tests: add mceliece

Author: chadsec1

README.md

@@ -6,11 +6,10 @@
 
 ## 🔒 Security Model & Features
 - **Best‑case security**: achieves [unbreakable encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad) under the principles of information theory using [one‑time pads](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad) 
-- **Worst‑case security**: falls back only to ML‑KEM‑1024 (Kyber) resistance  
+- **Worst‑case security**: falls back only to combined security of ML‑KEM‑1024 and McEliece8192128  
 - **Perfect-Forward-Secrecy**: on every [OTP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad) batch through ephemeral PQC key exchanges  
 - **Plausible Deniability**: messages are not cryptographically tied to you, providing more deniability than [Off‑The‑Record messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-record_messaging) !
 - **Mandatory SMP**: We enforce [Socialist millionaire problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_millionaire_problem) before any chat. **MiTM attacks are impossible**.  
-- **NIST PQC Tier‑5**: We use highest security algorithms (Kyber1024, Dilithium5) that provide AES‑256 strength using [OQS Project](https://openquantumsafe.org/)
 - **Minimal Attack Surface**:  
   - Tkinter UI only, no embedded browsers or HTML
   - Minimal Python dependecies

logic/background_worker.py

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ def background_worker(user_data, user_data_lock, ui_queue, stop_flag):
         # *Sigh* I had to put this here because if we rotate before finishing reading all of the messages
         # we would literally overwrite our own key.
         # TODO: We need to keep the last used key and use it when decapsulation with new key gives invalid output
-        # because it might actually take some time for our keys to be uploaded to server + other servers and to the contact.
+        # because it might actually take some time for our keys to be uploaded to server + other servers, and to the contact.
         #
         update_ephemeral_keys(user_data, user_data_lock)
 

tests/test_crypto.py

@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
 # tests/test_crypto.py
 """
-Tests for ML-KEM-1024 (Kyber) and ML-DSA-87 (Dilithium5).
+Tests for ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-87, Classic-McEliece-8192128f.
 Covers:
 - Key generation conformance to NIST spec
-- Dilithium Signature generation and verification
+- Signature generation and verification
 - OTP encryption using Kyber key exchange
 - Hash chain tamper detection
 """
 
-import pytest
 from core.crypto import (
     generate_kem_keys,
     generate_sign_keys,
@@ -29,7 +28,13 @@
     ML_DSA_87_NAME,  
     ML_DSA_87_SK_LEN,
     ML_DSA_87_PK_LEN,
-    ML_DSA_87_SIGN_LEN
+    ML_DSA_87_SIGN_LEN,
+
+    CLASSIC_MCELIECE_8_F_NAME,
+    CLASSIC_MCELIECE_8_F_SK_LEN, 
+    CLASSIC_MCELIECE_8_F_PK_LEN,
+    CLASSIC_MCELIECE_8_F_CT_LEN 
+
 )
 from core.trad_crypto import sha3_512
 
@@ -65,6 +70,26 @@ def test_mlkem_keygen_basic():
         seen_public_keys.add(public_key)
 
 
+def test_mceliece_keygen_basic():
+    """Validate ML-KEM-1024 key generation: uniqueness, type, and length."""
+    seen_private_keys = set()
+    seen_public_keys  = set()
+
+    for _ in range(10):
+        private_key, public_key = generate_kem_keys(CLASSIC_MCELIECE_8_F_NAME)
+
+        assert private_key not in seen_private_keys, "Duplicate private key detected"
+        assert public_key not in seen_public_keys,  "Duplicate public key detected"
+
+        assert private_key != public_key, "Private and public keys must differ"
+        assert isinstance(private_key, bytes) and isinstance(public_key, bytes), "Keys must be bytes"
+        assert len(private_key) == CLASSIC_MCELIECE_8_F_SK_LEN, "Private key length mismatch with spec"
+        assert len(public_key)  == CLASSIC_MCELIECE_8_F_PK_LEN,, "Public key length mismatch with spec"
+
+        seen_private_keys.add(private_key)
+        seen_public_keys.add(public_key)
+
+
 def test_mldsa_keygen_basic():
     """Validate ML-DSA-87 key generation: uniqueness, type, and length."""
     seen_private_keys = set()