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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: src/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/uac-user-account-control.md
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@@ -255,6 +255,28 @@ If you take a look to **UACME** you will note that **most UAC bypasses abuse a D
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Consists on watching if an **autoElevated binary** tries to **read** from the **registry** the **name/path** of a **binary** or **command** to be **executed** (this is more interesting if the binary searches this information inside the **HKCU**).
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### UAC bypass via `SysWOW64\iscsicpl.exe` + user `PATH` DLL hijack
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The 32-bit `C:\Windows\SysWOW64\iscsicpl.exe` is an **auto-elevated** binary that can be abused to load `iscsiexe.dll` by search order. If you can place a malicious `iscsiexe.dll` inside a **user-writable** folder and then modify the current user `PATH` (for example via `HKCU\Environment\Path`) so that folder is searched, Windows may load the attacker DLL inside the elevated `iscsicpl.exe` process **without showing a UAC prompt**.
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Practical notes:
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- This is useful when the current user is in **Administrators** but running at **Medium Integrity** due to UAC.
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- The **SysWOW64** copy is the relevant one for this bypass. Treat the **System32** copy as a separate binary and validate behavior independently.
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- The primitive is a combination of **auto-elevation** and **DLL search-order hijacking**, so the same ProcMon workflow used for other UAC bypasses is useful to validate the missing DLL load.
- Alert on `reg add` / registry writes to `HKCU\Environment\Path` immediately followed by execution of `C:\Windows\SysWOW64\iscsicpl.exe`.
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- Hunt for `iscsiexe.dll` in **user-controlled** locations such as `%TEMP%` or `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WindowsApps`.
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- Correlate `iscsicpl.exe` launches with unexpected child processes or DLL loads from outside the normal Windows directories.
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### Administrator Protection (25H2) drive-letter hijack via per-logon-session DOS device map
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Windows 11 25H2 “Administrator Protection” uses shadow-admin tokens with per-session `\Sessions\0\DosDevices/<LUID>` maps. The directory is created lazily by `SeGetTokenDeviceMap` on first `\??` resolution. If the attacker impersonates the shadow-admin token only at **SecurityIdentification**, the directory is created with the attacker as **owner** (inherits `CREATOR OWNER`), allowing drive-letter links that take precedence over `\GLOBAL??`.
-[Microsoft Docs – How User Account Control works](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works)
-[Checkpoint Research – KONNI Adopts AI to Generate PowerShell Backdoors](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/konni-targets-developers-with-ai-malware/)
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-[Check Point Research – Operation TrueChaos: 0-Day Exploitation Against Southeast Asian Government Targets](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/operation-truechaos-0-day-exploitation-against-southeast-asian-government-targets/)
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-[Project Zero – Windows Administrator Protection drive-letter hijack](https://projectzero.google/2026/26/windows-administrator-protection.html)
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