diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index 287c5b3..f207b96 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ Layered prompt-injection / approval-fatigue defenses. Full reference: [docs/SECU
 - **write_file content cap** (`cmd/odek/file_tool.go`) — the `content` argument is capped at 1 MiB to prevent disk exhaustion and memory pressure from a single enormous tool call.
 - **file_info confinement + wrapping** (`cmd/odek/file_tool.go`) — `file_info` respects the same `restrictToCWD` path confinement as `write_file`/`patch`, and the returned path is wrapped as untrusted content.
 - **WebSocket message-size cap** (`cmd/odek/serve.go`) — `odek serve` sets `MaxPayloadBytes` on every WebSocket connection so a local client cannot OOM the server with a huge frame.
+- **WebSocket approval relay non-blocking** (`cmd/odek/wsapprover.go`) — `HandleResponse` uses a non-blocking send on the pending response channel, so duplicate or late approval responses are dropped instead of blocking the WebSocket read goroutine and exhausting the global connection semaphore.
 - **Session file size cap** (`internal/session/session.go`) — session files larger than 32 MiB are rejected by `Load()` to prevent OOM from tampered or corrupted transcripts.
 - **Skill file size cap** (`internal/skills/loader.go`) — `SKILL.md` files larger than 1 MiB are skipped so a malicious project cannot OOM the process at startup or bloat the system prompt.
 - **Serve sandbox default-on** — `odek serve` enables `--sandbox` automatically unless `--no-sandbox` is passed.
diff --git a/cmd/odek/wsapprover.go b/cmd/odek/wsapprover.go
index bab5302..2a3f591 100644
--- a/cmd/odek/wsapprover.go
+++ b/cmd/odek/wsapprover.go
@@ -201,12 +201,20 @@ func (a *wsApprover) PromptOperation(op danger.ToolOperation) error {
 // HandleResponse processes a response from the browser.
 // Called by the WebSocket read loop when an approval_response arrives.
 // Returns true if the response matched a pending request.
+//
+// The send to the response channel is non-blocking: the channel has capacity
+// 1, so if a duplicate or late response races with the first one, or if the
+// request has already timed out and the reader is gone, the send drops the
+// response instead of wedging the WebSocket read goroutine.
 func (a *wsApprover) HandleResponse(id, action string) bool {
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	resp, ok := a.pending[id]
 	a.mu.Unlock()
 	if ok {
-		resp <- action
+		select {
+		case resp <- action:
+		default:
+		}
 	}
 	return ok
 }
diff --git a/cmd/odek/wsapprover_test.go b/cmd/odek/wsapprover_test.go
index 04bf1b3..71dd932 100644
--- a/cmd/odek/wsapprover_test.go
+++ b/cmd/odek/wsapprover_test.go
@@ -76,6 +76,49 @@ func TestWSApprover_HandleResponse_NonMatching(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestWSApprover_HandleResponse_DoesNotBlock verifies that a duplicate or
+// late approval response is dropped instead of blocking the WebSocket read
+// goroutine. This is a regression test for the L3 relay race: previously the
+// second response could wedge on a buffer-1 channel and exhaust the connection
+// semaphore.
+func TestWSApprover_HandleResponse_DoesNotBlock(t *testing.T) {
+	a := newWSApprover(func(v any) error { return nil })
+	id := "test-id-block"
+
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	a.pending[id] = make(chan string, 1)
+	a.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// First response fills the buffer-1 channel.
+	if !a.HandleResponse(id, "approve") {
+		t.Fatal("first HandleResponse should match")
+	}
+
+	// Second response must return promptly even though the channel is full.
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		a.HandleResponse(id, "approve")
+		close(done)
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+		// expected
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("second HandleResponse blocked on a full response channel")
+	}
+
+	// Only one value should have been delivered.
+	select {
+	case action := <-a.pending[id]:
+		if action != "approve" {
+			t.Errorf("expected 'approve', got %q", action)
+		}
+	default:
+		t.Fatal("expected exactly one buffered response")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestWSApprover_PromptCommand_TrustedClass(t *testing.T) {
 	callCount := 0
 	a := newWSApprover(func(v any) error {
diff --git a/docs/SECURITY.md b/docs/SECURITY.md
index 4ff8858..58b234c 100644
--- a/docs/SECURITY.md
+++ b/docs/SECURITY.md
@@ -133,9 +133,7 @@ The `guard` section is operator-controlled: project-level `./odek.json` cannot s
 When a classification is set to `prompt`, an approver pauses the agent until the user decides. Two implementations:
 
 - **TTYApprover** (CLI / REPL) — reads from `/dev/tty`.
-- **WSApprover** (Web UI) — sends `approval_request` over WebSocket; the browser shows a modal.
-
-Both:
+- **WSApprover** (Web UI) — sends `approval_request` over WebSocket; the browser shows a modal. Responses are relayed to the pending prompt via a non-blocking send on a capacity-1 channel, so a duplicate, late, or raced response cannot block the WebSocket read goroutine and exhaust the global connection semaphore.
 
 - Disable the "Trust class for session" shortcut for `destructive` and `blocked`. A forged or stale UI that sends `"trust"` for those classes is coerced to a single approve.
 - Engage **friction mode** after 3 approvals of the same class in 60 s: require typing the literal word `approve` (no single-letter / button shortcut) and impose a 1.5 s pause before accepting input. This breaks reflex click-through under sustained LLM-driven approval pressure.