From 8280cd8f72ae076f020157ef278d6ea55a6df2b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benjamin Beichler Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 22:13:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 001/908] mac80211_hwsim: report NOACK frames in tx_status [ Upstream commit 42a79960ffa50bfe9e0bf5d6280be89bf563a5dd ] Add IEEE80211_TX_STAT_NOACK_TRANSMITTED to tx_status flags to have proper statistics for non-acked frames. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Beichler Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220111221327.1499881-1-benjamin.beichler@uni-rostock.de Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c index a8ec5b2c5abb..b19d19c4be27 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c @@ -2983,6 +2983,10 @@ static int hwsim_tx_info_frame_received_nl(struct sk_buff *skb_2, } txi->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_STAT_ACK; } + + if (hwsim_flags & HWSIM_TX_CTL_NO_ACK) + txi->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_STAT_NOACK_TRANSMITTED; + ieee80211_tx_status_irqsafe(data2->hw, skb); return 0; out: From 0f7f9b02f97edc2e1135b5172f4eda4aa3cc6535 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JaeMan Park Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 15:02:35 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 002/908] mac80211_hwsim: initialize ieee80211_tx_info at hw_scan_work [ Upstream commit cacfddf82baf1470e5741edeecb187260868f195 ] In mac80211_hwsim, the probe_req frame is created and sent while scanning. It is sent with ieee80211_tx_info which is not initialized. Uninitialized ieee80211_tx_info can cause problems when using mac80211_hwsim with wmediumd. wmediumd checks the tx_rates field of ieee80211_tx_info and doesn't relay probe_req frame to other clients even if it is a broadcasting message. Call ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() to initialize ieee80211_tx_info for the probe_req that is created by hw_scan_work in mac80211_hwsim. Signed-off-by: JaeMan Park Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220113060235.546107-1-jaeman@google.com [fix memory leak] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c index b19d19c4be27..ee1eb14ae8fc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c @@ -2025,6 +2025,15 @@ static void hw_scan_work(struct work_struct *work) if (req->ie_len) skb_put_data(probe, req->ie, req->ie_len); + if (!ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb(hwsim->hw, + hwsim->hw_scan_vif, + probe, + hwsim->tmp_chan->band, + NULL)) { + kfree_skb(probe); + continue; + } + local_bh_disable(); mac80211_hwsim_tx_frame(hwsim->hw, probe, hwsim->tmp_chan); From 389b44298b84f85598c1d7d2122e4a20237a0945 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Anholt Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 22:42:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 003/908] i2c: bcm2835: Avoid clock stretching timeouts [ Upstream commit 9495b9b31abe525ebd93da58de2c88b9f66d3a0e ] The CLKT register contains at poweron 0x40, which at our typical 100kHz bus rate means .64ms. But there is no specified limit to how long devices should be able to stretch the clocks, so just disable the timeout. We still have a timeout wrapping the entire transfer. Signed-off-by: Eric Anholt Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren BugLink: https://github.com/raspberrypi/linux/issues/3064 Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-bcm2835.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-bcm2835.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-bcm2835.c index 4d19254f78c8..db1ab9ccc30e 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-bcm2835.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-bcm2835.c @@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ #define BCM2835_I2C_FIFO 0x10 #define BCM2835_I2C_DIV 0x14 #define BCM2835_I2C_DEL 0x18 +/* + * 16-bit field for the number of SCL cycles to wait after rising SCL + * before deciding the slave is not responding. 0 disables the + * timeout detection. + */ #define BCM2835_I2C_CLKT 0x1c #define BCM2835_I2C_C_READ BIT(0) @@ -398,6 +403,12 @@ static int bcm2835_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) adap->dev.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node; adap->quirks = &bcm2835_i2c_quirks; + /* + * Disable the hardware clock stretching timeout. SMBUS + * specifies a limit for how long the device can stretch the + * clock, but core I2C doesn't. + */ + bcm2835_i2c_writel(i2c_dev, BCM2835_I2C_CLKT, 0); bcm2835_i2c_writel(i2c_dev, BCM2835_I2C_C, 0); ret = i2c_add_adapter(adap); From 2ef7caab187bbd5497142a656d9811eb02cdbf10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 09:59:16 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 004/908] Input: clear BTN_RIGHT/MIDDLE on buttonpads MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 37ef4c19b4c659926ce65a7ac709ceaefb211c40 ] Buttonpads are expected to map the INPUT_PROP_BUTTONPAD property bit and the BTN_LEFT key bit. As explained in the specification, where a device has a button type value of 0 (click-pad) or 1 (pressure-pad) there should not be discrete buttons: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/component-guidelines/touchpad-windows-precision-touchpad-collection#device-capabilities-feature-report However, some drivers map the BTN_RIGHT and/or BTN_MIDDLE key bits even though the device is a buttonpad and therefore does not have those buttons. This behavior has forced userspace applications like libinput to implement different workarounds and quirks to detect buttonpads and offer to the user the right set of features and configuration options. For more information: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/libinput/libinput/-/merge_requests/726 In order to avoid this issue clear the BTN_RIGHT and BTN_MIDDLE key bits when the input device is register if the INPUT_PROP_BUTTONPAD property bit is set. Notice that this change will not affect udev because it does not check for buttons. See systemd/src/udev/udev-builtin-input_id.c. List of known affected hardware: - Chuwi AeroBook Plus - Chuwi Gemibook - Framework Laptop - GPD Win Max - Huawei MateBook 2020 - Prestigio Smartbook 141 C2 - Purism Librem 14v1 - StarLite Mk II - AMI firmware - StarLite Mk II - Coreboot firmware - StarLite Mk III - AMI firmware - StarLite Mk III - Coreboot firmware - StarLabTop Mk IV - AMI firmware - StarLabTop Mk IV - Coreboot firmware - StarBook Mk V Acked-by: Peter Hutterer Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires Acked-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: José Expósito Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220208174806.17183-1-jose.exposito89@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/input/input.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/input/input.c b/drivers/input/input.c index cadb368be8ef..cb8ff919ba82 100644 --- a/drivers/input/input.c +++ b/drivers/input/input.c @@ -2120,6 +2120,12 @@ int input_register_device(struct input_dev *dev) /* KEY_RESERVED is not supposed to be transmitted to userspace. */ __clear_bit(KEY_RESERVED, dev->keybit); + /* Buttonpads should not map BTN_RIGHT and/or BTN_MIDDLE. */ + if (test_bit(INPUT_PROP_BUTTONPAD, dev->propbit)) { + __clear_bit(BTN_RIGHT, dev->keybit); + __clear_bit(BTN_MIDDLE, dev->keybit); + } + /* Make sure that bitmasks not mentioned in dev->evbit are clean. */ input_cleanse_bitmasks(dev); From 147a0e71ccf96df9fc8c2ac500829d8e423ef02c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronnie Sahlberg Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 02:59:15 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 005/908] cifs: fix double free race when mount fails in cifs_get_root() [ Upstream commit 3d6cc9898efdfb062efb74dc18cfc700e082f5d5 ] When cifs_get_root() fails during cifs_smb3_do_mount() we call deactivate_locked_super() which eventually will call delayed_free() which will free the context. In this situation we should not proceed to enter the out: section in cifs_smb3_do_mount() and free the same resources a second time. [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888364f4d110 by task swapper/1/0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G OE 5.17.0-rc3+ #4 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.0 12/17/2019 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Call Trace: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x78 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x24/0x150 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] kasan_report.cold+0x7d/0x117 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __asan_load8+0x86/0xa0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_core+0x547/0xca0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? call_rcu+0x3c0/0x3c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? lock_is_held_type+0xea/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_core_si+0xe/0x10 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x67b [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __irq_exit_rcu+0x100/0x150 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x30 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] sysvec_hyperv_stimer0+0x9d/0xc0 ... [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] Freed by task 58179: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] ____kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x170 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xb3/0x1d0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kfree+0xcd/0x520 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x149/0xbe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] smb3_get_tree+0x1a0/0x2e0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] vfs_get_tree+0x52/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] path_mount+0x635/0x10c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __x64_sys_mount+0x1bf/0x210 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] Last potentially related work creation: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] call_rcu+0x76/0x3c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_umount+0xce/0xe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_kill_sb+0xc8/0xe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] deactivate_locked_super+0x5d/0xd0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0xab9/0xbe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] smb3_get_tree+0x1a0/0x2e0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] vfs_get_tree+0x52/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] path_mount+0x635/0x10c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __x64_sys_mount+0x1bf/0x210 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Reported-by: Shyam Prasad N Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/cifs/cifsfs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c index 74f405a05efc..dba0d12c3db1 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c @@ -753,6 +753,7 @@ cifs_do_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, out_super: deactivate_locked_super(sb); + return root; out: cifs_cleanup_volume_info(volume_info); return root; From fd9fa98938ed6cd0bab23852018f8a1cd2c6e360 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yongzhi Liu Date: Sat, 15 Jan 2022 21:34:56 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 006/908] dmaengine: shdma: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error [ Upstream commit 455896c53d5b803733ddd84e1bf8a430644439b6 ] pm_runtime_get_() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code, thus a matching decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced. Signed-off-by: Yongzhi Liu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1642311296-87020-1-git-send-email-lyz_cs@pku.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/dma/sh/shdma-base.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/sh/shdma-base.c b/drivers/dma/sh/shdma-base.c index 12fa48e380cf..4f8dfe77da3c 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/sh/shdma-base.c +++ b/drivers/dma/sh/shdma-base.c @@ -118,8 +118,10 @@ static dma_cookie_t shdma_tx_submit(struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx) ret = pm_runtime_get(schan->dev); spin_unlock_irq(&schan->chan_lock); - if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0) { dev_err(schan->dev, "%s(): GET = %d\n", __func__, ret); + pm_runtime_put(schan->dev); + } pm_runtime_barrier(schan->dev); From f44100d8feb618f5565e4358b880da78750ceeab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wolfram Sang Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 20:45:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 007/908] i2c: cadence: allow COMPILE_TEST [ Upstream commit 0b0dcb3882c8f08bdeafa03adb4487e104d26050 ] Driver builds fine with COMPILE_TEST. Enable it for wider test coverage and easier maintenance. Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Acked-by: Michal Simek Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig b/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig index c457f65136f8..ab9c7f2f1f79 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig @@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ config I2C_BLACKFIN_TWI_CLK_KHZ config I2C_CADENCE tristate "Cadence I2C Controller" - depends on ARCH_ZYNQ || ARM64 || XTENSA + depends on ARCH_ZYNQ || ARM64 || XTENSA || COMPILE_TEST help Say yes here to select Cadence I2C Host Controller. This controller is e.g. used by Xilinx Zynq. From b712c7514772c9e5f07279b6bdc2426b031c61ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wolfram Sang Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 20:47:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 008/908] i2c: qup: allow COMPILE_TEST [ Upstream commit 5de717974005fcad2502281e9f82e139ca91f4bb ] Driver builds fine with COMPILE_TEST. Enable it for wider test coverage and easier maintenance. Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig b/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig index ab9c7f2f1f79..2619f1dc095a 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig @@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ config I2C_PXA_SLAVE config I2C_QUP tristate "Qualcomm QUP based I2C controller" - depends on ARCH_QCOM + depends on ARCH_QCOM || COMPILE_TEST help If you say yes to this option, support will be included for the built-in I2C interface on the Qualcomm SoCs. From 3718226da1141e86dedcc6f038e21f1bec07da12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniele Palmas Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 12:13:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 009/908] net: usb: cdc_mbim: avoid altsetting toggling for Telit FN990 [ Upstream commit 21e8a96377e6b6debae42164605bf9dcbe5720c5 ] Add quirk CDC_MBIM_FLAG_AVOID_ALTSETTING_TOGGLE for Telit FN990 0x1071 composition in order to avoid bind error. Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/usb/cdc_mbim.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_mbim.c b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_mbim.c index cdd1b193fd4f..41bac861ca99 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_mbim.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_mbim.c @@ -660,6 +660,11 @@ static const struct usb_device_id mbim_devs[] = { .driver_info = (unsigned long)&cdc_mbim_info_avoid_altsetting_toggle, }, + /* Telit FN990 */ + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x1bc7, 0x1071, USB_CLASS_COMM, USB_CDC_SUBCLASS_MBIM, USB_CDC_PROTO_NONE), + .driver_info = (unsigned long)&cdc_mbim_info_avoid_altsetting_toggle, + }, + /* default entry */ { USB_INTERFACE_INFO(USB_CLASS_COMM, USB_CDC_SUBCLASS_MBIM, USB_CDC_PROTO_NONE), .driver_info = (unsigned long)&cdc_mbim_info_zlp, From 6936d1097e9cb891e1daaa8aab1b9c080f5e59a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Sat, 1 Jan 2022 01:21:37 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 010/908] usb: gadget: don't release an existing dev->buf commit 89f3594d0de58e8a57d92d497dea9fee3d4b9cda upstream. dev->buf does not need to be released if it already exists before executing dev_config. Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211231172138.7993-2-hbh25y@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c index c67d53beed85..06aa74e2be35 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c @@ -1833,8 +1833,9 @@ dev_config (struct file *fd, const char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *ptr) spin_lock_irq (&dev->lock); value = -EINVAL; if (dev->buf) { + spin_unlock_irq(&dev->lock); kfree(kbuf); - goto fail; + return value; } dev->buf = kbuf; From 70959fa1a003cb7c6ed2fd0e0f887125d08b8bf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Sat, 1 Jan 2022 01:21:38 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 011/908] usb: gadget: clear related members when goto fail commit 501e38a5531efbd77d5c73c0ba838a889bfc1d74 upstream. dev->config and dev->hs_config and dev->dev need to be cleaned if dev_config fails to avoid UAF. Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211231172138.7993-3-hbh25y@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c index 06aa74e2be35..53d17e1bb65a 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c @@ -1882,8 +1882,8 @@ dev_config (struct file *fd, const char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *ptr) value = usb_gadget_probe_driver(&gadgetfs_driver); if (value != 0) { - kfree (dev->buf); - dev->buf = NULL; + spin_lock_irq(&dev->lock); + goto fail; } else { /* at this point "good" hardware has for the first time * let the USB the host see us. alternatively, if users @@ -1900,6 +1900,9 @@ dev_config (struct file *fd, const char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *ptr) return value; fail: + dev->config = NULL; + dev->hs_config = NULL; + dev->dev = NULL; spin_unlock_irq (&dev->lock); pr_debug ("%s: %s fail %zd, %p\n", shortname, __func__, value, dev); kfree (dev->buf); From 0b79c5dd7bb56da0c57f8272d1746f8594b4fdac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergey Shtylyov Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2022 23:04:29 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 012/908] ata: pata_hpt37x: fix PCI clock detection [ Upstream commit 5f6b0f2d037c8864f20ff15311c695f65eb09db5 ] The f_CNT register (at the PCI config. address 0x78) is 16-bit, not 8-bit! The bug was there from the very start... :-( Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov Fixes: 669a5db411d8 ("[libata] Add a bunch of PATA drivers.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/ata/pata_hpt37x.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/ata/pata_hpt37x.c b/drivers/ata/pata_hpt37x.c index 821fc1f2324c..44cc02afaa8b 100644 --- a/drivers/ata/pata_hpt37x.c +++ b/drivers/ata/pata_hpt37x.c @@ -964,14 +964,14 @@ static int hpt37x_init_one(struct pci_dev *dev, const struct pci_device_id *id) if ((freq >> 12) != 0xABCDE) { int i; - u8 sr; + u16 sr; u32 total = 0; pr_warn("BIOS has not set timing clocks\n"); /* This is the process the HPT371 BIOS is reported to use */ for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) { - pci_read_config_byte(dev, 0x78, &sr); + pci_read_config_word(dev, 0x78, &sr); total += sr & 0x1FF; udelay(15); } From d57c4e88b97d002b5df534541cf56bf9c6cb4792 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhen Ni Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 15:42:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 013/908] ALSA: intel_hdmi: Fix reference to PCM buffer address commit 0aa6b294b312d9710804679abd2c0c8ca52cc2bc upstream. PCM buffers might be allocated dynamically when the buffer preallocation failed or a larger buffer is requested, and it's not guaranteed that substream->dma_buffer points to the actually used buffer. The driver needs to refer to substream->runtime->dma_addr instead for the buffer address. Signed-off-by: Zhen Ni Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220302074241.30469-1-nizhen@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c b/sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c index 88fe5eb4516f..bf894087e5fa 100644 --- a/sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c +++ b/sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c @@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ static int had_pcm_mmap(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, { vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot); return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, - substream->dma_buffer.addr >> PAGE_SHIFT, + substream->runtime->dma_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT, vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start, vma->vm_page_prot); } From 7e0e4bc93811cf600508ff36f07abea7b40643ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marek Vasut Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 14:06:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 014/908] ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min commit 9bdd10d57a8807dba0003af0325191f3cec0f11c upstream. While the $val/$val2 values passed in from userspace are always >= 0 integers, the limits of the control can be signed integers and the $min can be non-zero and less than zero. To correctly validate $val/$val2 against platform_max, add the $min offset to val first. Fixes: 817f7c9335ec0 ("ASoC: ops: Reject out of bounds values in snd_soc_put_volsw()") Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut Cc: Mark Brown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220215130645.164025-1-marex@denx.de Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/soc/soc-ops.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-ops.c b/sound/soc/soc-ops.c index 76bd264ee88d..d6d72595fbd0 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-ops.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-ops.c @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int snd_soc_put_volsw(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, mask = BIT(sign_bit + 1) - 1; val = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; - if (mc->platform_max && val > mc->platform_max) + if (mc->platform_max && ((int)val + min) > mc->platform_max) return -EINVAL; if (val > max - min) return -EINVAL; @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ int snd_soc_put_volsw(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, val = val << shift; if (snd_soc_volsw_is_stereo(mc)) { val2 = ucontrol->value.integer.value[1]; - if (mc->platform_max && val2 > mc->platform_max) + if (mc->platform_max && ((int)val2 + min) > mc->platform_max) return -EINVAL; if (val2 > max - min) return -EINVAL; From d4d5190b942ac7a0f048db718c0a9f280b4fc2ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Bohac Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2022 10:22:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 015/908] xfrm: fix MTU regression commit 6596a0229541270fb8d38d989f91b78838e5e9da upstream. Commit 749439bfac6e1a2932c582e2699f91d329658196 ("ipv6: fix udpv6 sendmsg crash caused by too small MTU") breaks PMTU for xfrm. A Packet Too Big ICMPv6 message received in response to an ESP packet will prevent all further communication through the tunnel if the reported MTU minus the ESP overhead is smaller than 1280. E.g. in a case of a tunnel-mode ESP with sha256/aes the overhead is 92 bytes. Receiving a PTB with MTU of 1371 or less will result in all further packets in the tunnel dropped. A ping through the tunnel fails with "ping: sendmsg: Invalid argument". Apparently the MTU on the xfrm route is smaller than 1280 and fails the check inside ip6_setup_cork() added by 749439bf. We found this by debugging USGv6/ipv6ready failures. Failing tests are: "Phase-2 Interoperability Test Scenario IPsec" / 5.3.11 and 5.4.11 (Tunnel Mode: Fragmentation). Commit b515d2637276a3810d6595e10ab02c13bfd0b63a ("xfrm: xfrm_state_mtu should return at least 1280 for ipv6") attempted to fix this but caused another regression in TCP MSS calculations and had to be reverted. The patch below fixes the situation by dropping the MTU check and instead checking for the underflows described in the 749439bf commit message. Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac Fixes: 749439bfac6e ("ipv6: fix udpv6 sendmsg crash caused by too small MTU") Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index f906fe2acedd..c474e4b4c4bb 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -1266,8 +1266,6 @@ static int ip6_setup_cork(struct sock *sk, struct inet_cork_full *cork, if (np->frag_size) mtu = np->frag_size; } - if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU) - return -EINVAL; cork->base.fragsize = mtu; if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path)) cork->base.flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG; @@ -1316,8 +1314,6 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len + (opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0); - maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen - - sizeof(struct frag_hdr); headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) + @@ -1325,6 +1321,13 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, sizeof(struct frag_hdr) : 0) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len; + if (mtu < fragheaderlen || + ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen < sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) + goto emsgsize; + + maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen - + sizeof(struct frag_hdr); + /* as per RFC 7112 section 5, the entire IPv6 Header Chain must fit * the first fragment */ From 05f7927b25d2635e87267ff6c79db79fb46cf313 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sun, 27 Feb 2022 10:01:41 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 016/908] netfilter: fix use-after-free in __nf_register_net_hook() commit 56763f12b0f02706576a088e85ef856deacc98a0 upstream. We must not dereference @new_hooks after nf_hook_mutex has been released, because other threads might have freed our allocated hooks already. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_hook_entries_get_hook_ops include/linux/netfilter.h:130 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hooks_validate net/netfilter/core.c:171 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __nf_register_net_hook+0x77a/0x820 net/netfilter/core.c:438 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c1a8000 by task syz-executor237/4430 CPU: 1 PID: 4430 Comm: syz-executor237 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc5-syzkaller-00306-g2293be58d6a1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 nf_hook_entries_get_hook_ops include/linux/netfilter.h:130 [inline] hooks_validate net/netfilter/core.c:171 [inline] __nf_register_net_hook+0x77a/0x820 net/netfilter/core.c:438 nf_register_net_hook+0x114/0x170 net/netfilter/core.c:571 nf_register_net_hooks+0x59/0xc0 net/netfilter/core.c:587 nf_synproxy_ipv6_init+0x85/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c:1218 synproxy_tg6_check+0x30d/0x560 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_SYNPROXY.c:81 xt_check_target+0x26c/0x9e0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1038 check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:530 [inline] find_check_entry.constprop.0+0x7f1/0x9e0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:573 translate_table+0xc8b/0x1750 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:735 do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1153 [inline] do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x56e/0xb90 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1639 nf_setsockopt+0x83/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101 ipv6_setsockopt+0x122/0x180 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1024 rawv6_setsockopt+0xd3/0x6a0 net/ipv6/raw.c:1084 __sys_setsockopt+0x2db/0x610 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f65a1ace7d9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 71 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f65a1a7f308 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00007f65a1ace7d9 RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000029 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f65a1b574c8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f65a1b55130 R13: 00007f65a1b574c0 R14: 00007f65a1b24090 R15: 0000000000022000 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0000706a00 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1c1a8 flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000000000 ffffea0001c1b108 ffffea000046dd08 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as freed page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), pid 4430, ts 1061781545818, free_ts 1061791488993 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165 __alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:572 [inline] alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:595 [inline] kmalloc_large_node+0x62/0x130 mm/slub.c:4438 __kmalloc_node+0x35a/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:4454 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline] kvmalloc_node+0x97/0x100 mm/util.c:580 kvmalloc include/linux/slab.h:731 [inline] kvzalloc include/linux/slab.h:739 [inline] allocate_hook_entries_size net/netfilter/core.c:61 [inline] nf_hook_entries_grow+0x140/0x780 net/netfilter/core.c:128 __nf_register_net_hook+0x144/0x820 net/netfilter/core.c:429 nf_register_net_hook+0x114/0x170 net/netfilter/core.c:571 nf_register_net_hooks+0x59/0xc0 net/netfilter/core.c:587 nf_synproxy_ipv6_init+0x85/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c:1218 synproxy_tg6_check+0x30d/0x560 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_SYNPROXY.c:81 xt_check_target+0x26c/0x9e0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1038 check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:530 [inline] find_check_entry.constprop.0+0x7f1/0x9e0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:573 translate_table+0xc8b/0x1750 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:735 do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1153 [inline] do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x56e/0xb90 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1639 nf_setsockopt+0x83/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101 page last free stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline] free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404 free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline] free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404 kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:613 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2527 [inline] rcu_core+0x7b1/0x1820 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2778 __do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88801c1a7f00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88801c1a7f80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff88801c1a8000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff88801c1a8080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88801c1a8100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff Fixes: 2420b79f8c18 ("netfilter: debug: check for sorted array") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Acked-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/core.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/core.c b/net/netfilter/core.c index 52cd2901a097..aff54f5c65e9 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/core.c @@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ int nf_register_net_hook(struct net *net, const struct nf_hook_ops *reg) p = nf_entry_dereference(*pp); new_hooks = nf_hook_entries_grow(p, reg); - if (!IS_ERR(new_hooks)) + if (!IS_ERR(new_hooks)) { + hooks_validate(new_hooks); rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, new_hooks); + } mutex_unlock(&nf_hook_mutex); if (IS_ERR(new_hooks)) return PTR_ERR(new_hooks); - hooks_validate(new_hooks); #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER_INGRESS if (reg->pf == NFPROTO_NETDEV && reg->hooknum == NF_NETDEV_INGRESS) net_inc_ingress_queue(); From ab4fa0d4f8e721d8ca94c47512d2d6df69f44fb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 16:14:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 017/908] xfrm: enforce validity of offload input flags commit 7c76ecd9c99b6e9a771d813ab1aa7fa428b3ade1 upstream. struct xfrm_user_offload has flags variable that received user input, but kernel didn't check if valid bits were provided. It caused a situation where not sanitized input was forwarded directly to the drivers. For example, XFRM_OFFLOAD_IPV6 define that was exposed, was used by strongswan, but not implemented in the kernel at all. As a solution, check and sanitize input flags to forward XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND to the drivers. Fixes: d77e38e612a0 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h | 6 ++++++ net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h b/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h index 0b636432cdf3..748e22a92a81 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h @@ -501,6 +501,12 @@ struct xfrm_user_offload { int ifindex; __u8 flags; }; +/* This flag was exposed without any kernel code that supporting it. + * Unfortunately, strongswan has the code that uses sets this flag, + * which makes impossible to reuse this bit. + * + * So leave it here to make sure that it won't be reused by mistake. + */ #define XFRM_OFFLOAD_IPV6 1 #define XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND 2 diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c index c58557193527..338928ac9219 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c @@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ int xfrm_dev_state_add(struct net *net, struct xfrm_state *x, if (x->encap || x->tfcpad || (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN)) return 0; + if (xuo->flags & ~(XFRM_OFFLOAD_IPV6 | XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND)) + return -EINVAL; + dev = dev_get_by_index(net, xuo->ifindex); if (!dev) { if (!(xuo->flags & XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND)) { @@ -98,7 +101,8 @@ int xfrm_dev_state_add(struct net *net, struct xfrm_state *x, xso->dev = dev; xso->num_exthdrs = 1; - xso->flags = xuo->flags; + /* Don't forward bit that is not implemented */ + xso->flags = xuo->flags & ~XFRM_OFFLOAD_IPV6; err = dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_add(x); if (err) { From e208bedb74b3f1487aea5590c4cad0cffc89dcc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 14:02:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 018/908] netfilter: nf_queue: don't assume sk is full socket commit 747670fd9a2d1b7774030dba65ca022ba442ce71 upstream. There is no guarantee that state->sk refers to a full socket. If refcount transitions to 0, sock_put calls sk_free which then ends up with garbage fields. I'd like to thank Oleksandr Natalenko and Jiri Benc for considerable debug work and pointing out state->sk oddities. Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/nf_queue.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c index b06ef4c62522..59340b3ef7ef 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c @@ -44,6 +44,15 @@ void nf_unregister_queue_handler(struct net *net) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(nf_unregister_queue_handler); +static void nf_queue_sock_put(struct sock *sk) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_INET + sock_gen_put(sk); +#else + sock_put(sk); +#endif +} + void nf_queue_entry_release_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry) { struct nf_hook_state *state = &entry->state; @@ -54,7 +63,7 @@ void nf_queue_entry_release_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry) if (state->out) dev_put(state->out); if (state->sk) - sock_put(state->sk); + nf_queue_sock_put(state->sk); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER) if (entry->skb->nf_bridge) { struct net_device *physdev; From ef97921ccdc243170fcef857ba2a17cf697aece5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 06:22:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 019/908] netfilter: nf_queue: fix possible use-after-free commit c3873070247d9e3c7a6b0cf9bf9b45e8018427b1 upstream. Eric Dumazet says: The sock_hold() side seems suspect, because there is no guarantee that sk_refcnt is not already 0. On failure, we cannot queue the packet and need to indicate an error. The packet will be dropped by the caller. v2: split skb prefetch hunk into separate change Fixes: 271b72c7fa82c ("udp: RCU handling for Unicast packets.") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_queue.c | 12 ++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 12 +++++++++--- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h index 814058d0f167..f38cc6092c5a 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ void nf_register_queue_handler(struct net *net, const struct nf_queue_handler *q void nf_unregister_queue_handler(struct net *net); void nf_reinject(struct nf_queue_entry *entry, unsigned int verdict); -void nf_queue_entry_get_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry); +bool nf_queue_entry_get_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry); void nf_queue_entry_release_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry); static inline void init_hashrandom(u32 *jhash_initval) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c index 59340b3ef7ef..dbc45165c533 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c @@ -80,10 +80,13 @@ void nf_queue_entry_release_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_queue_entry_release_refs); /* Bump dev refs so they don't vanish while packet is out */ -void nf_queue_entry_get_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry) +bool nf_queue_entry_get_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry) { struct nf_hook_state *state = &entry->state; + if (state->sk && !refcount_inc_not_zero(&state->sk->sk_refcnt)) + return false; + if (state->in) dev_hold(state->in); if (state->out) @@ -102,6 +105,7 @@ void nf_queue_entry_get_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry) dev_hold(physdev); } #endif + return true; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_queue_entry_get_refs); @@ -159,7 +163,11 @@ static int __nf_queue(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state, .size = sizeof(*entry) + afinfo->route_key_size, }; - nf_queue_entry_get_refs(entry); + if (!nf_queue_entry_get_refs(entry)) { + kfree(entry); + return -ENOTCONN; + } + afinfo->saveroute(skb, entry); status = qh->outfn(entry, queuenum); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c index 26f563bbb58d..ba74bb2d6341 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c @@ -693,9 +693,15 @@ static struct nf_queue_entry * nf_queue_entry_dup(struct nf_queue_entry *e) { struct nf_queue_entry *entry = kmemdup(e, e->size, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (entry) - nf_queue_entry_get_refs(entry); - return entry; + + if (!entry) + return NULL; + + if (nf_queue_entry_get_refs(entry)) + return entry; + + kfree(entry); + return NULL; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER) From 3968f2013cbe1404eea6674a85de4c4f24e8bc4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 00:01:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 020/908] batman-adv: Request iflink once in batadv-on-batadv check commit 690bb6fb64f5dc7437317153902573ecad67593d upstream. There is no need to call dev_get_iflink multiple times for the same net_device in batadv_is_on_batman_iface. And since some of the .ndo_get_iflink callbacks are dynamic (for example via RCUs like in vxcan_get_iflink), it could easily happen that the returned values are not stable. The pre-checks before __dev_get_by_index are then of course bogus. Fixes: b7eddd0b3950 ("batman-adv: prevent using any virtual device created on batman-adv as hard-interface") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c b/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c index 7bdc5f26442e..f9e9de2ae7bb 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c @@ -155,22 +155,23 @@ static bool batadv_is_on_batman_iface(const struct net_device *net_dev) struct net *net = dev_net(net_dev); struct net_device *parent_dev; struct net *parent_net; + int iflink; bool ret; /* check if this is a batman-adv mesh interface */ if (batadv_softif_is_valid(net_dev)) return true; + iflink = dev_get_iflink(net_dev); + /* no more parents..stop recursion */ - if (dev_get_iflink(net_dev) == 0 || - dev_get_iflink(net_dev) == net_dev->ifindex) + if (iflink == 0 || iflink == net_dev->ifindex) return false; parent_net = batadv_getlink_net(net_dev, net); /* recurse over the parent device */ - parent_dev = __dev_get_by_index((struct net *)parent_net, - dev_get_iflink(net_dev)); + parent_dev = __dev_get_by_index((struct net *)parent_net, iflink); /* if we got a NULL parent_dev there is something broken.. */ if (!parent_dev) { pr_err("Cannot find parent device\n"); From c74d462ff1ad894d6e3052cf28840fb697a60b69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 00:01:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 021/908] batman-adv: Request iflink once in batadv_get_real_netdevice commit 6116ba09423f7d140f0460be6a1644dceaad00da upstream. There is no need to call dev_get_iflink multiple times for the same net_device in batadv_get_real_netdevice. And since some of the ndo_get_iflink callbacks are dynamic (for example via RCUs like in vxcan_get_iflink), it could easily happen that the returned values are not stable. The pre-checks before __dev_get_by_index are then of course bogus. Fixes: 5ed4a460a1d3 ("batman-adv: additional checks for virtual interfaces on top of WiFi") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c b/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c index f9e9de2ae7bb..516f8791003e 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c @@ -221,14 +221,16 @@ static struct net_device *batadv_get_real_netdevice(struct net_device *netdev) struct net_device *real_netdev = NULL; struct net *real_net; struct net *net; - int ifindex; + int iflink; ASSERT_RTNL(); if (!netdev) return NULL; - if (netdev->ifindex == dev_get_iflink(netdev)) { + iflink = dev_get_iflink(netdev); + + if (netdev->ifindex == iflink) { dev_hold(netdev); return netdev; } @@ -238,9 +240,8 @@ static struct net_device *batadv_get_real_netdevice(struct net_device *netdev) goto out; net = dev_net(hard_iface->soft_iface); - ifindex = dev_get_iflink(netdev); real_net = batadv_getlink_net(netdev, net); - real_netdev = dev_get_by_index(real_net, ifindex); + real_netdev = dev_get_by_index(real_net, iflink); out: if (hard_iface) From 0b7fe79d3d92a583d6868b065dcd508e870015a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Sun, 27 Feb 2022 23:23:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 022/908] batman-adv: Don't expect inter-netns unique iflink indices commit 6c1f41afc1dbe59d9d3c8bb0d80b749c119aa334 upstream. The ifindex doesn't have to be unique for multiple network namespaces on the same machine. $ ip netns add test1 $ ip -net test1 link add dummy1 type dummy $ ip netns add test2 $ ip -net test2 link add dummy2 type dummy $ ip -net test1 link show dev dummy1 6: dummy1: mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000 link/ether 96:81:55:1e:dd:85 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff $ ip -net test2 link show dev dummy2 6: dummy2: mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000 link/ether 5a:3c:af:35:07:c3 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff But the batman-adv code to walk through the various layers of virtual interfaces uses this assumption because dev_get_iflink handles it internally and doesn't return the actual netns of the iflink. And dev_get_iflink only documents the situation where ifindex == iflink for physical devices. But only checking for dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_iflink is also not an option because ipoib_get_iflink implements it even when it sometimes returns an iflink != ifindex and sometimes iflink == ifindex. The caller must therefore make sure itself to check both netns and iflink + ifindex for equality. Only when they are equal, a "physical" interface was detected which should stop the traversal. On the other hand, vxcan_get_iflink can also return 0 in case there was currently no valid peer. In this case, it is still necessary to stop. Fixes: b7eddd0b3950 ("batman-adv: prevent using any virtual device created on batman-adv as hard-interface") Fixes: 5ed4a460a1d3 ("batman-adv: additional checks for virtual interfaces on top of WiFi") Reported-by: Sabrina Dubroca Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c b/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c index 516f8791003e..5fe2e63370ad 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c @@ -163,13 +163,15 @@ static bool batadv_is_on_batman_iface(const struct net_device *net_dev) return true; iflink = dev_get_iflink(net_dev); - - /* no more parents..stop recursion */ - if (iflink == 0 || iflink == net_dev->ifindex) + if (iflink == 0) return false; parent_net = batadv_getlink_net(net_dev, net); + /* iflink to itself, most likely physical device */ + if (net == parent_net && iflink == net_dev->ifindex) + return false; + /* recurse over the parent device */ parent_dev = __dev_get_by_index((struct net *)parent_net, iflink); /* if we got a NULL parent_dev there is something broken.. */ @@ -229,8 +231,7 @@ static struct net_device *batadv_get_real_netdevice(struct net_device *netdev) return NULL; iflink = dev_get_iflink(netdev); - - if (netdev->ifindex == iflink) { + if (iflink == 0) { dev_hold(netdev); return netdev; } @@ -241,6 +242,14 @@ static struct net_device *batadv_get_real_netdevice(struct net_device *netdev) net = dev_net(hard_iface->soft_iface); real_net = batadv_getlink_net(netdev, net); + + /* iflink to itself, most likely physical device */ + if (net == real_net && netdev->ifindex == iflink) { + real_netdev = netdev; + dev_hold(real_netdev); + goto out; + } + real_netdev = dev_get_by_index(real_net, iflink); out: From 5950e969812e59d71fa880f14d3229c4572d9d46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 18:01:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 023/908] net: dcb: flush lingering app table entries for unregistered devices commit 91b0383fef06f20b847fa9e4f0e3054ead0b1a1b upstream. If I'm not mistaken (and I don't think I am), the way in which the dcbnl_ops work is that drivers call dcb_ieee_setapp() and this populates the application table with dynamically allocated struct dcb_app_type entries that are kept in the module-global dcb_app_list. However, nobody keeps exact track of these entries, and although dcb_ieee_delapp() is supposed to remove them, nobody does so when the interface goes away (example: driver unbinds from device). So the dcb_app_list will contain lingering entries with an ifindex that no longer matches any device in dcb_app_lookup(). Reclaim the lost memory by listening for the NETDEV_UNREGISTER event and flushing the app table entries of interfaces that are now gone. In fact something like this used to be done as part of the initial commit (blamed below), but it was done in dcbnl_exit() -> dcb_flushapp(), essentially at module_exit time. That became dead code after commit 7a6b6f515f77 ("DCB: fix kconfig option") which essentially merged "tristate config DCB" and "bool config DCBNL" into a single "bool config DCB", so net/dcb/dcbnl.c could not be built as a module anymore. Commit 36b9ad8084bd ("net/dcb: make dcbnl.c explicitly non-modular") recognized this and deleted dcbnl_exit() and dcb_flushapp() altogether, leaving us with the version we have today. Since flushing application table entries can and should be done as soon as the netdevice disappears, fundamentally the commit that is to blame is the one that introduced the design of this API. Fixes: 9ab933ab2cc8 ("dcbnl: add appliction tlv handlers") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/dcb/dcbnl.