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Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

If you find a security issue, please do not open a public GitHub issue.

Instead, use one of these private channels:

Please include:

  • A description of the issue and its impact
  • Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept
  • The affected version (output of codex-browser-bridge --version)
  • Your environment (Windows version, Chrome version, Codex Desktop version)

You can expect an initial response within a few days. Once the issue is confirmed, we will work on a fix and coordinate disclosure with you.

Scope

This project bridges your existing Chrome browser session to MCP-compatible agents. Reports about the following are in scope:

  • Issues that allow an MCP client to take actions outside the documented tool surface
  • Issues in the named-pipe / JSON-RPC framing that could be exploited by a hostile process on the same machine
  • Issues with the npm install pipeline (checksum verification, post-install script)
  • Issues that leak sensitive data (cookies, tokens, page contents) beyond the MCP transport

Built-in protections

The bridge applies these safeguards at runtime:

  • URL scheme filtering: codex_navigate blocks file:, javascript:, data:, and vbscript: URLs (see internal/client/browser.go:validateURL)
  • Pipe spoofing detection: warns to stderr when multiple codex-browser-use-* pipes are found, as this could indicate a hostile process impersonating Codex Desktop
  • Log sanitization: error messages are stripped of newline characters before writing to the debug log, preventing log injection via crafted error responses
  • JSON safety: the jsonEscaped helper always produces valid JSON strings for JavaScript embedding, with a safe "" fallback on error instead of propagating corrupted values

These are defense-in-depth measures, not a complete security boundary. The bridge's primary security model is that it runs locally and is only connected to trusted MCP clients on the same machine.

Out of scope:

  • The fact that the bridge gives an MCP client access to your active browser session — this is the project's stated purpose. See the README's "Security Notes" section for the threat model.
  • Issues in Codex Desktop, the Codex Chrome Extension, or Chrome itself — please report those upstream.