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| 2022 |**CVE-2022-26923** – “Certifried” / ESC6 |*Privilege escalation* by spoofing machine account certificates during PKINIT. | Patch is included in the **May 10 2022** security updates. Auditing & strong-mapping controls were introduced via **KB5014754**; environments should now be in *Full Enforcement* mode. citeturn2search0 |
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| 2023 |**CVE-2023-35350 / 35351**|*Remote code-execution* in the AD CS Web Enrollment (certsrv) and CES roles. | Public PoCs are limited, but the vulnerable IIS components are often exposed internally. Patch as of **July 2023** Patch Tuesday. citeturn3search0 |
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| 2024 |**CVE-2024-49019** – “EKUwu” / ESC15 | Low-privileged users with enrollment rights could override **any** EKU or SAN during CSR generation, issuing certificates usable for client-authentication or code-signing and leading to *domain compromise*. | Addressed in **April 2024** updates. Remove “Supply in the request” from templates and restrict enrollment permissions. citeturn1search3 |
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### Microsoft hardening timeline (KB5014754)
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Microsoft introduced a three-phase rollout (Compatibility → Audit → Enforcement) to move Kerberos certificate authentication away from weak implicit mappings. As of **February 11 2025**, domain controllers automatically switch to **Full Enforcement** if the `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` registry value is not set. Administrators should:
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1. Patch all DCs & AD CS servers (May 2022 or later).
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2. Monitor Event ID 39/41 for weak mappings during the *Audit* phase.
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3. Re-issue client-auth certificates with the new **SID extension** or configure strong manual mappings before February 2025. citeturn2search0
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---
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## Detection & Hardening Enhancements
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***Defender for Identity AD CS sensor (2023-2024)** now surfaces posture assessments for ESC1-ESC8/ESC11 and generates real-time alerts such as *“Domain-controller certificate issuance for a non-DC”* (ESC8) and *“Prevent Certificate Enrollment with arbitrary Application Policies”* (ESC15). Ensure sensors are deployed to all AD CS servers to benefit from these detections. citeturn5search0
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* Disable or tightly scope the **“Supply in the request”** option on all templates; prefer explicitly defined SAN/EKU values.
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* Remove **Any Purpose** or **No EKU** from templates unless absolutely required (addresses ESC2 scenarios).
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* Require **manager approval** or dedicated Enrollment Agent workflows for sensitive templates (e.g., WebServer / CodeSigning).
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* Restrict web enrollment (`certsrv`) and CES/NDES endpoints to trusted networks or behind client-certificate authentication.
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