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/dcb/dcbnl.c b/net/dcb/dcbnl.c index 58a1ab2f37d3..33b4c8c34d49 100644 --- a/net/dcb/dcbnl.c +++ b/net/dcb/dcbnl.c @@ -1939,10 +1939,54 @@ int dcb_ieee_delapp(struct net_device *dev, struct dcb_app *del) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(dcb_ieee_delapp); +static void dcbnl_flush_dev(struct net_device *dev) +{ + struct dcb_app_type *itr, *tmp; + + spin_lock(&dcb_lock); + + list_for_each_entry_safe(itr, tmp, &dcb_app_list, list) { + if (itr->ifindex == dev->ifindex) { + list_del(&itr->list); + kfree(itr); + } + } + + spin_unlock(&dcb_lock); +} + +static int dcbnl_netdevice_event(struct notifier_block *nb, + unsigned long event, void *ptr) +{ + struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr); + + switch (event) { + case NETDEV_UNREGISTER: + if (!dev->dcbnl_ops) + return NOTIFY_DONE; + + dcbnl_flush_dev(dev); + + return NOTIFY_OK; + default: + return NOTIFY_DONE; + } +} + +static struct notifier_block dcbnl_nb __read_mostly = { + .notifier_call = dcbnl_netdevice_event, +}; + static int __init dcbnl_init(void) { + int err; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dcb_app_list); + err = register_netdevice_notifier(&dcbnl_nb); + if (err) + return err; + rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_GETDCB, dcb_doit, NULL, 0); rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_SETDCB, dcb_doit, NULL, 0); From acff2f561ff46081dc5ec3d9f753382867504f05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "D. Wythe" Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 21:25:11 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 024/908] net/smc: fix unexpected SMC_CLC_DECL_ERR_REGRMB error generated by client commit 0537f0a2151375dcf90c1bbfda6a0aaf57164e89 upstream. The main reason for this unexpected SMC_CLC_DECL_ERR_REGRMB in client dues to following execution sequence: Server Conn A: Server Conn B: Client Conn B: smc_lgr_unregister_conn smc_lgr_register_conn smc_clc_send_accept -> smc_rtoken_add smcr_buf_unuse -> Client Conn A: smc_rtoken_delete smc_lgr_unregister_conn() makes current link available to assigned to new incoming connection, while smcr_buf_unuse() has not executed yet, which means that smc_rtoken_add may fail because of insufficient rtoken_entry, reversing their execution order will avoid this problem. Fixes: 3e034725c0d8 ("net/smc: common functions for RMBs and send buffers") Signed-off-by: D. Wythe Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/smc/smc_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/smc/smc_core.c b/net/smc/smc_core.c index 0de788fa43e9..a5fe8c10bb23 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_core.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_core.c @@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ void smc_conn_free(struct smc_connection *conn) if (!lgr) return; smc_cdc_tx_dismiss_slots(conn); - smc_lgr_unregister_conn(conn); smc_buf_unuse(conn); + smc_lgr_unregister_conn(conn); } static void smc_link_clear(struct smc_link *lnk) From b9cea2e600a38b191ab8b692eee5c662258c36a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "D. Wythe" Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 21:25:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 025/908] net/smc: fix unexpected SMC_CLC_DECL_ERR_REGRMB error cause by server commit 4940a1fdf31c39f0806ac831cde333134862030b upstream. The problem of SMC_CLC_DECL_ERR_REGRMB on the server is very clear. Based on the fact that whether a new SMC connection can be accepted or not depends on not only the limit of conn nums, but also the available entries of rtoken. Since the rtoken release is trigger by peer, while the conn nums is decrease by local, tons of thing can happen in this time difference. This only thing that needs to be mentioned is that now all connection creations are completely protected by smc_server_lgr_pending lock, it's enough to check only the available entries in rtokens_used_mask. Fixes: cd6851f30386 ("smc: remote memory buffers (RMBs)") Signed-off-by: D. Wythe Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/smc/smc_core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/smc/smc_core.c b/net/smc/smc_core.c index a5fe8c10bb23..7dc907a45c68 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_core.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_core.c @@ -428,7 +428,8 @@ int smc_conn_create(struct smc_sock *smc, __be32 peer_in_addr, (lgr->role == role) && (lgr->vlan_id == vlan_id) && ((role == SMC_CLNT) || - (lgr->conns_num < SMC_RMBS_PER_LGR_MAX))) { + (lgr->conns_num < SMC_RMBS_PER_LGR_MAX && + !bitmap_full(lgr->rtokens_used_mask, SMC_RMBS_PER_LGR_MAX)))) { /* link group found */ local_contact = SMC_REUSE_CONTACT; conn->lgr = lgr; From c6ae87177503f640841ae3b70504b7b0eb1e45bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qiushi Wu Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2020 14:05:33 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 026/908] firmware: Fix a reference count leak. commit fe3c60684377d5ad9b0569b87ed3e26e12c8173b upstream. kobject_init_and_add() takes reference even when it fails. If this function returns an error, kobject_put() must be called to properly clean up the memory associated with the object. Callback function fw_cfg_sysfs_release_entry() in kobject_put() can handle the pointer "entry" properly. Signed-off-by: Qiushi Wu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200613190533.15712-1-wu000273@umn.edu Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin [sudip: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c b/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c index 586dedadb2f0..59ecbed32042 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c @@ -461,8 +461,10 @@ static int fw_cfg_register_file(const struct fw_cfg_file *f) /* register entry under "/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_key/" */ err = kobject_init_and_add(&entry->kobj, &fw_cfg_sysfs_entry_ktype, fw_cfg_sel_ko, "%d", entry->f.select); - if (err) - goto err_register; + if (err) { + kobject_put(&entry->kobj); + return err; + } /* add raw binary content access */ err = sysfs_create_bin_file(&entry->kobj, &fw_cfg_sysfs_attr_raw); @@ -478,7 +480,6 @@ static int fw_cfg_register_file(const struct fw_cfg_file *f) err_add_raw: kobject_del(&entry->kobj); -err_register: kfree(entry); return err; } From ad2df17f42e9807ffff1584f28e7ba1ea96c9e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 14:25:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 027/908] firmware: qemu_fw_cfg: fix kobject leak in probe error path commit 47a1db8e797da01a1309bf42e0c0d771d4e4d4f3 upstream. An initialised kobject must be freed using kobject_put() to avoid leaking associated resources (e.g. the object name). Commit fe3c60684377 ("firmware: Fix a reference count leak.") "fixed" the leak in the first error path of the file registration helper but left the second one unchanged. This "fix" would however result in a NULL pointer dereference due to the release function also removing the never added entry from the fw_cfg_entry_cache list. This has now been addressed. Fix the remaining kobject leak by restoring the common error path and adding the missing kobject_put(). Fixes: 75f3e8e47f38 ("firmware: introduce sysfs driver for QEMU's fw_cfg device") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6 Cc: Gabriel Somlo Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211201132528.30025-3-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman [sudip: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c b/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c index 59ecbed32042..047d3fd08474 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c @@ -461,15 +461,13 @@ static int fw_cfg_register_file(const struct fw_cfg_file *f) /* register entry under "/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_key/" */ err = kobject_init_and_add(&entry->kobj, &fw_cfg_sysfs_entry_ktype, fw_cfg_sel_ko, "%d", entry->f.select); - if (err) { - kobject_put(&entry->kobj); - return err; - } + if (err) + goto err_put_entry; /* add raw binary content access */ err = sysfs_create_bin_file(&entry->kobj, &fw_cfg_sysfs_attr_raw); if (err) - goto err_add_raw; + goto err_del_entry; /* try adding "/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/" symlink */ fw_cfg_build_symlink(fw_cfg_fname_kset, &entry->kobj, entry->f.name); @@ -478,9 +476,10 @@ static int fw_cfg_register_file(const struct fw_cfg_file *f) fw_cfg_sysfs_cache_enlist(entry); return 0; -err_add_raw: +err_del_entry: kobject_del(&entry->kobj); - kfree(entry); +err_put_entry: + kobject_put(&entry->kobj); return err; } From be4a083b8c3f29bb4df8ee2a22cd2eae1bd26177 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Escande Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 18:32:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 028/908] mac80211: fix forwarded mesh frames AC & queue selection commit 859ae7018316daa4adbc496012dcbbb458d7e510 upstream. There are two problems with the current code that have been highlighted with the AQL feature that is now enbaled by default. First problem is in ieee80211_rx_h_mesh_fwding(), ieee80211_select_queue_80211() is used on received packets to choose the sending AC queue of the forwarding packet although this function should only be called on TX packet (it uses ieee80211_tx_info). This ends with forwarded mesh packets been sent on unrelated random AC queue. To fix that, AC queue can directly be infered from skb->priority which has been extracted from QOS info (see ieee80211_parse_qos()). Second problem is the value of queue_mapping set on forwarded mesh frames via skb_set_queue_mapping() is not the AC of the packet but a hardware queue index. This may or may not work depending on AC to HW queue mapping which is driver specific. Both of these issues lead to improper AC selection while forwarding mesh packets but more importantly due to improper airtime accounting (which is done on a per STA, per AC basis) caused traffic stall with the introduction of AQL. Fixes: cf44012810cc ("mac80211: fix unnecessary frame drops in mesh fwding") Fixes: d3c1597b8d1b ("mac80211: fix forwarded mesh frame queue mapping") Co-developed-by: Remi Pommarel Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel Signed-off-by: Nicolas Escande Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214173214.368862-1-nico.escande@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 13cae95a3466..5a38be9145ff 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2631,13 +2631,13 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_mesh_fwding(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) ether_addr_equal(sdata->vif.addr, hdr->addr3)) return RX_CONTINUE; - ac = ieee80211_select_queue_80211(sdata, skb, hdr); + ac = ieee802_1d_to_ac[skb->priority]; q = sdata->vif.hw_queue[ac]; if (ieee80211_queue_stopped(&local->hw, q)) { IEEE80211_IFSTA_MESH_CTR_INC(ifmsh, dropped_frames_congestion); return RX_DROP_MONITOR; } - skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, q); + skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, ac); if (!--mesh_hdr->ttl) { if (!is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) From 5508126c5b13aebbf32dd24c72031f2ace74383c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 19:35:36 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 029/908] net: stmmac: fix return value of __setup handler commit e01b042e580f1fbf4fd8da467442451da00c7a90 upstream. __setup() handlers should return 1 on success, i.e., the parameter has been handled. A return of 0 causes the "option=value" string to be added to init's environment strings, polluting it. Fixes: 47dd7a540b8a ("net: add support for STMicroelectronics Ethernet controllers.") Fixes: f3240e2811f0 ("stmmac: remove warning when compile as built-in (V2)") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru Cc: Giuseppe Cavallaro Cc: Alexandre Torgue Cc: Jose Abreu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220224033536.25056-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c index 2be2b3055904..a2b45f6ac43e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c @@ -4550,7 +4550,7 @@ static int __init stmmac_cmdline_opt(char *str) char *opt; if (!str || !*str) - return -EINVAL; + return 1; while ((opt = strsep(&str, ",")) != NULL) { if (!strncmp(opt, "debug:", 6)) { if (kstrtoint(opt + 6, 0, &debug)) @@ -4581,11 +4581,11 @@ static int __init stmmac_cmdline_opt(char *str) goto err; } } - return 0; + return 1; err: pr_err("%s: ERROR broken module parameter conversion", __func__); - return -EINVAL; + return 1; } __setup("stmmaceth=", stmmac_cmdline_opt); From 60bcbdab5375de46e89cec868f423a5bb52c7f86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 19:35:28 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 030/908] net: sxgbe: fix return value of __setup handler commit 50e06ddceeea263f57fe92baa677c638ecd65bb6 upstream. __setup() handlers should return 1 on success, i.e., the parameter has been handled. A return of 0 causes the "option=value" string to be added to init's environment strings, polluting it. Fixes: acc18c147b22 ("net: sxgbe: add EEE(Energy Efficient Ethernet) for Samsung sxgbe") Fixes: 1edb9ca69e8a ("net: sxgbe: add basic framework for Samsung 10Gb ethernet driver") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru Cc: Siva Reddy Cc: Girish K S Cc: Byungho An Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220224033528.24640-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/samsung/sxgbe/sxgbe_main.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/samsung/sxgbe/sxgbe_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/samsung/sxgbe/sxgbe_main.c index 6d27eec85fce..4f2ec4ee349e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/samsung/sxgbe/sxgbe_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/samsung/sxgbe/sxgbe_main.c @@ -2282,18 +2282,18 @@ static int __init sxgbe_cmdline_opt(char *str) char *opt; if (!str || !*str) - return -EINVAL; + return 1; while ((opt = strsep(&str, ",")) != NULL) { if (!strncmp(opt, "eee_timer:", 10)) { if (kstrtoint(opt + 10, 0, &eee_timer)) goto err; } } - return 0; + return 1; err: pr_err("%s: ERROR broken module parameter conversion\n", __func__); - return -EINVAL; + return 1; } __setup("sxgbeeth=", sxgbe_cmdline_opt); From b1ee6b9340a38bdb9e5c90f0eac5b22b122c3049 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheyu Ma Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 20:24:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 031/908] net: arcnet: com20020: Fix null-ptr-deref in com20020pci_probe() commit bd6f1fd5d33dfe5d1b4f2502d3694a7cc13f166d upstream. During driver initialization, the pointer of card info, i.e. the variable 'ci' is required. However, the definition of 'com20020pci_id_table' reveals that this field is empty for some devices, which will cause null pointer dereference when initializing these devices. The following log reveals it: [ 3.973806] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] [ 3.973819] RIP: 0010:com20020pci_probe+0x18d/0x13e0 [com20020_pci] [ 3.975181] Call Trace: [ 3.976208] local_pci_probe+0x13f/0x210 [ 3.977248] pci_device_probe+0x34c/0x6d0 [ 3.977255] ? pci_uevent+0x470/0x470 [ 3.978265] really_probe+0x24c/0x8d0 [ 3.978273] __driver_probe_device+0x1b3/0x280 [ 3.979288] driver_probe_device+0x50/0x370 Fix this by checking whether the 'ci' is a null pointer first. Fixes: 8c14f9c70327 ("ARCNET: add com20020 PCI IDs with metadata") Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/arcnet/com20020-pci.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/arcnet/com20020-pci.c b/drivers/net/arcnet/com20020-pci.c index eb7f76753c9c..9f44e2e458df 100644 --- a/drivers/net/arcnet/com20020-pci.c +++ b/drivers/net/arcnet/com20020-pci.c @@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ static int com20020pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, return -ENOMEM; ci = (struct com20020_pci_card_info *)id->driver_data; + if (!ci) + return -EINVAL; + priv->ci = ci; mm = &ci->misc_map; From a0261dc55c01c18e265d0796a2be7ca0c9429728 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2022 19:05:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 032/908] efivars: Respect "block" flag in efivar_entry_set_safe() commit 258dd902022cb10c83671176688074879517fd21 upstream. When the "block" flag is false, the old code would sometimes still call check_var_size(), which wrongly tells ->query_variable_store() that it can block. As far as I can tell, this can't really materialize as a bug at the moment, because ->query_variable_store only does something on X86 with generic EFI, and in that configuration we always take the efivar_entry_set_nonblocking() path. Fixes: ca0e30dcaa53 ("efi: Add nonblocking option to efi_query_variable_store()") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220218180559.1432559-1-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c index fceaafd67ec6..e619ced030d5 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c @@ -763,6 +763,7 @@ int efivar_entry_set_safe(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t vendor, u32 attributes, { const struct efivar_operations *ops; efi_status_t status; + unsigned long varsize; if (!__efivars) return -EINVAL; @@ -785,15 +786,17 @@ int efivar_entry_set_safe(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t vendor, u32 attributes, return efivar_entry_set_nonblocking(name, vendor, attributes, size, data); + varsize = size + ucs2_strsize(name, 1024); if (!block) { if (down_trylock(&efivars_lock)) return -EBUSY; + status = check_var_size_nonblocking(attributes, varsize); } else { if (down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)) return -EINTR; + status = check_var_size(attributes, varsize); } - status = check_var_size(attributes, size + ucs2_strsize(name, 1024)); if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { up(&efivars_lock); return -ENOSPC; From 12aa4bb408eb3bb708379c0286cd69b34c12ab2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vincent Mailhol Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 08:48:14 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 033/908] can: gs_usb: change active_channels's type from atomic_t to u8 commit 035b0fcf02707d3c9c2890dc1484b11aa5335eb1 upstream. The driver uses an atomic_t variable: gs_usb:active_channels to keep track of the number of opened channels in order to only allocate memory for the URBs when this count changes from zero to one. However, the driver does not decrement the counter when an error occurs in gs_can_open(). This issue is fixed by changing the type from atomic_t to u8 and by simplifying the logic accordingly. It is safe to use an u8 here because the network stack big kernel lock (a.k.a. rtnl_mutex) is being hold. For details, please refer to [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/CAMZ6Rq+sHpiw34ijPsmp7vbUpDtJwvVtdV7CvRZJsLixjAFfrg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t Fixes: d08e973a77d1 ("can: gs_usb: Added support for the GS_USB CAN devices") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220214234814.1321599-1-mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c index 6b6fe0fba74f..ab2e019c841f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c @@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ struct gs_can { struct gs_usb { struct gs_can *canch[GS_MAX_INTF]; struct usb_anchor rx_submitted; - atomic_t active_channels; struct usb_device *udev; + u8 active_channels; }; /* 'allocate' a tx context. @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static int gs_can_open(struct net_device *netdev) if (rc) return rc; - if (atomic_add_return(1, &parent->active_channels) == 1) { + if (!parent->active_channels) { for (i = 0; i < GS_MAX_RX_URBS; i++) { struct urb *urb; u8 *buf; @@ -697,6 +697,7 @@ static int gs_can_open(struct net_device *netdev) dev->can.state = CAN_STATE_ERROR_ACTIVE; + parent->active_channels++; if (!(dev->can.ctrlmode & CAN_CTRLMODE_LISTENONLY)) netif_start_queue(netdev); @@ -712,7 +713,8 @@ static int gs_can_close(struct net_device *netdev) netif_stop_queue(netdev); /* Stop polling */ - if (atomic_dec_and_test(&parent->active_channels)) + parent->active_channels--; + if (!parent->active_channels) usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&parent->rx_submitted); /* Stop sending URBs */ @@ -991,8 +993,6 @@ static int gs_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, init_usb_anchor(&dev->rx_submitted); - atomic_set(&dev->active_channels, 0); - usb_set_intfdata(intf, dev); dev->udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf); From 54fd522cbb3ede1e05fdf535fe9aca64c28e1baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 20:46:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 034/908] ARM: 9182/1: mmu: fix returns from early_param() and __setup() functions MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 7b83299e5b9385943a857d59e15cba270df20d7e upstream. early_param() handlers should return 0 on success. __setup() handlers should return 1 on success, i.e., the parameter has been handled. A return of 0 would cause the "option=value" string to be added to init's environment strings, polluting it. ../arch/arm/mm/mmu.c: In function 'test_early_cachepolicy': ../arch/arm/mm/mmu.c:215:1: error: no return statement in function returning non-void [-Werror=return-type] ../arch/arm/mm/mmu.c: In function 'test_noalign_setup': ../arch/arm/mm/mmu.c:221:1: error: no return statement in function returning non-void [-Werror=return-type] Fixes: b849a60e0903 ("ARM: make cr_alignment read-only #ifndef CONFIG_CPU_CP15") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov Cc: Uwe Kleine-König Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: patches@armlinux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/mm/mmu.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c index 4c417f3cbfd5..8073e7823c25 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c @@ -230,12 +230,14 @@ early_param("ecc", early_ecc); static int __init early_cachepolicy(char *p) { pr_warn("cachepolicy kernel parameter not supported without cp15\n"); + return 0; } early_param("cachepolicy", early_cachepolicy); static int __init noalign_setup(char *__unused) { pr_warn("noalign kernel parameter not supported without cp15\n"); + return 1; } __setup("noalign", noalign_setup); From 405878545d2081382aaec05a714b069c51e530b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiasheng Jiang Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 09:45:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 035/908] soc: fsl: qe: Check of ioremap return value [ Upstream commit a222fd8541394b36b13c89d1698d9530afd59a9c ] As the possible failure of the ioremap(), the par_io could be NULL. Therefore it should be better to check it and return error in order to guarantee the success of the initiation. But, I also notice that all the caller like mpc85xx_qe_par_io_init() in `arch/powerpc/platforms/85xx/common.c` don't check the return value of the par_io_init(). Actually, par_io_init() needs to check to handle the potential error. I will submit another patch to fix that. Anyway, par_io_init() itsely should be fixed. Fixes: 7aa1aa6ecec2 ("QE: Move QE from arch/powerpc to drivers/soc") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang Signed-off-by: Li Yang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/soc/fsl/qe/qe_io.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/soc/fsl/qe/qe_io.c b/drivers/soc/fsl/qe/qe_io.c index 7ae59abc7863..127a4a836e67 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/fsl/qe/qe_io.c +++ b/drivers/soc/fsl/qe/qe_io.c @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ int par_io_init(struct device_node *np) if (ret) return ret; par_io = ioremap(res.start, resource_size(&res)); + if (!par_io) + return -ENOMEM; num_ports = of_get_property(np, "num-ports", NULL); if (num_ports) From c83366d0b3508fa9d35d29e5fe1d8ea592c917f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jia-Ju Bai Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 04:37:27 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 036/908] net: chelsio: cxgb3: check the return value of pci_find_capability() [ Upstream commit 767b9825ed1765894e569a3d698749d40d83762a ] The function pci_find_capability() in t3_prep_adapter() can fail, so its return value should be checked. Fixes: 4d22de3e6cc4 ("Add support for the latest 1G/10G Chelsio adapter, T3") Reported-by: TOTE Robot Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/t3_hw.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/t3_hw.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/t3_hw.c index a89721fad633..29220141e4e4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/t3_hw.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/t3_hw.c @@ -3677,6 +3677,8 @@ int t3_prep_adapter(struct adapter *adapter, const struct adapter_info *ai, MAC_STATS_ACCUM_SECS : (MAC_STATS_ACCUM_SECS * 10); adapter->params.pci.vpd_cap_addr = pci_find_capability(adapter->pdev, PCI_CAP_ID_VPD); + if (!adapter->params.pci.vpd_cap_addr) + return -ENODEV; ret = get_vpd_params(adapter, &adapter->params.vpd); if (ret < 0) return ret; From 0425baf4cbfb9f91b364be85f49487ec0071bd5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiasheng Jiang Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 18:00:20 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 037/908] nl80211: Handle nla_memdup failures in handle_nan_filter [ Upstream commit 6ad27f522cb3b210476daf63ce6ddb6568c0508b ] As there's potential for failure of the nla_memdup(), check the return value. Fixes: a442b761b24b ("cfg80211: add add_nan_func / del_nan_func") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220301100020.3801187-1-jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index f630fa2e3164..bbc3c876a5d8 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -11257,6 +11257,9 @@ static int handle_nan_filter(struct nlattr *attr_filter, i = 0; nla_for_each_nested(attr, attr_filter, rem) { filter[i].filter = nla_memdup(attr, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!filter[i].filter) + goto err; + filter[i].len = nla_len(attr); i++; } @@ -11269,6 +11272,15 @@ static int handle_nan_filter(struct nlattr *attr_filter, } return 0; + +err: + i = 0; + nla_for_each_nested(attr, attr_filter, rem) { + kfree(filter[i].filter); + i++; + } + kfree(filter); + return -ENOMEM; } static int nl80211_nan_add_func(struct sk_buff *skb, From 247c7fe81ef0b743edf124e2cea985ac883cd265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans de Goede Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:39:38 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 038/908] Input: elan_i2c - move regulator_[en|dis]able() out of elan_[en|dis]able_power() commit 81a36d8ce554b82b0a08e2b95d0bd44fcbff339b upstream. elan_disable_power() is called conditionally on suspend, where as elan_enable_power() is always called on resume. This leads to an imbalance in the regulator's enable count. Move the regulator_[en|dis]able() calls out of elan_[en|dis]able_power() in preparation of fixing this. No functional changes intended. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131135436.29638-1-hdegoede@redhat.com [dtor: consolidate elan_[en|dis]able() into elan_set_power()] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c | 62 ++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c b/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c index 73e5d485d849..b9d124a02e44 100644 --- a/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c +++ b/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c @@ -137,55 +137,21 @@ static int elan_get_fwinfo(u16 ic_type, u16 *validpage_count, return 0; } -static int elan_enable_power(struct elan_tp_data *data) +static int elan_set_power(struct elan_tp_data *data, bool on) { int repeat = ETP_RETRY_COUNT; int error; - error = regulator_enable(data->vcc); - if (error) { - dev_err(&data->client->dev, - "failed to enable regulator: %d\n", error); - return error; - } - do { - error = data->ops->power_control(data->client, true); + error = data->ops->power_control(data->client, on); if (error >= 0) return 0; msleep(30); } while (--repeat > 0); - dev_err(&data->client->dev, "failed to enable power: %d\n", error); - return error; -} - -static int elan_disable_power(struct elan_tp_data *data) -{ - int repeat = ETP_RETRY_COUNT; - int error; - - do { - error = data->ops->power_control(data->client, false); - if (!error) { - error = regulator_disable(data->vcc); - if (error) { - dev_err(&data->client->dev, - "failed to disable regulator: %d\n", - error); - /* Attempt to power the chip back up */ - data->ops->power_control(data->client, true); - break; - } - - return 0; - } - - msleep(30); - } while (--repeat > 0); - - dev_err(&data->client->dev, "failed to disable power: %d\n", error); + dev_err(&data->client->dev, "failed to set power %s: %d\n", + on ? "on" : "off", error); return error; } @@ -1206,9 +1172,19 @@ static int __maybe_unused elan_suspend(struct device *dev) /* Enable wake from IRQ */ data->irq_wake = (enable_irq_wake(client->irq) == 0); } else { - ret = elan_disable_power(data); + ret = elan_set_power(data, false); + if (ret) + goto err; + + ret = regulator_disable(data->vcc); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "error %d disabling regulator\n", ret); + /* Attempt to power the chip back up */ + elan_set_power(data, true); + } } +err: mutex_unlock(&data->sysfs_mutex); return ret; } @@ -1224,7 +1200,13 @@ static int __maybe_unused elan_resume(struct device *dev) data->irq_wake = false; } - error = elan_enable_power(data); + error = regulator_enable(data->vcc); + if (error) { + dev_err(dev, "error %d enabling regulator\n", error); + goto err; + } + + error = elan_set_power(data, true); if (error) { dev_err(dev, "power up when resuming failed: %d\n", error); goto err; From 674caa2728b25d556dd58b9794fa4964edd16918 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans de Goede Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:39:50 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 039/908] Input: elan_i2c - fix regulator enable count imbalance after suspend/resume commit 04b7762e37c95d9b965d16bb0e18dbd1fa2e2861 upstream. Before these changes elan_suspend() would only disable the regulator when device_may_wakeup() returns false; whereas elan_resume() would unconditionally enable it, leading to an enable count imbalance when device_may_wakeup() returns true. This triggers the "WARN_ON(regulator->enable_count)" in regulator_put() when the elan_i2c driver gets unbound, this happens e.g. with the hot-plugable dock with Elan I2C touchpad for the Asus TF103C 2-in-1. Fix this by making the regulator_enable() call also be conditional on device_may_wakeup() returning false. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131135436.29638-2-hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c b/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c index b9d124a02e44..3c7281248432 100644 --- a/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c +++ b/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c @@ -1195,17 +1195,17 @@ static int __maybe_unused elan_resume(struct device *dev) struct elan_tp_data *data = i2c_get_clientdata(client); int error; - if (device_may_wakeup(dev) && data->irq_wake) { + if (!device_may_wakeup(dev)) { + error = regulator_enable(data->vcc); + if (error) { + dev_err(dev, "error %d enabling regulator\n", error); + goto err; + } + } else if (data->irq_wake) { disable_irq_wake(client->irq); data->irq_wake = false; } - error = regulator_enable(data->vcc); - if (error) { - dev_err(dev, "error %d enabling regulator\n", error); - goto err; - } - error = elan_set_power(data, true); if (error) { dev_err(dev, "power up when resuming failed: %d\n", error); From 24fb6fbe7ec004459b3c3cabe82ff8c13146e7d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: William Mahon Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 18:26:22 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 040/908] HID: add mapping for KEY_ALL_APPLICATIONS commit 327b89f0acc4c20a06ed59e4d9af7f6d804dc2e2 upstream. This patch adds a new key definition for KEY_ALL_APPLICATIONS and aliases KEY_DASHBOARD to it. It also maps the 0x0c/0x2a2 usage code to KEY_ALL_APPLICATIONS. Signed-off-by: William Mahon Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303035618.1.I3a7746ad05d270161a18334ae06e3b6db1a1d339@changeid Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-debug.c | 4 +++- drivers/hid/hid-input.c | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/input-event-codes.h | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-debug.c b/drivers/hid/hid-debug.c index a0bcbb633b67..5d0e150c21ff 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-debug.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-debug.c @@ -835,7 +835,9 @@ static const char *keys[KEY_MAX + 1] = { [KEY_F22] = "F22", [KEY_F23] = "F23", [KEY_F24] = "F24", [KEY_PLAYCD] = "PlayCD", [KEY_PAUSECD] = "PauseCD", [KEY_PROG3] = "Prog3", - [KEY_PROG4] = "Prog4", [KEY_SUSPEND] = "Suspend", + [KEY_PROG4] = "Prog4", + [KEY_ALL_APPLICATIONS] = "AllApplications", + [KEY_SUSPEND] = "Suspend", [KEY_CLOSE] = "Close", [KEY_PLAY] = "Play", [KEY_FASTFORWARD] = "FastForward", [KEY_BASSBOOST] = "BassBoost", [KEY_PRINT] = "Print", [KEY_HP] = "HP", diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-input.c b/drivers/hid/hid-input.c index 96bf221ba572..97782ceb407e 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-input.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-input.c @@ -1026,6 +1026,8 @@ static void hidinput_configure_usage(struct hid_input *hidinput, struct hid_fiel case 0x28b: map_key_clear(KEY_FORWARDMAIL); break; case 0x28c: map_key_clear(KEY_SEND); break; + case 0x2a2: map_key_clear(KEY_ALL_APPLICATIONS); break; + case 0x2c7: map_key_clear(KEY_KBDINPUTASSIST_PREV); break; case 0x2c8: map_key_clear(KEY_KBDINPUTASSIST_NEXT); break; case 0x2c9: map_key_clear(KEY_KBDINPUTASSIST_PREVGROUP); break; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/input-event-codes.h b/include/uapi/linux/input-event-codes.h index bce76e55a3c8..7711447c02b4 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/input-event-codes.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/input-event-codes.h @@ -278,7 +278,8 @@ #define KEY_PAUSECD 201 #define KEY_PROG3 202 #define KEY_PROG4 203 -#define KEY_DASHBOARD 204 /* AL Dashboard */ +#define KEY_ALL_APPLICATIONS 204 /* AC Desktop Show All Applications */ +#define KEY_DASHBOARD KEY_ALL_APPLICATIONS #define KEY_SUSPEND 205 #define KEY_CLOSE 206 /* AC Close */ #define KEY_PLAY 207 From da0acf94045bb41cb0dbbb675f1ae5ae94071bc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 20:29:01 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 041/908] memfd: fix F_SEAL_WRITE after shmem huge page allocated commit f2b277c4d1c63a85127e8aa2588e9cc3bd21cb99 upstream. Wangyong reports: after enabling tmpfs filesystem to support transparent hugepage with the following command: echo always > /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled the docker program tries to add F_SEAL_WRITE through the following command, but it fails unexpectedly with errno EBUSY: fcntl(5, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_WRITE) = -1. That is because memfd_tag_pins() and memfd_wait_for_pins() were never updated for shmem huge pages: checking page_mapcount() against page_count() is hopeless on THP subpages - they need to check total_mapcount() against page_count() on THP heads only. Make memfd_tag_pins() (compared > 1) as strict as memfd_wait_for_pins() (compared != 1): either can be justified, but given the non-atomic total_mapcount() calculation, it is better now to be strict. Bear in mind that total_mapcount() itself scans all of the THP subpages, when choosing to take an XA_CHECK_SCHED latency break. Also fix the unlikely xa_is_value() case in memfd_wait_for_pins(): if a page has been swapped out since memfd_tag_pins(), then its refcount must have fallen, and so it can safely be untagged. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a4f79248-df75-2c8c-3df-ba3317ccb5da@google.com Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Reported-by: Zeal Robot Reported-by: wangyong Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) Cc: CGEL ZTE Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Song Liu Cc: Yang Yang Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/shmem.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 5a7b182f7845..e639188f9da4 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -2689,7 +2689,8 @@ static void shmem_tag_pins(struct address_space *mapping) slot = radix_tree_iter_retry(&iter); continue; } - } else if (page_count(page) - page_mapcount(page) > 1) { + } else if (!PageTail(page) && page_count(page) != + hpage_nr_pages(page) + total_mapcount(page)) { radix_tree_tag_set(&mapping->page_tree, iter.index, SHMEM_TAG_PINNED); } @@ -2749,8 +2750,8 @@ static int shmem_wait_for_pins(struct address_space *mapping) page = NULL; } - if (page && - page_count(page) - page_mapcount(page) != 1) { + if (page && page_count(page) != + hpage_nr_pages(page) + total_mapcount(page)) { if (scan < LAST_SCAN) goto continue_resched; From 3210dd5bcea96769c53f8c1f5e15aeb915999e36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 21:39:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 042/908] net: dcb: disable softirqs in dcbnl_flush_dev() commit 10b6bb62ae1a49ee818fc479cf57b8900176773e upstream. Ido Schimmel points out that since commit 52cff74eef5d ("dcbnl : Disable software interrupts before taking dcb_lock"), the DCB API can be called by drivers from softirq context. One such in-tree example is the chelsio cxgb4 driver: dcb_rpl -> cxgb4_dcb_handle_fw_update -> dcb_ieee_setapp If the firmware for this driver happened to send an event which resulted in a call to dcb_ieee_setapp() at the exact same time as another DCB-enabled interface was unregistering on the same CPU, the softirq would deadlock, because the interrupted process was already holding the dcb_lock in dcbnl_flush_dev(). Fix this unlikely event by using spin_lock_bh() in dcbnl_flush_dev() as in the rest of the dcbnl code. Fixes: 91b0383fef06 ("net: dcb: flush lingering app table entries for unregistered devices") Reported-by: Ido Schimmel Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220302193939.1368823-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/dcb/dcbnl.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/dcb/dcbnl.c b/net/dcb/dcbnl.c index 33b4c8c34d49..ef7029ec23ad 100644 --- a/net/dcb/dcbnl.c +++ b/net/dcb/dcbnl.c @@ -1943,7 +1943,7 @@ static void dcbnl_flush_dev(struct net_device *dev) { struct dcb_app_type *itr, *tmp; - spin_lock(&dcb_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&dcb_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(itr, tmp, &dcb_app_list, list) { if (itr->ifindex == dev->ifindex) { @@ -1952,7 +1952,7 @@ static void dcbnl_flush_dev(struct net_device *dev) } } - spin_unlock(&dcb_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&dcb_lock); } static int dcbnl_netdevice_event(struct notifier_block *nb, From db167d37f93f9ca8e4bda62f6a895755e534f7b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huang Pei Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 19:07:48 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 043/908] hamradio: fix macro redefine warning commit 16517829f2e02f096fb5ea9083d160381127faf3 upstream. MIPS/IA64 define END as assembly function ending, which conflict with END definition in mkiss.c, just undef it at first Reported-by: lkp@intel.com Signed-off-by: Huang Pei Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c index cbd637a3257b..f0bd65942054 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c +++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ #define AX_MTU 236 +/* some arch define END as assembly function ending, just undef it */ +#undef END /* SLIP/KISS protocol characters. */ #define END 0300 /* indicates end of frame */ #define ESC 0333 /* indicates byte stuffing */ From c9fcc1545c3bb19f4e04b1c82bf5c2856fef39bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 19:01:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 044/908] Linux 4.14.270 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307091636.146155347@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 560ecede8070..6b4a4650a507 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 14 -SUBLEVEL = 269 +SUBLEVEL = 270 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Petit Gorille From cb5d0103b1f8fc3aa997a696472fd774c67a1b1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tadeusz Struk Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 18:38:35 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 045/908] Revert "ANDROID: incremental-fs: fix mount_fs issue" This reverts commit 4ab5bac1598e3ed91a6267f6cada336467312112 and 2da7ed1f781983a2bc818f1d6f7cc9f2fa3ff1d2. This is to fix the incrementalinstall test. Can now install the same apk twice, and repeated installs are stable. Bug: 217661925 Bug: 219731048 Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk Change-Id: I77f038b296041b329060ff9350e4c9711f5ed91d --- fs/incfs/vfs.c | 65 ++++++++++++++------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/incfs/vfs.c b/fs/incfs/vfs.c index 1ac3dd859a2d..194c3b08a0bd 100644 --- a/fs/incfs/vfs.c +++ b/fs/incfs/vfs.c @@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ static struct mount_info *get_mount_info(struct super_block *sb) { struct mount_info *result = sb->s_fs_info; + WARN_ON(!result); return result; } @@ -682,7 +683,7 @@ static int iterate_incfs_dir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) struct mount_info *mi = get_mount_info(file_superblock(file)); bool root; - if (!dir || !mi) { + if (!dir) { error = -EBADF; goto out; } @@ -1846,9 +1847,6 @@ static int dir_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct dentry *trap; int error = 0; - if (!mi) - return -EBADF; - error = mutex_lock_interruptible(&mi->mi_dir_struct_mutex); if (error) return error; @@ -2096,9 +2094,6 @@ static ssize_t incfs_getxattr(struct dentry *d, const char *name, char *stored_value; size_t stored_size; - if (!mi) - return -EBADF; - if (di && di->backing_path.dentry) return vfs_getxattr(di->backing_path.dentry, name, value, size); @@ -2135,9 +2130,6 @@ static ssize_t incfs_setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char *name, void **stored_value; size_t *stored_size; - if (!mi) - return -EBADF; - if (di && di->backing_path.dentry) return vfs_setxattr(di->backing_path.dentry, name, value, size, flags); @@ -2178,11 +2170,6 @@ static ssize_t incfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size) return vfs_listxattr(di->backing_path.dentry, list, size); } -static int incfs_test_super(struct super_block *s, void *p) -{ - return s->s_fs_info != NULL; -} - struct dentry *incfs_mount_fs(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data) { @@ -2192,8 +2179,7 @@ struct dentry *incfs_mount_fs(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, struct dentry *index_dir; struct super_block *src_fs_sb = NULL; struct inode *root_inode = NULL; - struct super_block *sb = sget(type, incfs_test_super, set_anon_super, - flags, NULL); + struct super_block *sb = sget(type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL); int error = 0; if (IS_ERR(sb)) @@ -2234,19 +2220,13 @@ struct dentry *incfs_mount_fs(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, src_fs_sb = backing_dir_path.dentry->d_sb; sb->s_maxbytes = src_fs_sb->s_maxbytes; - if (!sb->s_fs_info) { - mi = incfs_alloc_mount_info(sb, &options, &backing_dir_path); + mi = incfs_alloc_mount_info(sb, &options, &backing_dir_path); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mi)) { - error = PTR_ERR(mi); - pr_err("incfs: Error allocating mount info. %d\n", - error); - mi = NULL; - goto err; - } - sb->s_fs_info = mi; - } else { - mi = sb->s_fs_info; + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mi)) { + error = PTR_ERR(mi); + pr_err("incfs: Error allocating mount info. %d\n", error); + mi = NULL; + goto err; } index_dir = open_or_create_index_dir(backing_dir_path.dentry); @@ -2258,24 +2238,23 @@ struct dentry *incfs_mount_fs(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, } mi->mi_index_dir = index_dir; + sb->s_fs_info = mi; root_inode = fetch_regular_inode(sb, backing_dir_path.dentry); if (IS_ERR(root_inode)) { error = PTR_ERR(root_inode); goto err; } + sb->s_root = d_make_root(root_inode); if (!sb->s_root) { - sb->s_root = d_make_root(root_inode); - if (!sb->s_root) { - error = -ENOMEM; - goto err; - } - error = incfs_init_dentry(sb->s_root, &backing_dir_path); - if (error) - goto err; + error = -ENOMEM; + goto err; } + error = incfs_init_dentry(sb->s_root, &backing_dir_path); + if (error) + goto err; - mi->mi_backing_dir_path = backing_dir_path; + path_put(&backing_dir_path); sb->s_flags |= SB_ACTIVE; pr_debug("incfs: mount\n"); @@ -2294,9 +2273,6 @@ static int incfs_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) struct mount_info *mi = get_mount_info(sb); int err = 0; - if (!mi) - return err; - sync_filesystem(sb); err = parse_options(&options, (char *)data); if (err) @@ -2315,19 +2291,14 @@ void incfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb) struct mount_info *mi = sb->s_fs_info; pr_debug("incfs: unmount\n"); - vfs_rmdir(d_inode(mi->mi_backing_dir_path.dentry), mi->mi_index_dir); - kill_anon_super(sb); incfs_free_mount_info(mi); - sb->s_fs_info = NULL; + generic_shutdown_super(sb); } static int show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) { struct mount_info *mi = get_mount_info(root->d_sb); - if (!mi) - return -EBADF; - seq_printf(m, ",read_timeout_ms=%u", mi->mi_options.read_timeout_ms); seq_printf(m, ",readahead=%u", mi->mi_options.readahead_pages); if (mi->mi_options.read_log_pages != 0) { From bd63aa4ff3c9113ff0a97023b6e688e0b37e6fb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Borislav Petkov Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 08:51:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 046/908] x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() commit a5ce9f2bb665d1d2b31f139a02dbaa2dfbb62fa6 upstream. Merge the test whether the CPU supports STIBP into the test which determines whether STIBP is required. Thus try to simplify what is already an insane logic. Remove a superfluous newline in a comment, while at it. