The Department of State is the lead instrument of American foreign policy—responsible for diplomacy, alliance management, treaty obligations, refugee protection, consular services, and the cultivation of the relationships and institutions that have underwritten international stability since 1945. At its core, the Department is a repository of irreplaceable human expertise: career Foreign Service Officers who speak the languages, know the cultures, and maintain the relationships that no political appointee can replicate. The State Department's authority derives from Article II of the Constitution, which vests in the President the power to make treaties and receive ambassadors, and from the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq.), the State Department Basic Authorities Act (22 U.S.C. § 2651), and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.).
The Trump administration, implementing the blueprint laid out in Project 2025's Chapter 6 (pages 171–200), systematically dismantled this institution. Beginning on January 20, 2025, the administration withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization, and the UN Human Rights Council; froze all U.S. foreign assistance and disbanded USAID; threatened NATO allies with abandonment while pursuing territorial claims against sovereign partners; and purged the career Foreign Service through mass firings and politically motivated overseas recalls. By July 2025, USAID had ceased to exist, more than 1,350 State Department employees had been fired outright, and an additional estimated 3,000 personnel had departed—gutting the department's institutional knowledge and operational capacity. The proposed fiscal year 2026 State Department budget of $28.4 billion represented nearly a 50 percent cut from the enacted FY2025 level of $54.4 billion.
The next Democratic administration must not merely restore the State Department—it must transform it. This chapter charts a course for rebuilding the career Foreign Service, restoring multilateral commitments, reconstituting USAID as an independent agency, renewing alliances from NATO to the Indo-Pacific, and embedding democratic values and climate leadership as the organizing principles of American foreign policy.
The Stakes: American diplomatic credibility, once squandered, takes years to rebuild. Every day the United States remains outside the WHO and the Paris Agreement, every day career diplomats sit idle or leave government, and every day allies recalibrate toward alternative powers represents a strategic loss that compounds. Authoritarian regimes—Russia, China, Iran, North Korea—benefit directly from American diplomatic retreat. The window to restore U.S. leadership before permanent realignment occurs is narrow.
Key Reforms:
- Rebuild the career Foreign Service: reinstate fired officers, reverse politicized dismissals, end Schedule F application to State Department positions, and fund a multi-year hiring surge
- Rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization, and the UN Human Rights Council on Day One via executive action
- Restore and reconstitute USAID as a fully independent agency with a restored budget and professional leadership
- Recommit unconditionally to NATO Article 5 and conduct an emergency alliance reassurance tour within the first 30 days
- End the use of political donor ambassadorial appointments at all strategically significant posts
- Restore refugee admissions to 125,000 per year and rebuild the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program infrastructure
- Re-engage with multilateral institutions—the UN, WTO, ICC, and international financial institutions—and pay all arrears
- Establish a strategic competition framework for China that is coherent, sustained, and does not sacrifice Taiwan or regional allies to trade deals
- Hold Russia accountable for aggression in Ukraine through sustained sanctions, military assistance, and diplomatic pressure
- Restore the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to full authority and funding and enforce the Global Magnitsky Act (22 U.S.C. § 2304)
Constitutional and Legal Basis: U.S. Constitution, Art. II §§ 2–3; Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. § 3901); State Department Basic Authorities Act (22 U.S.C. § 2651); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2151); Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2751); Refugee Act of 1980 (8 U.S.C. § 1521); Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. § 2656 note); Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (21 U.S.T. 77).
What Project 2025 Did:
Project 2025's Chapter 6 explicitly called for the installation of political appointees with "established partisan credentials" throughout the State Department, describing career Foreign Service Officers as a bureaucratic obstacle to the president's agenda. The Heritage Foundation's blueprint treated professional diplomatic expertise as a liability rather than an asset.
The Trump administration implemented this blueprint with precision. Beginning in early 2025, the administration subjected the State Department to a DOGE-directed reduction in force that fired more than 1,350 employees in July 2025 alone. The State Department's proposed cuts ultimately targeted approximately 3,400 positions—the largest forced reduction in the department's history. An additional estimated 1,600 employees departed through a coerced voluntary retirement scheme, bringing total departures to approximately 3,000 in the first year.
In December 2025, the administration recalled nearly 30 career diplomats from ambassadorial posts overseas—experienced officers who had been serving in critical bilateral relationships—replacing them with political loyalists or leaving posts vacant. These career officers were removed not for performance failures but because, in the words of State Department leadership, their postings no longer aligned with administration priorities.
The proposed FY2026 State Department budget of $28.4 billion represented a 47.8 percent cut from the enacted FY2025 level of $54.4 billion. The budget eliminated or drastically reduced funding for the UN and other international organizations, democracy programs, climate initiatives, and humanitarian aid lines. Congress passed the Rescissions Act of 2025, cutting approximately $7 billion from State and foreign assistance accounts, including UN contributions, democracy programs, and climate initiatives.
The Foreign Service Oral History Program, the Foreign Service Institute's language training capacity, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research's analytical staff, and the Policy Planning Staff were all reduced or destabilized. The institutional memory of the United States government on foreign affairs—built over decades—was deliberately degraded.
What Project 2025 Did:
Project 2025 called for eliminating USAID as an independent agency and subsuming its functions within the State Department under direct political control, characterizing foreign aid as a vehicle for imposing "leftist" values on recipient nations.
Within hours of taking office on January 20, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14169, "Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid," imposing a 90-day freeze on all U.S. foreign development assistance. Secretary of State Rubio implemented the freeze with a January 24 memorandum ordering stop-work on all existing foreign aid contracts. By February 6, over 10,000 USAID employees had been placed on administrative leave, leaving approximately 300 staff to manage a portfolio that had served hundreds of millions of people worldwide.
The review that followed was not a genuine assessment of program effectiveness. It was a mechanism for elimination. By March 2025, Secretary Rubio announced that 83 percent of USAID programs—representing approximately 5,200 contracts—had been cut. On July 1, 2025, USAID officially ceased operations as an independent agency, with remaining programs transferred to the State Department under political supervision.
The human consequences were immediate and severe. UN experts issued a statement in July 2025 concluding that the U.S. government was "fuelling a global humanitarian catastrophe." Programs that provided food assistance, HIV/AIDS treatment, maternal health care, malaria prevention, refugee support, and democracy assistance were terminated or severely curtailed. Nations that had depended on U.S. development partnerships for decades lost critical support overnight.
Numerous courts found the freeze unlawful. Federal judges issued injunctions, with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia finding that the administration had improperly withheld congressionally appropriated funds in violation of the Impoundment Control Act (2 U.S.C. § 681 et seq.). The administration defied these rulings and proceeded with dismantlement regardless.
