Harden CreateMessageActivity against external navigation injection#3228
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DenBond7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Harden CreateMessageActivity against external navigation injection#3228DenBond7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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This change hardens the exported compose entry point against untrusted external intents reaching internal send-only flows.
Problem
CreateMessageActivity is intentionally exported to support normal Android share and mail intents. However, untrusted external intents were able to influence internal navigation behavior more than intended and reach the outgoing-message creation path directly. That flow could then process attacker-controlled attachment URIs using FlowCrypt’s own app identity.
What changed
Why
External intents should only initialize the normal compose experience. They must not be able to route directly into internal send logic or supply unsafe attachment locations that are later opened with app privileges.
What verified:
close #3227
Tests (delete all except exactly one):
To be filled by reviewers
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