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Anthony Steinhauser Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200615065806.GB14668@zn.tnic [fllinden@amazon.com: fixed contextual conflict (comment) for 4.14] Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 ++++--------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index fcea3aa19c23..44853d2d9a0e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -756,10 +756,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) } /* - * If enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not + * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not * required. */ - if (!smt_possible || spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || + !smt_possible || + spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) return; /* @@ -771,12 +773,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED; - /* - * If STIBP is not available, clear the STIBP mode. - */ - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; - spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode; set_mode: @@ -1255,7 +1251,6 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) return 0; - /* * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead, From 3862830dd5b8d6769466f648cf259766b0f686a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 14:01:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 047/908] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd commit f8a66d608a3e471e1202778c2a36cbdc96bae73b upstream. Currently Linux prevents usage of retpoline,amd on !AMD hardware, this is unfriendly and gets in the way of testing. Remove this restriction. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.487348118@infradead.org [fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14 (no Hygon in 4.14)] Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 44853d2d9a0e..57f180a65de3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -839,12 +839,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } - if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD && - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { - pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - } - spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option, mitigation_options[i].secure); return cmd; From 35c13d13becb5b951ea0fc708dda03fe900cf879 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 20:57:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 048/908] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE commit d45476d9832409371537013ebdd8dc1a7781f97a upstream. The RETPOLINE_AMD name is unfortunate since it isn't necessarily AMD only, in fact Hygon also uses it. Furthermore it will likely be sufficient for some Intel processors. Therefore rename the thing to RETPOLINE_LFENCE to better describe what it is. Add the spectre_v2=retpoline,lfence option as an alias to spectre_v2=retpoline,amd to preserve existing setups. However, the output of /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 will be changed. [ bp: Fix typos, massage. ] Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner [fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 12 +++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 29 +++++++++++++++--------- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index e08866cd2287..094b8f2d9821 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 270448b178a7..c5cfd3e884c1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), \ __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ - __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD + __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE #else jmp *\reg #endif @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), \ __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\ - __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD + __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE #else call *\reg #endif @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ "lfence;\n" \ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD) + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr) #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ "lfence;\n" \ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD) + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) #endif @@ -223,8 +223,8 @@ /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_NONE, - SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, - SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD, + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE, + SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE, SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 57f180a65de3..833e2474ff84 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, - SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, }; enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { @@ -781,8 +781,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", - [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", - [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines", + [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE", [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", }; @@ -794,7 +794,8 @@ static const struct { { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false }, { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true }, { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false }, - { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false }, + { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false }, + { "retpoline,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false }, { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false }, { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, }; @@ -832,13 +833,19 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) } if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE || - cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) { pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } + if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) { + pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option, mitigation_options[i].secure); return cmd; @@ -873,9 +880,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) goto retpoline_auto; break; - case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD: + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) - goto retpoline_amd; + goto retpoline_lfence; break; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) @@ -891,17 +898,17 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) retpoline_auto: if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) { - retpoline_amd: + retpoline_lfence: if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) { pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n"); goto retpoline_generic; } - mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD; - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD); + mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE; + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); } else { retpoline_generic: - mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC; + mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); } diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 8418462298e7..bb5861adb5a0 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCEs for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ From 716c06c7196f2ff22777b5bb3c713094ec677a93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 20:57:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 049/908] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options commit 1e19da8522c81bf46b335f84137165741e0d82b7 upstream. Thanks to the chaps at VUsec it is now clear that eIBRS is not sufficient, therefore allow enabling of retpolines along with eIBRS. Add spectre_v2=eibrs, spectre_v2=eibrs,lfence and spectre_v2=eibrs,retpoline options to explicitly pick your preferred means of mitigation. Since there's new mitigations there's also user visible changes in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 to reflect these new mitigations. [ bp: Massage commit message, trim error messages, do more precise eIBRS mode checking. ] Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Patrick Colp Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner [fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14 (no Hygon)] Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 131 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index c5cfd3e884c1..19829b00e4fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -225,7 +225,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_NONE, SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE, - SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, + SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS, + SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, + SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE, }; /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 833e2474ff84..59265539d4b1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -622,6 +622,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, }; enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { @@ -694,6 +697,13 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; } +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ + return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE); +} + static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) { @@ -761,7 +771,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) + spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return; /* @@ -783,7 +793,9 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines", [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE", - [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines", }; static const struct { @@ -797,6 +809,9 @@ static const struct { { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false }, { "retpoline,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false }, { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false }, + { "eibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, false }, + { "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false }, + { "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false }, { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, }; @@ -834,15 +849,29 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE || - cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) && + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) { - pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option); + pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { + pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } - if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) && + if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) { - pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option); + pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } @@ -851,6 +880,24 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return cmd; } +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void) +{ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) { + pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!"); + return SPECTRE_V2_NONE; + } + + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) { + pr_err("LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n"); + return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; + } + return SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE; + } + + return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; +} + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -871,48 +918,60 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { - mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED; - /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ - x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); - goto specv2_set_mode; + mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS; + break; } - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) - goto retpoline_auto; + + mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline(); break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE: - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) - goto retpoline_lfence; + mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE; break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC: - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) - goto retpoline_generic; + mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE: - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) - goto retpoline_auto; + mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline(); + break; + + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS; + break; + + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; + break; + + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE; break; } - pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!"); - return; -retpoline_auto: - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) { - retpoline_lfence: - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) { - pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n"); - goto retpoline_generic; - } - mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE; + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { + /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + } + + switch (mode) { + case SPECTRE_V2_NONE: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: + break; + + case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE); + /* fallthrough */ + + case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); - } else { - retpoline_generic: - mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); + break; } -specv2_set_mode: spectre_v2_enabled = mode; pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); @@ -938,7 +997,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not * enable IBRS around firmware calls. */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } @@ -1596,7 +1655,7 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf) static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { From d2109c347ec237f6a4cf4d44336abdeeab82ec8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 20:57:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 050/908] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc commit 5ad3eb1132453b9795ce5fd4572b1c18b292cca9 upstream. Update the doc with the new fun. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner [fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 42 +++++++++++++------ .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++- 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index 985181dba0ba..dca6d3baf01d 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the victim's data. +Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the +Branch History Buffer (BHB) to speculatively steer an indirect branch +to a specific Branch Target Buffer (BTB) entry, even if the entry isn't +associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically, +the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of +Enhanced IBRS. + +Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via +unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable +unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines). +For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use +retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines). + Attack scenarios ---------------- @@ -364,13 +377,15 @@ The possible values in this file are: - Kernel status: - ==================================== ================================= - 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable - 'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation - 'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation - 'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation - 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation - ==================================== ================================= + ======================================== ================================= + 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable + 'Mitigation: None' Vulnerable, no mitigation + 'Mitigation: Retpolines' Use Retpoline thunks + 'Mitigation: LFENCE' Use LFENCE instructions + 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation + 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines' Hardware-focused + Retpolines + 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE' Hardware-focused + LFENCE + ======================================== ================================= - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only). @@ -584,12 +599,13 @@ kernel command line. Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: - retpoline - replace indirect branches - retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline - retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk + retpoline auto pick between generic,lfence + retpoline,generic Retpolines + retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch + retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence + eibrs enhanced IBRS + eibrs,retpoline enhanced IBRS + Retpolines + eibrs,lfence enhanced IBRS + LFENCE Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2=auto. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index d840466c8b21..55ad746d3574 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4150,8 +4150,12 @@ Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: retpoline - replace indirect branches - retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline - retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk + retpoline,generic - Retpolines + retpoline,lfence - LFENCE; indirect branch + retpoline,amd - alias for retpoline,lfence + eibrs - enhanced IBRS + eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines + eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2=auto. From 383973dc1a9dfc7baf12652b9e75498bef16aed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2022 11:49:08 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 051/908] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting commit 44a3918c8245ab10c6c9719dd12e7a8d291980d8 upstream. With unprivileged eBPF enabled, eIBRS (without retpoline) is vulnerable to Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks. When both are enabled, print a warning message and report it in the 'spectre_v2' sysfs vulnerabilities file. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner [fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ include/linux/bpf.h | 11 +++++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 59265539d4b1..383ea4440aac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "cpu.h" @@ -607,6 +608,16 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } #endif +#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n" + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && !new_state) + pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); +} +#endif + static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) { int len = strlen(opt); @@ -950,6 +961,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } + if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) + pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; @@ -1685,6 +1699,20 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void) return ""; } +static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + ibpb_state(), + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", + stibp_state(), + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "", + spectre_v2_module_string()); +} + static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) { return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); @@ -1707,12 +1735,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]); case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2: - return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], - ibpb_state(), - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", - stibp_state(), - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "", - spectre_v2_module_string()); + return spectre_v2_show_state(buf); case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]); diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index e9e87599338e..3aa05ea79ba1 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -337,6 +337,11 @@ static inline int bpf_map_attr_numa_node(const union bpf_attr *attr) attr->numa_node : NUMA_NO_NODE; } +static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void) +{ + return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled; +} + #else static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd) { @@ -400,6 +405,12 @@ static inline void __dev_map_insert_ctx(struct bpf_map *map, u32 index) static inline void __dev_map_flush(struct bpf_map *map) { } + +static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ #if defined(CONFIG_STREAM_PARSER) && defined(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index c9a3e61c88f8..4258db3a6470 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -243,6 +243,11 @@ static int sysrq_sysctl_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + +void __weak unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state) +{ +} + static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -260,6 +265,9 @@ static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return -EPERM; *(int *)table->data = unpriv_enable; } + + unpriv_ebpf_notify(unpriv_enable); + return ret; } #endif From 85938688be23ecd36a06757096896b2779b80d97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kim Phillips Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 11:23:15 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 052/908] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD commit 244d00b5dd4755f8df892c86cab35fb2cfd4f14b upstream. AMD retpoline may be susceptible to speculation. The speculation execution window for an incorrect indirect branch prediction using LFENCE/JMP sequence may potentially be large enough to allow exploitation using Spectre V2. By default, don't use retpoline,lfence on AMD. Instead, use the generic retpoline. Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 383ea4440aac..b77daef95cb2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -898,14 +898,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_NONE; } - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) { - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) { - pr_err("LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n"); - return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; - } - return SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE; - } - return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; } From 416ec8f017b368ab953f624b075a7b0ffd296b9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kim Phillips Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 11:23:16 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 053/908] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper commit e9b6013a7ce31535b04b02ba99babefe8a8599fa upstream. Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation on AMD Processors" whitepaper. Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index dca6d3baf01d..6bd97cd50d62 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the speculative execution. Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory. -See :ref:`[1] ` :ref:`[5] ` :ref:`[7] ` -:ref:`[10] ` :ref:`[11] `. +See :ref:`[1] ` :ref:`[5] ` :ref:`[6] ` +:ref:`[7] ` :ref:`[10] ` :ref:`[11] `. Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass) --------------------------------------- @@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ AMD white papers: .. _spec_ref6: -[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors `_. +[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors `_. ARM white papers: From 2b871b5fedb85c1962ccab26c64bef9bf6f377d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 14:31:49 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 054/908] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation commit eafd987d4a82c7bb5aa12f0e3b4f8f3dea93e678 upstream. With: f8a66d608a3e ("x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd") it became possible to enable the LFENCE "retpoline" on Intel. However, Intel doesn't recommend it, as it has some weaknesses compared to retpoline. Now AMD doesn't recommend it either. It can still be left available as a cmdline option. It's faster than retpoline but is weaker in certain scenarios -- particularly SMT, but even non-SMT may be vulnerable in some cases. So just unconditionally warn if the user requests it on the cmdline. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index b77daef95cb2..c9117ca38ec7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -608,6 +608,7 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } #endif +#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n" #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n" #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL @@ -929,6 +930,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE: + pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG); mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE; break; @@ -1693,6 +1695,9 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void) static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) { + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n"); + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n"); From 38c557efd4cd5e59dee1d021009278b491523fee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 14:32:28 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 055/908] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT commit 0de05d056afdb00eca8c7bbb0c79a3438daf700c upstream. The commit 44a3918c8245 ("x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting") added a warning for the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" combination, which has been shown to be vulnerable against Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks. However, there's no warning about the "eIBRS + LFENCE retpoline + unprivileged eBPF" combo. The LFENCE adds more protection by shortening the speculation window after a mispredicted branch. That makes an attack significantly more difficult, even with unprivileged eBPF. So at least for now the logic doesn't warn about that combination. But if you then add SMT into the mix, the SMT attack angle weakens the effectiveness of the LFENCE considerably. So extend the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" warning to also include the "eIBRS + LFENCE + unprivileged eBPF + SMT" case. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Suggested-by: Alyssa Milburn Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c9117ca38ec7..cf8d3f69ab30 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -610,12 +610,27 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } #define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n" #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n" +#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n" #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state) { - if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && !new_state) + if (new_state) + return; + + /* Unprivileged eBPF is enabled */ + + switch (spectre_v2_enabled) { + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: + if (sched_smt_active()) + pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG); + break; + default: + break; + } } #endif @@ -1075,6 +1090,10 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) { mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); + if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() && + spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE) + pr_warn_once(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG); + switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: break; @@ -1699,7 +1718,11 @@ static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n"); if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS with unprivileged eBPF\n"); + + if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() && + spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n"); return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], From d0f9db16eb4e3c0a8b5dd23c746f9faeb4b24ccb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Price Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 16:28:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 056/908] arm/arm64: Provide a wrapper for SMCCC 1.1 calls commit 541625ac47ce9d0835efaee0fcbaa251b0000a37 upstream. SMCCC 1.1 calls may use either HVC or SMC depending on the PSCI conduit. Rather than coding this in every call site, provide a macro which uses the correct instruction. The macro also handles the case where no conduit is configured/available returning a not supported error in res, along with returning the conduit used for the call. This allow us to remove some duplicated code and will be useful later when adding paravirtualized time hypervisor calls. Signed-off-by: Steven Price Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h index 18863d56273c..5d883c4d82ab 100644 --- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h @@ -311,5 +311,63 @@ asmlinkage void __arm_smccc_hvc(unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1, #define SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED -1 #define SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED -2 +/* + * Like arm_smccc_1_1* but always returns SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED. + * Used when the SMCCC conduit is not defined. The empty asm statement + * avoids compiler warnings about unused variables. + */ +#define __fail_smccc_1_1(...) \ + do { \ + __declare_args(__count_args(__VA_ARGS__), __VA_ARGS__); \ + asm ("" __constraints(__count_args(__VA_ARGS__))); \ + if (___res) \ + ___res->a0 = SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED; \ + } while (0) + +/* + * arm_smccc_1_1_invoke() - make an SMCCC v1.1 compliant call + * + * This is a variadic macro taking one to eight source arguments, and + * an optional return structure. + * + * @a0-a7: arguments passed in registers 0 to 7 + * @res: result values from registers 0 to 3 + * + * This macro will make either an HVC call or an SMC call depending on the + * current SMCCC conduit. If no valid conduit is available then -1 + * (SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED) is returned in @res.a0 (if supplied). + * + * The return value also provides the conduit that was used. + */ +#define arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(...) ({ \ + int method = arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit(); \ + switch (method) { \ + case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC: \ + arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(__VA_ARGS__); \ + break; \ + case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC: \ + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(__VA_ARGS__); \ + break; \ + default: \ + __fail_smccc_1_1(__VA_ARGS__); \ + method = SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE; \ + break; \ + } \ + method; \ + }) + +/* Paravirtualised time calls (defined by ARM DEN0057A) */ +#define ARM_SMCCC_HV_PV_TIME_FEATURES \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ + ARM_SMCCC_SMC_64, \ + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_STANDARD_HYP, \ + 0x20) + +#define ARM_SMCCC_HV_PV_TIME_ST \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ + ARM_SMCCC_SMC_64, \ + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_STANDARD_HYP, \ + 0x21) + #endif /*__ASSEMBLY__*/ #endif /*__LINUX_ARM_SMCCC_H*/ From c169216a63ad1547b79e4688e6983ac54a5631fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Rutland Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2019 14:22:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 057/908] arm/arm64: smccc/psci: add arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() commit 6b7fe77c334ae59fed9500140e08f4f896b36871 upstream. SMCCC callers are currently amassing a collection of enums for the SMCCC conduit, and are having to dig into the PSCI driver's internals in order to figure out what to do. Let's clean this up, with common SMCCC_CONDUIT_* definitions, and an arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() helper that abstracts the PSCI driver's internal state. We can kill off the PSCI_CONDUIT_* definitions once we've migrated users over to the new interface. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/firmware/psci.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/psci.c b/drivers/firmware/psci.c index c80ec1d03274..d855c20de663 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/psci.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/psci.c @@ -64,6 +64,21 @@ struct psci_operations psci_ops = { .smccc_version = SMCCC_VERSION_1_0, }; +enum arm_smccc_conduit arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit(void) +{ + if (psci_ops.smccc_version < SMCCC_VERSION_1_1) + return SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE; + + switch (psci_ops.conduit) { + case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: + return SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC; + case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: + return SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC; + default: + return SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE; + } +} + typedef unsigned long (psci_fn)(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); static psci_fn *invoke_psci_fn; diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h index 5d883c4d82ab..6366b04c7d5f 100644 --- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h @@ -89,6 +89,22 @@ #include #include + +enum arm_smccc_conduit { + SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE, + SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC, + SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC, +}; + +/** + * arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() + * + * Returns the conduit to be used for SMCCCv1.1 or later. + * + * When SMCCCv1.1 is not present, returns SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE. + */ +enum arm_smccc_conduit arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit(void); + /** * struct arm_smccc_res - Result from SMC/HVC call * @a0-a3 result values from registers 0 to 3 From 2d44960d3edf9994998ff798ef618e666c4f0143 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Russell King (Oracle)" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 16:45:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 058/908] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs commit 9dd78194a3722fa6712192cdd4f7032d45112a9a upstream. As per other architectures, add support for reporting the Spectre vulnerability status via sysfs CPU. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) [ preserve res variable and add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED - gregkh ] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h | 28 +++++++ arch/arm/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c | 54 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 5 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8a9019e08dba --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef __ASM_SPECTRE_H +#define __ASM_SPECTRE_H + +enum { + SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED, + SPECTRE_MITIGATED, + SPECTRE_VULNERABLE, +}; + +enum { + __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL, + __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU, + __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC, + __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC, +}; + +enum { + SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL), + SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU), + SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC), + SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC), +}; + +void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int methods); + +#endif diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile index 3939ad178405..07a421255e4e 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile @@ -101,4 +101,6 @@ endif obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_SMCCC) += smccc-call.o +obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) += spectre.o + extra-y := $(head-y) vmlinux.lds diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6f6dd1cfd099 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +#include +#include + +#include + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); +} + +static unsigned int spectre_v2_state; +static unsigned int spectre_v2_methods; + +void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int method) +{ + if (state > spectre_v2_state) + spectre_v2_state = state; + spectre_v2_methods |= method; +} + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + const char *method; + + if (spectre_v2_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Not affected"); + + if (spectre_v2_state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED) + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Vulnerable"); + + switch (spectre_v2_methods) { + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL: + method = "Branch predictor hardening"; + break; + + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU: + method = "I-cache invalidation"; + break; + + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC: + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC: + method = "Firmware call"; + break; + + default: + method = "Multiple mitigations"; + break; + } + + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s\n", method); +} diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig index 77fd4446b5fc..b3c66f931c0c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig @@ -829,6 +829,7 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE config CPU_SPECTRE bool + select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c index 9a07916af8dd..61b429d0c659 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c @@ -7,8 +7,36 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI +#define SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED 1 +static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); + + switch ((int)res.a0) { + case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS: + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + + case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED: + return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + + default: + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } +} +#else +static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void) +{ + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn); @@ -37,13 +65,60 @@ static void __maybe_unused call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void) arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL); } -static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void) +static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method) { const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL; int cpu = smp_processor_id(); if (per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu)) - return; + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + + switch (method) { + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL: + per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = + harden_branch_predictor_bpiall; + spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL"; + break; + + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU: + per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = + harden_branch_predictor_iciallu; + spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU"; + break; + + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC: + per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = + call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; + cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm; + spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor"; + break; + + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC: + per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = + call_smc_arch_workaround_1; + cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm; + spectre_v2_method = "firmware"; + break; + } + + if (spectre_v2_method) + pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n", + smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method); + + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; +} +#else +static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method) +{ + pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n"); + + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; +} +#endif + +static void cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(void) +{ + unsigned int state, method = 0; switch (read_cpuid_part()) { case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A8: @@ -52,29 +127,32 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void) case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17: case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73: case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75: - per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = - harden_branch_predictor_bpiall; - spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL"; + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL; break; case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15: case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15: - per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = - harden_branch_predictor_iciallu; - spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU"; + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU; break; -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI default: /* Other ARM CPUs require no workaround */ - if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM) + if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM) { + state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; break; + } /* fallthrough */ - /* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */ + /* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57: case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: { struct arm_smccc_res res; + state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(); + if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED) + break; + if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) break; @@ -84,10 +162,7 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void) ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); if ((int)res.a0 != 0) break; - per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = - call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; - cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm; - spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor"; + method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC; break; case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: @@ -95,28 +170,21 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void) ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); if ((int)res.a0 != 0) break; - per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = - call_smc_arch_workaround_1; - cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm; - spectre_v2_method = "firmware"; + method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC; break; default: + state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; break; } } -#endif } - if (spectre_v2_method) - pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n", - smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method); -} -#else -static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void) -{ + if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED) + state = spectre_v2_install_workaround(method); + + spectre_v2_update_state(state, method); } -#endif static __maybe_unused bool cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned, u32 mask, const char *msg) @@ -146,16 +214,16 @@ static bool check_spectre_auxcr(bool *warned, u32 bit) void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void) { if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(6))) - cpu_v7_spectre_init(); + cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(); } void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void) { if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(0))) - cpu_v7_spectre_init(); + cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(); } void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void) { - cpu_v7_spectre_init(); + cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(); } From 17ee39b4c6157055732ee2717ee4c9818e0dac2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Russell King (Oracle)" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 19:46:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 059/908] ARM: early traps initialisation commit 04e91b7324760a377a725e218b5ee783826d30f5 upstream. Provide a couple of helpers to copy the vectors and stubs, and also to flush the copied vectors and stubs. