update report widget

Author: dogboat

dojo/reports/widgets.py

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 import json
 from collections import OrderedDict
 
+import bleach
+from bleach.css_sanitizer import CSSSanitizer
 from django import forms
 from django.conf import settings
 from django.forms import Widget
@@ -216,6 +218,51 @@ def get_option_form(self):
         return mark_safe(html)
 
 
+# Allow-list of the formatting the report builder's WYSIWYG editor can emit
+# (bold/italic/underline/strikethrough, lists, alignment, indentation, links,
+# images). Anything else -- <script>, on* handlers, javascript: URLs -- is
+# neutralized by bleach.clean() before the content reaches the |safe filter.
+WYSIWYG_ALLOWED_TAGS = {
+    "a", "b", "strong", "i", "em", "u", "s", "strike", "sub", "sup",
+    "p", "br", "hr", "div", "span", "blockquote", "pre", "code",
+    "h1", "h2", "h3", "h4", "h5", "h6", "ul", "ol", "li",
+    "table", "thead", "tbody", "tr", "th", "td", "img",
+}
+WYSIWYG_ALLOWED_STYLES = [
+    "color", "background-color", "font-weight", "font-style",
+    "text-decoration", "text-align", "margin-left", "padding-left",
+]
+# http(s)/mailto for link hrefs; data: is permitted (only on <img src>, see the
+# attribute filter below) so an inline base64 image renders without opening
+# data:text/html on a link.
+WYSIWYG_ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS = ["http", "https", "mailto", "data"]
+
+
+def wysiwyg_attribute_filter(tag, name, value):
+    """
+    Bleach attribute allow-list for sanitized Custom Content.
+
+    A callable (rather than a dict) so data: URIs can be permitted on inline
+    images -- <img src="data:image/..."> -- without also allowing them on link
+    hrefs, where data:text/html would be an XSS/phishing vector. style/class are
+    allowed everywhere; their values are constrained by the css_sanitizer.
+    """
+    value = (value or "").strip().lower()
+    if name in {"style", "class"}:
+        return True
+    if tag == "a":
+        # Allow-list link schemes: data:/javascript:/obfuscated variants can't match an
+        # allowed prefix, so they are dropped (bleach's protocol check is a second layer).
+        return name in {"title", "target"} or (
+            name == "href" and value.startswith(("http://", "https://", "mailto:"))
+        )
+    if tag == "img":
+        return name in {"alt", "title", "width", "height"} or (
+            name == "src" and value.startswith(("http://", "https://", "'
+        'CAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk+M8AAAMBAQDJ/pLvAAAAAElFTkSuQmCC" alt="pixel">'
+    )
+    # ...but data: must be limited to images -- data:text/html on an <img src>...
+    DATA_HTML_IMAGE_PAYLOAD = '<img src="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">'
+    # ...and data: URLs must never be accepted on a link href.
+    DATA_URL_LINK_PAYLOAD = '<a href="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==">link</a>'
+    # Event handlers must be stripped even from allow-listed tags.
+    EVENT_HANDLER_PAYLOAD = '<div onclick="alert(1)">click</div>'
+
+    def _render_custom_content(self, hidden_content, heading="Custom Content"):
+        """Render a Custom Content widget the way the report builder does."""
+        widget_json = json.dumps([
+            {"custom-content": [
+                {"name": "heading", "value": heading},
+                {"name": "hidden_content", "value": hidden_content},
+                {"name": "page_break_after", "value": False},
+            ]},
+        ])
+        widgets = report_widget_factory(json_data=widget_json, request=None)
+        return str(widgets["custom-content-0"].get_html())
+
+    def test_script_is_neutralized_and_image_handler_is_stripped(self):
+        """<script> is escaped to inert text; <img> is kept but its onerror is removed."""
+        html = self._render_custom_content(self.SCRIPT_PAYLOAD)
+
+        # <script> is escaped (rendered as inert text, not a raw tag)...
+        self.assertNotIn("<script", html)
+        # ...the image element itself is allowed...
+        self.assertIn("<img", html)
+        # ...but the event handler that made it dangerous is gone.
+        self.assertNotIn("onerror", html)
+
+    def test_data_url_image_is_preserved(self):
+        """Inline data:image/ sources survive so pasted/base64 images still render."""
+        html = self._render_custom_content(self.DATA_IMAGE_PAYLOAD)
+
+        self.assertIn("data:image/png;base64", html)
+
+    def test_data_url_non_image_is_stripped(self):
+        """data: on an <img src> is limited to images; data:text/html is dropped."""
+        html = self._render_custom_content(self.DATA_HTML_IMAGE_PAYLOAD)
+
+        self.assertNotIn("data:text/html", html)
+        self.assertNotIn("<script", html)
+
+    def test_data_url_link_is_stripped(self):
+        """data: URLs are never allowed on link hrefs (only on <img src>)."""
+        html = self._render_custom_content(self.DATA_URL_LINK_PAYLOAD)
+
+        self.assertNotIn("data:text/html", html)
+        self.assertIn("link", html)  # anchor text is preserved
+
+    def test_obfuscated_data_url_link_is_stripped(self):
+        """data: on a link href stays blocked even when its scheme is split by control chars."""
+        for payload in (
+            '<a href="da&#10;ta:text/html,alert(1)">l</a>',  # newline in scheme
+            '<a href="da&#9;ta:text/html,alert(1)">l</a>',  # tab in scheme
+        ):
+            html = self._render_custom_content(payload)
+            self.assertNotIn("ta:text/html", html)
+
+    def test_event_handler_on_allowed_tag_is_stripped(self):
+        """Event-handler attributes are removed even from allow-listed tags."""
+        html = self._render_custom_content(self.EVENT_HANDLER_PAYLOAD)
+
+        self.assertNotIn("onclick", html)
+        self.assertIn("click", html)
+
+    def test_javascript_url_is_stripped(self):
+        """javascript: hrefs are removed; the anchor text is preserved."""
+        html = self._render_custom_content(self.JS_URL_PAYLOAD)
+
+        self.assertNotIn("javascript:", html)
+        self.assertIn("click me", html)
+
+    def test_safe_formatting_is_preserved(self):
+        """The formatting the WYSIWYG editor emits must pass through intact."""
+        html = self._render_custom_content(self.SAFE_PAYLOAD)
+
+        self.assertIn("<b>bold</b>", html)
+        self.assertIn("<u>underline</u>", html)
+        self.assertIn('href="https://example.com/safe"', html)
+        self.assertIn("safe link", html)
+
+    def test_heading_is_escaped(self):
+        """The heading is auto-escaped and cannot be used to inject markup."""
+        html = self._render_custom_content("benign", heading="<script>alert(1)</script>")
+
+        self.assertNotIn("<script", html)