|
| 1 | +"""Live AI Guardrails — real-time rule violation detection (#1439). |
| 2 | +
|
| 3 | +Intercepts Edit/Write tool calls and checks content against known |
| 4 | +security violation patterns (SQL injection, XSS, hardcoded secrets, etc.). |
| 5 | +Configurable via CODINGBUDDY_GUARDRAIL_LEVEL env var: strict/normal/off. |
| 6 | +""" |
| 7 | +import os |
| 8 | +import re |
| 9 | +from dataclasses import dataclass |
| 10 | +from typing import List, Optional |
| 11 | + |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +@dataclass |
| 14 | +class Violation: |
| 15 | + """A single rule violation found in code content.""" |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | + rule_id: str |
| 18 | + severity: str |
| 19 | + message: str |
| 20 | + line_content: str |
| 21 | + suggested_fix: str |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | + |
| 24 | +# --- Comment detection --- |
| 25 | + |
| 26 | +_COMMENT_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:#|//|/\*|\*|<!--)") |
| 27 | + |
| 28 | +_VALID_LEVELS = {"strict", "normal", "off"} |
| 29 | + |
| 30 | + |
| 31 | +def _is_comment(line: str) -> bool: |
| 32 | + """Check if a line is a comment.""" |
| 33 | + return bool(_COMMENT_RE.match(line)) |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | + |
| 36 | +# --- Placeholder / false-positive filters for secrets --- |
| 37 | + |
| 38 | +_PLACEHOLDER_RE = re.compile( |
| 39 | + r"(?:your[-_]|example|placeholder|changeme|xxx|test|dummy|fake|sample|TODO)", |
| 40 | + re.IGNORECASE, |
| 41 | +) |
| 42 | + |
| 43 | +_ENV_REF_RE = re.compile( |
| 44 | + r"(?:os\.environ|process\.env|getenv|ENV\[|config\.|settings\.)", |
| 45 | + re.IGNORECASE, |
| 46 | +) |
| 47 | + |
| 48 | + |
| 49 | +# --- Pattern definitions --- |
| 50 | +# Each pattern: (compiled_regex, rule_id, severity, message, suggested_fix) |
| 51 | +# Patterns are applied per-line after filtering out comments. |
| 52 | + |
| 53 | +_SQL_KEYWORDS = r"(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|CREATE|MERGE|REPLACE)\b" |
| 54 | + |
| 55 | +# SQL injection: f-string, %-format, or concatenation with SQL keywords |
| 56 | +_SQL_FSTRING_RE = re.compile( |
| 57 | + rf'f["\'].*{_SQL_KEYWORDS}.*\{{', |
| 58 | + re.IGNORECASE, |
| 59 | +) |
| 60 | +_SQL_PERCENT_RE = re.compile( |
| 61 | + rf'["\'].*{_SQL_KEYWORDS}.*%\s*(?:s|d|r)["\'].*%\s*\w', |
| 62 | + re.IGNORECASE, |
| 63 | +) |
| 64 | +_SQL_CONCAT_RE = re.compile( |
| 65 | + rf'["\'].*{_SQL_KEYWORDS}.*["\']\s*\+\s*\w', |
| 66 | + re.IGNORECASE, |
| 67 | +) |
| 68 | + |
| 69 | +_NORMAL_PATTERNS = [ |
| 70 | + # SEC-001: SQL Injection |
| 71 | + ( |
| 72 | + _SQL_FSTRING_RE, |
| 73 | + "SEC-001", |
| 74 | + "high", |
| 75 | + "SQL injection detected — dynamic SQL via string interpolation", |
| 76 | + "Use parameterized queries (e.g., cursor.execute('SELECT ... WHERE id = ?', (id,)))", |
| 77 | + ), |
| 78 | + ( |
| 79 | + _SQL_PERCENT_RE, |
| 80 | + "SEC-001", |
| 81 | + "high", |
| 82 | + "SQL injection detected — dynamic SQL via %-formatting", |
| 83 | + "Use parameterized queries instead of string formatting", |
| 84 | + ), |
| 85 | + ( |
| 86 | + _SQL_CONCAT_RE, |
| 87 | + "SEC-001", |
| 88 | + "high", |
| 89 | + "SQL injection detected — dynamic SQL via string concatenation", |
| 90 | + "Use parameterized queries instead of string concatenation", |
| 91 | + ), |
| 92 | + # SEC-002: XSS |
| 93 | + ( |
| 94 | + re.compile(r"\.\s*innerHTML\s*=", re.IGNORECASE), |
| 95 | + "SEC-002", |
| 96 | + "high", |
| 97 | + "XSS risk — direct innerHTML assignment", |