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c index f702f2b37052..83c001cfcb41 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c @@ -820,10 +820,22 @@ static inline void __init kuser_init(void *vectors) } #endif +#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M +static void copy_from_lma(void *vma, void *lma_start, void *lma_end) +{ + memcpy(vma, lma_start, lma_end - lma_start); +} + +static void flush_vectors(void *vma, size_t offset, size_t size) +{ + unsigned long start = (unsigned long)vma + offset; + unsigned long end = start + size; + + flush_icache_range(start, end); +} + void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base) { -#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M - unsigned long vectors = (unsigned long)vectors_base; extern char __stubs_start[], __stubs_end[]; extern char __vectors_start[], __vectors_end[]; unsigned i; @@ -844,17 +856,20 @@ void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base) * into the vector page, mapped at 0xffff0000, and ensure these * are visible to the instruction stream. */ - memcpy((void *)vectors, __vectors_start, __vectors_end - __vectors_start); - memcpy((void *)vectors + 0x1000, __stubs_start, __stubs_end - __stubs_start); + copy_from_lma(vectors_base, __vectors_start, __vectors_end); + copy_from_lma(vectors_base + 0x1000, __stubs_start, __stubs_end); kuser_init(vectors_base); - flush_icache_range(vectors, vectors + PAGE_SIZE * 2); + flush_vectors(vectors_base, 0, PAGE_SIZE * 2); +} #else /* ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M */ +void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base) +{ /* * on V7-M there is no need to copy the vector table to a dedicated * memory area. The address is configurable and so a table in the kernel * image can be used. */ -#endif } +#endif From 5a4427812d2f0bd3c435a16a5ab4a54e552309a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Russell King (Oracle)" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 19:49:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 060/908] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections commit 8d9d651ff2270a632e9dc497b142db31e8911315 upstream. Use the linker's LOADADDR() macro to get the load address of the sections, and provide a macro to set the start and end symbols. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S | 19 ++++++++++++------- arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 19 ++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S index 0951df916b85..23da0e2a3fde 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S @@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ #include #include +/* Set start/end symbol names to the LMA for the section */ +#define ARM_LMA(sym, section) \ + sym##_start = LOADADDR(section); \ + sym##_end = LOADADDR(section) + SIZEOF(section) + #define PROC_INFO \ . = ALIGN(4); \ VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__proc_info_begin) = .; \ @@ -149,19 +154,19 @@ SECTIONS * The vectors and stubs are relocatable code, and the * only thing that matters is their relative offsets */ - __vectors_start = .; + __vectors_lma = .; .vectors 0xffff0000 : AT(__vectors_start) { *(.vectors) } - . = __vectors_start + SIZEOF(.vectors); - __vectors_end = .; + ARM_LMA(__vectors, .vectors); + . = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors); - __stubs_start = .; - .stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_start) { + __stubs_lma = .; + .stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_lma) { *(.stubs) } - . = __stubs_start + SIZEOF(.stubs); - __stubs_end = .; + ARM_LMA(__stubs, .stubs); + . = __stubs_lma + SIZEOF(.stubs); PROVIDE(vector_fiq_offset = vector_fiq - ADDR(.vectors)); diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 1845a5affb44..ba80db65398e 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ #include #include +/* Set start/end symbol names to the LMA for the section */ +#define ARM_LMA(sym, section) \ + sym##_start = LOADADDR(section); \ + sym##_end = LOADADDR(section) + SIZEOF(section) + #define PROC_INFO \ . = ALIGN(4); \ VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__proc_info_begin) = .; \ @@ -170,19 +175,19 @@ SECTIONS * The vectors and stubs are relocatable code, and the * only thing that matters is their relative offsets */ - __vectors_start = .; + __vectors_lma = .; .vectors 0xffff0000 : AT(__vectors_start) { *(.vectors) } - . = __vectors_start + SIZEOF(.vectors); - __vectors_end = .; + ARM_LMA(__vectors, .vectors); + . = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors); - __stubs_start = .; - .stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_start) { + __stubs_lma = .; + .stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_lma) { *(.stubs) } - . = __stubs_start + SIZEOF(.stubs); - __stubs_end = .; + ARM_LMA(__stubs, .stubs); + . = __stubs_lma + SIZEOF(.stubs); PROVIDE(vector_fiq_offset = vector_fiq - ADDR(.vectors)); From cf32c1579d50f1e26970557bc68b365d0ae10a89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Russell King (Oracle)" Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 16:05:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 061/908] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround commit b9baf5c8c5c356757f4f9d8180b5e9d234065bc3 upstream. Workaround the Spectre BHB issues for Cortex-A15, Cortex-A57, Cortex-A72, Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75. We also include Brahma B15 as well to be safe, which is affected by Spectre V2 in the same ways as Cortex-A15. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) [changes due to lack of SYSTEM_FREEING_INITMEM - gregkh] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h | 10 ++++ arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h | 4 ++ arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 24 ++++++++++ arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c | 4 ++ arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | 38 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S | 18 +++++-- arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 18 +++++-- arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 10 ++++ arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 269 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h index 1935b580f0e8..0d6a0f2b32e8 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -110,6 +110,16 @@ .endm #endif +#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 7 + .macro dsb, args + mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c10, 4 + .endm + + .macro isb, args + mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, r5, 4 + .endm +#endif + .macro asm_trace_hardirqs_off, save=1 #if defined(CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS) .if \save diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h index 8a9019e08dba..d1fa5607d3aa 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ enum { __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU, __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC, __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC, + __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8, }; enum { @@ -21,8 +22,11 @@ enum { SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU), SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC), SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC), + SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8 = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8), }; void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int methods); +int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method); + #endif diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S index 2d8323648256..8d75da86ea8b 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S @@ -1033,12 +1033,11 @@ vector_\name: sub lr, lr, #\correction .endif - @ - @ Save r0, lr_ (parent PC) and spsr_ - @ (parent CPSR) - @ + @ Save r0, lr_ (parent PC) stmia sp, {r0, lr} @ save r0, lr - mrs lr, spsr + + @ Save spsr_ (parent CPSR) +2: mrs lr, spsr str lr, [sp, #8] @ save spsr @ @@ -1059,6 +1058,44 @@ vector_\name: movs pc, lr @ branch to handler in SVC mode ENDPROC(vector_\name) +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY + .subsection 1 + .align 5 +vector_bhb_loop8_\name: + .if \correction + sub lr, lr, #\correction + .endif + + @ Save r0, lr_ (parent PC) + stmia sp, {r0, lr} + + @ bhb workaround + mov r0, #8 +1: b . + 4 + subs r0, r0, #1 + bne 1b + dsb + isb + b 2b +ENDPROC(vector_bhb_loop8_\name) + +vector_bhb_bpiall_\name: + .if \correction + sub lr, lr, #\correction + .endif + + @ Save r0, lr_ (parent PC) + stmia sp, {r0, lr} + + @ bhb workaround + mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6 @ BPIALL + @ isb not needed due to "movs pc, lr" in the vector stub + @ which gives a "context synchronisation". + b 2b +ENDPROC(vector_bhb_bpiall_\name) + .previous +#endif + .align 2 @ handler addresses follow this label 1: @@ -1067,6 +1104,10 @@ ENDPROC(vector_\name) .section .stubs, "ax", %progbits @ This must be the first word .word vector_swi +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY + .word vector_bhb_loop8_swi + .word vector_bhb_bpiall_swi +#endif vector_rst: ARM( swi SYS_ERROR0 ) @@ -1181,8 +1222,10 @@ vector_addrexcptn: * FIQ "NMI" handler *----------------------------------------------------------------------------- * Handle a FIQ using the SVC stack allowing FIQ act like NMI on x86 - * systems. + * systems. This must be the last vector stub, so lets place it in its own + * subsection. */ + .subsection 2 vector_stub fiq, FIQ_MODE, 4 .long __fiq_usr @ 0 (USR_26 / USR_32) @@ -1215,6 +1258,30 @@ vector_addrexcptn: W(b) vector_irq W(b) vector_fiq +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY + .section .vectors.bhb.loop8, "ax", %progbits +.L__vectors_bhb_loop8_start: + W(b) vector_rst + W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_und + W(ldr) pc, .L__vectors_bhb_loop8_start + 0x1004 + W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_pabt + W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_dabt + W(b) vector_addrexcptn + W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_irq + W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_fiq + + .section .vectors.bhb.bpiall, "ax", %progbits +.L__vectors_bhb_bpiall_start: + W(b) vector_rst + W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_und + W(ldr) pc, .L__vectors_bhb_bpiall_start + 0x1008 + W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_pabt + W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_dabt + W(b) vector_addrexcptn + W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_irq + W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_fiq +#endif + .data .align 2 diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S index 08a7132f5600..558f88fbb33c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S @@ -151,6 +151,29 @@ ENDPROC(ret_from_fork) *----------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + .align 5 +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY +ENTRY(vector_bhb_loop8_swi) + sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE + stmia sp, {r0 - r12} + mov r8, #8 +1: b 2f +2: subs r8, r8, #1 + bne 1b + dsb + isb + b 3f +ENDPROC(vector_bhb_loop8_swi) + + .align 5 +ENTRY(vector_bhb_bpiall_swi) + sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE + stmia sp, {r0 - r12} + mcr p15, 0, r8, c7, c5, 6 @ BPIALL + isb + b 3f +ENDPROC(vector_bhb_bpiall_swi) +#endif .align 5 ENTRY(vector_swi) #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_V7M @@ -158,6 +181,7 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi) #else sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE stmia sp, {r0 - r12} @ Calling r0 - r12 +3: ARM( add r8, sp, #S_PC ) ARM( stmdb r8, {sp, lr}^ ) @ Calling sp, lr THUMB( mov r8, sp ) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c index 6f6dd1cfd099..ade967f18d06 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c @@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, method = "Firmware call"; break; + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8: + method = "History overwrite"; + break; + default: method = "Multiple mitigations"; break; diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c index 83c001cfcb41..7d81d4a1f5a9 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -834,6 +835,43 @@ static void flush_vectors(void *vma, size_t offset, size_t size) flush_icache_range(start, end); } +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY +int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method) +{ + extern char __vectors_bhb_bpiall_start[], __vectors_bhb_bpiall_end[]; + extern char __vectors_bhb_loop8_start[], __vectors_bhb_loop8_end[]; + void *vec_start, *vec_end; + + if (system_state > SYSTEM_SCHEDULING) { + pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB workaround too late - system vulnerable\n", + smp_processor_id()); + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } + + switch (method) { + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8: + vec_start = __vectors_bhb_loop8_start; + vec_end = __vectors_bhb_loop8_end; + break; + + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL: + vec_start = __vectors_bhb_bpiall_start; + vec_end = __vectors_bhb_bpiall_end; + break; + + default: + pr_err("CPU%u: unknown Spectre BHB state %d\n", + smp_processor_id(), method); + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } + + copy_from_lma(vectors_page, vec_start, vec_end); + flush_vectors(vectors_page, 0, vec_end - vec_start); + + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; +} +#endif + void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base) { extern char __stubs_start[], __stubs_end[]; diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S index 23da0e2a3fde..ac8842f72fbb 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S @@ -155,11 +155,23 @@ SECTIONS * only thing that matters is their relative offsets */ __vectors_lma = .; - .vectors 0xffff0000 : AT(__vectors_start) { - *(.vectors) + OVERLAY 0xffff0000 : NOCROSSREFS AT(__vectors_lma) { + .vectors { + *(.vectors) + } + .vectors.bhb.loop8 { + *(.vectors.bhb.loop8) + } + .vectors.bhb.bpiall { + *(.vectors.bhb.bpiall) + } } ARM_LMA(__vectors, .vectors); - . = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors); + ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_loop8, .vectors.bhb.loop8); + ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_bpiall, .vectors.bhb.bpiall); + . = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors) + + SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.loop8) + + SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.bpiall); __stubs_lma = .; .stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_lma) { diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index ba80db65398e..6ac4f76f68b2 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -176,11 +176,23 @@ SECTIONS * only thing that matters is their relative offsets */ __vectors_lma = .; - .vectors 0xffff0000 : AT(__vectors_start) { - *(.vectors) + OVERLAY 0xffff0000 : NOCROSSREFS AT(__vectors_lma) { + .vectors { + *(.vectors) + } + .vectors.bhb.loop8 { + *(.vectors.bhb.loop8) + } + .vectors.bhb.bpiall { + *(.vectors.bhb.bpiall) + } } ARM_LMA(__vectors, .vectors); - . = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors); + ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_loop8, .vectors.bhb.loop8); + ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_bpiall, .vectors.bhb.bpiall); + . = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors) + + SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.loop8) + + SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.bpiall); __stubs_lma = .; .stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_lma) { diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig index b3c66f931c0c..09c6ba22a02e 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig @@ -850,6 +850,16 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR If unsure, say Y. +config HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY + bool "Harden Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT + depends on CPU_SPECTRE + default y + help + Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can + make use of branch history to influence future speculation. When + taking an exception, a sequence of branches overwrites the branch + history, or branch history is invalidated. + config TLS_REG_EMUL bool select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c index 61b429d0c659..bc5b01fd0ce2 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c @@ -186,6 +186,81 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(void) spectre_v2_update_state(state, method); } +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY +static int spectre_bhb_method; + +static const char *spectre_bhb_method_name(int method) +{ + switch (method) { + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8: + return "loop"; + + case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL: + return "BPIALL"; + + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + +static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method) +{ + if (spectre_bhb_method != method) { + if (spectre_bhb_method) { + pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: method disagreement, system vulnerable\n", + smp_processor_id()); + + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } + + if (spectre_bhb_update_vectors(method) == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + + spectre_bhb_method = method; + } + + pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: using %s workaround\n", + smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method)); + + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; +} +#else +static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method) +{ + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; +} +#endif + +static void cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init(void) +{ + unsigned int state, method = 0; + + switch (read_cpuid_part()) { + case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15: + case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15: + case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57: + case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8; + break; + + case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73: + case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75: + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL; + break; + + default: + state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + break; + } + + if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED) + state = spectre_bhb_install_workaround(method); + + spectre_v2_update_state(state, method); +} + static __maybe_unused bool cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned, u32 mask, const char *msg) { @@ -226,4 +301,5 @@ void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void) void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void) { cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(); + cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init(); } From e01553f4048027183dc480ada93dc34b5d056a42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Russell King (Oracle)" Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 19:28:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 062/908] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting commit 25875aa71dfefd1959f07e626c4d285b88b27ac2 upstream. The mitigations for Spectre-BHB are only applied when an exception is taken, but when unprivileged BPF is enabled, userspace can load BPF programs that can be used to exploit the problem. When unprivileged BPF is enabled, report the vulnerable status via the spectre_v2 sysfs file. Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c index ade967f18d06..e7fea962d632 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c @@ -1,9 +1,19 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +#include #include #include #include +static bool _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled; +#else + return false +#endif +} + ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { @@ -31,6 +41,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, if (spectre_v2_state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED) return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Vulnerable"); + if (_unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n"); + switch (spectre_v2_methods) { case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL: method = "Branch predictor hardening"; From 0aa01cfbfc1ab9f305a7fe868d13230aa95788d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Emmanuel Gil Peyrot Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 20:18:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 063/908] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled commit 330f4c53d3c2d8b11d86ec03a964b86dc81452f5 upstream. It was missing a semicolon. Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Gil Peyrot Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor Fixes: 25875aa71dfe ("ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting"). Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c index e7fea962d632..0dcefc36fb7a 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ static bool _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void) #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled; #else - return false + return false; #endif } From 76898a6bba872b801749523518bda71085ee4615 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Russell King (Oracle)" Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 19:08:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 064/908] ARM: fix co-processor register typo commit 33970b031dc4653cc9dc80f2886976706c4c8ef1 upstream. In the recent Spectre BHB patches, there was a typo that is only exposed in certain configurations: mcr p15,0,XX,c7,r5,4 should have been mcr p15,0,XX,c7,c5,4 Reported-by: kernel test robot Fixes: b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround") Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h index 0d6a0f2b32e8..c7fa0c0ff447 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ .endm .macro isb, args - mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, r5, 4 + mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 4 .endm #endif From 21bf814f57f9f8c142b920e996d8f01444a153eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 15:07:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 065/908] ARM: Do not use NOCROSSREFS directive with ld.lld commit 36168e387fa7d0f1fe0cd5cf76c8cea7aee714fa upstream. ld.lld does not support the NOCROSSREFS directive at the moment, which breaks the build after commit b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround"): ld.lld: error: ./arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds:34: AT expected, but got NOCROSSREFS Support for this directive will eventually be implemented, at which point a version check can be added. To avoid breaking the build in the meantime, just define NOCROSSREFS to nothing when using ld.lld, with a link to the issue for tracking. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround") Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1609 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S index ac8842f72fbb..a7d553f11e0e 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S @@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ #include #include +/* + * ld.lld does not support NOCROSSREFS: + * https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1609 + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_LD_IS_LLD +#define NOCROSSREFS +#endif + /* Set start/end symbol names to the LMA for the section */ #define ARM_LMA(sym, section) \ sym##_start = LOADADDR(section); \ diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 6ac4f76f68b2..b7a27a563a3a 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ #include #include +/* + * ld.lld does not support NOCROSSREFS: + * https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1609 + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_LD_IS_LLD +#define NOCROSSREFS +#endif + /* Set start/end symbol names to the LMA for the section */ #define ARM_LMA(sym, section) \ sym##_start = LOADADDR(section); \ From 0848347b970455401febb23fcfedab42f99d40aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Russell King (Oracle)" Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 10:22:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 066/908] ARM: fix build warning in proc-v7-bugs.c commit b1a384d2cbccb1eb3f84765020d25e2c1929706e upstream. The kernel test robot discovered that building without HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR issues a warning due to a missing argument to pr_info(). Add the missing argument. Reported-by: kernel test robot Fixes: 9dd78194a372 ("ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs") Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c index bc5b01fd0ce2..1b6e770bc1cd 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c @@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method) #else static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method) { - pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n"); + pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n", + smp_processor_id()); return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; } From 67d21d5bddef88c1977378e4aca2b9c6a4af9edc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:05:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 067/908] xen/xenbus: don't let xenbus_grant_ring() remove grants in error case Commit 3777ea7bac3113005b7180e6b9dadf16d19a5827 upstream. Letting xenbus_grant_ring() tear down grants in the error case is problematic, as the other side could already have used these grants. Calling gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() without checking success is resulting in an unclear situation for any caller of xenbus_grant_ring() as in the error case the memory pages of the ring page might be partially mapped. Freeing them would risk unwanted foreign access to them, while not freeing them would leak memory. In order to remove the need to undo any gnttab_grant_foreign_access() calls, use gnttab_alloc_grant_references() to make sure no further error can occur in the loop granting access to the ring pages. It should be noted that this way of handling removes leaking of grant entries in the error case, too. This is CVE-2022-23040 / part of XSA-396. Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c | 24 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c index e35bb6b87449..6dde323dabd4 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c +++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c @@ -368,7 +368,14 @@ int xenbus_grant_ring(struct xenbus_device *dev, void *vaddr, unsigned int nr_pages, grant_ref_t *grefs) { int err; - int i, j; + unsigned int i; + grant_ref_t gref_head; + + err = gnttab_alloc_grant_references(nr_pages, &gref_head); + if (err) { + xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "granting access to ring page"); + return err; + } for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { unsigned long gfn; @@ -378,23 +385,14 @@ int xenbus_grant_ring(struct xenbus_device *dev, void *vaddr, else gfn = virt_to_gfn(vaddr); - err = gnttab_grant_foreign_access(dev->otherend_id, gfn, 0); - if (err < 0) { - xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, - "granting access to ring page"); - goto fail; - } - grefs[i] = err; + grefs[i] = gnttab_claim_grant_reference(&gref_head); + gnttab_grant_foreign_access_ref(grefs[i], dev->otherend_id, + gfn, 0); vaddr = vaddr + XEN_PAGE_SIZE; } return 0; - -fail: - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) - gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(grefs[j], 0); - return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_grant_ring); From 1b2f59f854e7069ba059adfe03d648ea643eba51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:05:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 068/908] xen/grant-table: add gnttab_try_end_foreign_access() Commit 6b1775f26a2da2b05a6dc8ec2b5d14e9a4701a1a upstream. Add a new grant table function gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(), which will remove and free a grant if it is not in use. Its main use case is to either free a grant if it is no longer in use, or to take some other action if it is still in use. This other action can be an error exit, or (e.g. in the case of blkfront persistent grant feature) some special handling. This is CVE-2022-23036, CVE-2022-23038 / part of XSA-396. Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/xen/grant-table.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- include/xen/grant_table.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c index 1fb374466e84..92bd6237c911 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c +++ b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c @@ -378,11 +378,21 @@ static void gnttab_add_deferred(grant_ref_t ref, bool readonly, what, ref, page ? page_to_pfn(page) : -1); } +int gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref) +{ + int ret = _gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0); + + if (ret) + put_free_entry(ref); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_try_end_foreign_access); + void gnttab_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly, unsigned long page) { - if (gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, readonly)) { - put_free_entry(ref); + if (gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(ref)) { if (page != 0) put_page(virt_to_page(page)); } else diff --git a/include/xen/grant_table.h b/include/xen/grant_table.h index f9d8aac170fb..23f4d824f901 100644 --- a/include/xen/grant_table.h +++ b/include/xen/grant_table.h @@ -97,10 +97,22 @@ int gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly); * access has been ended, free the given page too. Access will be ended * immediately iff the grant entry is not in use, otherwise it will happen * some time later. page may be 0, in which case no freeing will occur. + * Note that the granted page might still be accessed (read or write) by the + * other side after gnttab_end_foreign_access() returns, so even if page was + * specified as 0 it is not allowed to just reuse the page for other + * purposes immediately. */ void gnttab_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly, unsigned long page); +/* + * End access through the given grant reference, iff the grant entry is + * no longer in use. In case of success ending foreign access, the + * grant reference is deallocated. + * Return 1 if the grant entry was freed, 0 if it is still in use. + */ +int gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref); + int gnttab_grant_foreign_transfer(domid_t domid, unsigned long pfn); unsigned long gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref(grant_ref_t ref); From 60dd3ab592fe8c004cc400a3a38d369c44d6212f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:05:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 069/908] xen/blkfront: don't use gnttab_query_foreign_access() for mapped status MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Commit abf1fd5919d6238ee3bc5eb4a9b6c3947caa6638 upstream. It isn't enough to check whether a grant is still being in use by calling gnttab_query_foreign_access(), as a mapping could be realized by the other side just after having called that function. In case the call was done in preparation of revoking a grant it is better to do so via gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() and check the success of that operation instead. For the ring allocation use alloc_pages_exact() in order to avoid high order pages in case of a multi-page ring. If a grant wasn't unmapped by the backend without persistent grants being used, set the device state to "error". This is CVE-2022-23036 / part of XSA-396. Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c index 448753021724..a97a306c3850 100644 --- a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c +++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c @@ -1278,17 +1278,16 @@ static void blkif_free_ring(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo) list_for_each_entry_safe(persistent_gnt, n, &rinfo->grants, node) { list_del(&persistent_gnt->node); - if (persistent_gnt->gref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) { - gnttab_end_foreign_access(persistent_gnt->gref, - 0, 0UL); - rinfo->persistent_gnts_c--; - } + if (persistent_gnt->gref == GRANT_INVALID_REF || + !gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(persistent_gnt->gref)) + continue; + + rinfo->persistent_gnts_c--; if (info->feature_persistent) __free_page(persistent_gnt->page); kfree(persistent_gnt); } } - BUG_ON(rinfo->persistent_gnts_c != 0); for (i = 0; i < BLK_RING_SIZE(info); i++) { /* @@ -1345,7 +1344,8 @@ static void blkif_free_ring(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo) rinfo->ring_ref[i] = GRANT_INVALID_REF; } } - free_pages((unsigned long)rinfo->ring.sring, get_order(info->nr_ring_pages * XEN_PAGE_SIZE)); + free_pages_exact(rinfo->ring.sring, + info->nr_ring_pages * XEN_PAGE_SIZE); rinfo->ring.sring = NULL; if (rinfo->irq) @@ -1429,9 +1429,15 @@ static int blkif_get_final_status(enum blk_req_status s1, return BLKIF_RSP_OKAY; } -static bool blkif_completion(unsigned long *id, - struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo, - struct blkif_response *bret) +/* + * Return values: + * 1 response processed. + * 0 missing further responses. + * -1 error while processing. + */ +static int blkif_completion(unsigned long *id, + struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo, + struct blkif_response *bret) { int i = 0; struct scatterlist *sg; @@ -1505,42 +1511,43 @@ static bool blkif_completion(unsigned long *id, } /* Add the persistent grant into the list of free grants */ for (i = 0; i < num_grant; i++) { - if (gnttab_query_foreign_access(s->grants_used[i]->gref)) { + if (!gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(s->grants_used[i]->gref)) { /* * If the grant is still mapped by the backend (the * backend has chosen to make this grant persistent) * we add it at the head of the list, so it will be * reused first. */ - if (!info->feature_persistent) - pr_alert_ratelimited("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n", - s->grants_used[i]->gref); + if (!info->feature_persistent) { + pr_alert("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n", + s->grants_used[i]->gref); + return -1; + } list_add(&s->grants_used[i]->node, &rinfo->grants); rinfo->persistent_gnts_c++; } else { /* - * If the grant is not mapped by the backend we end the - * foreign access and add it to the tail of the list, - * so it will not be picked again unless we run out of - * persistent grants. + * If the grant is not mapped by the backend we add it + * to the tail of the list, so it will not be picked + * again unless we run out of persistent grants. */ - gnttab_end_foreign_access(s->grants_used[i]->gref, 0, 0UL); s->grants_used[i]->gref = GRANT_INVALID_REF; list_add_tail(&s->grants_used[i]->node, &rinfo->grants); } } if (s->req.operation == BLKIF_OP_INDIRECT) { for (i = 0; i < INDIRECT_GREFS(num_grant); i++) { - if (gnttab_query_foreign_access(s->indirect_grants[i]->gref)) { - if (!info->feature_persistent) - pr_alert_ratelimited("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n", - s->indirect_grants[i]->gref); + if (!gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(s->indirect_grants[i]->gref)) { + if (!info->feature_persistent) { + pr_alert("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n", + s->indirect_grants[i]->gref); + return -1; + } list_add(&s->indirect_grants[i]->node, &rinfo->grants); rinfo->persistent_gnts_c++; } else { struct page *indirect_page; - gnttab_end_foreign_access(s->indirect_grants[i]->gref, 0, 0UL); /* * Add the used indirect page back to the list of * available pages for indirect grefs. @@ -1621,12 +1628,17 @@ static irqreturn_t blkif_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) } if (bret.operation != BLKIF_OP_DISCARD) { + int ret; + /* * We may need to wait for an extra response if the * I/O request is split in 2 */ - if (!blkif_completion(&id, rinfo, &bret)) + ret = blkif_completion(&id, rinfo, &bret); + if (!ret) continue; + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + goto err; } if (add_id_to_freelist(rinfo, id)) { @@ -1732,8 +1744,7 @@ static int setup_blkring(struct xenbus_device *dev, for (i = 0; i < info->nr_ring_pages; i++) rinfo->ring_ref[i] = GRANT_INVALID_REF; - sring = (struct blkif_sring *)__get_free_pages(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH, - get_order(ring_size)); + sring = alloc_pages_exact(ring_size, GFP_NOIO); if (!sring) { xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, -ENOMEM, "allocating shared ring"); return -ENOMEM; @@ -1743,7 +1754,7 @@ static int setup_blkring(struct xenbus_device *dev, err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, rinfo->ring.sring, info->nr_ring_pages, gref); if (err < 0) { - free_pages((unsigned long)sring, get_order(ring_size)); + free_pages_exact(sring, ring_size); rinfo->ring.sring = NULL; goto fail; } From fbb5d5edd233c25774109dc0a673702c7b4985e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:05:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 070/908] xen/netfront: don't use gnttab_query_foreign_access() for mapped status Commit 31185df7e2b1d2fa1de4900247a12d7b9c7087eb upstream. It isn't enough to check whether a grant is still being in use by calling gnttab_query_foreign_access(), as a mapping could be realized by the other side just after having called that function. In case the call was done in preparation of revoking a grant it is better to do so via gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() and check the success of that operation instead. This is CVE-2022-23037 / part of XSA-396. Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c index 56c7f2ebf573..d1bcbc24a70b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -414,14 +414,12 @@ static bool xennet_tx_buf_gc(struct netfront_queue *queue) queue->tx_link[id] = TX_LINK_NONE; skb = queue->tx_skbs[id]; queue->tx_skbs[id] = NULL; - if (unlikely(gnttab_query_foreign_access( - queue->grant_tx_ref[id]) != 0)) { + if (unlikely(!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref( + queue->grant_tx_ref[id], GNTMAP_readonly))) { dev_alert(dev, "Grant still in use by backend domain\n"); goto err; } - gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref( - queue->grant_tx_ref[id], GNTMAP_readonly); gnttab_release_grant_reference( &queue->gref_tx_head, queue->grant_tx_ref[id]); queue->grant_tx_ref[id] = GRANT_INVALID_REF; From bbf2a869c3c279fd9b665802112d8d9086bba242 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:05:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 071/908] xen/scsifront: don't use gnttab_query_foreign_access() for mapped status Commit 33172ab50a53578a95691310f49567c9266968b0 upstream. It isn't enough to check whether a grant is still being in use by calling gnttab_query_foreign_access(), as a mapping could be realized by the other side just after having called that function. In case the call was done in preparation of revoking a grant it is better to do so via gnttab_try_end_foreign_access() and check the success of that operation instead. This is CVE-2022-23038 / part of XSA-396. Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c b/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c index 61389bdc7926..a1d822ae9fca 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c @@ -233,12 +233,11 @@ static void scsifront_gnttab_done(struct vscsifrnt_info *info, return; for (i = 0; i < shadow->nr_grants; i++) { - if (unlikely(gnttab_query_foreign_access(shadow->gref[i]))) { + if (unlikely(!gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(shadow->gref[i]))) { shost_printk(KERN_ALERT, info->host, KBUILD_MODNAME "grant still in use by backend\n"); BUG(); } - gnttab_end_foreign_access(shadow->gref[i], 0, 0UL); } kfree(shadow->sg); From a37eb077983e678bece23d4061fe5a6614f41354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:05:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 072/908] xen/gntalloc: don't use gnttab_query_foreign_access() Commit d3b6372c5881cb54925212abb62c521df8ba4809 upstream. Using gnttab_query_foreign_access() is unsafe, as it is racy by design. The use case in the gntalloc driver is not needed at all. While at it replace the call of gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() with a call of gnttab_end_foreign_access(), which is what is really wanted there. In case the grant wasn't used due to an allocation failure, just free the grant via gnttab_free_grant_reference(). This is CVE-2022-23039 / part of XSA-396. Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/xen/gntalloc.c | 25 +++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c b/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c index 3fa40c723e8e..edb0acd0b832 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c +++ b/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c @@ -169,20 +169,14 @@ static int add_grefs(struct ioctl_gntalloc_alloc_gref *op, __del_gref(gref); } - /* It's possible for the target domain to map the just-allocated grant - * references by blindly guessing their IDs; if this is done, then - * __del_gref will leave them in the queue_gref list. They need to be - * added to the global list so that we can free them when they are no - * longer referenced. - */ - if (unlikely(!list_empty(&queue_gref))) - list_splice_tail(&queue_gref, &gref_list); mutex_unlock(&gref_mutex); return rc; } static void __del_gref(struct gntalloc_gref *gref) { + unsigned long addr; + if (gref->notify.flags & UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE) { uint8_t *tmp = kmap(gref->page); tmp[gref->notify.pgoff] = 0; @@ -196,21 +190,16 @@ static void __del_gref(struct gntalloc_gref *gref) gref->notify.flags = 0; if (gref->gref_id) { - if (gnttab_query_foreign_access(gref->gref_id)) - return; - - if (!