What Project 2025 Did:
Project 2025 called for reassessing U.S. participation in international organizations that, in Heritage's view, constrained American sovereignty or promoted progressive values. The blueprint advocated "America First" unilateralism over multilateral engagement and specifically targeted the WHO, the Paris Agreement, and the UN Human Rights Council.
On January 20, 2025—Day One—President Trump signed executive orders withdrawing the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement (Executive Order 14162) and the World Health Organization (Executive Order 14155). The U.S. formally departed WHO on January 22, 2026. Trump additionally withdrew the United States from the UN Human Rights Council and from additional international organizations in January 2026, citing a formal fact sheet declaring these institutions "contrary to the interests of the United States."
These withdrawals were not isolated acts. They signaled to the world that U.S. treaty commitments are contingent on the ideology of whoever holds the presidency—a signal that permanently damages the credibility of U.S. commitments regardless of future rejoining. The Paris Agreement withdrawal removed the world's second-largest greenhouse gas emitter from the central international climate framework at the moment when emissions reductions are most urgently needed. The WHO withdrawal eliminated U.S. leadership in pandemic preparedness and global health security at a time when emerging pathogen threats remain acute.
The administration's budget proposal eliminated all funding for most international organizations, including the United Nations, NATO headquarters administrative budgets, and dozens of other multilateral bodies. Congress approved $9 billion in rescissions from foreign assistance and international organization funding.
What Project 2025 Did:
Project 2025 characterized NATO allies as "free riders" and called for conditioning U.S. security commitments on allies meeting specific financial and policy benchmarks—a fundamental repudiation of the unconditional mutual defense commitment of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Trump administration implemented this conditionality explicitly. The 2025 National Security Strategy recast U.S. security backing for Europe as contingent on increased European defense spending, accelerated contributions to American weapons programs, and European alignment with U.S. trade policy. President Trump refused to rule out withdrawing the United States from NATO entirely, particularly in the context of disputes over Greenland, creating the first genuine crisis of confidence in Article 5 since the alliance's founding.
The administration pursued coercive territorial claims against sovereign NATO partners. Trump declared the acquisition of Greenland from Denmark "an absolute necessity," refused to rule out military or economic force to acquire Greenland or the Panama Canal, and directed Secretary Rubio to travel to Panama to press U.S. claims over the canal. These actions—unprecedented in the postwar era—transformed allies into adversaries and demonstrated to the world that U.S. partnership offered no security against American coercion.
In the Indo-Pacific, the administration's erratic handling of the Taiwan relationship—alternating between treating Taiwan as irrelevant and as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations—alarmed Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. Analysts at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs documented how Trump's "improvisational" approach to China policy created strategic uncertainty that benefited Beijing. Foreign Policy reported in February 2026 that Xi Jinping had "good reason to believe that Trump will facilitate China's attempt to extend influence over Taiwan without having to gamble on an invasion," given Trump's demonstrated willingness to trade strategic commitments for economic agreements.
What Project 2025 Did:
Project 2025 treated continued U.S. support for Ukraine as a strategic mistake and called for negotiating a settlement that accepted Russian territorial gains—a position that rewarded naked military aggression and established a precedent inviting further expansionism.
The Trump administration's Ukraine policy followed this blueprint through early 2025. Administration envoys reportedly mulled formal U.S. recognition of Russian-held Ukrainian territory as de facto Russian, including Crimea and occupied portions of the Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. The administration's 28-point peace plan, released in November 2025, proposed granting Russia parts of eastern Ukraine it did not even currently control, in exchange for a U.S. security guarantee for the remainder of Ukraine—a guarantee with no enforcement mechanism.
While Trump eventually shifted to a more ambiguous position in September 2025—stating Ukraine could theoretically reclaim all its territory with European support—the damage to U.S. credibility as a security guarantor had already been done. European allies accelerated defense spending and contingency planning premised on the assumption that U.S. commitments cannot be trusted.
The human consequences of Project 2025's implementation at the State Department are measurable and severe:
- Approximately 83 percent of USAID programs—5,200 contracts—were terminated, affecting hundreds of millions of aid beneficiaries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The World Food Programme reported that the cessation of U.S. contributions directly threatened food assistance to approximately 8 million people in acute food insecurity situations across Yemen, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Syria
- The suspension of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) left tens of thousands of refugees—many of them already vetted and awaiting resettlement—stranded in camps and unsafe situations; the Refugee Act of 1980 (8 U.S.C. § 1521 et seq.) authorizes annual refugee admissions; the administration's indefinite suspension was found by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington to constitute "effective nullification of congressional will"
- The termination of HIV/AIDS programs that had been supported through PEPFAR threatened treatment access for an estimated 20 million people receiving antiretroviral therapy through U.S.-supported programs; global health experts warned of the potential for treatment interruption to generate drug-resistant HIV strains with implications far beyond immediate program areas
- Approximately 3,000 State Department personnel departed in 2025, representing decades of accumulated diplomatic expertise in languages, regional knowledge, and institutional relationships that cannot be quickly rebuilt; the average departing Foreign Service Officer had approximately 12 years of experience and significant post-specific expertise
- The proposed 48 percent budget cut, if enacted, would eliminate the U.S. capacity to maintain adequate consular services, fund embassy security, or sustain diplomatic missions in strategically significant posts
- The recall of career ambassadors from nearly 30 overseas posts in December 2025 created acute vacuums in bilateral relationships at precisely the moment when U.S. credibility was most in need of active defense; posts in Eastern Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East lost senior diplomatic leadership during active crises
- Democracy assistance programs in at least 30 countries were eliminated or severely curtailed, including programs that supported independent media, anti-corruption commissions, election observation, and civil society organizations that had served as bulwarks against authoritarian encroachment; UN experts documented a measurable relationship between the U.S. assistance cuts and accelerating democratic backsliding in recipient countries
- The closure of USAID's overseas missions eliminated approximately 7,000 local staff positions in developing nations—employees who served as the on-the-ground engine of U.S. development programming and whose loss cannot be replenished quickly; many of these individuals faced retaliation or professional ruin as a consequence of their association with U.S. programs
The Constitution vests primary foreign affairs authority in the President and the Senate jointly. Article II, Section 2 grants the President the power to make treaties (with Senate advice and consent), appoint ambassadors (with Senate confirmation), and receive ambassadors from foreign nations. Article II, Section 3 requires the President to receive foreign ambassadors and ministers. These provisions create the constitutional framework for executive leadership of foreign policy while reserving to Congress significant tools of oversight and control.
