fix: redact Groq, xAI, HuggingFace keys and underscores in sk- keys (M-11)

AGENTS.md

@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ Layered prompt-injection / approval-fatigue defenses. Full reference: [docs/SECU
 - **git config code execution** (`internal/danger/classifier.go`) — `git -c alias.*=!<cmd>`, `git -c core.pager=...`, `git -c core.fsmonitor=...`, `git -c credential.helper=...`, and the `git config` subcommand are classified as `code_execution` because they can inject arbitrary shell commands.
 - **find / rsync destructive flags** (`internal/danger/classifier.go`) — `find -delete` and `rsync --delete` / `--del` / `--remove-source-files` are classified as `destructive`; `find -fprint` / `-fprintf` are classified as `local_write`.
 - **Shell operand path classification** (`internal/danger/classifier.go`) — file operands and redirect targets of shell commands are checked with `ClassifyPath`, so writes to `~/.bashrc`, `~/.zshrc`, `~/.profile`, `~/.ssh`, `~/.odek`, etc. are escalated to `system_write` instead of auto-allowed `local_write`.
-- **Secret redaction** (`internal/redact/redact.go`) — 20+ patterns: OpenAI, Anthropic, GitHub PAT, AWS, PEM, JWT, Vault, Google OAuth, SendGrid, Discord, DB URLs, etc.
+- **Secret redaction** (`internal/redact/redact.go`) — 20+ patterns: OpenAI/Anthropic `sk-` (including underscore-bearing bodies), Groq `gsk_`, xAI `xai-`, HuggingFace `hf_`, GitHub PAT, AWS, PEM, JWT, Vault, Google OAuth, SendGrid, Discord, DB URLs, etc.
 
 ### Security findings (`sec_findings.md`)
 

cmd/odek/security_report_validation_test.go

@@ -181,6 +181,10 @@ func TestReport_RedactMissesRealSecretFormats(t *testing.T) {
 		{"db_url_mongo", "mongodb+srv://root:VeryLongMongoPassword1234@cluster.mongodb.net/db", "Mongo URL with embedded password"},
 		{"discord_bot", "N01234567890123456789012345.aBcDe.6789abcdef0123456789abcdef012345678", "Discord bot token (synthetic test value)"},
 		{"sendgrid", "SG.dQw4w9WgXcQ-AbCdEfGh.JkLmNoPqRsTuVwXyZ0123456789abcdefghij", "SendGrid API key"},
+		{"groq", "gsk_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890", "Groq API key (gsk_ prefix)"},
+		{"xai", "xai-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890_0123456789", "xAI API key (xai- prefix)"},
+		{"huggingface", "hf_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890", "HuggingFace token (hf_ prefix)"},
+		{"anthropic_underscore", "sk-ant-api03-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz_1234567890", "Anthropic key with underscore in body"},
 	}
 
 	for _, tc := range cases {

docs/SECURITY.md

@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ Files attached through the Web UI are sourced from the browser trust boundary. T
 
 ### 10. Secret redaction
 
-`internal/redact` scans every tool output and session/memory write for known secret formats and replaces matches with `[REDACTED]` before they reach Telegram replies, persistent sessions, or memory. Patterns include OpenAI `sk-`, Anthropic `sk-ant-`, GitHub PATs (classic + fine-grained), AWS access keys, multi-line PEM private keys, JWT, generic `api_key=` / `password=` env lines, Slack `xoxb-`, Stripe `sk_live_`, Google API keys, Twilio `SK`, HashiCorp Vault `hvs.` / `hvb.`, Google OAuth `ya29.` / `1//0`, SendGrid `SG.`, Discord bot tokens (M/N/O-anchored), and DB URLs with embedded credentials (`postgresql://`, `mongodb://`, etc.).
+`internal/redact` scans every tool output and session/memory write for known secret formats and replaces matches with `[REDACTED]` before they reach Telegram replies, persistent sessions, or memory. Patterns include OpenAI `sk-` (and underscore-bearing bodies such as Anthropic `sk-ant-...`), Groq `gsk_`, xAI `xai-`, HuggingFace `hf_`, GitHub PATs (classic + fine-grained), AWS access keys, multi-line PEM private keys, JWT, generic `api_key=` / `password=` env lines, Slack `xoxb-`, Stripe `sk_live_`, Google API keys, Twilio `SK`, HashiCorp Vault `hvs.` / `hvb.`, Google OAuth `ya29.` / `1//0`, SendGrid `SG.`, Discord bot tokens (M/N/O-anchored), and DB URLs with embedded credentials (`postgresql://`, `mongodb://`, etc.).
 
 If you find a format that leaks, add a regex to `internal/redact/redact.go:31-100` and a row to `TestReport_RedactMissesRealSecretFormats` in `cmd/odek/security_report_validation_test.go`.
 

internal/redact/redact.go

@@ -34,9 +34,17 @@ import (
 // The first matching pattern wins — subsequent patterns are skipped for
 // that portion of text.
 var patterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
-	// OpenAI / AI provider keys: sk-<alphanumeric+hyphens>
-	// sk-proj- variant for project-scoped keys
-	regexp.MustCompile(`sk-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{32,}`),
+	// Provider-specific AI API keys (ordered before the generic sk- pattern).
+	// Groq: gsk_<alphanumeric>
+	regexp.MustCompile(`gsk_[a-zA-Z0-9]{32,}`),
+	// xAI: xai-<alphanumeric+hyphens/underscores>
+	regexp.MustCompile(`xai-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{32,}`),
+	// HuggingFace: hf_<alphanumeric>
+	regexp.MustCompile(`hf_[a-zA-Z0-9]{32,}`),
+	// OpenAI / generic AI provider keys: sk-<alphanumeric+hyphens+underscores>
+	// sk-proj- variant for project-scoped keys. The underscore is required
+	// because Anthropic keys (sk-ant-...) and some provider keys contain it.
+	regexp.MustCompile(`sk-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{32,}`),
 
 	// GitHub personal access tokens (classic + fine-grained)
 	regexp.MustCompile(`ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36,}`),

internal/redact/redact_test.go

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ func TestRedactSecrets_OpenAIKey(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []string{
 		"sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456",
 		"sk-1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuv",
+		// Anthropic-style keys contain underscores in the body.
+		"sk-ant-api03-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz_1234567890",
 	}
 	for _, input := range tests {
 		result := RedactSecrets(input)
@@ -31,6 +33,25 @@ func TestRedactSecrets_OpenAIKey(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestRedactSecrets_ProviderKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name   string
+		secret string
+	}{
+		{"groq", "gsk_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890"},
+		{"xai", "xai-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890_0123456789"},
+		{"huggingface", "hf_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890"},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := RedactSecrets(tc.secret)
+			if result != "[REDACTED]" {
+				t.Errorf("%s key not redacted: %q → %q", tc.name, tc.secret, result)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestRedactSecrets_GitHubToken(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []string{
 		"ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890",