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(gref->gref_id, 0)) - return; - - gnttab_free_grant_reference(gref->gref_id); + if (gref->page) { + addr = (unsigned long)page_to_virt(gref->page); + gnttab_end_foreign_access(gref->gref_id, 0, addr); + } else + gnttab_free_grant_reference(gref->gref_id); } gref_size--; list_del(&gref->next_gref); - if (gref->page) - __free_page(gref->page); - kfree(gref); } From 9a7fa4be28ac13725e9e344572cced8b215b93c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:05:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 073/908] xen: remove gnttab_query_foreign_access() Commit 1dbd11ca75fe664d3e54607547771d021f531f59 upstream. Remove gnttab_query_foreign_access(), as it is unused and unsafe to use. All previous use cases assumed a grant would not be in use after gnttab_query_foreign_access() returned 0. This information is useless in best case, as it only refers to a situation in the past, which could have changed already. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/xen/grant-table.c | 19 ------------------- include/xen/grant_table.h | 2 -- 2 files changed, 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c index 92bd6237c911..889ff23e91ea 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c +++ b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c @@ -114,13 +114,6 @@ struct gnttab_ops { * return the frame. */ unsigned long (*end_foreign_transfer_ref)(grant_ref_t ref); - /* - * Query the status of a grant entry. Ref parameter is reference of - * queried grant entry, return value is the status of queried entry. - * Detailed status(writing/reading) can be gotten from the return value - * by bit operations. - */ - int (*query_foreign_access)(grant_ref_t ref); }; struct unmap_refs_callback_data { @@ -255,17 +248,6 @@ int gnttab_grant_foreign_access(domid_t domid, unsigned long frame, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_grant_foreign_access); -static int gnttab_query_foreign_access_v1(grant_ref_t ref) -{ - return gnttab_shared.v1[ref].flags & (GTF_reading|GTF_writing); -} - -int gnttab_query_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref) -{ - return gnttab_interface->query_foreign_access(ref); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_query_foreign_access); - static int gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref_v1(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly) { u16 flags, nflags; @@ -1029,7 +1011,6 @@ static const struct gnttab_ops gnttab_v1_ops = { .update_entry = gnttab_update_entry_v1, .end_foreign_access_ref = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref_v1, .end_foreign_transfer_ref = gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref_v1, - .query_foreign_access = gnttab_query_foreign_access_v1, }; static void gnttab_request_version(void) diff --git a/include/xen/grant_table.h b/include/xen/grant_table.h index 23f4d824f901..e145e1f73bf1 100644 --- a/include/xen/grant_table.h +++ b/include/xen/grant_table.h @@ -118,8 +118,6 @@ int gnttab_grant_foreign_transfer(domid_t domid, unsigned long pfn); unsigned long gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref(grant_ref_t ref); unsigned long gnttab_end_foreign_transfer(grant_ref_t ref); -int gnttab_query_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref); - /* * operations on reserved batches of grant references */ From 22fd4f3fc1cd37d3daa4462f3184b20adb9342f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:05:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 074/908] xen/9p: use alloc/free_pages_exact() Commit 5cadd4bb1d7fc9ab201ac14620d1a478357e4ebd upstream. Instead of __get_free_pages() and free_pages() use alloc_pages_exact() and free_pages_exact(). This is in preparation of a change of gnttab_end_foreign_access() which will prohibit use of high-order pages. By using the local variable "order" instead of ring->intf->ring_order in the error path of xen_9pfs_front_alloc_dataring() another bug is fixed, as the error path can be entered before ring->intf->ring_order is being set. By using alloc_pages_exact() the size in bytes is specified for the allocation, which fixes another bug for the case of order < (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT). This is part of CVE-2022-23041 / XSA-396. Reported-by: Simon Gaiser Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/9p/trans_xen.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/9p/trans_xen.c b/net/9p/trans_xen.c index da843b68cdeb..ac6a69f6c5e2 100644 --- a/net/9p/trans_xen.c +++ b/net/9p/trans_xen.c @@ -301,9 +301,9 @@ static void xen_9pfs_front_free(struct xen_9pfs_front_priv *priv) ref = priv->rings[i].intf->ref[j]; gnttab_end_foreign_access(ref, 0, 0); } - free_pages((unsigned long)priv->rings[i].data.in, - XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER - - (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)); + free_pages_exact(priv->rings[i].data.in, + 1UL << (XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER + + XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)); } gnttab_end_foreign_access(priv->rings[i].ref, 0, 0); free_page((unsigned long)priv->rings[i].intf); @@ -341,8 +341,8 @@ static int xen_9pfs_front_alloc_dataring(struct xenbus_device *dev, if (ret < 0) goto out; ring->ref = ret; - bytes = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, - XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER - (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)); + bytes = alloc_pages_exact(1UL << (XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER + XEN_PAGE_SHIFT), + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!bytes) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -373,9 +373,7 @@ static int xen_9pfs_front_alloc_dataring(struct xenbus_device *dev, if (bytes) { for (i--; i >= 0; i--) gnttab_end_foreign_access(ring->intf->ref[i], 0, 0); - free_pages((unsigned long)bytes, - XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER - - (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)); + free_pages_exact(bytes, 1UL << (XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER + XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)); } gnttab_end_foreign_access(ring->ref, 0, 0); free_page((unsigned long)ring->intf); From 94b8ccbcc063325d23daa1cea89ef799c8c673e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:05:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 075/908] xen/gnttab: fix gnttab_end_foreign_access() without page specified Commit 42baefac638f06314298087394b982ead9ec444b upstream. gnttab_end_foreign_access() is used to free a grant reference and optionally to free the associated page. In case the grant is still in use by the other side processing is being deferred. This leads to a problem in case no page to be freed is specified by the caller: the caller doesn't know that the page is still mapped by the other side and thus should not be used for other purposes. The correct way to handle this situation is to take an additional reference to the granted page in case handling is being deferred and to drop that reference when the grant reference could be freed finally. This requires that there are no users of gnttab_end_foreign_access() left directly repurposing the granted page after the call, as this might result in clobbered data or information leaks via the not yet freed grant reference. This is part of CVE-2022-23041 / XSA-396. Reported-by: Simon Gaiser Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/xen/grant-table.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- include/xen/grant_table.h | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c index 889ff23e91ea..2d203ba75e46 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c +++ b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c @@ -114,6 +114,10 @@ struct gnttab_ops { * return the frame. */ unsigned long (*end_foreign_transfer_ref)(grant_ref_t ref); + /* + * Read the frame number related to a given grant reference. + */ + unsigned long (*read_frame)(grant_ref_t ref); }; struct unmap_refs_callback_data { @@ -278,6 +282,11 @@ int gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref); +static unsigned long gnttab_read_frame_v1(grant_ref_t ref) +{ + return gnttab_shared.v1[ref].frame; +} + struct deferred_entry { struct list_head list; grant_ref_t ref; @@ -307,12 +316,9 @@ static void gnttab_handle_deferred(unsigned long unused) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gnttab_list_lock, flags); if (_gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(entry->ref, entry->ro)) { put_free_entry(entry->ref); - if (entry->page) { - pr_debug("freeing g.e. %#x (pfn %#lx)\n", - entry->ref, page_to_pfn(entry->page)); - put_page(entry->page); - } else - pr_info("freeing g.e. %#x\n", entry->ref); + pr_debug("freeing g.e. %#x (pfn %#lx)\n", + entry->ref, page_to_pfn(entry->page)); + put_page(entry->page); kfree(entry); entry = NULL; } else { @@ -337,9 +343,18 @@ static void gnttab_handle_deferred(unsigned long unused) static void gnttab_add_deferred(grant_ref_t ref, bool readonly, struct page *page) { - struct deferred_entry *entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC); + struct deferred_entry *entry; + gfp_t gfp = (in_atomic() || irqs_disabled()) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_KERNEL; const char *what = KERN_WARNING "leaking"; + entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), gfp); + if (!page) { + unsigned long gfn = gnttab_interface->read_frame(ref); + + page = pfn_to_page(gfn_to_pfn(gfn)); + get_page(page); + } + if (entry) { unsigned long flags; @@ -1011,6 +1026,7 @@ static const struct gnttab_ops gnttab_v1_ops = { .update_entry = gnttab_update_entry_v1, .end_foreign_access_ref = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref_v1, .end_foreign_transfer_ref = gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref_v1, + .read_frame = gnttab_read_frame_v1, }; static void gnttab_request_version(void) diff --git a/include/xen/grant_table.h b/include/xen/grant_table.h index e145e1f73bf1..c51ae64b6dcb 100644 --- a/include/xen/grant_table.h +++ b/include/xen/grant_table.h @@ -100,7 +100,12 @@ int gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly); * Note that the granted page might still be accessed (read or write) by the * other side after gnttab_end_foreign_access() returns, so even if page was * specified as 0 it is not allowed to just reuse the page for other - * purposes immediately. + * purposes immediately. gnttab_end_foreign_access() will take an additional + * reference to the granted page in this case, which is dropped only after + * the grant is no longer in use. + * This requires that multi page allocations for areas subject to + * gnttab_end_foreign_access() are done via alloc_pages_exact() (and freeing + * via free_pages_exact()) in order to avoid high order pages. */ void gnttab_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly, unsigned long page); From 1b9f4115738af90427a8c94a3980bc52fbb23296 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:05:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 076/908] xen/netfront: react properly to failing gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() Commit 66e3531b33ee51dad17c463b4d9c9f52e341503d upstream. When calling gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() the returned value must be tested and the reaction to that value should be appropriate. In case of failure in xennet_get_responses() the reaction should not be to crash the system, but to disable the network device. The calls in setup_netfront() can be replaced by calls of gnttab_end_foreign_access(). While at it avoid double free of ring pages and grant references via xennet_disconnect_backend() in this case. This is CVE-2022-23042 / part of XSA-396. Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c index d1bcbc24a70b..430d7c223585 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -839,7 +839,6 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct netfront_queue *queue, int max = XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN + (rx->status <= RX_COPY_THRESHOLD); int slots = 1; int err = 0; - unsigned long ret; if (rx->flags & XEN_NETRXF_extra_info) { err = xennet_get_extras(queue, extras, rp); @@ -870,8 +869,13 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct netfront_queue *queue, goto next; } - ret = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0); - BUG_ON(!ret); + if (!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0)) { + dev_alert(dev, + "Grant still in use by backend domain\n"); + queue->info->broken = true; + dev_alert(dev, "Disabled for further use\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } gnttab_release_grant_reference(&queue->gref_rx_head, ref); @@ -1075,6 +1079,10 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) err = xennet_get_responses(queue, &rinfo, rp, &tmpq); if (unlikely(err)) { + if (queue->info->broken) { + spin_unlock(&queue->rx_lock); + return 0; + } err: while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&tmpq))) __skb_queue_tail(&errq, skb); @@ -1652,7 +1660,7 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_device *dev, struct netfront_queue *queue, unsigned int feature_split_evtchn) { struct xen_netif_tx_sring *txs; - struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs; + struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs = NULL; grant_ref_t gref; int err; @@ -1672,21 +1680,21 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_device *dev, err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, txs, 1, &gref); if (err < 0) - goto grant_tx_ring_fail; + goto fail; queue->tx_ring_ref = gref; rxs = (struct xen_netif_rx_sring *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH); if (!rxs) { err = -ENOMEM; xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "allocating rx ring page"); - goto alloc_rx_ring_fail; + goto fail; } SHARED_RING_INIT(rxs); FRONT_RING_INIT(&queue->rx, rxs, XEN_PAGE_SIZE); err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, rxs, 1, &gref); if (err < 0) - goto grant_rx_ring_fail; + goto fail; queue->rx_ring_ref = gref; if (feature_split_evtchn) @@ -1699,22 +1707,28 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_device *dev, err = setup_netfront_single(queue); if (err) - goto alloc_evtchn_fail; + goto fail; return 0; /* If we fail to setup netfront, it is safe to just revoke access to * granted pages because backend is not accessing it at this point. */ -alloc_evtchn_fail: - gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0); -grant_rx_ring_fail: - free_page((unsigned long)rxs); -alloc_rx_ring_fail: - gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0); -grant_tx_ring_fail: - free_page((unsigned long)txs); -fail: + fail: + if (queue->rx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) { + gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0, + (unsigned long)rxs); + queue->rx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF; + } else { + free_page((unsigned long)rxs); + } + if (queue->tx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) { + gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0, + (unsigned long)txs); + queue->tx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF; + } else { + free_page((unsigned long)txs); + } return err; } From af48f51cb5934738a3ee97e951d7dededf029488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2022 10:13:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 077/908] Linux 4.14.271 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220309155856.090281301@linuxfoundation.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310140807.524313448@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 6b4a4650a507..78850e721b3d 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 14 -SUBLEVEL = 270 +SUBLEVEL = 271 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Petit Gorille From 9ace998abd043e097384843e0e52f3bfb6b62c25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jia-Ju Bai Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2022 01:14:11 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 078/908] net: qlogic: check the return value of dma_alloc_coherent() in qed_vf_hw_prepare() [ Upstream commit e0058f0fa80f6e09c4d363779c241c45a3c56b94 ] The function dma_alloc_coherent() in qed_vf_hw_prepare() can fail, so its return value should be checked. Fixes: 1408cc1fa48c ("qed: Introduce VFs") Reported-by: TOTE Robot Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_vf.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_vf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_vf.c index 693f2a039383..848a6574c0b2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_vf.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_vf.c @@ -539,6 +539,9 @@ int qed_vf_hw_prepare(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn) p_iov->bulletin.size, &p_iov->bulletin.phys, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p_iov->bulletin.p_virt) + goto free_pf2vf_reply; + DP_VERBOSE(p_hwfn, QED_MSG_IOV, "VF's bulletin Board [%p virt 0x%llx phys 0x%08x bytes]\n", p_iov->bulletin.p_virt, @@ -578,6 +581,10 @@ int qed_vf_hw_prepare(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn) return rc; +free_pf2vf_reply: + dma_free_coherent(&p_hwfn->cdev->pdev->dev, + sizeof(union pfvf_tlvs), + p_iov->pf2vf_reply, p_iov->pf2vf_reply_phys); free_vf2pf_request: dma_free_coherent(&p_hwfn->cdev->pdev->dev, sizeof(union vfpf_tlvs), From d7ba28a3902c1e0b228ae0c862989f65733a50e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Rix Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2022 07:06:42 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 079/908] qed: return status of qed_iov_get_link [ Upstream commit d9dc0c84ad2d4cc911ba252c973d1bf18d5eb9cf ] Clang static analysis reports this issue qed_sriov.c:4727:19: warning: Assigned value is garbage or undefined ivi->max_tx_rate = tx_rate ? tx_rate : link.speed; ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ link is only sometimes set by the call to qed_iov_get_link() qed_iov_get_link fails without setting link or returning status. So change the decl to return status. Fixes: 73390ac9d82b ("qed*: support ndo_get_vf_config") Signed-off-by: Tom Rix Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c index bc9eec1bcbf1..5e7e977c62b6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c @@ -3782,11 +3782,11 @@ bool qed_iov_mark_vf_flr(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn, u32 *p_disabled_vfs) return found; } -static void qed_iov_get_link(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn, - u16 vfid, - struct qed_mcp_link_params *p_params, - struct qed_mcp_link_state *p_link, - struct qed_mcp_link_capabilities *p_caps) +static int qed_iov_get_link(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn, + u16 vfid, + struct qed_mcp_link_params *p_params, + struct qed_mcp_link_state *p_link, + struct qed_mcp_link_capabilities *p_caps) { struct qed_vf_info *p_vf = qed_iov_get_vf_info(p_hwfn, vfid, @@ -3794,7 +3794,7 @@ static void qed_iov_get_link(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn, struct qed_bulletin_content *p_bulletin; if (!p_vf) - return; + return -EINVAL; p_bulletin = p_vf->bulletin.p_virt; @@ -3804,6 +3804,7 @@ static void qed_iov_get_link(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn, __qed_vf_get_link_state(p_hwfn, p_link, p_bulletin); if (p_caps) __qed_vf_get_link_caps(p_hwfn, p_caps, p_bulletin); + return 0; } static void qed_iov_process_mbx_req(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn, @@ -4554,6 +4555,7 @@ static int qed_get_vf_config(struct qed_dev *cdev, struct qed_public_vf_info *vf_info; struct qed_mcp_link_state link; u32 tx_rate; + int ret; /* Sanitize request */ if (IS_VF(cdev)) @@ -4567,7 +4569,9 @@ static int qed_get_vf_config(struct qed_dev *cdev, vf_info = qed_iov_get_public_vf_info(hwfn, vf_id, true); - qed_iov_get_link(hwfn, vf_id, NULL, &link, NULL); + ret = qed_iov_get_link(hwfn, vf_id, NULL, &link, NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; /* Fill information about VF */ ivi->vf = vf_id; From b7220f8e9d6c6b9594ddfb3125dad938cd478b1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 02:47:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 080/908] ethernet: Fix error handling in xemaclite_of_probe [ Upstream commit b19ab4b38b06aae12442b2de95ccf58b5dc53584 ] This node pointer is returned by of_parse_phandle() with refcount incremented in this function. Calling of_node_put() to avoid the refcount leak. As the remove function do. Fixes: 5cdaaa12866e ("net: emaclite: adding MDIO and phy lib support") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308024751.2320-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c index 5261796ce708..d83e6743f156 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c @@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ static int xemaclite_of_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev) if (rc) { dev_err(dev, "Cannot register network device, aborting\n"); - goto error; + goto put_node; } dev_info(dev, @@ -1169,6 +1169,8 @@ static int xemaclite_of_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev) (unsigned int __force)ndev->mem_start, lp->base_addr, ndev->irq); return 0; +put_node: + of_node_put(lp->phy_node); error: free_netdev(ndev); return rc; From 27e0eb1c3725ebefb2e2696f898617bf1403f102 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiasheng Jiang Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 14:40:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 081/908] net: ethernet: ti: cpts: Handle error for clk_enable [ Upstream commit 6babfc6e6fab068018c36e8f6605184b8c0b349d ] As the potential failure of the clk_enable(), it should be better to check it and return error if fails. Fixes: 8a2c9a5ab4b9 ("net: ethernet: ti: cpts: rework initialization/deinitialization") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpts.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpts.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpts.c index 9e7e7e8a018d..232662cbc26a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpts.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpts.c @@ -440,7 +440,9 @@ int cpts_register(struct cpts *cpts) for (i = 0; i < CPTS_MAX_EVENTS; i++) list_add(&cpts->pool_data[i].list, &cpts->pool); - clk_enable(cpts->refclk); + err = clk_enable(cpts->refclk); + if (err) + return err; cpts_write32(cpts, CPTS_EN, control); cpts_write32(cpts, TS_PEND_EN, int_enable); From 890d399df5f6364c19f773565e8f9c51ef7bbc1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiasheng Jiang Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 14:57:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 082/908] net: ethernet: lpc_eth: Handle error for clk_enable [ Upstream commit 2169b79258c8be803d2595d6456b1e77129fe154 ] As the potential failure of the clk_enable(), it should be better to check it and return error if fails. Fixes: b7370112f519 ("lpc32xx: Added ethernet driver") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/nxp/lpc_eth.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/nxp/lpc_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/nxp/lpc_eth.c index 415ac33341c5..27c22f0e9d25 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/nxp/lpc_eth.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/nxp/lpc_eth.c @@ -1512,6 +1512,7 @@ static int lpc_eth_drv_resume(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct net_device *ndev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); struct netdata_local *pldat; + int ret; if (device_may_wakeup(&pdev->dev)) disable_irq_wake(ndev->irq); @@ -1521,7 +1522,9 @@ static int lpc_eth_drv_resume(struct platform_device *pdev) pldat = netdev_priv(ndev); /* Enable interface clock */ - clk_enable(pldat->clk); + ret = clk_enable(pldat->clk); + if (ret) + return ret; /* Reset and initialize */ __lpc_eth_reset(pldat); From d03aba820f1549c9f3b1d14bf48fa082663d22b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 16:12:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 083/908] ax25: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ax25_kill_by_device [ Upstream commit 71171ac8eb34ce7fe6b3267dce27c313ab3cb3ac ] When two ax25 devices attempted to establish connection, the requester use ax25_create(), ax25_bind() and ax25_connect() to initiate connection. The receiver use ax25_rcv() to accept connection and use ax25_create_cb() in ax25_rcv() to create ax25_cb, but the ax25_cb->sk is NULL. When the receiver is detaching, a NULL pointer dereference bug caused by sock_hold(sk) in ax25_kill_by_device() will happen. The corresponding fail log is shown below: =============================================================== BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in ax25_device_event+0xfd/0x290 Call Trace: ... ax25_device_event+0xfd/0x290 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x5e/0x70 dev_close_many+0x174/0x220 unregister_netdevice_many+0x1f7/0xa60 unregister_netdevice_queue+0x12f/0x170 unregister_netdev+0x13/0x20 mkiss_close+0xcd/0x140 tty_ldisc_release+0xc0/0x220 tty_release_struct+0x17/0xa0 tty_release+0x62d/0x670 ... This patch add condition check in ax25_kill_by_device(). If s->sk is NULL, it will goto if branch to kill device. Fixes: 4e0f718daf97 ("ax25: improve the incomplete fix to avoid UAF and NPD bugs") Reported-by: Thomas Osterried Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c index 36d2e1dfa1e6..466f9e3883c8 100644 --- a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c +++ b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c @@ -90,6 +90,13 @@ static void ax25_kill_by_device(struct net_device *dev) ax25_for_each(s, &ax25_list) { if (s->ax25_dev == ax25_dev) { sk = s->sk; + if (!sk) { + spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_list_lock); + s->ax25_dev = NULL; + ax25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH); + spin_lock_bh(&ax25_list_lock); + goto again; + } sock_hold(sk); spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_list_lock); lock_sock(sk); From a4688533c0e5b04c9a3c1de43c26623b5fe1bdd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mohammad Kabat Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2021 14:38:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 084/908] net/mlx5: Fix size field in bufferx_reg struct [ Upstream commit ac77998b7ac3044f0509b097da9637184598980d ] According to HW spec the field "size" should be 16 bits in bufferx register. Fixes: e281682bf294 ("net/mlx5_core: HW data structs/types definitions cleanup") Signed-off-by: Mohammad Kabat Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h b/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h index c4b8602ea6f5..e0eed46e4039 100644 --- a/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h +++ b/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h @@ -7953,8 +7953,8 @@ struct mlx5_ifc_bufferx_reg_bits { u8 reserved_at_0[0x6]; u8 lossy[0x1]; u8 epsb[0x1]; - u8 reserved_at_8[0xc]; - u8 size[0xc]; + u8 reserved_at_8[0x8]; + u8 size[0x10]; u8 xoff_threshold[0x10]; u8 xon_threshold[0x10]; From 32e866ae5a7af590597ef4bcff8451bf96d5f980 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Skripkin Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 21:50:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 085/908] NFC: port100: fix use-after-free in port100_send_complete [ Upstream commit f80cfe2f26581f188429c12bd937eb905ad3ac7b ] Syzbot reported UAF in port100_send_complete(). The root case is in missing usb_kill_urb() calls on error handling path of ->probe function. port100_send_complete() accesses devm allocated memory which will be freed on probe failure. We should kill this urbs before returning an error from probe function to prevent reported use-after-free Fail log: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in port100_send_complete+0x16e/0x1a0 drivers/nfc/port100.c:935 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801bb59540 by task ksoftirqd/2/26 ... Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x303 mm/kasan/report.c:255 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 port100_send_complete+0x16e/0x1a0 drivers/nfc/port100.c:935 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2b0/0x5c0 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1670 ... Allocated by task 1255: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:436 [inline] ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:515 [inline] ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:474 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:524 alloc_dr drivers/base/devres.c:116 [inline] devm_kmalloc+0x96/0x1d0 drivers/base/devres.c:823 devm_kzalloc include/linux/device.h:209 [inline] port100_probe+0x8a/0x1320 drivers/nfc/port100.c:1502 Freed by task 1255: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:370 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:366 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free+0xff/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:328 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:236 [inline] __cache_free mm/slab.c:3437 [inline] kfree+0xf8/0x2b0 mm/slab.c:3794 release_nodes+0x112/0x1a0 drivers/base/devres.c:501 devres_release_all+0x114/0x190 drivers/base/devres.c:530 really_probe+0x626/0xcc0 drivers/base/dd.c:670 Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+16bcb127fb73baeecb14@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 0347a6ab300a ("NFC: port100: Commands mechanism implementation") Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308185007.6987-1-paskripkin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/nfc/port100.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/port100.c b/drivers/nfc/port100.c index 0f37acec98ab..bc680b8be133 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/port100.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/port100.c @@ -1618,7 +1618,9 @@ static int port100_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, nfc_digital_free_device(dev->nfc_digital_dev); error: + usb_kill_urb(dev->in_urb); usb_free_urb(dev->in_urb); + usb_kill_urb(dev->out_urb); usb_free_urb(dev->out_urb); usb_put_dev(dev->udev); From 2987549111ac5080db6ba397e574933eb2c9a6fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Featherston Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 17:16:16 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 086/908] gpio: ts4900: Do not set DAT and OE together [ Upstream commit 03fe003547975680fdb9ff5ab0e41cb68276c4f2 ] This works around an issue with the hardware where both OE and DAT are exposed in the same register. If both are updated simultaneously, the harware makes no guarantees that OE or DAT will actually change in any given order and may result in a glitch of a few ns on a GPIO pin when changing direction and value in a single write. Setting direction to input now only affects OE bit. Setting direction to output updates DAT first, then OE. Fixes: 9c6686322d74 ("gpio: add Technologic I2C-FPGA gpio support") Signed-off-by: Mark Featherston Signed-off-by: Kris Bahnsen Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpio/gpio-ts4900.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-ts4900.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-ts4900.c index 5bd21725e604..930a6098b758 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-ts4900.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-ts4900.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Digital I/O driver for Technologic Systems I2C FPGA Core * - * Copyright (C) 2015 Technologic Systems + * Copyright (C) 2015, 2018 Technologic Systems * Copyright (C) 2016 Savoir-Faire Linux * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or @@ -52,19 +52,33 @@ static int ts4900_gpio_direction_input(struct gpio_chip *chip, { struct ts4900_gpio_priv *priv = gpiochip_get_data(chip); - /* - * This will clear the output enable bit, the other bits are - * dontcare when this is cleared + /* Only clear the OE bit here, requires a RMW. Prevents potential issue + * with OE and data getting to the physical pin at different times. */ - return regmap_write(priv->regmap, offset, 0); + return regmap_update_bits(priv->regmap, offset, TS4900_GPIO_OE, 0); } static int ts4900_gpio_direction_output(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned int offset, int value) { struct ts4900_gpio_priv *priv = gpiochip_get_data(chip); + unsigned int reg; int ret; + /* If changing from an input to an output, we need to first set the + * proper data bit to what is requested and then set OE bit. This + * prevents a glitch that can occur on the IO line + */ + regmap_read(priv->regmap, offset, ®); + if (!(reg & TS4900_GPIO_OE)) { + if (value) + reg = TS4900_GPIO_OUT; + else + reg &= ~TS4900_GPIO_OUT; + + regmap_write(priv->regmap, offset, reg); + } + if (value) ret = regmap_write(priv->regmap, offset, TS4900_GPIO_OE | TS4900_GPIO_OUT); From 41a2864cf719c17294f417726edd411643462ab8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 16:11:45 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 087/908] sctp: fix kernel-infoleak for SCTP sockets [ Upstream commit 633593a808980f82d251d0ca89730d8bb8b0220c ] syzbot reported a kernel infoleak [1] of 4 bytes. After analysis, it turned out r->idiag_expires is not initialized if inet_sctp_diag_fill() calls inet_diag_msg_common_fill() Make sure to clear idiag_timer/idiag_retrans/idiag_expires and let inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() fill them again if needed. [1] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout lib/iov_iter.c:154 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x6ef/0x25a0 lib/iov_iter.c:668 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline] copyout lib/iov_iter.c:154 [inline] _copy_to_iter+0x6ef/0x25a0 lib/iov_iter.c:668 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:162 [inline] simple_copy_to_iter+0xf3/0x140 net/core/datagram.c:519 __skb_datagram_iter+0x2d5/0x11b0 net/core/datagram.c:425 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0xdc/0x270 net/core/datagram.c:533 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3696 [inline] netlink_recvmsg+0x669/0x1c80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1977 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline] __sys_recvfrom+0x795/0xa10 net/socket.c:2097 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2115 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2111 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x19d/0x210 net/socket.c:2111 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:737 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3247 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe0c/0x1510 mm/slub.c:4975 kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:354 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x545/0xf90 net/core/skbuff.c:426 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1158 [inline] netlink_dump+0x3e5/0x16c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2248 __netlink_dump_start+0xcf8/0xe90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2373 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:254 [inline] inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x2e7/0x400 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1341 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x24a/0x620 netlink_rcv_skb+0x40c/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494 sock_diag_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/core/sock_diag.c:277 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x1093/0x1360 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x14d9/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x594/0x690 net/socket.c:1061 do_iter_readv_writev+0xa7f/0xc70 do_iter_write+0x52c/0x1500 fs/read_write.c:851 vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:924 [inline] do_writev+0x645/0xe00 fs/read_write.c:967 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1040 [inline] __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1037 [inline] __x64_sys_writev+0xe5/0x120 fs/read_write.c:1037 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Bytes 68-71 of 2508 are uninitialized Memory access of size 2508 starts at ffff888114f9b000 Data copied to user address 00007f7fe09ff2e0 CPU: 1 PID: 3478 Comm: syz-executor306 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Cc: Vlad Yasevich Cc: Neil Horman Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Reviewed-by: Xin Long Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310001145.297371-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sctp/sctp_diag.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c b/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c index 7c7b476bad31..9c9d6cbdd14f 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c +++ b/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c @@ -45,10 +45,6 @@ static void inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill(struct inet_diag_msg *r, r->idiag_timer = SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T3_RTX; r->idiag_retrans = asoc->rtx_data_chunks; r->idiag_expires = jiffies_to_msecs(t3_rtx->expires - jiffies); - } else { - r->idiag_timer = 0; - r->idiag_retrans = 0; - r->idiag_expires = 0; } } @@ -128,13 +124,14 @@ static int inet_sctp_diag_fill(struct sock *sk, struct sctp_association *asoc, r = nlmsg_data(nlh); BUG_ON(!sk_fullsock(sk)); + r->idiag_timer = 0; + r->idiag_retrans = 0; + r->idiag_expires = 0; if (asoc) { inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill(r, sk, asoc); } else { inet_diag_msg_common_fill(r, sk); r->idiag_state = sk->sk_state; - r->idiag_timer = 0; - r->idiag_retrans = 0; } if (inet_diag_msg_attrs_fill(sk, skb, r, ext, user_ns, net_admin)) From 081369ad088a76429984483b8a5f7e967a125aad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: suresh kumar Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 07:25:18 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 088/908] net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show [ Upstream commit 4224cfd7fb6523f7a9d1c8bb91bb5df1e38eb624 ] When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already removed. [ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called [ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called ... [ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 758.031397] IP: [] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280 crash> bt ... PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd" ... #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778 [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab] RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090 RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00 R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core] #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core] #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core] #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core] #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core] #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46 #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208 #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3 #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596 #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10 #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5 #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92 crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000 state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER) To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present. Signed-off-by: suresh kumar Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/core/net-sysfs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c index 7d8c6ba5cbd2..5ff47c5bc453 100644 --- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c +++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static ssize_t speed_show(struct device *dev, if (!rtnl_trylock()) return restart_syscall(); - if (netif_running(netdev)) { + if (netif_running(netdev) && netif_device_present(netdev)) { struct ethtool_link_ksettings cmd; if (!__ethtool_get_link_ksettings(netdev, &cmd)) From 1306c1bb943f7b2b4d5e551ac78a9dd57d7e9143 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Marek=20Marczykowski-G=C3=B3recki?= Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 01:18:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 089/908] Revert "xen-netback: remove 'hotplug-status' once it has served its purpose" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 0f4558ae91870692ce7f509c31c9d6ee721d8cdc ] This reverts commit 1f2565780e9b7218cf92c7630130e82dcc0fe9c2. The 'hotplug-status' node should not be removed as long as the vif device remains configured. Otherwise the xen-netback would wait for re-running the network script even if it was already called (in case of the frontent re-connecting). But also, it _should_ be removed when the vif device is destroyed (for example when unbinding the driver) - otherwise hotplug script would not configure the device whenever it re-appear. Moving removal of the 'hotplug-status' node was a workaround for nothing calling network script after xen-netback module is reloaded. But when vif interface is re-created (on xen-netback unbind/bind for example), the script should be called, regardless of who does that - currently this case is not handled by the toolstack, and requires manual script call. Keeping hotplug-status=connected to skip the call is wrong and leads to not configured interface. More discussion at https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/afedd7cb-a291-e773-8b0d-4db9b291fa98@ipxe.org/T/#u Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220222001817.2264967-1-marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c index 9092b55e087f..df2e1ec9e624 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c @@ -499,6 +499,7 @@ static void backend_disconnect(struct backend_info *be) unsigned int queue_index; xen_unregister_watchers(vif); + xenbus_rm(XBT_NIL, be->dev->nodename, "hotplug-status"); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS xenvif_debugfs_delif(vif); #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */ From e8c17cd61ab502b043fae0251a2d4e59e37ffbae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Marek=20Marczykowski-G=C3=B3recki?= Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 01:18:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 090/908] Revert "xen-netback: Check for hotplug-status existence before watching" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit e8240addd0a3919e0fd7436416afe9aa6429c484 ] This reverts commit 2afeec08ab5c86ae21952151f726bfe184f6b23d. The reasoning in the commit was wrong - the code expected to setup the watch even if 'hotplug-status' didn't exist. In fact, it relied on the watch being fired the first time - to check if maybe 'hotplug-status' is already set to 'connected'. Not registering a watch for non-existing path (which is the case if hotplug script hasn't been executed yet), made the backend not waiting for the hotplug script to execute. This in turns, made the netfront think the interface is fully operational, while in fact it was not (the vif interface on xen-netback side might not be configured yet). This was a workaround for 'hotplug-status' erroneously being removed. But since that is reverted now, the workaround is not necessary either. More discussion at https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/afedd7cb-a291-e773-8b0d-4db9b291fa98@ipxe.org/T/#u Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: Michael Brown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220222001817.2264967-2-marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c index df2e1ec9e624..37b662f0eebc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c @@ -1044,15 +1044,11 @@ static void connect(struct backend_info *be) xenvif_carrier_on(be->vif); unregister_hotplug_status_watch(be); - if (xenbus_exists(XBT_NIL, dev->nodename, "hotplug-status")) { - err = xenbus_watch_pathfmt(dev, &be->hotplug_status_watch, - NULL, hotplug_status_changed, - "%s/%s", dev->nodename, - "hotplug-status"); - if (err) - goto err; + err = xenbus_watch_pathfmt(dev, &be->hotplug_status_watch, NULL, + hotplug_status_changed, + "%s/%s", dev->nodename, "hotplug-status"); + if (!err) be->have_hotplug_status_watch = 1; - } netif_tx_wake_all_queues(be->vif->dev); From 33d11cef2d4978ba5357b26d00eaeb8e4fba162e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Schnelle Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 14:44:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 091/908] tracing: Ensure trace buffer is at least 4096 bytes large [ Upstream commit 7acf3a127bb7c65ff39099afd78960e77b2ca5de ] Booting the kernel with 'trace_buf_size=1' give a warning at boot during the ftrace selftests: [ 0.892809] Running postponed tracer tests: [ 0.892893] Testing tracer function: [ 0.901899] Callback from call_rcu_tasks_trace() invoked. [ 0.983829] Callback from call_rcu_tasks_rude() invoked. [ 1.072003] .. bad ring buffer .. corrupted trace buffer .. [ 1.091944] Callback from call_rcu_tasks() invoked. [ 1.097695] PASSED [ 1.097701] Testing dynamic ftrace: .. filter failed count=0 ..FAILED! [ 1.353474] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1.353478] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/trace/trace.c:1951 run_tracer_selftest+0x13c/0x1b0 Therefore enforce a minimum of 4096 bytes to make the selftest pass. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220214134456.1751749-1-svens@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/trace/trace.