Congress holds the power of the purse over foreign affairs spending (Article I, Section 9), the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3), the power to declare war (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11), and the Senate's advice and consent power over treaties and senior diplomatic appointments. The Supreme Court held in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), that executive power is at its lowest when the President acts contrary to the expressed will of Congress—a holding directly applicable to the administration's unlawful impoundment of congressionally appropriated foreign assistance funds.
The Spending Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1) requires that appropriated funds be spent as directed by Congress. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. § 681 et seq.) prohibits the executive branch from unilaterally refusing to obligate congressionally appropriated funds without following specific deferral and rescission procedures. Multiple federal courts found the administration's foreign aid freeze to violate both the Constitution and this statute.
Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq.): Establishes the Foreign Service as a professional corps of career officers, sets merit-based personnel procedures, and prohibits terminations outside established procedures. Section 3905 establishes the merit system principles applicable to Foreign Service personnel. Section 3943 limits political appointees in the Foreign Service and prohibits using the Foreign Service as a vehicle for partisan patronage.
State Department Basic Authorities Act (22 U.S.C. § 2651 et seq.): Authorizes the State Department's core functions, including representation abroad, treaty negotiation, passport and consular services, and coordination of foreign policy across the executive branch.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.): The foundational statute authorizing U.S. foreign development and humanitarian assistance programs. Sections 2151 through 2430 authorize the full range of development, economic support, and humanitarian programs that USAID administered. The Act does not authorize the President to abolish USAID unilaterally; abolition requires an act of Congress.
Refugee Act of 1980 (8 U.S.C. § 1521 et seq.): Establishes the United States Refugee Admissions Program and requires the President to consult with Congress on annual refugee admissions ceilings. The statute does not authorize the President to eliminate the admissions program indefinitely.
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. § 2656 note): Authorizes sanctions against foreign persons responsible for serious human rights abuses or significant corruption, a critical tool for accountability diplomacy.
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq.): Governs the transfer of defense articles and services to foreign nations, requiring human rights assessments (the Leahy Law) before security assistance is provided.
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.): Authorizes the President to impose economic sanctions against foreign threats to national security—the primary legal basis for sanctions programs administered through State and Treasury.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (21 U.S.T. 77, TIAS 7502), ratified by the United States in 1972, establishes the international legal framework governing diplomatic missions and personnel. The United States is bound by its obligations under this convention regardless of the administration in power. Mass recalls of diplomatic personnel, as conducted by the Trump administration in December 2025, damage U.S. standing under the convention by disrupting the continuity of diplomatic representation that the convention is designed to protect.
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. § 7501 et seq.) protects civil servants from removal except for cause determined through established procedures. The Foreign Service Act's parallel protections (22 U.S.C. § 3946) require that career Foreign Service Officers may be separated only for cause documented through a formal performance or disciplinary process with full due process rights including appeal to the Foreign Service Grievance Board.
The Supreme Court's decision in Elgin v. Department of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012), confirmed that federal employees possess statutory due process rights that cannot be circumvented by executive reclassification schemes. The application of Schedule F or similar reclassification to career diplomats to strip these protections is legally vulnerable and shall be reversed through both executive action and legislation.
The Civil Service Employees Association and the American Foreign Service Association filed legal challenges to the 2025 reduction in force. Courts issued preliminary injunctions in multiple cases finding that the administration had failed to comply with mandatory reduction-in-force procedures under 5 C.F.R. Part 351 before terminating employees—further demonstrating that the purge of the Foreign Service was not merely politically destructive but procedurally unlawful.
The executive branch's authority to terminate congressionally mandated foreign assistance programs has firm limits established by statute and constitutional law. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. § 681 et seq.) distinguishes between deferrals—which may be temporary and subject to congressional override—and rescissions, which require positive congressional action. An executive order unilaterally declaring a permanent freeze on appropriated foreign assistance funds does not constitute a lawful rescission and is not consistent with the Impoundment Control Act.
The Supreme Court held in Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975), that the President may not impound funds that Congress has mandated be spent. This precedent applies directly to the Trump administration's foreign aid freeze: Congress appropriated these funds for specific statutory purposes under the Foreign Assistance Act, and the executive branch's refusal to obligate them was not a lawful exercise of presidential discretion but an unconstitutional impoundment.
The next administration shall direct the Department of Justice to publish a formal legal opinion repudiating the legal theories advanced by the Trump administration's Office of Legal Counsel in support of the foreign aid freeze, establishing clear standards for the limits of executive authority over congressionally appropriated foreign assistance funds.
The career Foreign Service is the irreplaceable foundation of American diplomatic power. It must be rebuilt immediately and protected permanently against future politicization.
Issue an executive order within the first 30 days directing the State Department to reinstate all Foreign Service Officers and Civil Service employees terminated through the 2025 reduction in force unless there is an individualized, documented, performance-based justification for the termination consistent with the Foreign Service Act (22 U.S.C. § 3946). Officers who were recalled from overseas assignments based on political, ideological, or personal characteristics shall be offered reinstatement at equivalent or higher grade.
The Office of Personnel Management shall work with the State Department to conduct a systematic review of all 2025 terminations, separating those that were performance-based from those that were politically motivated. The latter category shall be reversed with back pay and restoration of seniority.
Issue an executive order rescinding any application of Schedule F (or its successor designations) to State Department positions, including all positions reclassified as Schedule F during 2025. The Foreign Service Act's merit system protections (22 U.S.C. § 3905) apply to the career Foreign Service and shall be enforced. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978's (5 U.S.C. § 7501 et seq.) merit system protections apply to State Department Civil Service employees and shall be enforced. No career diplomat shall be dismissed, demoted, or reassigned as a result of their prior policy positions, public statements, or exercise of legitimate dissent through established departmental channels.
Authorize and fund a multi-year Foreign Service Officer hiring surge to rebuild the personnel reductions of 2025. The Foreign Service Act (22 U.S.C. § 3941) authorizes the Secretary of State to establish selection and hiring targets. The target shall be to restore State Department staffing to at minimum FY2024 levels within 24 months and to the staffing levels necessary to meet the operational demands identified in the Department's own Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review within 48 months.
The Foreign Service Institute (22 U.S.C. § 4021) shall receive a dedicated funding increase to expand language training capacity, area studies programs, and mid-career professional development. Critical language proficiency—particularly in Mandarin, Arabic, Russian, Farsi, Korean, and Hindi—shall be treated as a national security priority with corresponding pay incentives.