| 98 | + "Use textContent for plain text, or sanitize with DOMPurify before assigning innerHTML", |
| 99 | + ), |
| 100 | + ( |
| 101 | + re.compile(r"document\.write\s*\("), |
| 102 | + "SEC-002", |
| 103 | + "high", |
| 104 | + "XSS risk — document.write with potentially unsafe content", |
| 105 | + "Use DOM APIs (createElement/textContent) instead of document.write", |
| 106 | + ), |
| 107 | + ( |
| 108 | + re.compile(r"dangerouslySetInnerHTML"), |
| 109 | + "SEC-002", |
| 110 | + "high", |
| 111 | + "XSS risk — dangerouslySetInnerHTML bypasses React's XSS protection", |
| 112 | + "Sanitize content with DOMPurify before using dangerouslySetInnerHTML", |
| 113 | + ), |
| 114 | + # SEC-004: Dangerous eval/exec |
| 115 | + ( |
| 116 | + re.compile(r"\beval\s*\("), |
| 117 | + "SEC-004", |
| 118 | + "high", |
| 119 | + "Dangerous eval() call — arbitrary code execution risk", |
| 120 | + "Avoid eval(). Use JSON.parse() for data, or ast.literal_eval() for Python literals", |
| 121 | + ), |
| 122 | + ( |
| 123 | + re.compile(r"\bexec\s*\("), |
| 124 | + "SEC-004", |
| 125 | + "high", |
| 126 | + "Dangerous exec() call — arbitrary code execution risk", |
| 127 | + "Avoid exec(). Use safer alternatives like importlib or specific parsers", |
| 128 | + ), |
| 129 | +] |
| 130 | + |
| 131 | +# SEC-003: Hardcoded secrets — handled separately with extra false-positive filtering |
| 132 | +_SECRET_KEY_RE = re.compile( |
| 133 | + r"""(?:api[_-]?key|secret(?:[_-]?key)?|password|passwd|token|auth[_-]?token|private[_-]?key|access[_-]?key)""" |
| 134 | + r"""\s*=\s*["']([^"']{8,})["']""", |
| 135 | + re.IGNORECASE, |
| 136 | +) |
| 137 | + |
| 138 | +# AWS access key pattern |
| 139 | +_AWS_KEY_RE = re.compile( |
| 140 | + r"""(?:aws[_-]?access[_-]?key(?:[_-]?id)?|aws[_-]?secret)\s*=\s*["']([A-Za-z0-9/+=]{16,})["']""", |
| 141 | + re.IGNORECASE, |
| 142 | +) |
| 143 | + |
| 144 | +# Generic variable names containing "secret" but not caught above |
| 145 | +_GENERIC_SECRET_RE = re.compile( |
| 146 | + r"""(?:secret|credential|private_key)\s*=\s*["']([^"']{8,})["']""", |
| 147 | + re.IGNORECASE, |
| 148 | +) |
| 149 | + |
| 150 | +# Strict-only patterns |
| 151 | +_STRICT_PATTERNS = [ |
| 152 | + # SEC-005: Shell injection |
| 153 | + ( |
| 154 | + re.compile(r"subprocess\.\w+\(.*shell\s*=\s*True", re.DOTALL), |
| 155 | + "SEC-005", |
| 156 | + "medium", |
| 157 | + "Shell injection risk — subprocess with shell=True", |
| 158 | + "Use subprocess.run(cmd_list) without shell=True, passing args as a list", |
| 159 | + ), |
| 160 | + ( |
| 161 | + re.compile(r"os\.system\s*\("), |
| 162 | + "SEC-005", |
| 163 | + "medium", |
| 164 | + "Shell injection risk — os.system allows arbitrary command execution", |
| 165 | + "Use subprocess.run(cmd_list) instead of os.system()", |
| 166 | + ), |
| 167 | +] |
| 168 | + |
| 169 | + |
| 170 | +class RuleChecker: |
| 171 | + """Checks code content against known security violation patterns.""" |
| 172 | + |
| 173 | + def __init__(self) -> None: |
| 174 | + raw = os.environ.get("CODINGBUDDY_GUARDRAIL_LEVEL", "normal").lower() |
| 175 | + self.level: str = raw if raw in _VALID_LEVELS else "normal" |
| 176 | + |
| 177 | + def check(self, content: str) -> List[Violation]: |
| 178 | + """Check code content for violations. |
| 179 | +
|
| 180 | + Args: |
| 181 | + content: Code content string (possibly multiline). |
| 182 | +
|
| 183 | + Returns: |
| 184 | + List of Violation objects found. Empty if level is 'off'. |
| 185 | + """ |
| 186 | + if self.level == "off": |
| 187 | + return [] |
| 188 | + |
| 189 | + violations: List[Violation] = [] |
| 190 | + lines = content.split("\n") |