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index c1da2a4a629a..c728acb6b14c 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -1118,10 +1118,12 @@ static int __init set_buf_size(char *str) if (!str) return 0; buf_size = memparse(str, &str); - /* nr_entries can not be zero */ - if (buf_size == 0) - return 0; - trace_buf_size = buf_size; + /* + * nr_entries can not be zero and the startup + * tests require some buffer space. Therefore + * ensure we have at least 4096 bytes of buffer. + */ + trace_buf_size = max(4096UL, buf_size); return 1; } __setup("trace_buf_size=", set_buf_size); From 086e3685efbc6102912a02de44443f0bb2948fbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Kravetz Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 19:11:26 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 092/908] selftests/memfd: clean up mapping in mfd_fail_write [ Upstream commit fda153c89af344d21df281009a9d046cf587ea0f ] Running the memfd script ./run_hugetlbfs_test.sh will often end in error as follows: memfd-hugetlb: CREATE memfd-hugetlb: BASIC memfd-hugetlb: SEAL-WRITE memfd-hugetlb: SEAL-FUTURE-WRITE memfd-hugetlb: SEAL-SHRINK fallocate(ALLOC) failed: No space left on device ./run_hugetlbfs_test.sh: line 60: 166855 Aborted (core dumped) ./memfd_test hugetlbfs opening: ./mnt/memfd fuse: DONE If no hugetlb pages have been preallocated, run_hugetlbfs_test.sh will allocate 'just enough' pages to run the test. In the SEAL-FUTURE-WRITE test the mfd_fail_write routine maps the file, but does not unmap. As a result, two hugetlb pages remain reserved for the mapping. When the fallocate call in the SEAL-SHRINK test attempts allocate all hugetlb pages, it is short by the two reserved pages. Fix by making sure to unmap in mfd_fail_write. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220219004340.56478-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz Cc: Joel Fernandes Cc: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c index 845e5f67b6f0..cf4c5276eb06 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c @@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ static void mfd_fail_write(int fd) printf("mmap()+mprotect() didn't fail as expected\n"); abort(); } + munmap(p, mfd_def_size); } /* verify PUNCH_HOLE fails */ From ca8c9fd34278ac22db0c6682e2d92432a85e11f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2022 11:49:12 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 093/908] ARM: Spectre-BHB: provide empty stub for non-config commit 68453767131a5deec1e8f9ac92a9042f929e585d upstream. When CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES is not set, references to spectre_v2_update_state() cause a build error, so provide an empty stub for that function when the Kconfig option is not set. Fixes this build error: arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.o: in function `cpu_v7_bugs_init': proc-v7-bugs.c:(.text+0x52): undefined reference to `spectre_v2_update_state' arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: proc-v7-bugs.c:(.text+0x82): undefined reference to `spectre_v2_update_state' Fixes: b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: kernel test robot Cc: Russell King Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: patches@armlinux.org.uk Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h index d1fa5607d3aa..85f9e538fb32 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h @@ -25,7 +25,13 @@ enum { SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8 = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8), }; +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int methods); +#else +static inline void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, + unsigned int methods) +{} +#endif int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method); From 83a9c886c2b5a0d28c0b37e1736b47f38d61332a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 10:43:31 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 094/908] staging: gdm724x: fix use after free in gdm_lte_rx() commit fc7f750dc9d102c1ed7bbe4591f991e770c99033 upstream. The netif_rx_ni() function frees the skb so we can't dereference it to save the skb->len. Fixes: 61e121047645 ("staging: gdm7240: adding LTE USB driver") Cc: stable Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220228074331.GA13685@kili Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/gdm724x/gdm_lte.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/gdm724x/gdm_lte.c b/drivers/staging/gdm724x/gdm_lte.c index ed0c5fd2d640..8a863686dd6d 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/gdm724x/gdm_lte.c +++ b/drivers/staging/gdm724x/gdm_lte.c @@ -85,14 +85,15 @@ static void tx_complete(void *arg) static int gdm_lte_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nic *nic, int nic_type) { - int ret; + int ret, len; + len = skb->len + ETH_HLEN; ret = netif_rx_ni(skb); if (ret == NET_RX_DROP) { nic->stats.rx_dropped++; } else { nic->stats.rx_packets++; - nic->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len + ETH_HLEN; + nic->stats.rx_bytes += len; } return 0; From 3bfbae141b5166e894a8f9c77453504443b5de60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 14:56:15 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 095/908] virtio: unexport virtio_finalize_features commit 838d6d3461db0fdbf33fc5f8a69c27b50b4a46da upstream. virtio_finalize_features is only used internally within virtio. No reason to export it. Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck Acked-by: Jason Wang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 3 +-- include/linux/virtio.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c index 4230b4e72f4a..8f3a0e905657 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void virtio_add_status(struct virtio_device *dev, unsigned int status) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(virtio_add_status); -int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev) +static int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev) { int ret = dev->config->finalize_features(dev); unsigned status; @@ -185,7 +185,6 @@ int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev) } return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(virtio_finalize_features); static int virtio_dev_probe(struct device *_d) { diff --git a/include/linux/virtio.h b/include/linux/virtio.h index fa1b5da2804e..14f6cf650ecf 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio.h @@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ void virtio_break_device(struct virtio_device *dev); void virtio_config_changed(struct virtio_device *dev); void virtio_config_disable(struct virtio_device *dev); void virtio_config_enable(struct virtio_device *dev); -int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev); #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP int virtio_device_freeze(struct virtio_device *dev); int virtio_device_restore(struct virtio_device *dev); From 5864f2bec17b4597cae6a65033ebd97b436224ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 14:58:41 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 096/908] virtio: acknowledge all features before access commit 4fa59ede95195f267101a1b8916992cf3f245cdb upstream. The feature negotiation was designed in a way that makes it possible for devices to know which config fields will be accessed by drivers. This is broken since commit 404123c2db79 ("virtio: allow drivers to validate features") with fallout in at least block and net. We have a partial work-around in commit 2f9a174f918e ("virtio: write back F_VERSION_1 before validate") which at least lets devices find out which format should config space have, but this is a partial fix: guests should not access config space without acknowledging features since otherwise we'll never be able to change the config space format. To fix, split finalize_features from virtio_finalize_features and call finalize_features with all feature bits before validation, and then - if validation changed any bits - once again after. Since virtio_finalize_features no longer writes out features rename it to virtio_features_ok - since that is what it does: checks that features are ok with the device. As a side effect, this also reduces the amount of hypervisor accesses - we now only acknowledge features once unless we are clearing any features when validating (which is uncommon). IRC I think that this was more or less always the intent in the spec but unfortunately the way the spec is worded does not say this explicitly, I plan to address this at the spec level, too. Acked-by: Jason Wang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 404123c2db79 ("virtio: allow drivers to validate features") Fixes: 2f9a174f918e ("virtio: write back F_VERSION_1 before validate") Cc: "Halil Pasic" Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++---------------- include/linux/virtio_config.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c index 8f3a0e905657..679c6ad25de2 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c @@ -165,14 +165,11 @@ void virtio_add_status(struct virtio_device *dev, unsigned int status) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(virtio_add_status); -static int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev) +/* Do some validation, then set FEATURES_OK */ +static int virtio_features_ok(struct virtio_device *dev) { - int ret = dev->config->finalize_features(dev); unsigned status; - if (ret) - return ret; - if (!virtio_has_feature(dev, VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1)) return 0; @@ -221,17 +218,6 @@ static int virtio_dev_probe(struct device *_d) driver_features_legacy = driver_features; } - /* - * Some devices detect legacy solely via F_VERSION_1. Write - * F_VERSION_1 to force LE config space accesses before FEATURES_OK for - * these when needed. - */ - if (drv->validate && !virtio_legacy_is_little_endian() - && device_features & BIT_ULL(VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1)) { - dev->features = BIT_ULL(VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1); - dev->config->finalize_features(dev); - } - if (device_features & (1ULL << VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1)) dev->features = driver_features & device_features; else @@ -242,13 +228,26 @@ static int virtio_dev_probe(struct device *_d) if (device_features & (1ULL << i)) __virtio_set_bit(dev, i); + err = dev->config->finalize_features(dev); + if (err) + goto err; + if (drv->validate) { + u64 features = dev->features; + err = drv->validate(dev); if (err) goto err; + + /* Did validation change any features? Then write them again. */ + if (features != dev->features) { + err = dev->config->finalize_features(dev); + if (err) + goto err; + } } - err = virtio_finalize_features(dev); + err = virtio_features_ok(dev); if (err) goto err; @@ -400,7 +399,11 @@ int virtio_device_restore(struct virtio_device *dev) /* We have a driver! */ virtio_add_status(dev, VIRTIO_CONFIG_S_DRIVER); - ret = virtio_finalize_features(dev); + ret = dev->config->finalize_features(dev); + if (ret) + goto err; + + ret = virtio_features_ok(dev); if (ret) goto err; diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_config.h b/include/linux/virtio_config.h index 5559a2d31c46..b1bc50ee09db 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio_config.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio_config.h @@ -51,8 +51,9 @@ struct irq_affinity; * Returns the first 32 feature bits (all we currently need). * @finalize_features: confirm what device features we'll be using. * vdev: the virtio_device - * This gives the final feature bits for the device: it can change + * This sends the driver feature bits to the device: it can change * the dev->feature bits if it wants. + * Note: despite the name this can be called any number of times. * Returns 0 on success or error status * @bus_name: return the bus name associated with the device * vdev: the virtio_device From 8319ad4e76c1617857d7506076f081574eaa46d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Russell King (Oracle)" Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2022 17:13:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 097/908] ARM: fix Thumb2 regression with Spectre BHB commit 6c7cb60bff7aec24b834343ff433125f469886a3 upstream. When building for Thumb2, the vectors make use of a local label. Sadly, the Spectre BHB code also uses a local label with the same number which results in the Thumb2 reference pointing at the wrong place. Fix this by changing the number used for the Spectre BHB local label. Fixes: b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround") Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S index 8d75da86ea8b..b54084f9b77a 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S @@ -1071,9 +1071,9 @@ vector_bhb_loop8_\name: @ bhb workaround mov r0, #8 -1: b . + 4 +3: b . + 4 subs r0, r0, #1 - bne 1b + bne 3b dsb isb b 2b From 227610ef62d341f36dc7220f3fd189e468f959c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Triplett Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 12:15:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 098/908] ext4: add check to prevent attempting to resize an fs with sparse_super2 commit b1489186cc8391e0c1e342f9fbc3eedf6b944c61 upstream. The in-kernel ext4 resize code doesn't support filesystem with the sparse_super2 feature. It fails with errors like this and doesn't finish the resize: EXT4-fs (loop0): resizing filesystem from 16640 to 7864320 blocks EXT4-fs warning (device loop0): verify_reserved_gdb:760: reserved GDT 2 missing grp 1 (32770) EXT4-fs warning (device loop0): ext4_resize_fs:2111: error (-22) occurred during file system resize EXT4-fs (loop0): resized filesystem to 2097152 To reproduce: mkfs.ext4 -b 4096 -I 256 -J size=32 -E resize=$((256*1024*1024)) -O sparse_super2 ext4.img 65M truncate -s 30G ext4.img mount ext4.img /mnt python3 -c 'import fcntl, os, struct ; fd = os.open("/mnt", os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY) ; fcntl.ioctl(fd, 0x40086610, struct.pack("Q", 30 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 // 4096), False) ; os.close(fd)' dmesg | tail e2fsck ext4.img The userspace resize2fs tool has a check for this case: it checks if the filesystem has sparse_super2 set and if the kernel provides /sys/fs/ext4/features/sparse_super2. However, the former check requires manually reading and parsing the filesystem superblock. Detect this case in ext4_resize_begin and error out early with a clear error message. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/74b8ae78405270211943cd7393e65586c5faeed1.1623093259.git.josh@joshtriplett.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/resize.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/resize.c b/fs/ext4/resize.c index 454fd21a00b4..e0f4a9e3114e 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/resize.c +++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c @@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ int ext4_resize_begin(struct super_block *sb) return -EPERM; } + if (ext4_has_feature_sparse_super2(sb)) { + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Online resizing not supported with sparse_super2"); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + if (test_and_set_bit_lock(EXT4_FLAGS_RESIZING, &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_ext4_flags)) ret = -EBUSY; From e0956dd95ddd6b02b7eb084d127b926a509ae8e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 14:57:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 099/908] btrfs: unlock newly allocated extent buffer after error commit 19ea40dddf1833db868533958ca066f368862211 upstream. [BUG] There is a bug report that injected ENOMEM error could leave a tree block locked while we return to user-space: BTRFS info (device loop0): enabling ssd optimizations FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 0 PID: 7579 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1 #16 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xcf lib/dump_stack.c:106 fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:52 [inline] should_fail+0x13c/0x160 lib/fault-inject.c:146 should_failslab+0x5/0x10 mm/slab_common.c:1328 slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.99+0x4e/0xc0 mm/slab.h:494 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3120 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3214 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x44/0x280 mm/slub.c:3219 btrfs_alloc_delayed_extent_op fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.h:299 [inline] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x38c/0x670 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4833 __btrfs_cow_block+0x16f/0x7d0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:415 btrfs_cow_block+0x12a/0x300 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:570 btrfs_search_slot+0x6b0/0xee0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1768 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x80/0xf0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:3905 btrfs_new_inode+0x311/0xa60 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6530 btrfs_create+0x12b/0x270 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6783 lookup_open+0x660/0x780 fs/namei.c:3282 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3352 [inline] path_openat+0x465/0xe20 fs/namei.c:3557 do_filp_open+0xe3/0x170 fs/namei.c:3588 do_sys_openat2+0x357/0x4a0 fs/open.c:1200 do_sys_open+0x87/0xd0 fs/open.c:1216 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x46ae99 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f46711b9c48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000055 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000078c0a0 RCX: 000000000046ae99 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000000a1 RDI: 0000000020005800 RBP: 00007f46711b9c80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000017 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000078c0a0 R15: 00007ffc129da6e0 ================================================ WARNING: lock held when returning to user space! 5.15.0-rc1 #16 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------ syz-executor/7579 is leaving the kernel with locks still held! 1 lock held by syz-executor/7579: #0: ffff888104b73da8 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x2e/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:112 [CAUSE] In btrfs_alloc_tree_block(), after btrfs_init_new_buffer(), the new extent buffer @buf is locked, but if later operations like adding delayed tree ref fail, we just free @buf without unlocking it, resulting above warning. [FIX] Unlock @buf in out_free_buf: label. Reported-by: Hao Sun Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CACkBjsZ9O6Zr0KK1yGn=1rQi6Crh1yeCRdTSBxx9R99L4xdn-Q@mail.gmail.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index 00481cfe6cfc..e59987385673 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -8595,6 +8595,7 @@ struct extent_buffer *btrfs_alloc_tree_block(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, out_free_delayed: btrfs_free_delayed_extent_op(extent_op); out_free_buf: + btrfs_tree_unlock(buf); free_extent_buffer(buf); out_free_reserved: btrfs_free_reserved_extent(fs_info, ins.objectid, ins.offset, 0); From eb045674aab31aa55a4f9aec27cce36e3d946a21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 12:57:09 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 100/908] Linux 4.14.272 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314112731.050583127@linuxfoundation.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314145907.257355309@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 78850e721b3d..f683ed316664 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 14 -SUBLEVEL = 271 +SUBLEVEL = 272 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Petit Gorille From 878cc8e47413d6c35995187992039b1a664ea4f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2021 07:42:42 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 101/908] sctp: fix the processing for INIT chunk commit eae5783908042a762c24e1bd11876edb91d314b1 upstream. This patch fixes the problems below: 1. In non-shutdown_ack_sent states: in sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit(): chunk length check should be done before any checks that may cause to send abort, as making packet for abort will access the init_tag from init_hdr in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(). 2. In shutdown_ack_sent state: in sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(): The same checks as does in sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit() is needed for sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index b26067798dbf..91aecc3449d2 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -161,6 +161,12 @@ static enum sctp_disposition __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort( void *arg, struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands); +static enum sctp_disposition +__sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands); + /* Small helper function that checks if the chunk length * is of the appropriate length. The 'required_length' argument * is set to be the size of a specific chunk we are testing. @@ -337,6 +343,14 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, if (!chunk->singleton) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. + * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation + * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll + * just discard the packet. + */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT. */ @@ -351,14 +365,6 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. - * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation - * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll - * just discard the packet. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* If the INIT is coming toward a closing socket, we'll send back * and ABORT. Essentially, this catches the race of INIT being * backloged to the socket at the same time as the user isses close(). @@ -1460,19 +1466,16 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( if (!chunk->singleton) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* 3.1 A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification * Tag. */ if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. - * In this case, we generate a protocol violation since we have - * an association established. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); /* Grab the INIT header. */ chunk->subh.init_hdr = (struct sctp_inithdr *)chunk->skb->data; @@ -1787,9 +1790,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a( * its peer. */ if (sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT)) { - disposition = sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, - SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type), - chunk, commands); + disposition = __sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, + SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type), + chunk, commands); if (SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM == disposition) goto nomem; @@ -2847,13 +2850,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_shut_ctsn( * that belong to this association, it should discard the INIT chunk and * retransmit the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk. */ -enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack( - struct net *net, - const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, - const struct sctp_association *asoc, - const union sctp_subtype type, - void *arg, - struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +static enum sctp_disposition +__sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; struct sctp_chunk *reply; @@ -2887,6 +2888,26 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack( return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM; } +enum sctp_disposition +sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +{ + struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + + if (!chunk->singleton) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) + return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + return __sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); +} + /* * sctp_sf_do_ecn_cwr * From 8a7952ec41de8f855f0cddb552cf3f5340a80482 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2021 07:42:43 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 102/908] sctp: fix the processing for INIT_ACK chunk commit 438b95a7c98f77d51cbf4db021f41b602d750a3f upstream. Currently INIT_ACK chunk in non-cookie_echoed state is processed in sctp_sf_discard_chunk() to send an abort with the existent asoc's vtag if the chunk length is not valid. But the vtag in the chunk's sctphdr is not verified, which may be exploited by one to cook a malicious chunk to terminal a SCTP asoc. sctp_sf_discard_chunk() also is called in many other places to send an abort, and most of those have this problem. This patch is to fix it by sending abort with the existent asoc's vtag only if the vtag from the chunk's sctphdr is verified in sctp_sf_discard_chunk(). Note on sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort() and sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_abort(), the chunk length has been verified before sctp_sf_discard_chunk(), so replace it with sctp_sf_discard(). On sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack() and sctp_sf_do_asconf(), move the sctp_chunk_length_valid check ahead of sctp_sf_discard_chunk(), then replace it with sctp_sf_discard(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 91aecc3449d2..03434e7295eb 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -2221,7 +2221,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2267,7 +2267,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shutdown_sent_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2537,7 +2537,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -3702,6 +3702,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); } + /* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* ADD-IP: Section 4.1.1 * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk @@ -3709,13 +3714,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, * described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. */ if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !chunk->auth) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - - /* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); hdr = (struct sctp_addiphdr *)chunk->skb->data; serial = ntohl(hdr->serial); @@ -3844,6 +3843,12 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); } + /* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, + sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* ADD-IP, Section 4.1.2: * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk @@ -3851,14 +3856,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net, * described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. */ if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - - /* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, - sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); addip_hdr = (struct sctp_addiphdr *)asconf_ack->skb->data; rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial); @@ -4435,6 +4433,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_discard_chunk(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. * Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general * chunkhdr structure to make a comparison. From d429be3baf55aeb6400fdcaf874cd28159a4c60b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yan Yan Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:00:14 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 103/908] xfrm: Fix xfrm migrate issues when address family changes [ Upstream commit e03c3bba351f99ad932e8f06baa9da1afc418e02 ] xfrm_migrate cannot handle address family change of an xfrm_state. The symptons are the xfrm_state will be migrated to a wrong address, and sending as well as receiving packets wil be broken. This commit fixes it by breaking the original xfrm_state_clone method into two steps so as to update the props.family before running xfrm_init_state. As the result, xfrm_state's inner mode, outer mode, type and IP header length in xfrm_state_migrate can be updated with the new address family. Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1885354 Signed-off-by: Yan Yan Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index 5164dfe0aa09..2c17fbdd2366 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -1421,9 +1421,6 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_clone(struct xfrm_state *orig, memcpy(&x->mark, &orig->mark, sizeof(x->mark)); - if (xfrm_init_state(x) < 0) - goto error; - x->props.flags = orig->props.flags; x->props.extra_flags = orig->props.extra_flags; @@ -1501,6 +1498,11 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_migrate(struct xfrm_state *x, if (!xc) return NULL; + xc->props.family = m->new_family; + + if (xfrm_init_state(xc) < 0) + goto error; + memcpy(&xc->id.daddr, &m->new_daddr, sizeof(xc->id.daddr)); memcpy(&xc->props.saddr, &m->new_saddr, sizeof(xc->props.saddr)); From 26fe3777e20d04460216a31bc5762cbb7395f0bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakob Unterwurzacher Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:49:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 104/908] arm64: dts: rockchip: fix rk3399-puma eMMC HS400 signal integrity [ Upstream commit 62966cbdda8a92f82d966a45aa671e788b2006f7 ] There are signal integrity issues running the eMMC at 200MHz on Puma RK3399-Q7. Similar to the work-around found for RK3399 Gru boards, lowering the frequency to 100MHz made the eMMC much more stable, so let's lower the frequency to 100MHz. It might be possible to run at 150MHz as on RK3399 Gru boards but only 100MHz was extensively tested. Cc: Quentin Schulz Signed-off-by: Jakob Unterwurzacher Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220119134948.1444965-1-quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi index 0d5679380b2a..70fe6013d17c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi @@ -484,6 +484,12 @@ }; &sdhci { + /* + * Signal integrity isn't great at 200MHz but 100MHz has proven stable + * enough. + */ + max-frequency = <100000000>; + bus-width = <8>; mmc-hs400-1_8v; mmc-hs400-enhanced-strobe; From dd26db6c82affa89bea453c693da67020232fa19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Corentin Labbe Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 12:03:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 105/908] ARM: dts: rockchip: fix a typo on rk3288 crypto-controller [ Upstream commit 3916c3619599a3970d3e6f98fb430b7c46266ada ] crypto-controller had a typo, fix it. In the same time, rename it to just crypto Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220209120355.1985707-1-clabbe@baylibre.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi index 9adb58930c08..872e4e690beb 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi @@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ status = "disabled"; }; - crypto: cypto-controller@ff8a0000 { + crypto: crypto@ff8a0000 { compatible = "rockchip,rk3288-crypto"; reg = <0x0 0xff8a0000 0x0 0x4000>; interrupts = ; From 32813321f18d5432cec1b1a6ecc964f9ea26d565 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Lobakin Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 22:21:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 106/908] MIPS: smp: fill in sibling and core maps earlier MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit f2703def339c793674010cc9f01bfe4980231808 ] After enabling CONFIG_SCHED_CORE (landed during 5.14 cycle), 2-core 2-thread-per-core interAptiv (CPS-driven) started emitting the following: [ 0.025698] CPU1 revision is: 0001a120 (MIPS interAptiv (multi)) [ 0.048183] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 0.048187] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/core.c:6025 sched_core_cpu_starting+0x198/0x240 [ 0.048220] Modules linked in: [ 0.048233] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3+ #35 b7b319f24073fd9a3c2aa7ad15fb7993eec0b26f [ 0.048247] Stack : 817f0000 00000004 327804c8 810eb050 00000000 00000004 00000000 c314fdd1 [ 0.048278] 830cbd64 819c0000 81800000 817f0000 83070bf4 00000001 830cbd08 00000000 [ 0.048307] 00000000 00000000 815fcbc4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 0.048334] 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 817f0000 00000000 00000000 817f6f34 [ 0.048361] 817f0000 818a3c00 817f0000 00000004 00000000 00000000 4dc33260 0018c933 [ 0.048389] ... [ 0.048396] Call Trace: [ 0.048399] [<8105a7bc>] show_stack+0x3c/0x140 [ 0.048424] [<8131c2a0>] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 [ 0.048440] [<8108b5c0>] __warn+0xc0/0xf4 [ 0.048454] [<8108b658>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x64/0x10c [ 0.048467] [<810bd418>] sched_core_cpu_starting+0x198/0x240 [ 0.048483] [<810c6514>] sched_cpu_starting+0x14/0x80 [ 0.048497] [<8108c0f8>] cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x78/0x140 [ 0.048510] [<8108d914>] notify_cpu_starting+0x94/0x140 [ 0.048523] [<8106593c>] start_secondary+0xbc/0x280 [ 0.048539] [ 0.048543] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 0.048636] Synchronize counters for CPU 1: done. ...for each but CPU 0/boot. Basic debug printks right before the mentioned line say: [ 0.048170] CPU: 1, smt_mask: So smt_mask, which is sibling mask obviously, is empty when entering the function. This is critical, as sched_core_cpu_starting() calculates core-scheduling parameters only once per CPU start, and it's crucial to have all the parameters filled in at that moment (at least it uses cpu_smt_mask() which in fact is `&cpu_sibling_map[cpu]` on MIPS). A bit of debugging led me to that set_cpu_sibling_map() performing the actual map calculation, was being invocated after notify_cpu_start(), and exactly the latter function starts CPU HP callback round (sched_core_cpu_starting() is basically a CPU HP callback). While the flow is same on ARM64 (maps after the notifier, although before calling set_cpu_online()), x86 started calculating sibling maps earlier than starting the CPU HP callbacks in Linux 4.14 (see [0] for the reference). Neither me nor my brief tests couldn't find any potential caveats in calculating the maps right after performing delay calibration, but the WARN splat is now gone. The very same debug prints now yield exactly what I expected from them: [ 0.048433] CPU: 1, smt_mask: 0-1 [0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linux.git/commit/?id=76ce7cfe35ef Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/mips/kernel/smp.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/smp.c b/arch/mips/kernel/smp.c index 88be966d3e61..f057b0c34844 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/smp.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/smp.c @@ -372,6 +372,9 @@ asmlinkage void start_secondary(void) cpu = smp_processor_id(); cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; + set_cpu_sibling_map(cpu); + set_cpu_core_map(cpu); + cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &cpu_coherent_mask); notify_cpu_starting(cpu); @@ -383,9 +386,6 @@ asmlinkage void start_secondary(void) /* The CPU is running and counters synchronised, now mark it online */ set_cpu_online(cpu, true); - set_cpu_sibling_map(cpu); - set_cpu_core_map(cpu); - calculate_cpu_foreign_map(); /* From 724eceda12860b7d8e0abbe02d839e4e10484178 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Braha Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 05:09:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 107/908] ARM: 9178/1: fix unmet dependency on BITREVERSE for HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE [ Upstream commit 11c57c3ba94da74c3446924260e34e0b1950b5d7 ] Resending this to properly add it to the patch tracker - thanks for letting me know, Arnd :) When ARM is enabled, and BITREVERSE is disabled, Kbuild gives the following warning: WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE Depends on [n]: BITREVERSE [=n] Selected by [y]: - ARM [=y] && (CPU_32v7M [=n] || CPU_32v7 [=y]) && !CPU_32v6 [=n] This is because ARM selects HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE without selecting BITREVERSE, despite HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE depending on BITREVERSE. This unmet dependency bug was found by Kismet, a static analysis tool for Kconfig. Please advise if this is not the appropriate solution. Signed-off-by: Julian Braha Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- lib/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig index 8396c4cfa1ab..1a33e9365951 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig +++ b/lib/Kconfig @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ config BITREVERSE config HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE bool default n - depends on BITREVERSE help This option enables the use of hardware bit-reversal instructions on architectures which support such operations. From 53207668e443a6876c091403c7b9fc93ac48faa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lad Prabhakar Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 22:59:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 108/908] can: rcar_canfd: rcar_canfd_channel_probe(): register the CAN device when fully ready [ Upstream commit c5048a7b2c23ab589f3476a783bd586b663eda5b ] Register the CAN device only when all the necessary initialization is completed. This patch makes sure all the data structures and locks are initialized before registering the CAN device. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220221225935.12300-1-prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com Reported-by: Pavel Machek Signed-off-by: Lad Prabhakar Reviewed-by: Pavel Machek Reviewed-by: Ulrich Hecht Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c b/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c index 786d852a70d5..a1634834b640 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c @@ -1602,15 +1602,15 @@ static int rcar_canfd_channel_probe(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv, u32 ch, netif_napi_add(ndev, &priv->napi, rcar_canfd_rx_poll, RCANFD_NAPI_WEIGHT); + spin_lock_init(&priv->tx_lock); + devm_can_led_init(ndev); + gpriv->ch[priv->channel] = priv; err = register_candev(ndev); if (err) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "register_candev() failed, error %d\n", err); goto fail_candev; } - spin_lock_init(&priv->tx_lock); - devm_can_led_init(ndev); - gpriv->ch[priv->channel] = priv; dev_info(&pdev->dev, "device registered (channel %u)\n", priv->channel); return 0; From 7cf4345b973247d354ddd11540cd7571112766f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jia-Ju Bai Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 04:52:30 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 109/908] atm: firestream: check the return value of ioremap() in fs_init() [ Upstream commit d4e26aaea7f82ba884dcb4acfe689406bc092dc3 ] The function ioremap() in fs_init() can fail, so its return value should be checked. Reported-by: TOTE Robot Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/atm/firestream.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/atm/firestream.c b/drivers/atm/firestream.c index e7cffd0cc361..3557ff9ecd82 100644 --- a/drivers/atm/firestream.c +++ b/drivers/atm/firestream.c @@ -1692,6 +1692,8 @@ static int fs_init(struct fs_dev *dev) dev->hw_base = pci_resource_start(pci_dev, 0); dev->base = ioremap(dev->hw_base, 0x1000); + if (!dev->base) + return 1; reset_chip (dev); From a3d04dd8355dc607fc408775b56ffd3fb6348599 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sreeramya Soratkal Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 11:33:20 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 110/908] nl80211: Update bss channel on channel switch for P2P_CLIENT [ Upstream commit e50b88c4f076242358b66ddb67482b96947438f2 ] The wdev channel information is updated post channel switch only for the station mode and not for the other modes. Due to this, the P2P client still points to the old value though it moved to the new channel when the channel change is induced from the P2P GO. Update the bss channel after CSA channel switch completion for P2P client interface as well. Signed-off-by: Sreeramya Soratkal Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1646114600-31479-1-git-send-email-quic_ssramya@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index bbc3c876a5d8..7085c54e6e50 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -14777,7 +14777,8 @@ void cfg80211_ch_switch_notify(struct net_device *dev, wdev->chandef = *chandef; wdev->preset_chandef = *chandef; - if (wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION && + if ((wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION || + wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT) && !WARN_ON(!wdev->current_bss)) wdev->current_bss->pub.channel = chandef->chan; From b630da9e2542973dc0f96efe6760abfd1b8006ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 08:17:23 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 111/908] tcp: make tcp_read_sock() more robust [ Upstream commit e3d5ea2c011ecb16fb94c56a659364e6b30fac94 ] If recv_actor() returns an incorrect value, tcp_read_sock() might loop forever. Instead, issue a one time warning and make sure to make progress. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: John Fastabend Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220302161723.3910001-2-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index c9f6f28e54f3..a0fd9ef2d2c6 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -1657,11 +1657,13 @@ int tcp_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc, if (!copied) copied = used; break; - } else if (used <= len) { - seq += used; - copied += used; - offset += used; } + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(used > len)) + used = len; + seq += used; + copied += used; + offset += used; + /* If recv_actor drops the lock (e.g. TCP splice * receive) the skb pointer might be invalid when * getting here: tcp_collapse might have deleted it From 707a248f661f57b3e27851b2901d4f03674cbd44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Niels Dossche Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 23:28:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 112/908] sfc: extend the locking on mcdi->seqno [ Upstream commit f1fb205efb0ccca55626fd4ef38570dd16b44719 ] seqno could be read as a stale value outside of the lock. The lock is already acquired to protect the modification of seqno against a possible race condition. Place the reading of this value also inside this locking to protect it against a possible race condition. Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche Acked-by: Martin Habets Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/mcdi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/mcdi.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/mcdi.c index 3df872f56289..040b52affe19 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/mcdi.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/mcdi.c @@ -167,9 +167,9 @@ static void efx_mcdi_send_request(struct efx_nic *efx, unsigned cmd, /* Serialise with efx_mcdi_ev_cpl() and efx_mcdi_ev_death() */ spin_lock_bh(&mcdi->iface_lock); ++mcdi->seqno; + seqno = mcdi->seqno & SEQ_MASK; spin_unlock_bh(&mcdi->iface_lock); - seqno = mcdi->seqno & SEQ_MASK; xflags = 0; if (mcdi->mode == MCDI_MODE_EVENTS) xflags |= MCDI_HEADER_XFLAGS_EVREQ; From b8fe47f81d6a85f6a18d35b3a9b072f554551f79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengming Zhou Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 20:29:04 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 113/908] kselftest/vm: fix tests build with old libc [ Upstream commit b773827e361952b3f53ac6fa4c4e39ccd632102e ] The error message when I build vm tests on debian10 (GLIBC 2.28): userfaultfd.c: In function `userfaultfd_pagemap_test': userfaultfd.c:1393:37: error: `MADV_PAGEOUT' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean `MADV_RANDOM'? if (madvise(area_dst, test_pgsize, MADV_PAGEOUT)) ^~~~~~~~~~~~ MADV_RANDOM This patch includes these newer definitions from UAPI linux/mman.h, is useful to fix tests build on systems without these definitions in glibc sys/mman.h. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220227055330.43087-2-zhouchengming@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c index 1963440f6725..b2c7043c0c30 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include From d6ea756586007009dad41487c5419ff25e9b514f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lucas Wei Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 15:14:01 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 114/908] fs: sysfs_emit: Remove PAGE_SIZE alignment check For kernel releases older than 4.20, using the SLUB alloctor will cause this alignment check to fail as that allocator did NOT align kmalloc allocations on a PAGE_SIZE boundry. Remove the check for these older kernels as it is a false-positive and causes problems on many devices. Signed-off-by: Lucas Wei Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/sysfs/file.