Issue an executive order establishing that no individual whose primary qualification for ambassadorial appointment is financial contribution to a political campaign or party shall be appointed as ambassador to any of the 30 most strategically significant U.S. diplomatic posts, as determined by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. This order shall define "strategically significant" by reference to bilateral trade volume, alliance membership, geopolitical sensitivity, and active conflict or crisis proximity.
The practice of rewarding political donors with ambassadorial appointments at embassies serving as little more than social venues, while defensible for some posts, has historically compromised U.S. effectiveness at critical junctures. Career diplomats with demonstrated expertise shall hold the ambassadorial positions at NATO headquarters, Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo, Seoul, New Delhi, Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Brussels, Berlin, London, Paris, and all posts in active conflict zones.
The dissolution of USAID was unlawful, strategically counterproductive, and humanly catastrophic. It must be reversed completely.
Introduce and pass the USAID Restoration Act to re-establish USAID as a fully independent agency under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.), with a Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Administrator reporting to the President and coordinating with but not subordinate to the Secretary of State. The Act shall:
- Restore USAID's legal authorities and appropriations accounts as they existed on January 19, 2025
- Prohibit future Presidents from dissolving USAID except through an act of Congress
- Require a minimum annual appropriation of $25 billion for foreign assistance, indexed to inflation
- Restore the 10,000-person workforce that USAID maintained before the 2025 dissolution
- Reinstate all USAID Foreign Service Officers and Civil Service employees wrongfully terminated in 2025
While legislation is pending, issue executive orders directing:
- The immediate halt of all wind-down activities for USAID-originated programs currently administered by the State Department
- The restoration of stop-work order suspensions on all contracts and grants that were terminated pursuant to Executive Order 14169
- The appointment of an acting USAID Administrator with full authorities pending Senate confirmation
- A comprehensive audit of all terminated contracts and grants, with reinstatement of those addressing acute humanitarian crises, global health, food security, and democracy promotion
The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), authorized under the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. § 7601 et seq.), shall be restored to its pre-January 2025 funding level within 90 days. PEPFAR has provided life-saving antiretroviral treatment to approximately 20 million people and represents the single most effective humanitarian program in U.S. history. Its curtailment in 2025 constituted an unconscionable abandonment of the United States' most tangible expression of global health leadership.
Issue an executive order on Day One rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement, directing the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate to submit the formal notification of re-accession to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. The United States shall commit to a nationally determined contribution (NDC) consistent with a 1.5-degree Celsius pathway, establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas reduction targets of at least 50 to 52 percent below 2005 levels by 2030.
The United States shall fulfill its overdue obligations to the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility, and the Adaptation Fund. The United States contributed approximately $1 billion to the Green Climate Fund in the Obama administration; the Biden administration committed an additional $3 billion. The next administration shall fulfill these pledged contributions plus arrears accumulated during the Trump administration.
Issue an executive order on Day One rejoining the WHO, directing the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations to notify the WHO Director-General of U.S. re-accession and directing payment of all U.S. assessed and voluntary contributions owed since January 2025.
The United States shall negotiate reforms within the WHO rather than abandoning it. These shall include improved transparency in outbreak notification, stronger independence for the WHO Director-General from member state political pressure, and enhanced peer review of technical recommendations. Reform from within is the only strategy consistent with U.S. leadership in global health security; withdrawal simply cedes that leadership to China and other actors.
Rejoin the UN Human Rights Council and pursue reform of its membership criteria to require that member states meet minimum human rights standards. The United States has a far greater ability to shape the council's agenda from the inside than from the outside. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) shall lead U.S. engagement at the council.
The United States shall recommit to the rules-based international trading system and to the World Trade Organization (established under 19 U.S.C. § 3511) as the primary forum for resolving trade disputes. Unilateral tariffs imposed under the Emergency Economic Powers Act shall be reviewed and, where they violate WTO agreements, brought into compliance through negotiated outcomes or WTO dispute resolution. The United States shall work to restore the WTO Appellate Body, which the Trump administration effectively shuttered by blocking judicial appointments.
While the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, the next administration shall rescind any executive orders or sanctions targeting ICC officials and restore a cooperative relationship with the court on matters of mutual interest, including accountability for war crimes committed in Ukraine and other active conflict zones.
Issue a formal presidential statement on Day One reaffirming, unambiguously and without conditions, the United States commitment to NATO Article 5 mutual defense. The statement shall make clear that this commitment is not conditioned on allied defense spending levels, trade policy alignment, or any other bilateral consideration. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is a treaty obligation of the United States under the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, Cl. 2) and under the NATO Participation Act (22 U.S.C. § 1904).
Conduct a presidential visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels within the first 30 days, followed by bilateral visits to the most anxious alliance partners—Poland, the Baltic states, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State shall simultaneously conduct an alliance reassurance tour covering all 32 NATO member states within the first 90 days.
Rescind all territorial claims, coercive demands, and threats directed at NATO member states, including Greenland (Denmark) and Canada. These claims constitute a fundamental violation of the alliance's foundational principle of sovereign equality and shall be disavowed formally and completely.
Conduct emergency consultations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines within the first 60 days to reassess alliance damage and agree on a joint plan for restoration. Reaffirm U.S. treaty commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of the Philippines (1951), the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan (1960), and the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea (1953).
Reaffirm U.S. commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.), including U.S. obligations to provide Taiwan with defensive arms sufficient to maintain its self-defense capacity and to resist any coercive actions that would jeopardize Taiwan's security or social or economic system. The Taiwan Relations Act shall not be traded away in negotiations with China under any circumstances.
Re-engage AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) submarine partnership and the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, United States) as the core multilateral frameworks for Indo-Pacific security. The Quad's vaccine initiative, infrastructure financing, and technology cooperation shall be restored and expanded.
Issue executive orders restoring full U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, including military equipment, intelligence sharing, and logistical support consistent with the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative and authorities provided under the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. § 2321j). The United States shall not recognize any Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory as legitimately Russian, including Crimea and the Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions.
Enforce all existing sanctions on Russia under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. § 9501 et seq.) and impose additional sanctions on Russian entities and individuals who have benefited from the seizure of Ukrainian territory. Coordinate with European partners to maintain sanction unity and close enforcement gaps.
Work with European allies and within the UN Security Council to support accountability for Russian war crimes through referrals to the International Criminal Court, asset freezes on Russian state actors, and documentation of atrocities for eventual tribunal proceedings.
The United States' relationship with China is the defining strategic challenge of the 21st century. It requires a coherent, sustained, whole-of-government strategy—not improvisational transactionalism.
The State Department shall lead the development of a Quadrennial China Strategy—a classified assessment with unclassified summary—that integrates diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and values-based dimensions of the U.S.-China relationship. This strategy shall be developed in consultation with allies and updated every four years.
