `first_nullifier_hint` input to the init kernel is removed. This is handled automatically by the framework and PXE; contracts using the standard entrypoint need no changes beyond recompiling against the new protocol circuits.
 
 The salt serves two purposes. It keeps `H(tx_request)` (the protocol nullifier) unpredictable, preventing a dictionary attack that guesses the tx-request preimage to recompute the nullifier. It also lets the init kernel bind the proof to a specific tx request: the kernel asserts `tx_request_salt` equals `tx_request.salt`, so a third party holding the proof cannot rebind it to a different request (and thus a different protocol nullifier).
 
 Because `tx_request_salt` is now part of the private function's public inputs, an app or account contract can read it. Together with the other public inputs (the call context, `args_hash`, `tx_context`, and the function selector), an entrypoint can reconstruct the full `tx_request` and verify a signature over `tx_request.hash()`, instead of over a separate payload. This lets an account authorize the complete, kernel-checked transaction request rather than just the calls it contains. Building on that, the protocol nullifier can be made to provide a transaction's replay protection and cancellation directly, reducing the number of nullifiers an account needs to emit. This is not done by the standard entrypoint today; see issues #461 (the protocol/design direction) and #462 (the Aztec.nr account-layer work) for the full picture.
->>>>>>> origin/public-next
 
 ### [Aztec.js] Prefunded local network test accounts are now initializerless
 

docs/docs-words.txt

@@ -69,13 +69,8 @@ codealong
 Codex
 COEP
 Colour
-<<<<<<< HEAD
-CapsuleStore
-initializerless
-immutables
-=======
 colour
->>>>>>> origin/public-next
+immutables
 colums
 Commiting
 completer