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/sysfs/file.c b/fs/sysfs/file.c index 300cdbdc8494..c41e7f51150f 100644 --- a/fs/sysfs/file.c +++ b/fs/sysfs/file.c @@ -565,8 +565,7 @@ int sysfs_emit(char *buf, const char *fmt, ...) va_list args; int len; - if (WARN(!buf || offset_in_page(buf), - "invalid sysfs_emit: buf:%p\n", buf)) + if (WARN(!buf, "invalid sysfs_emit: buf:%p\n", buf)) return 0; va_start(args, fmt); From 6c7f2aaf4d3cc6e5b34efdb40b3806edf2294852 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 20:18:51 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 115/908] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers [ Upstream commit 9feaf8b387ee0ece9c1d7add308776b502a35d0c ] When "dump_apple_properties" is used on the kernel boot command line, it causes an Unknown parameter message and the string is added to init's argument strings: Unknown kernel command line parameters "dump_apple_properties BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc6 efivar_ssdt=newcpu_ssdt", will be passed to user space. Run /sbin/init as init process with arguments: /sbin/init dump_apple_properties with environment: HOME=/ TERM=linux BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc6 efivar_ssdt=newcpu_ssdt Similarly when "efivar_ssdt=somestring" is used, it is added to the Unknown parameter message and to init's environment strings, polluting them (see examples above). Change the return value of the __setup functions to 1 to indicate that the __setup options have been handled. Fixes: 58c5475aba67 ("x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties") Fixes: 475fb4e8b2f4 ("efi / ACPI: load SSTDs from EFI variables") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Lukas Wunner Cc: Octavian Purdila Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Cc: Matt Fleming Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220301041851.12459-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/firmware/efi/apple-properties.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/apple-properties.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/apple-properties.c index 9f6bcf173b0e..aa42d228762f 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/apple-properties.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/apple-properties.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static bool dump_properties __initdata; static int __init dump_properties_enable(char *arg) { dump_properties = true; - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("dump_apple_properties", dump_properties_enable); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index a3dc6cb7326a..24365601fbbf 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static int __init efivar_ssdt_setup(char *str) memcpy(efivar_ssdt, str, strlen(str)); else pr_warn("efivar_ssdt: name too long: %s\n", str); - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("efivar_ssdt=", efivar_ssdt_setup); From b1e27cda1e3c12b705875bb7e247a97168580e33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 15:29:58 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 116/908] net/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg() [ Upstream commit c700525fcc06b05adfea78039de02628af79e07a ] syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with garbage in skb->cb[], triggering a too big copy [1] Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489 Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631 CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66 memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline] packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline] ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632 ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674 __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60 R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54 addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame: ____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246 this frame has 1 object: [32, 160) 'addr' Memory state around the buggy address: ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 >ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 ^ ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Fixes: 0fb375fb9b93 ("[AF_PACKET]: Allow for > 8 byte hardware addresses.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220312232958.3535620-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 1381bfcb3cf0..92394595920c 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -2285,8 +2285,11 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, copy_skb = skb_get(skb); skb_head = skb->data; } - if (copy_skb) + if (copy_skb) { + memset(&PACKET_SKB_CB(copy_skb)->sa.ll, 0, + sizeof(PACKET_SKB_CB(copy_skb)->sa.ll)); skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk); + } } snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff; if ((int)snaplen < 0) { @@ -3442,6 +3445,8 @@ static int packet_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb); if (msg->msg_name) { + const size_t max_len = min(sizeof(skb->cb), + sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); int copy_len; /* If the address length field is there to be filled @@ -3464,6 +3469,10 @@ static int packet_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll); } } + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(copy_len > max_len)) { + copy_len = max_len; + msg->msg_namelen = copy_len; + } memcpy(msg->msg_name, &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa, copy_len); } From c7a9b80d0ea4df98b197c6d12c63b386fa75c0ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiasheng Jiang Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 09:34:48 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 117/908] atm: eni: Add check for dma_map_single [ Upstream commit 0f74b29a4f53627376cf5a5fb7b0b3fa748a0b2b ] As the potential failure of the dma_map_single(), it should be better to check it and return error if fails. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/atm/eni.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/atm/eni.c b/drivers/atm/eni.c index ffe519663687..e88fad45241f 100644 --- a/drivers/atm/eni.c +++ b/drivers/atm/eni.c @@ -1114,6 +1114,8 @@ DPRINTK("iovcnt = %d\n",skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags); } paddr = dma_map_single(&eni_dev->pci_dev->dev,skb->data,skb->len, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + if (dma_mapping_error(&eni_dev->pci_dev->dev, paddr)) + return enq_next; ENI_PRV_PADDR(skb) = paddr; /* prepare DMA queue entries */ j = 0; From a5b9b649a96631f736adb9f532eb838c79975dde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 10:20:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 118/908] net: handle ARPHRD_PIMREG in dev_is_mac_header_xmit() [ Upstream commit 4ee06de7729d795773145692e246a06448b1eb7a ] This kind of interface doesn't have a mac header. This patch fixes bpf_redirect() to a PIM interface. Fixes: 27b29f63058d ("bpf: add bpf_redirect() helper") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220315092008.31423-1-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/if_arp.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/include/linux/if_arp.h b/include/linux/if_arp.h index 4125f60ee53b..a9b09c7c2ce0 100644 --- a/include/linux/if_arp.h +++ b/include/linux/if_arp.h @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ static inline bool dev_is_mac_header_xmit(const struct net_device *dev) case ARPHRD_VOID: case ARPHRD_NONE: case ARPHRD_RAWIP: + case ARPHRD_PIMREG: return false; default: return true; From c7953cf03a26876d676145ce5d2ae6d8c9630b90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 11:04:24 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 119/908] usb: gadget: rndis: prevent integer overflow in rndis_set_response() commit 65f3324f4b6fed78b8761c3b74615ecf0ffa81fa upstream. If "BufOffset" is very large the "BufOffset + 8" operation can have an integer overflow. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 38ea1eac7d88 ("usb: gadget: rndis: check size of RNDIS_MSG_SET command") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220301080424.GA17208@kili Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c index 55be224b64a4..b6c707246dad 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c @@ -643,6 +643,7 @@ static int rndis_set_response(struct rndis_params *params, BufLength = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength); BufOffset = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset); if ((BufLength > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE) || + (BufOffset > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE) || (BufOffset + 8 >= RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE)) return -EINVAL; From e2d3a7009e505e120805f449c832942660f3f7f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Stern Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2022 21:47:22 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 120/908] usb: gadget: Fix use-after-free bug by not setting udc->dev.driver commit 16b1941eac2bd499f065a6739a40ce0011a3d740 upstream. The syzbot fuzzer found a use-after-free bug: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dev_uevent+0x712/0x780 drivers/base/core.c:2320 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802b934098 by task udevd/3689 CPU: 2 PID: 3689 Comm: udevd Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4-syzkaller-00229-g4f12b742eb2b #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x303 mm/kasan/report.c:255 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 dev_uevent+0x712/0x780 drivers/base/core.c:2320 uevent_show+0x1b8/0x380 drivers/base/core.c:2391 dev_attr_show+0x4b/0x90 drivers/base/core.c:2094 Although the bug manifested in the driver core, the real cause was a race with the gadget core. dev_uevent() does: if (dev->driver) add_uevent_var(env, "DRIVER=%s", dev->driver->name); and between the test and the dereference of dev->driver, the gadget core sets dev->driver to NULL. The race wouldn't occur if the gadget core registered its devices on a real bus, using the standard synchronization techniques of the driver core. However, it's not necessary to make such a large change in order to fix this bug; all we need to do is make sure that udc->dev.driver is always NULL. In fact, there is no reason for udc->dev.driver ever to be set to anything, let alone to the value it currently gets: the address of the gadget's driver. After all, a gadget driver only knows how to manage a gadget, not how to manage a UDC. This patch simply removes the statements in the gadget core that touch udc->dev.driver. Fixes: 2ccea03a8f7e ("usb: gadget: introduce UDC Class") CC: Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+348b571beb5eeb70a582@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alan Stern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YiQgukfFFbBnwJ/9@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c index db7c8aec23fc..b60c4527ff67 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c @@ -1284,7 +1284,6 @@ static void usb_gadget_remove_driver(struct usb_udc *udc) usb_gadget_udc_stop(udc); udc->driver = NULL; - udc->dev.driver = NULL; udc->gadget->dev.driver = NULL; } @@ -1333,7 +1332,6 @@ static int udc_bind_to_driver(struct usb_udc *udc, struct usb_gadget_driver *dri driver->function); udc->driver = driver; - udc->dev.driver = &driver->driver; udc->gadget->dev.driver = &driver->driver; usb_gadget_udc_set_speed(udc, driver->max_speed); @@ -1355,7 +1353,6 @@ static int udc_bind_to_driver(struct usb_udc *udc, struct usb_gadget_driver *dri dev_err(&udc->dev, "failed to start %s: %d\n", udc->driver->function, ret); udc->driver = NULL; - udc->dev.driver = NULL; udc->gadget->dev.driver = NULL; return ret; } From fc8033a55e2796d21e370260a784ac9fbb8305a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Skripkin Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2022 22:56:32 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 121/908] Input: aiptek - properly check endpoint type commit 5600f6986628dde8881734090588474f54a540a8 upstream. Syzbot reported warning in usb_submit_urb() which is caused by wrong endpoint type. There was a check for the number of endpoints, but not for the type of endpoint. Fix it by replacing old desc.bNumEndpoints check with usb_find_common_endpoints() helper for finding endpoints Fail log: usb 5-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 1 != type 3 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 48 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:502 usb_submit_urb+0xed2/0x18a0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:502 Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 48 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-syzkaller-00226-g07ebd38a0da2 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event ... Call Trace: aiptek_open+0xd5/0x130 drivers/input/tablet/aiptek.c:830 input_open_device+0x1bb/0x320 drivers/input/input.c:629 kbd_connect+0xfe/0x160 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1593 Fixes: 8e20cf2bce12 ("Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+75cccf2b7da87fb6f84b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308194328.26220-1-paskripkin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/tablet/aiptek.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/tablet/aiptek.c b/drivers/input/tablet/aiptek.c index fbe2df91aad3..2159ec69e223 100644 --- a/drivers/input/tablet/aiptek.c +++ b/drivers/input/tablet/aiptek.c @@ -1821,15 +1821,13 @@ aiptek_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id) input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_TILT_Y, AIPTEK_TILT_MIN, AIPTEK_TILT_MAX, 0, 0); input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_WHEEL, AIPTEK_WHEEL_MIN, AIPTEK_WHEEL_MAX - 1, 0, 0); - /* Verify that a device really has an endpoint */ - if (intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints < 1) { + err = usb_find_common_endpoints(intf->cur_altsetting, + NULL, NULL, &endpoint, NULL); + if (err) { dev_err(&intf->dev, - "interface has %d endpoints, but must have minimum 1\n", - intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints); - err = -EINVAL; + "interface has no int in endpoints, but must have minimum 1\n"); goto fail3; } - endpoint = &intf->cur_altsetting->endpoint[0].desc; /* Go set up our URB, which is called when the tablet receives * input. From 01064d855a4eb3f55ddd315e48f46fad73c633fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Petlan Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 14:55:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 122/908] perf symbols: Fix symbol size calculation condition commit 3cf6a32f3f2a45944dd5be5c6ac4deb46bcd3bee upstream. Before this patch, the symbol end address fixup to be called, needed two conditions being met: if (prev->end == prev->start && prev->end != curr->start) Where "prev->end == prev->start" means that prev is zero-long (and thus needs a fixup) and "prev->end != curr->start" means that fixup hasn't been applied yet However, this logic is incorrect in the following situation: *curr = {rb_node = {__rb_parent_color = 278218928, rb_right = 0x0, rb_left = 0x0}, start = 0xc000000000062354, end = 0xc000000000062354, namelen = 40, type = 2 '\002', binding = 0 '\000', idle = 0 '\000', ignore = 0 '\000', inlined = 0 '\000', arch_sym = 0 '\000', annotate2 = false, name = 0x1159739e "kprobe_optinsn_page\t[__builtin__kprobes]"} *prev = {rb_node = {__rb_parent_color = 278219041, rb_right = 0x109548b0, rb_left = 0x109547c0}, start = 0xc000000000062354, end = 0xc000000000062354, namelen = 12, type = 2 '\002', binding = 1 '\001', idle = 0 '\000', ignore = 0 '\000', inlined = 0 '\000', arch_sym = 0 '\000', annotate2 = false, name = 0x1095486e "optinsn_slot"} In this case, prev->start == prev->end == curr->start == curr->end, thus the condition above thinks that "we need a fixup due to zero length of prev symbol, but it has been probably done, since the prev->end == curr->start", which is wrong. After the patch, the execution path proceeds to arch__symbols__fixup_end function which fixes up the size of prev symbol by adding page_size to its end offset. Fixes: 3b01a413c196c910 ("perf symbols: Improve kallsyms symbol end addr calculation") Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan Cc: Athira Jajeev Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Kajol Jain Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220317135536.805-1-mpetlan@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/perf/util/symbol.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/util/symbol.c b/tools/perf/util/symbol.c index dea6f15af485..ba881aedbedd 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/symbol.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/symbol.c @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ void symbols__fixup_end(struct rb_root *symbols) prev = curr; curr = rb_entry(nd, struct symbol, rb_node); - if (prev->end == prev->start && prev->end != curr->start) + if (prev->end == prev->start || prev->end != curr->start) arch__symbols__fixup_end(prev, curr); } From 004bfaafc45ccc95366b37c9b9e7844cd5156368 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 09:01:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 123/908] Linux 4.14.273 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220321133217.602054917@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index f683ed316664..bc909859dd8b 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 14 -SUBLEVEL = 272 +SUBLEVEL = 273 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Petit Gorille From d908d2776464a8021a1f63eba6e7417fbe7653c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jordy Zomer Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 17:44:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 124/908] nfc: st21nfca: Fix potential buffer overflows in EVT_TRANSACTION commit 4fbcc1a4cb20fe26ad0225679c536c80f1648221 upstream. It appears that there are some buffer overflows in EVT_TRANSACTION. This happens because the length parameters that are passed to memcpy come directly from skb->data and are not guarded in any way. Signed-off-by: Jordy Zomer Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c index eac608a457f0..475f8a67856d 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c @@ -330,6 +330,11 @@ int st21nfca_connectivity_event_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, u8 host, return -ENOMEM; transaction->aid_len = skb->data[1]; + + /* Checking if the length of the AID is valid */ + if (transaction->aid_len > sizeof(transaction->aid)) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(transaction->aid, &skb->data[2], transaction->aid_len); @@ -339,6 +344,11 @@ int st21nfca_connectivity_event_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, u8 host, return -EPROTO; transaction->params_len = skb->data[transaction->aid_len + 3]; + + /* Total size is allocated (skb->len - 2) minus fixed array members */ + if (transaction->params_len > ((skb->len - 2) - sizeof(struct nfc_evt_transaction))) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(transaction->params, skb->data + transaction->aid_len + 4, transaction->params_len); From 5149b895206f810e3b616896c1ee99d7a2d005c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tadeusz Struk Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:25:38 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 125/908] net: ipv6: fix skb_over_panic in __ip6_append_data commit 5e34af4142ffe68f01c8a9acae83300f8911e20c upstream. Syzbot found a kernel bug in the ipv6 stack: LINK: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=205d6f11d72329ab8d62a610c44c5e7e25415580 The reproducer triggers it by sending a crafted message via sendmmsg() call, which triggers skb_over_panic, and crashes the kernel: skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff84647fb4 len:65575 put:65575 head:ffff888109ff0000 data:ffff888109ff0088 tail:0x100af end:0xfec0 dev: Update the check that prevents an invalid packet with MTU equal to the fregment header size to eat up all the space for payload. The reproducer can be found here: LINK: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=1648c83fb00000 Reported-by: syzbot+e223cf47ec8ae183f2a0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310232538.1044947-1-tadeusz.struk@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index c474e4b4c4bb..fbad7828568f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -1321,8 +1321,8 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, sizeof(struct frag_hdr) : 0) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len; - if (mtu < fragheaderlen || - ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen < sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) + if (mtu <= fragheaderlen || + ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen <= sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) goto emsgsize; maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen - From 2c8abafd6c72ef04bc972f40332c76c1dd04446d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steffen Klassert Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 13:11:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 126/908] esp: Fix possible buffer overflow in ESP transformation commit ebe48d368e97d007bfeb76fcb065d6cfc4c96645 upstream. The maximum message size that can be send is bigger than the maximum site that skb_page_frag_refill can allocate. So it is possible to write beyond the allocated buffer. Fix this by doing a fallback to COW in that case. v2: Avoid get get_order() costs as suggested by Linus Torvalds. Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible") Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible") Reported-by: valis Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Rustagi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/esp.h | 2 ++ include/net/sock.h | 3 +++ net/core/sock.c | 3 --- net/ipv4/esp4.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv6/esp6.c | 5 +++++ 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/esp.h b/include/net/esp.h index 117652eb6ea3..465e38890ee9 100644 --- a/include/net/esp.h +++ b/include/net/esp.h @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ #include +#define ESP_SKB_FRAG_MAXSIZE (PAGE_SIZE << SKB_FRAG_PAGE_ORDER) + struct ip_esp_hdr; static inline struct ip_esp_hdr *ip_esp_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb) diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index 029df5cdeaf1..f72753391acc 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -2438,4 +2438,7 @@ extern int sysctl_optmem_max; extern __u32 sysctl_wmem_default; extern __u32 sysctl_rmem_default; +/* On 32bit arches, an skb frag is limited to 2^15 */ +#define SKB_FRAG_PAGE_ORDER get_order(32768) + #endif /* _SOCK_H */ diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 427024597204..bbf9517218ff 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -2193,9 +2193,6 @@ static void sk_leave_memory_pressure(struct sock *sk) } } -/* On 32bit arches, an skb frag is limited to 2^15 */ -#define SKB_FRAG_PAGE_ORDER get_order(32768) - /** * skb_page_frag_refill - check that a page_frag contains enough room * @sz: minimum size of the fragment we want to get diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c index 9e664b6cef13..38e2aa2b2a31 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c @@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ int esp_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info * struct page *page; struct sk_buff *trailer; int tailen = esp->tailen; + unsigned int allocsz; /* this is non-NULL only with UDP Encapsulation */ if (x->encap) { @@ -266,6 +267,10 @@ int esp_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info * return err; } + allocsz = ALIGN(skb->data_len + tailen, L1_CACHE_BYTES); + if (allocsz > ESP_SKB_FRAG_MAXSIZE) + goto cow; + if (!skb_cloned(skb)) { if (tailen <= skb_tailroom(skb)) { nfrags = 1; diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c index dd1f4ed3fc2b..a9baf562bb9b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c @@ -223,6 +223,11 @@ int esp6_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info struct page *page; struct sk_buff *trailer; int tailen = esp->tailen; + unsigned int allocsz; + + allocsz = ALIGN(skb->data_len + tailen, L1_CACHE_BYTES); + if (allocsz > ESP_SKB_FRAG_MAXSIZE) + goto cow; if (!skb_cloned(skb)) { if (tailen <= skb_tailroom(skb)) { From 97f4a463902ca5f3246dad32100962d00816e1ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Graute Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 09:53:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 127/908] staging: fbtft: fb_st7789v: reset display before initialization commit b6821b0d9b56386d2bf14806f90ec401468c799f upstream. In rare cases the display is flipped or mirrored. This was observed more often in a low temperature environment. A clean reset on init_display() should help to get registers in a sane state. Fixes: ef8f317795da (staging: fbtft: use init function instead of init sequence) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oliver Graute Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220210085322.15676-1-oliver.graute@kococonnector.com [sudip: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/fbtft/fb_st7789v.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/fbtft/fb_st7789v.c b/drivers/staging/fbtft/fb_st7789v.c index a5d7c87557f8..b790b18de98b 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/fbtft/fb_st7789v.c +++ b/drivers/staging/fbtft/fb_st7789v.c @@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ enum st7789v_command { */ static int init_display(struct fbtft_par *par) { + par->fbtftops.reset(par); + /* turn off sleep mode */ write_reg(par, MIPI_DCS_EXIT_SLEEP_MODE); mdelay(120); From f0ddc5184b0127038d05008e2a69f89d1e13f980 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuansheng Liu Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 08:20:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 128/908] thermal: int340x: fix memory leak in int3400_notify() commit 3abea10e6a8f0e7804ed4c124bea2d15aca977c8 upstream. It is easy to hit the below memory leaks in my TigerLake platform: unreferenced object 0xffff927c8b91dbc0 (size 32): comm "kworker/0:2", pid 112, jiffies 4294893323 (age 83.604s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 4e 41 4d 45 3d 49 4e 54 33 34 30 30 20 54 68 65 NAME=INT3400 The 72 6d 61 6c 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 rmal.kkkkkkkkkk. backtrace: [] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x2fe/0x4a0 [] kvasprintf+0x65/0xd0 [] kasprintf+0x4e/0x70 [] int3400_notify+0x82/0x120 [int3400_thermal] [] acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x54/0x71 [] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x17/0x30 [] process_one_work+0x21a/0x3f0 [] worker_thread+0x4a/0x3b0 [] kthread+0xfd/0x130 [] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fix it by calling kfree() accordingly. Fixes: 38e44da59130 ("thermal: int3400_thermal: process "thermal table changed" event") Signed-off-by: Chuansheng Liu Cc: 4.14+ # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki [sudip: change in old path] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c b/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c index 4a20f4d47b1d..d7cd86116084 100644 --- a/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c @@ -223,6 +223,10 @@ static void int3400_notify(acpi_handle handle, thermal_prop[4] = NULL; kobject_uevent_env(&priv->thermal->device.kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE, thermal_prop); + kfree(thermal_prop[0]); + kfree(thermal_prop[1]); + kfree(thermal_prop[2]); + kfree(thermal_prop[3]); break; default: dev_err(&priv->adev->dev, "Unsupported event [0x%x]\n", event); From 0f294bc04be87f1c9e1d1a908db9fcc84ce94210 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 17:41:47 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 129/908] llc: fix netdevice reference leaks in llc_ui_bind() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 764f4eb6846f5475f1244767d24d25dd86528a4a upstream. Whenever llc_ui_bind() and/or llc_ui_autobind() took a reference on a netdevice but subsequently fail, they must properly release their reference or risk the infamous message from unregister_netdevice() at device dismantle. unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 3 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: 赵子轩 Reported-by: Stoyan Manolov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220323004147.1990845-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/llc/af_llc.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index ec48fb3fd30e..70f69f8e7078 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -311,6 +311,10 @@ static int llc_ui_autobind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_llc *addr) sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED); rc = 0; out: + if (rc) { + dev_put(llc->dev); + llc->dev = NULL; + } return rc; } @@ -410,6 +414,10 @@ static int llc_ui_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addrlen) out_put: llc_sap_put(sap); out: + if (rc) { + dev_put(llc->dev); + llc->dev = NULL; + } release_sock(sk); return rc; } From 11a63e57e4b9cba31c1e3ca6529438d837552908 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 18:13:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 130/908] ALSA: pcm: Add stream lock during PCM reset ioctl operations commit 1f68915b2efd0d6bfd6e124aa63c94b3c69f127c upstream. snd_pcm_reset() is a non-atomic operation, and it's allowed to run during the PCM stream running. It implies that the manipulation of hw_ptr and other parameters might be racy. This patch adds the PCM stream lock at appropriate places in snd_pcm_*_reset() actions for covering that. Cc: Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322171325.4355-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/pcm_native.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_native.c b/sound/core/pcm_native.c index c78db361cbba..c530d008fe01 100644 --- a/sound/core/pcm_native.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm_native.c @@ -1616,21 +1616,25 @@ static int snd_pcm_do_reset(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int state) int err = substream->ops->ioctl(substream, SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL1_RESET, NULL); if (err < 0) return err; + snd_pcm_stream_lock_irq(substream); runtime->hw_ptr_base = 0; runtime->hw_ptr_interrupt = runtime->status->hw_ptr - runtime->status->hw_ptr % runtime->period_size; runtime->silence_start = runtime->status->hw_ptr; runtime->silence_filled = 0; + snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream); return 0; } static void snd_pcm_post_reset(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int state) { struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime; + snd_pcm_stream_lock_irq(substream); runtime->control->appl_ptr = runtime->status->hw_ptr; if (substream->stream == SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK && runtime->silence_size > 0) snd_pcm_playback_silence(substream, ULONG_MAX); + snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream); } static const struct action_ops snd_pcm_action_reset = { From c5034a73f3478db28d00a86139ab3bc8db865841 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lars-Peter Clausen Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2022 21:14:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 131/908] ALSA: usb-audio: Add mute TLV for playback volumes on RODE NT-USB commit 0f306cca42fe879694fb5e2382748c43dc9e0196 upstream. For the RODE NT-USB the lowest Playback mixer volume setting mutes the audio output. But it is not reported as such causing e.g. PulseAudio to accidentally mute the device when selecting a low volume. Fix this by applying the existing quirk for this kind of issue when the device is detected. Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220311201400.235892-1-lars@metafoo.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c b/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c index d7878ed5ecc0..a84d3c9254d5 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c @@ -1884,9 +1884,10 @@ void snd_usb_mixer_fu_apply_quirk(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer, if (unitid == 7 && cval->control == UAC_FU_VOLUME) snd_dragonfly_quirk_db_scale(mixer, cval, kctl); break; - /* lowest playback value is muted on C-Media devices */ - case USB_ID(0x0d8c, 0x000c): - case USB_ID(0x0d8c, 0x0014): + /* lowest playback value is muted on some devices */ + case USB_ID(0x0d8c, 0x000c): /* C-Media */ + case USB_ID(0x0d8c, 0x0014): /* C-Media */ + case USB_ID(0x19f7, 0x0003): /* RODE NT-USB */ if (strstr(kctl->id.name, "Playback")) cval->min_mute = 1; break; From d097387ed143ff8e8035de3f7d429f59d95182df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Teh Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2022 19:56:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 132/908] ALSA: cmipci: Restore aux vol on suspend/resume commit c14231cc04337c2c2a937db084af342ce704dbde upstream. Save and restore CM_REG_AUX_VOL instead of register 0x24 twice on suspend/resume. Tested on CMI8738LX. Fixes: cb60e5f5b2b1 ("[ALSA] cmipci - Add PM support") Signed-off-by: Jonathan Teh Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/DBAPR04MB7366CB3EA9C8521C35C56E8B920E9@DBAPR04MB7366.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/cmipci.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/cmipci.c b/sound/pci/cmipci.c index 26a657870664..3d0f8f31b2e5 100644 --- a/sound/pci/cmipci.c +++ b/sound/pci/cmipci.c @@ -315,7 +315,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(joystick_port, "Joystick port address."); #define CM_MICGAINZ 0x01 /* mic boost */ #define CM_MICGAINZ_SHIFT 0 -#define CM_REG_MIXER3 0x24 #define CM_REG_AUX_VOL 0x26 #define CM_VAUXL_MASK 0xf0 #define CM_VAUXR_MASK 0x0f @@ -3326,7 +3325,7 @@ static void snd_cmipci_remove(struct pci_dev *pci) */ static unsigned char saved_regs[] = { CM_REG_FUNCTRL1, CM_REG_CHFORMAT, CM_REG_LEGACY_CTRL, CM_REG_MISC_CTRL, - CM_REG_MIXER0, CM_REG_MIXER1, CM_REG_MIXER2, CM_REG_MIXER3, CM_REG_PLL, + CM_REG_MIXER0, CM_REG_MIXER1, CM_REG_MIXER2, CM_REG_AUX_VOL, CM_REG_PLL, CM_REG_CH0_FRAME1, CM_REG_CH0_FRAME2, CM_REG_CH1_FRAME1, CM_REG_CH1_FRAME2, CM_REG_EXT_MISC, CM_REG_INT_STATUS, CM_REG_INT_HLDCLR, CM_REG_FUNCTRL0, From 7115e8d65b4da1a687c8080af30594c68c056ecc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Giacomo Guiduzzi Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 21:06:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 133/908] ALSA: pci: fix reading of swapped values from pcmreg in AC97 codec commit 17aaf0193392cb3451bf0ac75ba396ec4cbded6e upstream. Tests 72 and 78 for ALSA in kselftest fail due to reading inconsistent values from some devices on a VirtualBox Virtual Machine using the snd_intel8x0 driver for the AC'97 Audio Controller device. Taking for example test number 72, this is what the test reports: "Surround Playback Volume.0 expected 1 but read 0, is_volatile 0" "Surround Playback Volume.1 expected 0 but read 1, is_volatile 0" These errors repeat for each value from 0 to 31. Taking a look at these error messages it is possible to notice that the written values are read back swapped. When the write is performed, these values are initially stored in an array used to sanity-check them and write them in the pcmreg array. To write them, the two one-byte values are packed together in a two-byte variable through bitwise operations: the first value is shifted left by one byte and the second value is stored in the right byte through a bitwise OR. When reading the values back, right shifts are performed to retrieve the previously stored bytes. These shifts are executed in the wrong order, thus reporting the values swapped as shown above. This patch fixes this mistake by reversing the read operations' order. Signed-off-by: Giacomo Guiduzzi Signed-off-by: Paolo Valente Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322200653.15862-1-guiduzzi.giacomo@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c b/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c index 38f355ae1863..1cb2a1ecf3cf 100644 --- a/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c +++ b/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c @@ -958,8 +958,8 @@ static int snd_ac97_ad18xx_pcm_get_volume(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct int codec = kcontrol->private_value & 3; mutex_lock(&ac97->page_mutex); - ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = 31 - ((ac97->spec.ad18xx.pcmreg[codec] >> 0) & 31); - ucontrol->value.integer.value[1] = 31 - ((ac97->spec.ad18xx.pcmreg[codec] >> 8) & 31); + ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = 31 - ((ac97->spec.ad18xx.pcmreg[codec] >> 8) & 31); + ucontrol->value.integer.value[1] = 31 - ((ac97->spec.ad18xx.pcmreg[codec] >> 0) & 31); mutex_unlock(&ac97->page_mutex); return 0; } From 6c35f6cd1bbd5bf678107f9f15edccd0a2315764 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephane Graber Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 18:42:06 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 134/908] drivers: net: xgene: Fix regression in CRC stripping commit e9e6faeafaa00da1851bcf47912b0f1acae666b4 upstream. All packets on ingress (except for jumbo) are terminated with a 4-bytes CRC checksum. It's the responsability of the driver to strip those 4 bytes. Unfortunately a change dating back to March 2017 re-shuffled some code and made the CRC stripping code effectively dead. This change re-orders that part a bit such that the datalen is immediately altered if needed. Fixes: 4902a92270fb ("drivers: net: xgene: Add workaround for errata 10GE_8/ENET_11") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephane Graber Tested-by: Stephane Graber Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322224205.752795-1-stgraber@ubuntu.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/apm/xgene/xgene_enet_main.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/apm/xgene/xgene_enet_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/apm/xgene/xgene_enet_main.c index 3a489b2b99c9..86811de191ed 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/apm/xgene/xgene_enet_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/apm/xgene/xgene_enet_main.c @@ -707,6 +707,12 @@ static int xgene_enet_rx_frame(struct xgene_enet_desc_ring *rx_ring, buf_pool->rx_skb[skb_index] = NULL; datalen = xgene_enet_get_data_len(le64_to_cpu(raw_desc->m1)); + + /* strip off CRC as HW isn't doing this */ + nv = GET_VAL(NV, le64_to_cpu(raw_desc->m0)); + if (!nv) + datalen -= 4; + skb_put(skb, datalen); prefetch(skb->data - NET_IP_ALIGN); skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, ndev); @@ -728,12 +734,8 @@ static int xgene_enet_rx_frame(struct xgene_enet_desc_ring *rx_ring, } } - nv = GET_VAL(NV, le64_to_cpu(raw_desc->m0)); - if (!nv) { - /* strip off CRC as HW isn't doing this */ - datalen -= 4; + if (!nv) goto skip_jumbo; - } slots = page_pool->slots - 1; head = page_pool->head; From a3cc32863b175168283cb0a5fde08de6a1e27df9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 12:04:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 135/908] netfilter: nf_tables: initialize registers in nft_do_chain() commit 4c905f6740a365464e91467aa50916555b28213d upstream. Initialize registers to avoid stack leak into userspace. Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c index 32b7896929f3..7d60fa57bf80 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ nft_do_chain(struct nft_pktinfo *pkt, void *priv) const struct net *net = nft_net(pkt); const struct nft_rule *rule; const struct nft_expr *expr, *last; - struct nft_regs regs; + struct nft_regs regs = {}; unsigned int stackptr = 0; struct nft_jumpstack jumpstack[NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE]; int rulenum; From 1b5146d41effe85a831a8c5dca40728696e1c751 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Cilissen Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 04:16:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 136/908] ACPI / x86: Work around broken XSDT on Advantech DAC-BJ01 board commit e702196bf85778f2c5527ca47f33ef2e2fca8297 upstream. On this board the ACPI RSDP structure points to both a RSDT and an XSDT, but the XSDT points to a truncated FADT. This causes all sorts of trouble and usually a complete failure to boot after the following error occurs: ACPI Error: Unsupported address space: 0x20 (*/hwregs-*) ACPI Error: AE_SUPPORT, Unable to initialize fixed events (*/evevent-*) ACPI: Unable to start ACPI Interpreter This leaves the ACPI implementation in such a broken state that subsequent kernel subsystem initialisations go wrong, resulting in among others mismapped PCI memory, SATA and USB enumeration failures, and freezes. As this is an older embedded platform that will likely never see any BIOS updates to address this issue and its default shipping OS only complies to ACPI 1.0, work around this by forcing `acpi=rsdt`. This patch, applied on top of Linux 5.10.102, was confirmed on real hardware to fix the issue. Signed-off-by: Mark Cilissen Cc: All applicable Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c index 3613681b49cf..fd9c4479880d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c @@ -1343,6 +1343,17 @@ static int __init disable_acpi_pci(const struct dmi_system_id *d) return 0; } +static int __init disable_acpi_xsdt(const struct dmi_system_id *d) +{ + if (!acpi_force) { + pr_notice("%s detected: force use of acpi=rsdt\n", d->ident); + acpi_gbl_do_not_use_xsdt = TRUE; + } else { + pr_notice("Warning: DMI blacklist says broken, but acpi XSDT forced\n"); + } + return 0; +} + static int __init dmi_disable_acpi(const struct dmi_system_id *d) { if (!acpi_force) { @@ -1463,6 +1474,19 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id acpi_dmi_table[] __initconst = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "TravelMate 360"), }, }, + /* + * Boxes that need ACPI XSDT use disabled due to corrupted tables + */ + { + .callback = disable_acpi_xsdt, + .ident = "Advantech DAC-BJ01", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "NEC"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Bearlake CRB Board"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "V1.12"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_DATE, "02/01/2011"), + }, + }, {} }; From 419906dd8cc800d3ce24f4af5f9c9523a2f559de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maximilian Luz Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2022 16:49:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 137/908] ACPI: battery: Add device HID and quirk for Microsoft Surface Go 3 commit 7dacee0b9efc8bd061f097b1a8d4daa6591af0c6 upstream. For some reason, the Microsoft Surface Go 3 uses the standard ACPI interface for battery information, but does not use the standard PNP0C0A HID. Instead it uses MSHW0146 as identifier. Add that ID to the driver as this seems to work well. Additionally, the power state is not updated immediately after the AC has been (un-)plugged, so add the respective quirk for that. Signed-off-by: Maximilian Luz Cc: All applicable Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/battery.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/battery.c b/drivers/acpi/battery.c index 30996effc491..42fba8493854 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/battery.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/battery.c @@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ enum acpi_battery_files { static const struct acpi_device_id battery_device_ids[] = { {"PNP0C0A", 0}, + + /* Microsoft Surface Go 3 */ + {"MSHW0146", 0}, + {"", 0}, }; @@ -1183,6 +1187,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id bat_dmi_table[] __initconst = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Aspire V5-573G"), }, }, + { + /* Microsoft Surface Go 3 */ + .callback = battery_notification_delay_quirk, + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Microsoft Corporation"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Surface Go 3"), + }, + }, {}, }; From c2ddbb724a8c8341e88198acdad877202f2c73d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Werner Sembach Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 20:02:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 138/908] ACPI: video: Force backlight native for Clevo NL5xRU and NL5xNU commit c844d22fe0c0b37dc809adbdde6ceb6462c43acf upstream. Clevo NL5xRU and NL5xNU/TUXEDO Aura 15 Gen1 and Gen2 have both a working native and video interface. However the default detection mechanism first registers the video interface before unregistering it again and switching to the native interface during boot. This results in a dangling SBIOS request for backlight change for some reason, causing the backlight to switch to ~2% once per boot on the first power cord connect or disconnect event. Setting the native interface explicitly circumvents this buggy behaviour by avoiding the unregistering process. Signed-off-by: Werner Sembach Cc: All applicable Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/video_detect.