Status: Latticra Seal MCP alignment planning document Scope: documentation-only alignment plan for model-context style tool invocation security after the Latticra Seal agentic automation security contract. This document does not implement runtime execution, runtime authority, effect execution, capability enforcement, cryptographic verification, verified receipts, public-key parsing, public-key trust stores, key generation, private-key storage, hardware key use, network trust lookup, revocation lookup, object sealing, host reads, host writes, kernel behavior, Fedora approval claims, production readiness, MCP protocol implementation, MCP server behavior, MCP client behavior, AI agent execution, model execution, tool execution, or operating-system behavior.
This document records how Latticra Seal should align with model-context style automation security concerns while remaining evidence-bound and no-effect.
The purpose is not to implement MCP.
The purpose is to define a future-safe vocabulary and direction for protecting local tool invocation, automation, and AI-adjacent workflows through Seal metadata, policy, receipts, and runtime-boundary discipline.
Model-context style automation creates a new systems boundary:
model or assistant intent -> tool request -> parameter transfer -> local action -> output return -> possible downstream action
Latticra Seal should treat every boundary crossing as untrusted until measured, declared, constrained, and reported.
The existing Seal chain maps naturally to agentic automation security:
Seal report -> visibility surface
Seal measurement -> identity and evidence posture
Seal manifest -> declared tool identity and capability scope
Seal signature policy -> rules for signed and unsigned objects
Seal signature metadata -> signature presence and declared signature state
Seal verification policy -> rules for accepting or rejecting trust material
Seal verification receipt -> reportable verification result
Seal capability gate -> denied-by-default authority boundary
Seal effect decision -> explicit action decision
Seal runtime handoff -> disabled runtime boundary
Seal status rollup -> compact posture summary
Agentic automation security -> tool invocation and context boundary planning
Future MCP-adjacent records should remain bounded and deterministic.
Planned fields:
mcp_alignment_profile
protocol_implementation_supported
server_behavior_supported
client_behavior_supported
tool_registry_present
tool_manifest_required
tool_manifest_signed_required
parameter_schema_required
parameter_schema_valid
request_identity_required
request_timestamp_required
request_expiration_required
nonce_required
context_hash_required
parameter_hash_required
message_signature_required
replay_protection_required
output_treated_as_untrusted
downstream_execution_allowed
operator_approval_required
receipt_required
runtime_authority_granted
mode
status
Initial values:
mcp_alignment_profile=latticra-seal-mcp-alignment/0.1
protocol_implementation_supported=0
server_behavior_supported=0
client_behavior_supported=0
tool_registry_present=0
tool_manifest_required=1
tool_manifest_signed_required=1
parameter_schema_required=1
parameter_schema_valid=0
request_identity_required=1
request_timestamp_required=1
request_expiration_required=1
nonce_required=1
context_hash_required=1
parameter_hash_required=1
message_signature_required=1
replay_protection_required=1
output_treated_as_untrusted=1
downstream_execution_allowed=0
operator_approval_required=1
receipt_required=1
runtime_authority_granted=0
mode=planning-only
status=mcp-alignment-planning-only
Latticra Seal should preserve these rules for future implementation:
model output is not authority
tool output is not authority
retrieved context is not authority
unsigned manifests do not grant authority
unknown tools do not grant authority
parameters must not cross boundaries without validation
outputs must not become downstream inputs without policy
network access must remain denied unless explicitly granted
private key access must remain denied unless explicitly granted
runtime authority must remain zero until guarded implementation exists
Future Seal records should be able to report:
parameter_schema_present
parameter_schema_valid
max_input_bytes_declared
input_size_within_limit
source_context_known
parameter_hash_present
parameter_forwarding_allowed
The initial default is:
parameter_forwarding_allowed=0
Future Seal records should be able to report:
request_timestamp_present
request_expiration_present
nonce_present
freshness_valid
replay_detected
The initial default is:
freshness_valid=0
replay_detected=0
Future Seal records should treat returned tool/model output as untrusted until explicitly classified.
Initial defaults:
output_treated_as_untrusted=1
downstream_execution_allowed=0
chain_continuation_requires_policy=1
Latticra Seal should compose with Linux security instead of replacing it.
Future composition targets may include:
SELinux
systemd service boundaries
seccomp
read-only directories
temporary runtime directories
user namespaces
network namespace isolation
This plan does not implement any of these mechanisms.
This alignment plan must not be read as deployment, certification, endorsement, production hardening, or protocol implementation.
Required non-claims:
mcp_protocol_implemented=0
mcp_server_implemented=0
mcp_client_implemented=0
external_endorsement_claimed=0
NSA_endorsement_claimed=0
Fedora_approval_claimed=0
production_readiness_claimed=0
runtime_authority_granted=0
host_read_performed=0
host_write_performed=0
network_performed=0
The next valid Latticra Seal slice is a report-only agentic automation security metadata implementation.
That future slice may add bounded C metadata and deterministic report rendering.
It must not implement MCP behavior, runtime behavior, host behavior, network behavior, AI agent execution, model execution, tool execution, capability enforcement, cryptographic verification, or authority grants.