The strategy shall reject both naive engagement that ignores Chinese state conduct and reckless escalation that risks kinetic conflict. It shall pursue vigorous economic competition, technological decoupling in critical sectors (semiconductors, artificial intelligence, biotechnology), robust military deterrence through the Indo-Pacific alliance network, and selective cooperation in areas of mutual interest including climate, pandemic preparedness, and nuclear risk reduction.
U.S. policy toward Taiwan shall be governed by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.) and shall not be revised as a concession in trade negotiations with China under any circumstances. The United States shall continue arms sales to Taiwan sufficient to maintain credible deterrence consistent with Section 3301(b)(5) of the Taiwan Relations Act. The Secretary of State shall conduct an annual assessment of Taiwan's defensive needs and report findings to Congress.
The State Department shall restore and expand Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues with Taiwanese counterparts, strengthen economic engagement through negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement, and reinstate senior-level bilateral visits that were curtailed under the Trump administration's unpredictable approach to cross-strait relations. U.S. credibility on Taiwan is inseparable from U.S. credibility on all other alliance commitments; abandoning Taiwan would signal to every U.S. partner that American security guarantees carry no weight.
The State Department shall coordinate with the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Defense on a coherent economic statecraft strategy toward China that uses export controls, investment screening, and sanctions authorities to protect U.S. national security interests without unnecessarily decoupling the broader economies in ways that harm U.S. workers and consumers.
The Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs shall lead diplomatic outreach to allied nations to build multilateral export control coalitions that prevent Chinese acquisition of advanced semiconductors, AI chips, and quantum computing components. Unilateral U.S. export controls without allied coordination are porous; the next administration shall invest diplomatic capital in bringing the European Union, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom into aligned export control frameworks.
The State Department shall pursue negotiated frameworks with China on nuclear risk reduction, climate cooperation, pandemic preparedness, and maritime safety—areas where U.S. and Chinese interests overlap sufficiently to enable dialogue even in the context of broader strategic competition. These negotiations shall not be conditioned on progress in other areas and shall not be used as diplomatic leverage in economic disputes.
Restore the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) to its full staffing and budget levels as of FY2024, and issue a State Department policy directive establishing that democracy promotion and human rights protection are core U.S. foreign policy interests, not optional add-ons subject to sacrifice for other bilateral objectives.
Restore funding for democracy assistance programs in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America through the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and direct State Department programming.
The next administration shall convene a Summit for Democracy within the first 90 days, building on the Biden administration's Summits for Democracy (2021, 2023) and expanding their scope to include concrete, enforceable commitments from participating governments. The Summit shall produce:
- A multilateral Democracy Assistance Compact, committing participating nations to minimum levels of foreign assistance for democracy programs, independent media, and civil society support
- A Technology and Democracy Working Group to develop shared standards for preventing the misuse of surveillance technology and social media platforms by authoritarian governments
- A Forum for Democratic Resilience to coordinate responses to authoritarian interference in elections, disinformation campaigns, and the financing of anti-democratic political movements across democratic nations
The United States shall commit at the Summit to its own democratic reform agenda, demonstrating that the commitment to democratic values begins at home, and shall include representatives of civil society, independent media, and underrepresented communities alongside government delegations.
The State Department shall restore the 2011 Presidential Memorandum directing all federal departments to promote LGBTQ+ rights as a component of U.S. human rights policy. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall maintain dedicated staff for LGBTQ+ human rights documentation and diplomatic engagement. U.S. embassies shall fly the Pride flag as a symbol of U.S. commitment to the equal dignity of all persons. The United States shall use Global Magnitsky designations against foreign officials responsible for systematic violence, imprisonment, or persecution of LGBTQ+ individuals.
The State Department's Office of Global Criminal Justice, led by the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice (authorized under 22 U.S.C. § 2656), shall be restored to full authority and staffing. This office shall:
- Lead U.S. efforts to document, preserve evidence of, and pursue accountability for atrocities committed in Ukraine, Syria, Myanmar, Yemen, Sudan, and other active or recent conflict zones
- Coordinate with the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide on early warning mechanisms and diplomatic responses to emerging atrocity risk situations
- Develop legal frameworks for extraterritorial asset seizure and freezing for individuals and entities associated with mass atrocity crimes, in coordination with the Departments of Justice and Treasury
Direct the Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury to conduct an annual review of potential Global Magnitsky designations and publish a public report on the designation process. The United States shall designate individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses and grand corruption regardless of the bilateral relationship between the United States and the perpetrator's government. Strategic relationships shall not exempt individuals from accountability under 22 U.S.C. § 2656 note.
Issue an executive order on Day One restoring the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program to full operational status and setting an initial annual refugee admissions ceiling of 125,000 persons, consistent with the Refugee Act of 1980 (8 U.S.C. § 1521 et seq.). Direct the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to reinstate all processing pipelines that were suspended in January 2025 and to prioritize the most vulnerable populations—survivors of torture, unaccompanied minors, and refugees from active conflict zones.
The United States accepts its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (19 U.S.T. 6223) as a matter of international law and domestic statute. These obligations are not waivable by executive order.
The United States must lead the international climate response, not merely participate in it. The Special Presidential Envoy for Climate shall hold Cabinet-level rank and shall lead a dedicated Climate Diplomacy Directorate within the State Department.
The United States shall fulfill its pledged contributions to international climate finance mechanisms—the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund, the Climate Investment Funds, and the Global Environment Facility—and shall lead the development of a new multilateral commitment to mobilize $100 billion annually in climate finance for developing nations, in accordance with commitments made under the Paris Agreement.
The Secretary of State shall integrate climate considerations into all bilateral diplomatic relationships, including trade negotiations, security partnerships, and development agreements. Climate cooperation shall be pursued with China as an area of managed engagement even in periods of broader strategic competition.
The State Department shall expand the Clean Energy Demand Initiative and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) as frameworks for delivering clean energy infrastructure to developing nations as an alternative to Chinese Belt and Road investment. The Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR) shall be resourced to lead bilateral energy security agreements that lock in long-term clean energy partnerships. Technical assistance for energy transitions—grid modernization, renewable deployment, and energy efficiency programs—shall be treated as a core foreign policy tool, not a peripheral development activity.
American soft power—the ability to attract and persuade rather than compel—is a strategic asset that requires active cultivation and institutional investment. The Trump administration's DOGE-directed cuts decimated the State Department's public diplomacy capacity at the moment when authoritarian information operations against U.S. interests reached unprecedented scale.