| 191 | + |
| 192 | + for line in lines: |
| 193 | + stripped = line.strip() |
| 194 | + if not stripped or _is_comment(stripped): |
| 195 | + continue |
| 196 | + |
| 197 | + # Normal patterns (always active) |
| 198 | + for regex, rule_id, severity, message, fix in _NORMAL_PATTERNS: |
| 199 | + if regex.search(stripped): |
| 200 | + violations.append( |
| 201 | + Violation(rule_id, severity, message, stripped, fix) |
| 202 | + ) |
| 203 | + |
| 204 | + # SEC-003: Hardcoded secrets (special handling) |
| 205 | + self._check_secrets(stripped, violations) |
| 206 | + |
| 207 | + # Strict-only patterns |
| 208 | + if self.level == "strict": |
| 209 | + for regex, rule_id, severity, message, fix in _STRICT_PATTERNS: |
| 210 | + if regex.search(stripped): |
| 211 | + violations.append( |
| 212 | + Violation(rule_id, severity, message, stripped, fix) |
| 213 | + ) |
| 214 | + |
| 215 | + return violations |
| 216 | + |
| 217 | + def _check_secrets(self, line: str, violations: List[Violation]) -> None: |
| 218 | + """Check a line for hardcoded secrets with false-positive filtering.""" |
| 219 | + # Skip if line references env vars |
| 220 | + if _ENV_REF_RE.search(line): |
| 221 | + return |
| 222 | + |
| 223 | + # AWS access key IDs (AKIA prefix) — always flag, skip placeholder filter |
| 224 | + aws_match = _AWS_KEY_RE.search(line) |
| 225 | + if aws_match: |
| 226 | + value = aws_match.group(1) |
| 227 | + if len(value) >= 16: |
| 228 | + violations.append( |
| 229 | + Violation( |
| 230 | + rule_id="SEC-003", |
| 231 | + severity="high", |
| 232 | + message="Hardcoded AWS credential detected — must not be in source code", |
| 233 | + line_content=line, |
| 234 | + suggested_fix="Use environment variables (AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID) or AWS credentials file", |
| 235 | + ) |
| 236 | + ) |
| 237 | + return |
| 238 | + |
| 239 | + for regex in (_SECRET_KEY_RE, _GENERIC_SECRET_RE): |
| 240 | + match = regex.search(line) |
| 241 | + if match: |
| 242 | + value = match.group(1) |
| 243 | + # Skip empty, very short, or placeholder values |
| 244 | + if len(value) < 8: |
| 245 | + continue |
| 246 | + if _PLACEHOLDER_RE.search(value): |
| 247 | + continue |
| 248 | + violations.append( |
| 249 | + Violation( |
| 250 | + rule_id="SEC-003", |
| 251 | + severity="high", |
| 252 | + message="Hardcoded secret detected — credentials should not be in source code", |
| 253 | + line_content=line, |
| 254 | + suggested_fix="Use environment variables (os.environ / process.env) or a secrets manager", |
| 255 | + ) |
| 256 | + ) |
| 257 | + return # One match per line is enough |
| 258 | + |
| 259 | + def check_tool_input( |
| 260 | + self, tool_name: str, tool_input: dict |
| 261 | + ) -> List[Violation]: |
| 262 | + """Check a PreToolUse tool_input for violations. |
| 263 | +
|
| 264 | + Only checks Edit and Write tool calls. |
| 265 | +
|
| 266 | + Args: |
| 267 | + tool_name: Name of the tool being called. |
| 268 | + tool_input: The tool_input dict from the hook. |
| 269 | +
|
| 270 | + Returns: |
| 271 | + List of violations found in the content. |
| 272 | + """ |
| 273 | + if tool_name not in ("Edit", "Write"): |
| 274 | + return [] |
| 275 | + |
| 276 | + content: Optional[str] = None |
| 277 | + if tool_name == "Edit": |
| 278 | + content = tool_input.get("new_string", "") |
| 279 | + elif tool_name == "Write": |
| 280 | + content = tool_input.get("content", "") |
| 281 | + |
| 282 | + if not content: |
| 283 | + return [] |
| 284 | + |
| 285 | + return self.check(content) |
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