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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/lateral-vlan-segmentation-bypass.md
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@@ -60,11 +60,84 @@ Connectivity is tested by initiating ICMP requests to the default gateways for V
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Ultimately, this process enables bypassing of VLAN segmentation, thereby facilitating unrestricted access to any VLAN network, and setting the stage for subsequent actions.
## Other VLAN-Hopping Techniques (no privileged switch CLI)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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The previous method assumes authenticated console or Telnet/SSH access to the switch. In real-world engagements the attacker is usually connected to a **regular access port**. The following Layer-2 tricks often let you pivot laterally without ever logging into the switch OS:
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### 1. Switch-Spoofing with Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP)
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Cisco switches that keep DTP enabled will happily negotiate a trunk if the peer claims to be a switch. Crafting a single **DTP “desirable”** or **“trunk”** frame converts the access port into an 802.1Q trunk that carries *all* allowed VLANs.
Once the port switches to trunk you can create 802.1Q sub-interfaces and pivot exactly as shown in the previous section. Modern Linux kernels no longer require *vconfig*; instead use *ip link*:
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```bash
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sudo modprobe 8021q
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sudo ip link add link eth0 name eth0.30 type vlan id 30
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sudo ip addr add 10.10.30.66/24 dev eth0.30
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sudo ip link set eth0.30 up
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```
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### 2. Double-Tagging (Native-VLAN Abuse)
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If the attacker sits on the **native (untagged) VLAN**, a crafted frame with *two* 802.1Q headers can "hop" to a second VLAN even when the port is locked in access mode. Tooling such as **VLANPWN DoubleTagging.py** (2022-2024 refresh) automates the injection:
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```bash
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python3 DoubleTagging.py \
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--interface eth0 \
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--nativevlan 1 \
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--targetvlan 20 \
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--victim 10.10.20.24 \
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--attacker 10.10.1.54
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```
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Packet walk-through:
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1. Outer tag (1) is stripped by the first switch because it matches the native VLAN.
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2. Inner tag (20) is now exposed; the frame is forwarded onto the trunk towards VLAN 20.
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The technique still works in 2025 on networks that leave the native VLAN at the default and accept untagged frames .
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### 3. QinQ (802.1ad) Stacking
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Many enterprise cores support *Q-in-Q* service provider encapsulation. Where permitted, an attacker can tunnel arbitrary 802.1Q-tagged traffic inside a provider (S-tag) to cross security zones. Capture for 802.1ad ethertype 0x88a8 and attempt to pop the outer tag with Scapy:
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