The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs shall receive a dedicated budget increase of at least 25 percent above FY2024 levels, with funds directed to:
- Educational and cultural exchange programs, including the Fulbright Program (authorized under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2451 et seq.) and the International Visitor Leadership Program, which were cut in 2025; these programs generate lasting pro-American sentiment and professional networks that outlast any individual bilateral relationship
- Restoration and expansion of U.S. government international broadcasting through the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), including Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Open Technology Fund; these platforms reach hundreds of millions of people in authoritarian countries and are a critical tool for countering state-sponsored disinformation from Russia and China
- Counter-disinformation capacity within the State Department's Global Engagement Center (authorized under Section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017, 22 U.S.C. § 2656 note), which was guttered in 2025; the GEC shall be restored to operational status with a mandate to document and counter Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and other state-sponsored influence operations globally
American Spaces—including American Centers and American Corners maintained in partnership with local host institutions in over 100 countries—shall be fully funded and expanded. These spaces, which provide access to U.S. educational resources, English language instruction, and cultural programming, are among the most cost-effective instruments of American soft power and were disproportionately affected by the 2025 budget cuts.
The State Department shall reinstate and expand the English Language Fellows Program and English Access Microscholarship Program, which provide English language education to underserved communities in developing nations—an investment with measurable returns in pro-American orientation among future elites.
The 2025 staffing cuts severely degraded consular services, extending wait times for visa interviews and passport processing that affect hundreds of thousands of foreign students, tourists, business travelers, and visa applicants. The next administration shall:
- Direct an emergency staffing surge to Consular Section positions at posts with the longest visa wait times, prioritizing student visa (F and M category) processing to restore the United States' position as the world's leading destination for international higher education
- Modernize the visa application system through digital transformation initiatives under the authority of the Department of State Authorities Act (22 U.S.C. § 2651), reducing processing times and eliminating backlogs generated during the 2025 disruption
- Restore the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program and other visa pathways that had been administratively complicated by the 2025 reorganization, recognizing that legal immigration through State Department visa channels is a direct economic benefit to the United States
American foreign policy requires differentiated, expert-led regional strategies. The next administration shall direct the State Department's regional bureaus—the Bureaus of European and Eurasian Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, Western Hemisphere Affairs, African Affairs, and South and Central Asian Affairs—to produce updated five-year strategic plans within 90 days of the administration taking office. These strategies shall be developed by career regional experts—not political appointees—and shall be grounded in consultation with allies, partners, and civil society in each region. The dismantlement of the State Department's regional expertise during 2025 means that this planning process must begin immediately and must be resourced with the restored Foreign Service Officer corps.
The United States shall pursue a Middle East policy grounded in consistent principles rather than transactional relationships with authoritarian partners. The administration shall:
- Advance a credible two-state solution framework for Israeli-Palestinian peace, including conditioning military assistance to Israel on compliance with international humanitarian law under the Leahy Law (22 U.S.C. § 2378d) in all active conflict theaters
- Re-engage Iran on nuclear diplomacy through the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or a successor agreement, pursuing verifiable constraints on Iran's nuclear program through multilateral mechanisms
- Apply consistent human rights standards to all Gulf partners, including Saudi Arabia, using Global Magnitsky designations and conditioning arms sales under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2751) on compliance with international humanitarian law
- Lead a sustained diplomatic effort to end the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, including support for UN-mediated ceasefire efforts and full restoration of humanitarian access authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. § 2292)
The African continent—home to 54 nations, over 1.4 billion people, and enormous strategic importance in critical minerals, food security, and global governance—has been profoundly damaged by the 2025 USAID dissolution. The next administration shall:
- Restore the Prosper Africa initiative as a framework for private sector investment partnerships, ensuring that U.S. investment competes effectively with Chinese Belt and Road financing through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) authorities under the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.)
- Restore all humanitarian and food security assistance cut in 2025, including programs administered through the World Food Programme, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and bilateral agreements
- Engage the African Union as an equal partner in multilateral forums, including advocating for an AU permanent seat on the UN Security Council as part of broader Security Council reform
- Support democratic governance and civil society across the continent, using USAID democracy programming, NED grants, and bilateral security cooperation conditioned on democratic accountability under applicable law
The Trump administration abandoned a decade of progress on addressing the root causes of irregular migration from Central America, cutting off aid programs that had reduced violence and built economic opportunity in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. The next administration shall:
- Restore and expand the Central American Forward Alliance and direct USAID to reinstate economic development, anti-corruption, violence reduction, and rule of law programs in the Northern Triangle nations pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. § 2151)
- Engage Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua through calibrated diplomatic pressure that supports civil society and democratic opposition without resorting to counterproductive unilateral coercive measures that strengthen authoritarian governments' domestic narratives
- Renew the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities as the primary vehicle for cooperative border management, counter-narcotics operations, and anti-trafficking work
- Restore full engagement with the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as forums for multilateral democratic accountability in the hemisphere
The region spanning India through Central Asia represents one of the most consequential theaters for U.S. strategic competition with both Russia and China. The next administration shall:
- Deepen the U.S.-India strategic partnership through the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), defense industrial cooperation, and coordination within the Quad framework while respecting India's strategic autonomy in ways that keep New Delhi oriented toward democratic partnership
- Develop a coherent Central Asia strategy—encompassing Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—that offers economic alternatives to Russian and Chinese dependence through the C5+1 diplomatic platform
- Engage Pakistan through a relationship balanced between security cooperation on counterterrorism and consistent pressure on democratic governance, nuclear security, and regional stability
- Pursue a sustained Afghanistan policy that prioritizes Taliban accountability for human rights abuses under applicable UN sanctions, supports Afghan civil society in exile, and maintains humanitarian access to the Afghan population
- Issue presidential proclamation rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement and submitting formal notification to the UNFCCC Secretariat
- Sign executive order withdrawing from Executive Order 14155 (WHO withdrawal) and notifying the WHO Director-General of U.S. re-accession
- Issue presidential statement reaffirming unconditional U.S. commitment to NATO Article 5
- Issue executive order restoring the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and setting the annual ceiling at 125,000 persons
