Exploiting the Tesla Wall Connector from its charge port con...

[carlospolop]

🤖 Automated Content Update

This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.

📝 Source Information

• Blog URL: https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/exploiting-the-tesla-wall-connector-from-its-charge-port-connector-part-2-bypassing.html
• Blog Title: Exploiting the Tesla Wall Connector from its charge port connector - Part 2: bypassing the anti-downgrade
• Suggested Section: Hardware/Physical Access > Firmware Analysis, or a new Automotive / CAN / UDS firmware update attacks subsection

🎯 Content Summary

Overview

Synacktiv explains how they bypassed Tesla's anti-downgrade mechanism on the Tesla Wall Connector Gen 3, reachable from the charge-port connector using Single-Wire CAN and UDS. The original Pwn2Own Automotive 2025 exploit chain worked because the device had no rollback protection: an attacker able to speak UDS over the charging cable could downgrade the charger to an old vulnerable firmware, leak Wi-Fi credentials through UDS, a...

🔧 Technical Details

Updater-only rollback protection bypass: Anti-downgrade logic is fragile if it exists only in the updater and not in the boot path. In this case, firmware images contain VRSN version metadata and VRS2 security-ratchet metadata, and the updater compares the image ratchet against a current ratchet stored in persistent storage. However, the bootloader does not parse or enforce those fields. If an attacker can place an older but correctly signed image into a boot-selected slot without invoking the updater's validation routine, the bootloader will execute it.

A/B slot metadata desynchronization: In A/B firmware systems, slot activation metadata must be bound to the exact firmware content that was validated. Here, part_write_layout() promotes a slot by incrementing its gen_level in the partition table, but it does not bind that metadata to a firmware digest or ratchet value. Once the slot is promot...

🤖 Agent Actions

Done.

Updated:

• src/hardware-physical-access/firmware-analysis/README.md

Added:

• a new subsection covering updater-only anti-rollback bypasses in A/B slot designs
• the validate-one-image / boot-another-image pattern
• stale boot-state / slot-selection abuse
• checklist items for:
  • bootloader ratchet enforcement
  • binding slot metadata to validated image digest/version
  • forcing reboot or blocking further update routines after slot promotion

Also added the Synacktiv article to the file’s ## References section.

Validation:

• git diff --check
• basic file structure sanity check passed

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This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.

[carlospolop]

🔗 Additional Context

Original Blog Post: https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/exploiting-the-tesla-wall-connector-from-its-charge-port-connector-part-2-bypassing.html

Content Categories: Based on the analysis, this content was categorized under "Hardware/Physical Access > Firmware Analysis, or a new Automotive / CAN / UDS firmware update attacks subsection".

Repository Maintenance:

• MD Files Formatting: 974 files processed

Review Notes:

• This content was automatically processed and may require human review for accuracy
• Check that the placement within the repository structure is appropriate
• Verify that all technical details are correct and up-to-date
• All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.)

Bot Version: HackTricks News Bot v1.0