- Sign executive order halting all remaining wind-down of USAID programs and restoring emergency humanitarian assistance pipelines
- Issue directive rescinding Schedule F application to all State Department positions
- Sign executive order restoring full U.S. security assistance to Ukraine and reaffirming U.S. refusal to recognize Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory
- Issue formal disavowal of all coercive territorial claims directed at Greenland, Canada, Panama, and other sovereign states
- Conduct presidential visit to NATO headquarters and complete bilateral visits to all frontline NATO allies within 30 days
- Order a comprehensive reinstatement review of all 2025 State Department terminations; issue reinstatement offers to all wrongfully fired officers within 60 days
- Appoint confirmed or acting USAID Administrator and begin reconstitution of independent USAID within 60 days
- Restore PEPFAR funding to pre-January 2025 levels within 90 days
- Submit to Congress the USAID Restoration Act and the Foreign Service Protection Act within 60 days
- Conduct emergency alliance reassurance tours: Indo-Pacific within 45 days, Latin America within 60 days, Africa within 90 days
- Convene a Summit for Democracy within the first 90 days, bringing together democratic governments to recommit to shared norms and institutions
- Pay all arrears to the United Nations, WHO, and other international organizations within 90 days
- Restore the Global Engagement Center to operational status with a funded counter-disinformation mandate within 45 days
- Direct the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy to submit a comprehensive public diplomacy restoration plan within 60 days, covering Fulbright Program, American Spaces, USAGM, and exchange programs
- Restore emergency humanitarian assistance pipelines through USAID successor mechanisms within 30 days, prioritizing Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia, Syria, and Gaza
- Appoint the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice and direct the Office of Global Criminal Justice to submit a Ukraine atrocity documentation strategy within 60 days
- Conduct bilateral consultations with India within 45 days to reinstate and expand the iCET technology partnership framework
- Restore the Counter-Terrorism Bureau to full operational staffing and connectivity with the intelligence community within 60 days
- Restore State Department staffing to FY2024 levels through the hiring surge authorized by the Foreign Service Act
- Pass the USAID Restoration Act establishing USAID as an independent agency immune from unilateral executive dissolution
- Pass the Foreign Service Protection Act prohibiting Schedule F reclassification of career diplomats and strengthening whistleblower protections under 22 U.S.C. § 3905
- Complete and publish the Quadrennial China Strategy with an unclassified summary available to Congress and the public
- Restore all Global Magnitsky sanctions that were suspended or revoked during 2025, and issue at least 50 new designations by the end of Year 1
- Submit to Congress the Climate Diplomacy Authorization Act authorizing U.S. participation in international climate finance mechanisms and appropriating at least $3 billion annually for climate finance
- Negotiate and sign a bilateral trade agreement framework with Taiwan, demonstrating U.S. economic commitment to Taiwan's security independent of Chinese pressure
- Restore Fulbright Program exchange slots to at least FY2023 levels, with particular attention to programs in regions where U.S. educational relationships were disrupted by the 2025 cuts
- Direct the Foreign Service Institute to establish a mandatory digital diplomacy curriculum for all incoming Foreign Service Officers, reflecting the new landscape of technology policy, cyber diplomacy, and information operations that require Foreign Service expertise
- Complete the inter-agency review of all WTO-inconsistent tariffs imposed in 2025 and commence negotiations to address violations through agreed frameworks or WTO dispute resolution
- Achieve full restoration of USAID's pre-dissolution workforce and program portfolio, with particular emphasis on rebuilding local staff capacity in countries where USAID previously operated
- Complete Foreign Service Institute capacity expansion for critical language training, with measurable increases in Arabic, Mandarin, Russian, Farsi, Korean, and Hindi speakers in the active Foreign Service
- Conclude renegotiation of trade agreements affected by 2025-era tariff escalation consistent with WTO obligations; restore Appellate Body functionality through negotiated appointment framework
- Embed climate, human rights, and democracy metrics into all bilateral diplomatic engagement assessments through the State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and trafficking in persons reports
- Work through Congress to repeal the Rescissions Act of 2025 and restore funding to UN and other international organization accounts, bringing U.S. arrears to zero
- Develop a long-term strategy for strengthening international institutions, including a U.S. proposal for reform of the UN Security Council structure and a proposal for World Trade Organization appellate body restoration
- Complete a comprehensive Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) that establishes staffing, resource, and organizational benchmarks for the State Department through the next presidential term
- Achieve operational normalization of reconstituted USAID, with all regional programs fully staffed and operating; publish a public USAID annual performance report benchmarking outcomes against pre-2025 baselines
- Complete all foreign service grievance and reinstatement proceedings initiated following the 2025 reduction in force, ensuring full remediation for all wrongfully terminated officers
- Purpose: Re-establish USAID as a fully independent federal agency under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, immune from dissolution without an act of Congress, with a confirmed administrator, a protected workforce, and guaranteed minimum appropriations
- Key Provisions: Reconstitutes USAID legal authorities; prohibits executive dissolution without legislation; sets minimum annual appropriation of $25 billion indexed to inflation; requires Senate confirmation for the USAID Administrator; reinstates all wrongfully terminated USAID employees with back pay; authorizes a multi-year hiring surge; restores all PEPFAR, food security, and democracy assistance authorities
- Constitutional Authority: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2151); Spending Clause (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1); Necessary and Proper Clause (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 18)
- Purpose: Protect the career Foreign Service from politically motivated dismissals and reclassification schemes by strengthening the merit system protections of the Foreign Service Act of 1980
- Key Provisions: Prohibits Schedule F or equivalent reclassification of Foreign Service or Civil Service positions at the Department of State; requires individualized, documented, performance-based justification for any termination of a career officer; establishes an independent Board of Foreign Service Appeals with authority to order reinstatement; expands whistleblower protections for diplomats who report illegal orders; limits political appointees in the Foreign Service to the existing ceilings established under 22 U.S.C. § 3943
- Constitutional Authority: Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. § 3901); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. § 7501); Art. II, § 2 (Appointments Clause)
- Purpose: Authorize and appropriate U.S. participation in international climate finance mechanisms and establish the Climate Diplomacy Directorate within the State Department
- Key Provisions: Appropriates $3 billion annually for U.S. contributions to the Green Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund, and Climate Investment Funds; establishes the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate as a Senate-confirmed position with Cabinet-level access; requires annual Congressional reporting on U.S. climate finance commitments and disbursements; authorizes technical assistance programs for developing nations transitioning to clean energy
- Constitutional Authority: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2151); Treaty Power (Art. II, § 2) in implementation of Paris Agreement obligations; Spending Clause (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1)
- Purpose: Codify U.S. NATO commitments and prohibit executive branch actions inconsistent with Article 5 obligations without Senate approval
- Key Provisions: Declares U.S. commitment to NATO Article 5 as a matter of statute; prohibits the President from withdrawing from NATO without Congressional approval under the NATO Participation Act (22 U.S.C. § 1904); requires the Secretary of State to report annually on alliance health metrics; prohibits the use of appropriated funds to take any action that would undermine the territorial integrity or sovereignty of any NATO member state; establishes reporting requirements for any conditional interpretation of Article 5 obligations
- Constitutional Authority: NATO Participation Act (22 U.S.C. § 1904); Treaty Power and Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, Cl. 2); Declare War Clause (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 11)
- Purpose: Prevent future executive suspension of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program by codifying minimum annual admissions and strengthening the Refugee Act of 1980
- Key Provisions: Sets a statutory floor of 95,000 annual refugee admissions that the President may not reduce without a joint resolution of Congress; requires that presidential reductions in the annual admissions ceiling be accompanied by a detailed national security justification submitted to Congress; prohibits stop-work orders on USRAP processing without specific statutory authority; requires full funding for the Reception and Placement program administered by the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; strengthens protections for refugees already in the processing pipeline when new administration restrictions take effect
- Constitutional Authority: Refugee Act of 1980 (8 U.S.C. § 1521); 1951 Refugee Convention Protocol (19 U.S.T. 6223); Spending Clause (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1)
- Purpose: Strengthen the enforcement of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act by creating mandatory designation reviews and prohibiting the use of bilateral strategic relationships as grounds for non-designation
- Key Provisions: Requires the Secretary of State to designate annually at least 50 individuals credibly implicated in serious human rights abuses or grand corruption under 22 U.S.C. § 2656 note; prohibits the Secretary of State from declining a Magnitsky designation solely on the basis of bilateral relations; requires the Secretary to report to Congress within 90 days on any potential designation that is not pursued and the reasons therefor; creates a private right of action for victims to petition for designation review; increases maximum penalties for violations of Magnitsky-related asset freezes
- Constitutional Authority: Foreign Commerce Clause (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3); International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701); Treaty Power (Art. II, § 2)
The following measurable outcomes shall be assessed at 1-year, 2-year, and 4-year intervals:
Diplomatic Corps Restoration:
- State Department staffing returns to FY2024 levels within 24 months and reaches targets set by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review within 48 months
- The number of political donor ambassador appointments at the 30 most strategically significant posts reaches zero within 12 months
- Foreign Service Institute language training enrollment increases by at least 40 percent within 24 months
- 90 percent of wrongfully terminated Foreign Service Officers offered reinstatement within 90 days of the new administration taking office
Multilateral Engagement:
- United States formally re-accedes to Paris Agreement, WHO, and UN Human Rights Council within 30 days
- All U.S. arrears to the UN and international organizations paid within 90 days
- U.S. contributes at least $3 billion annually to international climate finance within 24 months
- PEPFAR restored to pre-January 2025 funding and beneficiary levels within 12 months
USAID Reconstitution:
- USAID Restoration Act passed within 18 months
- USAID workforce restored to at least 8,000 positions within 36 months
- At least 80 percent of terminated contracts and grants reviewed for reinstatement within 12 months, with humanitarian emergency programs restored within 90 days
Alliance Health:
- Annual polling on U.S. credibility as an ally (Pew Research Global Attitudes Survey, German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Trends) shows improvement of at least 15 percentage points from 2025 trough within 24 months
- All NATO allies formally acknowledge U.S. Article 5 commitment restoration through joint communique within 90 days
- AUKUS submarine partnership milestones back on schedule within 12 months
- U.S.-Japan, U.S.-South Korea, and U.S.-Philippines alliance health assessments—as measured by joint exercises, intelligence sharing metrics, and bilateral consultation frequency—show restoration to FY2024 baselines within 18 months
Public Diplomacy:
- Fulbright Program exchange slots restored to FY2023 levels within 12 months
- Voice of America and USAGM broadcasting platforms restored to full operational funding within 6 months
- Global Engagement Center counter-disinformation operations active in at least 20 countries within 12 months
- Pew Research Global Attitudes Survey annual favorable ratings for the United States show improvement in all surveyed NATO member nations within 24 months
Refugee and Humanitarian Metrics:
- U.S. Refugee Admissions Program restored to full operational processing within 90 days
- Annual refugee admissions ceiling of 125,000 set within 30 days and achieved within 18 months
- USRAP processing pipeline cleared of backlog accumulated during 2025 suspension within 36 months
Democracy and Human Rights:
- Global Magnitsky designations return to pre-2025 pace within 6 months
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor budget restored to FY2024 level within 6 months
- Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published on schedule with full analytical independence restored
Constitutional Provisions:
- U.S. Constitution, Art. I, §§ 8, 9 (congressional foreign affairs powers)
- U.S. Constitution, Art. II, §§ 2-3 (presidential treaty and appointment powers)
- U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, Cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause—treaties as supreme law)
Federal Statutes:
- Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq.
- State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, 22 U.S.C. § 2651 et seq.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.
- Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1521 et seq.
- Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq.
- Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2656 note
- Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), 22 U.S.C. § 9501 et seq.
- International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
- Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 681 et seq.
- NATO Participation Act of 1994, 22 U.S.C. § 1904
- Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, 22 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.
- United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. § 7601 et seq.
- Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 et seq.
- Uruguay Round Agreements Act (WTO implementing legislation), 19 U.S.C. § 3511
Treaties and International Agreements:
- North Atlantic Treaty (1949), 63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964
- Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), 21 U.S.T. 77; TIAS 7502
- United Nations Charter (1945), 59 Stat. 1031; TS 993
- Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC (2015), T.I.A.S. 16-1104
- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and 1967 Protocol, 19 U.S.T. 6223; TIAS 6577
Supreme Court Decisions:
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (limits on executive power against congressional will)
- Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (presidential power in foreign affairs with congressional acquiescence)
- Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015) (presidential recognition power in foreign affairs)
Executive Orders (Trump Administration, to be rescinded):
- Executive Order 14155, Withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization (Jan. 20, 2025)
- Executive Order 14162, Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements [Paris withdrawal] (Jan. 20, 2025)
- Executive Order 14169, Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid [foreign aid freeze] (Jan. 20, 2025)
Additional Statutes:
- Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2451 et seq. (Fulbright Program)
- United States Agency for Global Media Authorization Act (USAGM), 22 U.S.C. § 6201 et seq.
- Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act), 22 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
- National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017, Section 1287 (Global Engagement Center)
- Leahy Law, 22 U.S.C. § 2378d (human rights vetting for security assistance)
- Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of the Philippines (1951); Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan (1960); Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea (1953)
Regulatory Authorities:
- 22 C.F.R. Parts 11-19 (Foreign Service selection and assignment)
- 22 C.F.R. Part 41 (Visas and Consular Procedures)
- 22 C.F.R. Parts 200-226 (USAID acquisition regulations)
- 5 C.F.R. Part 351 (Reduction in Force procedures applicable to Civil Service positions at State Department)