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c index 86ffb4af4afc..298d9c65e084 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c @@ -356,6 +356,81 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "BA51_MV"), }, }, + /* + * Clevo NL5xRU and NL5xNU/TUXEDO Aura 15 Gen1 and Gen2 have both a + * working native and video interface. However the default detection + * mechanism first registers the video interface before unregistering + * it again and switching to the native interface during boot. This + * results in a dangling SBIOS request for backlight change for some + * reason, causing the backlight to switch to ~2% once per boot on the + * first power cord connect or disconnect event. Setting the native + * interface explicitly circumvents this buggy behaviour, by avoiding + * the unregistering process. + */ + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "AURA1501"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "EDUBOOK1502"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), + }, + }, /* * Desktops which falsely report a backlight and which our heuristics From 29116501726fef0f3b2ff14abe5c0a9467e80275 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Giovanni Cabiddu Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 17:54:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 139/908] crypto: qat - disable registration of algorithms commit 8893d27ffcaf6ec6267038a177cb87bcde4dd3de upstream. The implementations of aead and skcipher in the QAT driver do not support properly requests with the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG flag set. If the HW queue is full, the driver returns -EBUSY but does not enqueue the request. This can result in applications like dm-crypt waiting indefinitely for a completion of a request that was never submitted to the hardware. To avoid this problem, disable the registration of all crypto algorithms in the QAT driver by setting the number of crypto instances to 0 at configuration time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_crypto.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_crypto.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_crypto.c index 3852d31ce0a4..37a9f969c59c 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_crypto.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_crypto.c @@ -170,6 +170,14 @@ int qat_crypto_dev_config(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) goto err; if (adf_cfg_section_add(accel_dev, "Accelerator0")) goto err; + + /* Temporarily set the number of crypto instances to zero to avoid + * registering the crypto algorithms. + * This will be removed when the algorithms will support the + * CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG flag + */ + instances = 0; + for (i = 0; i < instances; i++) { val = i; snprintf(key, sizeof(key), ADF_CY "%d" ADF_RING_BANK_NUM, i); From c1d9c3628ef0a0ca197595d0f9e01cd3b5dda186 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Linus=20L=C3=BCssing?= Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 19:35:13 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 140/908] mac80211: fix potential double free on mesh join MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 4a2d4496e15ea5bb5c8e83b94ca8ca7fb045e7d3 upstream. While commit 6a01afcf8468 ("mac80211: mesh: Free ie data when leaving mesh") fixed a memory leak on mesh leave / teardown it introduced a potential memory corruption caused by a double free when rejoining the mesh: ieee80211_leave_mesh() -> kfree(sdata->u.mesh.ie); ... ieee80211_join_mesh() -> copy_mesh_setup() -> old_ie = ifmsh->ie; -> kfree(old_ie); This double free / kernel panics can be reproduced by using wpa_supplicant with an encrypted mesh (if set up without encryption via "iw" then ifmsh->ie is always NULL, which avoids this issue). And then calling: $ iw dev mesh0 mesh leave $ iw dev mesh0 mesh join my-mesh Note that typically these commands are not used / working when using wpa_supplicant. And it seems that wpa_supplicant or wpa_cli are going through a NETDEV_DOWN/NETDEV_UP cycle between a mesh leave and mesh join where the NETDEV_UP resets the mesh.ie to NULL via a memcpy of default_mesh_setup in cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call, which then avoids the memory corruption, too. The issue was first observed in an application which was not using wpa_supplicant but "Senf" instead, which implements its own calls to nl80211. Fixing the issue by removing the kfree()'ing of the mesh IE in the mesh join function and leaving it solely up to the mesh leave to free the mesh IE. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6a01afcf8468 ("mac80211: mesh: Free ie data when leaving mesh") Reported-by: Matthias Kretschmer Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing Tested-by: Mathias Kretschmer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310183513.28589-1-linus.luessing@c0d3.blue Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/cfg.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c index 3b3ed96c19e5..f769b08e6f2a 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c +++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c @@ -1811,13 +1811,11 @@ static int copy_mesh_setup(struct ieee80211_if_mesh *ifmsh, const struct mesh_setup *setup) { u8 *new_ie; - const u8 *old_ie; struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = container_of(ifmsh, struct ieee80211_sub_if_data, u.mesh); /* allocate information elements */ new_ie = NULL; - old_ie = ifmsh->ie; if (setup->ie_len) { new_ie = kmemdup(setup->ie, setup->ie_len, @@ -1827,7 +1825,6 @@ static int copy_mesh_setup(struct ieee80211_if_mesh *ifmsh, } ifmsh->ie_len = setup->ie_len; ifmsh->ie = new_ie; - kfree(old_ie); /* now copy the rest of the setup parameters */ ifmsh->mesh_id_len = setup->mesh_id_len; From f25366d9a27585d45dfd475aa1764b8886958aac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 20:58:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 141/908] llc: only change llc->dev when bind() succeeds MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 2d327a79ee176930dc72c131a970c891d367c1dc upstream. My latest patch, attempting to fix the refcount leak in a minimal way turned out to add a new bug. Whenever the bind operation fails before we attempt to grab a reference count on a device, we might release the device refcount of a prior successful bind() operation. syzbot was not happy about this [1]. Note to stable teams: Make sure commit b37a46683739 ("netdevice: add the case if dev is NULL") is already present in your trees. [1] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000070: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000380-0x0000000000000387] CPU: 1 PID: 3590 Comm: syz-executor361 Tainted: G W 5.17.0-syzkaller-04796-g169e77764adc #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:llc_ui_connect+0x400/0xcb0 net/llc/af_llc.c:500 Code: 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 fc 07 00 00 4c 8b a5 38 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d bc 24 80 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 a9 07 00 00 49 8b b4 24 80 03 00 00 4c 89 f2 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900038cfcc0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880756eb600 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000070 RSI: ffffc900038cfe3e RDI: 0000000000000380 RBP: ffff888015ee5000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888015ee5535 R10: ffffed1002bdcaa6 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc900038cfe37 R14: ffffc900038cfe38 R15: ffff888015ee5012 FS: 0000555555acd300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000280 CR3: 0000000077db6000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __sys_connect_file+0x155/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1900 __sys_connect+0x161/0x190 net/socket.c:1917 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1927 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1924 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1924 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f016acb90b9 Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd417947f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f016acb90b9 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f016ac7d0a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f016ac7d130 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:llc_ui_connect+0x400/0xcb0 net/llc/af_llc.c:500 Fixes: 764f4eb6846f ("llc: fix netdevice reference leaks in llc_ui_bind()") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Cc: 赵子轩 Cc: Stoyan Manolov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220325035827.360418-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/llc/af_llc.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index 70f69f8e7078..1e20b719fb3c 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ static int llc_ui_autobind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_llc *addr) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk); + struct net_device *dev = NULL; struct llc_sap *sap; int rc = -EINVAL; @@ -287,14 +288,14 @@ static int llc_ui_autobind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_llc *addr) goto out; rc = -ENODEV; if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) { - llc->dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if); - if (llc->dev && addr->sllc_arphrd != llc->dev->type) { - dev_put(llc->dev); - llc->dev = NULL; + dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if); + if (dev && addr->sllc_arphrd != dev->type) { + dev_put(dev); + dev = NULL; } } else - llc->dev = dev_getfirstbyhwtype(&init_net, addr->sllc_arphrd); - if (!llc->dev) + dev = dev_getfirstbyhwtype(&init_net, addr->sllc_arphrd); + if (!dev) goto out; rc = -EUSERS; llc->laddr.lsap = llc_ui_autoport(); @@ -304,6 +305,11 @@ static int llc_ui_autobind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_llc *addr) sap = llc_sap_open(llc->laddr.lsap, NULL); if (!sap) goto out; + + /* Note: We do not expect errors from this point. */ + llc->dev = dev; + dev = NULL; + memcpy(llc->laddr.mac, llc->dev->dev_addr, IFHWADDRLEN); memcpy(&llc->addr, addr, sizeof(llc->addr)); /* assign new connection to its SAP */ @@ -311,10 +317,7 @@ static int llc_ui_autobind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_llc *addr) sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED); rc = 0; out: - if (rc) { - dev_put(llc->dev); - llc->dev = NULL; - } + dev_put(dev); return rc; } @@ -337,6 +340,7 @@ static int llc_ui_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addrlen) struct sockaddr_llc *addr = (struct sockaddr_llc *)uaddr; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk); + struct net_device *dev = NULL; struct llc_sap *sap; int rc = -EINVAL; @@ -353,25 +357,26 @@ static int llc_ui_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addrlen) rc = -ENODEV; rcu_read_lock(); if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) { - llc->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(&init_net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if); - if (llc->dev) { + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(&init_net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if); + if (dev) { if (is_zero_ether_addr(addr->sllc_mac)) - memcpy(addr->sllc_mac, llc->dev->dev_addr, + memcpy(addr->sllc_mac, dev->dev_addr, IFHWADDRLEN); - if (addr->sllc_arphrd != llc->dev->type || + if (addr->sllc_arphrd != dev->type || !ether_addr_equal(addr->sllc_mac, - llc->dev->dev_addr)) { + dev->dev_addr)) { rc = -EINVAL; - llc->dev = NULL; + dev = NULL; } } - } else - llc->dev = dev_getbyhwaddr_rcu(&init_net, addr->sllc_arphrd, + } else { + dev = dev_getbyhwaddr_rcu(&init_net, addr->sllc_arphrd, addr->sllc_mac); - if (llc->dev) - dev_hold(llc->dev); + } + if (dev) + dev_hold(dev); rcu_read_unlock(); - if (!llc->dev) + if (!dev) goto out; if (!addr->sllc_sap) { rc = -EUSERS; @@ -404,6 +409,11 @@ static int llc_ui_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addrlen) goto out_put; } } + + /* Note: We do not expect errors from this point. */ + llc->dev = dev; + dev = NULL; + llc->laddr.lsap = addr->sllc_sap; memcpy(llc->laddr.mac, addr->sllc_mac, IFHWADDRLEN); memcpy(&llc->addr, addr, sizeof(llc->addr)); @@ -414,10 +424,7 @@ static int llc_ui_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addrlen) out_put: llc_sap_put(sap); out: - if (rc) { - dev_put(llc->dev); - llc->dev = NULL; - } + dev_put(dev); release_sock(sk); return rc; } From af1af6ebca0e28a97e5f802b9da695678fcd226a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 08:22:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 142/908] Linux 4.14.274 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220325150416.756136126@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index bc909859dd8b..a06abc38f35d 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 14 -SUBLEVEL = 273 +SUBLEVEL = 274 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Petit Gorille From 9aeb4a5a73d392580a2f5ee018dfe5506a2e8359 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Zyngier Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 143/908] arm64: arch_timer: Add workaround for ARM erratum 1188873 commit 95b861a4a6d94f64d5242605569218160ebacdbe upstream. When running on Cortex-A76, a timer access from an AArch32 EL0 task may end up with a corrupted value or register. The workaround for this is to trap these accesses at EL1/EL2 and execute them there. This only affects versions r0p0, r1p0 and r2p0 of the CPU. Acked-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 ++- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 8 ++++++++ drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index e76f74874a42..85310128a65e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -458,6 +458,18 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718 If unsure, say Y. +config ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 + bool "Cortex-A76: MRC read following MRRC read of specific Generic Timer in AArch32 might give incorrect result" + default y + help + This option adds work arounds for ARM Cortex-A76 erratum 1188873 + + Affected Cortex-A76 cores (r0p0, r1p0, r2p0) could cause + register corruption when accessing the timer registers from + AArch32 userspace. + + If unsure, say Y. + config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375 bool "Cavium erratum 22375, 24313" default y diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h index 2f8bd0388905..626e895dc008 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h @@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ #define ARM64_SSBD 25 #define ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE 26 #define ARM64_SSBS 27 +#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1188873 28 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 28 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 29 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h index b23456035eac..e862f1f56ad7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75 0xD0A #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A35 0xD04 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55 0xD05 +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76 0xD0B #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA 0x000 @@ -112,6 +113,7 @@ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A75 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A35 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A35) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A55 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_A76 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76) #define MIDR_THUNDERX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 7d15f4cb6393..d75c4f4144f4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -712,6 +712,14 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { .matches = has_ssbd_mitigation, .midr_range_list = arm64_ssb_cpus, }, +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 + { + /* Cortex-A76 r0p0 to r2p0 */ + .desc = "ARM erratum 1188873", + .capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_1188873, + ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A76, 0, 0, 2, 0), + }, +#endif { } }; diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c b/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c index 2c5913057b87..439a4d005812 100644 --- a/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c +++ b/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c @@ -298,6 +298,13 @@ static u64 notrace arm64_858921_read_cntvct_el0(void) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 +static u64 notrace arm64_1188873_read_cntvct_el0(void) +{ + return read_sysreg(cntvct_el0); +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_ARCH_TIMER_OOL_WORKAROUND DEFINE_PER_CPU(const struct arch_timer_erratum_workaround *, timer_unstable_counter_workaround); @@ -381,6 +388,14 @@ static const struct arch_timer_erratum_workaround ool_workarounds[] = { .read_cntvct_el0 = arm64_858921_read_cntvct_el0, }, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 + { + .match_type = ate_match_local_cap_id, + .id = (void *)ARM64_WORKAROUND_1188873, + .desc = "ARM erratum 1188873", + .read_cntvct_el0 = arm64_1188873_read_cntvct_el0, + }, +#endif }; typedef bool (*ate_match_fn_t)(const struct arch_timer_erratum_workaround *, From 6bfdf5a6ad347915fb8463c8fbbbde22e6867a2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 144/908] arm64: arch_timer: avoid unused function warning commit 040f340134751d73bd03ee92fabb992946c55b3d upstream. arm64_1188873_read_cntvct_el0() is protected by the correct CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 #ifdef, but the only reference to it is also inside of an CONFIG_ARM_ARCH_TIMER_OOL_WORKAROUND section, and causes a warning if that is disabled: drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c:323:20: error: 'arm64_1188873_read_cntvct_el0' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function] Since the erratum requires that we always apply the workaround in the timer driver, select that symbol as we do for SoC specific errata. Fixes: 95b861a4a6d9 ("arm64: arch_timer: Add workaround for ARM erratum 1188873") Acked-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 85310128a65e..7c205e0fd44b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -461,6 +461,7 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718 config ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 bool "Cortex-A76: MRC read following MRRC read of specific Generic Timer in AArch32 might give incorrect result" default y + select ARM_ARCH_TIMER_OOL_WORKAROUND help This option adds work arounds for ARM Cortex-A76 erratum 1188873 From 786ec17678a480c8dc31620aca56b117ac191a6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Zyngier Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 145/908] arm64: Add silicon-errata.txt entry for ARM erratum 1188873 commit e03a4e5bb7430f9294c12f02c69eb045d010e942 upstream. Document that we actually work around ARM erratum 1188873 Fixes: 95b861a4a6d9 ("arm64: arch_timer: Add workaround for ARM erratum 1188873") Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt b/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt index e4fe6adc372b..42f5672e8917 100644 --- a/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt +++ b/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ stable kernels. | ARM | Cortex-A72 | #853709 | N/A | | ARM | Cortex-A73 | #858921 | ARM64_ERRATUM_858921 | | ARM | Cortex-A55 | #1024718 | ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718 | +| ARM | Cortex-A76 | #1188873 | ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 | | ARM | MMU-500 | #841119,#826419 | N/A | | | | | | | Cavium | ThunderX ITS | #22375, #24313 | CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375 | From 3aee35ffc45b29e795573c047930fb849830806b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Zyngier Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 146/908] arm64: Make ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 depend on COMPAT commit c2b5bba3967a000764e9148e6f020d776b7ecd82 upstream. Since ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 only affects AArch32 EL0, it makes some sense that it should depend on COMPAT. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 7c205e0fd44b..729384f19c7f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -461,6 +461,7 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718 config ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 bool "Cortex-A76: MRC read following MRRC read of specific Generic Timer in AArch32 might give incorrect result" default y + depends on COMPAT select ARM_ARCH_TIMER_OOL_WORKAROUND help This option adds work arounds for ARM Cortex-A76 erratum 1188873 From 52d19a0f65310dc4603088093c0394718cd43cd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Zyngier Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:38 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 147/908] arm64: Add part number for Neoverse N1 commit 0cf57b86859c49381addb3ce47be70aadf5fd2c0 upstream. New CPU, new part number. You know the drill. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h index e862f1f56ad7..35a116577e62 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A35 0xD04 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55 0xD05 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76 0xD0B +#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1 0xD0C #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA 0x000 @@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A35 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A35) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A55 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A76 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76) +#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1) #define MIDR_THUNDERX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX) From 60cf0854f64082945969403ce57b9102b14bec9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rob Herring Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 148/908] arm64: Add part number for Arm Cortex-A77 commit 8a6b88e66233f5f1779b0a1342aa9dc030dddcd5 upstream. Add the MIDR part number info for the Arm Cortex-A77. Signed-off-by: Rob Herring Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201028182839.166037-1-robh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h index 35a116577e62..8221e816d3af 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55 0xD05 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76 0xD0B #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1 0xD0C +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77 0xD0D #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA 0x000 @@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A55 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A76 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76) #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_A77 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77) #define MIDR_THUNDERX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX) From 80c55ca10f3d4d3eab73ceb2ba01ff1d1c41989a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suzuki K Poulose Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 149/908] arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition commit 2d0d656700d67239a57afaf617439143d8dac9be upstream. Add the CPU Partnumbers for the new Arm designs. Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Will Deacon Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211019163153.3692640-2-suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h index 8221e816d3af..e289ea2aba07 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h @@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76 0xD0B #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1 0xD0C #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77 0xD0D +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710 0xD47 +#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2 0xD49 #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA 0x000 @@ -118,6 +120,8 @@ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A76 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76) #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A77 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710) +#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2) #define MIDR_THUNDERX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX) From 63271842d1b0232e45df6db155c7f3854b25f082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anshuman Khandual Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 150/908] arm64: Add Cortex-X2 CPU part definition commit 72bb9dcb6c33cfac80282713c2b4f2b254cd24d1 upstream. Add the CPU Partnumbers for the new Arm designs. Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Suzuki Poulose Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1642994138-25887-2-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h index e289ea2aba07..de5cbd7614f8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1 0xD0C #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77 0xD0D #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710 0xD47 +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2 0xD48 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2 0xD49 #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA 0x000 @@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A77 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_X2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2) #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2) #define MIDR_THUNDERX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX) From e92de6ac5028549d12fff8ee129cecc6cc55a53e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 151/908] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks commit 4330e2c5c04c27bebf89d34e0bc14e6943413067 upstream. Subsequent patches add even more code to the ventry slots. Ensure kernels that overflow a ventry slot don't get built. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index c1ffa95c0ad2..81069ad43a5e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ .macro kernel_ventry, el, label, regsize = 64 .align 7 +.Lventry_start\@: #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 alternative_if ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 .if \el == 0 @@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif mrs x0, tpidrro_el0 #endif b el\()\el\()_\label +.org .Lventry_start\@ + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot? .endm .macro tramp_alias, dst, sym @@ -1036,6 +1038,7 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 add x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors) isb ret +.org 1b + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot? .endm .macro tramp_exit, regsize = 64 From c199e434f35afa0d23780d69dc0b1f25bb7c5faf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 152/908] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional commit d739da1694a0eaef0358a42b76904b611539b77b upstream. Subsequent patches will add additional sets of vectors that use the same tricks as the kpti vectors to reach the full-fat vectors. The full-fat vectors contain some cleanup for kpti that is patched in by alternatives when kpti is in use. Once there are additional vectors, the cleanup will be needed in more cases. But on big/little systems, the cleanup would be harmful if no trampoline vector were in use. Instead of forcing CPUs that don't need a trampoline vector to use one, make the trampoline cleanup optional. Entry at the top of the vectors will skip the cleanup. The trampoline vectors can then skip the first instruction, triggering the cleanup to run. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 81069ad43a5e..1211e0da5476 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -76,16 +76,20 @@ .align 7 .Lventry_start\@: #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 -alternative_if ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 .if \el == 0 + /* + * This must be the first instruction of the EL0 vector entries. It is + * skipped by the trampoline vectors, to trigger the cleanup. + */ + b .Lskip_tramp_vectors_cleanup\@ .if \regsize == 64 mrs x30, tpidrro_el0 msr tpidrro_el0, xzr .else mov x30, xzr .endif +.Lskip_tramp_vectors_cleanup\@: .endif -alternative_else_nop_endif #endif sub sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE @@ -1035,7 +1039,7 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 #endif prfm plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors)] msr vbar_el1, x30 - add x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors) + add x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors + 4) isb ret .org 1b + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot? From 041f3c09a801f2243c27087777c0df4de848a245 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 153/908] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kpti's tramp_exit path commit 03aff3a77a58b5b52a77e00537a42090ad57b80b upstream. Kpti stashes x30 in far_el1 while it uses x30 for all its work. Making the vectors a per-cpu data structure will require a second register. Allow tramp_exit two registers before it unmaps the kernel, by leaving x30 on the stack, and stashing x29 in far_el1. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 1211e0da5476..b3014ed0ea8a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -356,14 +356,16 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif ldp x24, x25, [sp, #16 * 12] ldp x26, x27, [sp, #16 * 13] ldp x28, x29, [sp, #16 * 14] - ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] - add sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE // restore sp .if \el == 0 -alternative_insn eret, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 +alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 + ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] + add sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE // restore sp + eret +alternative_else_nop_endif #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 bne 4f - msr far_el1, x30 + msr far_el1, x29 tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_native br x30 4: @@ -371,6 +373,8 @@ alternative_insn eret, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 br x30 #endif .else + ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] + add sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE // restore sp eret .endif .endm @@ -1048,10 +1052,12 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 .macro tramp_exit, regsize = 64 adr x30, tramp_vectors msr vbar_el1, x30 - tramp_unmap_kernel x30 + ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] + tramp_unmap_kernel x29 .if \regsize == 64 - mrs x30, far_el1 + mrs x29, far_el1 .endif + add sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE // restore sp eret .endm From 2ca20e3012a3b716a0aa4bb7e1bb20a4db1c1f65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 154/908] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page commit c091fb6ae059cda563b2a4d93fdbc548ef34e1d6 upstream. The trampoline code has a data page that holds the address of the vectors, which is unmapped when running in user-space. This ensures that with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, the randomised address of the kernel can't be discovered until after the kernel has been mapped. If the trampoline text page is extended to include multiple sets of vectors, it will be larger than a single page, making it tricky to find the data page without knowing the size of the trampoline text pages, which will vary with PAGE_SIZE. Move the data page to appear before the text page. This allows the data page to be found without knowing the size of the trampoline text pages. 'tramp_vectors' is used to refer to the beginning of the .entry.tramp.text section, do that explicitly. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas [ removed SDEI for backport ] Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h index ec1e6d6fa14c..c0cfc6d3bf9f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h @@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ enum fixed_addresses { #endif /* CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_GHES */ #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 - FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_DATA, FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT, + FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_DATA, #define TRAMP_VALIAS (__fix_to_virt(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT)) #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */ __end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses, diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index b3014ed0ea8a..0669d05bd63c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -1019,6 +1019,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif */ .endm + .macro tramp_data_page dst + adr \dst, .entry.tramp.text + sub \dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE + .endm + .macro tramp_ventry, regsize = 64 .align 7 1: @@ -1035,7 +1040,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif 2: tramp_map_kernel x30 #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE - adr x30, tramp_vectors + PAGE_SIZE + tramp_data_page x30 alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 ldr x30, [x30] #else From e4b37f25dca4ee016ff24fd15f62b7c5a1f05f1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 155/908] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary commit 6c5bf79b69f911560fbf82214c0971af6e58e682 upstream. Systems using kpti enter and exit the kernel through a trampoline mapping that is always mapped, even when the kernel is not. tramp_valias is a macro to find the address of a symbol in the trampoline mapping. Adding extra sets of vectors will expand the size of the entry.tramp.text section to beyond 4K. tramp_valias will be unable to generate addresses for symbols beyond 4K as it uses the 12 bit immediate of the add instruction. As there are now two registers available when tramp_alias is called, use the extra register to avoid the 4K limit of the 12 bit immediate. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas [ Removed SDEI for backport ] Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 0669d05bd63c..f455557eaaaa 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -139,9 +139,12 @@ .org .Lventry_start\@ + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot? .endm - .macro tramp_alias, dst, sym + .macro tramp_alias, dst, sym, tmp mov_q \dst, TRAMP_VALIAS - add \dst, \dst, #(\sym - .entry.tramp.text) + adr_l \tmp, \sym + add \dst, \dst, \tmp + adr_l \tmp, .entry.tramp.text + sub \dst, \dst, \tmp .endm // This macro corrupts x0-x3. It is the caller's duty @@ -366,10 +369,10 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 bne 4f msr far_el1, x29 - tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_native + tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_native, x29 br x30 4: - tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_compat + tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_compat, x29 br x30 #endif .else From dc8f7c1018a69e72cdf1cba978071ae6b54ae164 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 156/908] arm64: entry: Don't assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors commit ed50da7764535f1e24432ded289974f2bf2b0c5a upstream. The tramp_ventry macro uses tramp_vectors as the address of the vectors when calculating which ventry in the 'full fat' vectors to branch to. While there is one set of tramp_vectors, this will be true. Adding multiple sets of vectors will break this assumption. Move the generation of the vectors to a macro, and pass the start of the vectors as an argument to tramp_ventry. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 28 +++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index f455557eaaaa..12612e3ae7f7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -1027,7 +1027,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif sub \dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE .endm - .macro tramp_ventry, regsize = 64 + .macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize .align 7 1: .if \regsize == 64 @@ -1049,9 +1049,9 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 #else ldr x30, =vectors #endif - prfm plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors)] + prfm plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - \vector_start)] msr vbar_el1, x30 - add x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors + 4) + add x30, x30, #(1b - \vector_start + 4) isb ret .org 1b + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot? @@ -1069,19 +1069,21 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 eret .endm - .align 11 -ENTRY(tramp_vectors) + .macro generate_tramp_vector +.Lvector_start\@: .space 0x400 - tramp_ventry - tramp_ventry - tramp_ventry - tramp_ventry + .rept 4 + tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64 + .endr + .rept 4 + tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32 + .endr + .endm - tramp_ventry 32 - tramp_ventry 32 - tramp_ventry 32 - tramp_ventry 32 + .align 11 +ENTRY(tramp_vectors) + generate_tramp_vector END(tramp_vectors) ENTRY(tramp_exit_native) From 10fbae210aaa77f506f7b853c027b3c47b3d137c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 157/908] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdef'd section commit 13d7a08352a83ef2252aeb464a5e08dfc06b5dfd upstream. The macros for building the kpti trampoline are all behind CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0, and in a region that outputs to the .entry.tramp.text section. Move the macros out so they can be used to generate other kinds of trampoline. Only the symbols need to be guarded by CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 and appear in the .entry.tramp.text section. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 12612e3ae7f7..20055f976146 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -985,12 +985,7 @@ __ni_sys_trace: .popsection // .entry.text -#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 -/* - * Exception vectors trampoline. - */ - .pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax" - + // Move from tramp_pg_dir to swapper_pg_dir .macro tramp_map_kernel, tmp mrs \tmp, ttbr1_el1 sub \tmp, \tmp, #(SWAPPER_DIR_SIZE + RESERVED_TTBR0_SIZE) @@ -1081,6 +1076,11 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 .endr .endm +#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 +/* + * Exception vectors trampoline. + */ + .pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax" .align 11 ENTRY(tramp_vectors) generate_tramp_vector From 5542470001b7eaae3409899489f9919585b193c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 158/908] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampoline's kpti sequence optional commit c47e4d04ba0f1ea17353d85d45f611277507e07a upstream. Spectre-BHB needs to add sequences to the vectors. Having one global set of vectors is a problem for big/little systems where the sequence is costly on cpus that are not vulnerable. Making the vectors per-cpu in the style of KVM's bh_harden_hyp_vecs requires the vectors to be generated by macros. Make the kpti re-mapping of the kernel optional, so the macros can be used without kpti. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 20055f976146..a58da4779b06 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -1022,9 +1022,10 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif sub \dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE .endm - .macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize + .macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti .align 7 1: + .if \kpti == 1 .if \regsize == 64 msr tpidrro_el0, x30 // Restored in kernel_ventry .endif @@ -1046,8 +1047,12 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 #endif prfm plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - \vector_start)] msr vbar_el1, x30 - add x30, x30, #(1b - \vector_start + 4) isb + .else + ldr x30, =vectors + .endif // \kpti == 1 + + add x30, x30, #(1b - \vector_start + 4) ret .org 1b + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot? .endm @@ -1064,15 +1069,15 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 eret .endm - .macro generate_tramp_vector + .macro generate_tramp_vector, kpti .Lvector_start\@: .space 0x400 .rept 4 - tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64 + tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64, \kpti .endr .rept 4 - tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32 + tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32, \kpti .endr .endm @@ -1083,7 +1088,7 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 .pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax" .align 11 ENTRY(tramp_vectors) - generate_tramp_vector + generate_tramp_vector kpti=1 END(tramp_vectors) ENTRY(tramp_exit_native) From 64bb608e39b5bf0455a9c2380f16f79518a7b4c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 159/908] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages commit a9c406e6462ff14956d690de7bbe5131a5677dc9 upstream. Adding a second set of vectors to .entry.tramp.text will make it larger than a single 4K page. Allow the trampoline text to occupy up to three pages by adding two more fixmap slots. Previous changes to tramp_valias allowed it to reach beyond a single page. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h | 6 ++++-- arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 +- arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 11 ++++++++--- 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h index c0cfc6d3bf9f..3c962ef081f8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h @@ -59,9 +59,11 @@ enum fixed_addresses { #endif /* CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_GHES */ #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 - FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT, + FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT3, + FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT2, + FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1, FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_DATA, -#define TRAMP_VALIAS (__fix_to_virt(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT)) +#define TRAMP_VALIAS (__fix_to_virt(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1)) #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */ __end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses, diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h index 941267caa39c..8d3f1eab58e0 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h @@ -28,5 +28,11 @@ extern char __initdata_begin[], __initdata_end[]; extern char __inittext_begin[], __inittext_end[]; extern char __irqentry_text_start[], __irqentry_text_end[]; extern char __mmuoff_data_start[], __mmuoff_data_end[]; +extern char __entry_tramp_text_start[], __entry_tramp_text_end[]; + +static inline size_t entry_tramp_text_size(void) +{ + return __entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start; +} #endif /* __ASM_SECTIONS_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index a58da4779b06..f50539bdf5be 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif .endm .macro tramp_data_page dst - adr \dst, .entry.tramp.text + adr_l \dst, .entry.tramp.text sub \dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE .endm diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 4c11d3e64aef..6543c58f26ec 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ ASSERT(__hibernate_exit_text_end - (__hibernate_exit_text_start & ~(SZ_4K - 1)) <= SZ_4K, "Hibernate exit text too big or misaligned") #endif #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 -ASSERT((__entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start) == PAGE_SIZE, +ASSERT((__entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start) <= 3*PAGE_SIZE, "Entry trampoline text too big") #endif /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c index e02a6326c800..4d472907194d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c @@ -532,6 +532,7 @@ early_param("rodata", parse_rodata); #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 static int __init map_entry_trampoline(void) { + int i; extern char __entry_tramp_text_start[]; pgprot_t prot = rodata_enabled ? PAGE_KERNEL_ROX : PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC; @@ -542,11 +543,15 @@ static int __init map_entry_trampoline(void) /* Map only the text into the trampoline page table */ memset(tramp_pg_dir, 0, PGD_SIZE); - __create_pgd_mapping(tramp_pg_dir, pa_start, TRAMP_VALIAS, PAGE_SIZE, - prot, pgd_pgtable_alloc, 0); + __create_pgd_mapping(tramp_pg_dir, pa_start, TRAMP_VALIAS, + entry_tramp_text_size(), prot, pgd_pgtable_alloc, + 0); /* Map both the text and data into the kernel page table */ - __set_fixmap(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT, pa_start, prot); + for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(entry_tramp_text_size(), PAGE_SIZE); i++) + __set_fixmap(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1 - i, + pa_start + i * PAGE_SIZE, prot); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) { extern char __entry_tramp_data_start[]; From 7bcd194d9823cfd1e09f461bb44c2fdd8581ef71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 160/908] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations commit aff65393fa1401e034656e349abd655cfe272de0 upstream. kpti is an optional feature, for systems not using kpti a set of vectors for the spectre-bhb mitigations is needed. Add another set of vectors, __bp_harden_el1_vectors, that will be used if a mitigation is needed and kpti is not in use. The EL1 ventries are repeated verbatim as there is no additional work needed for entry from EL1. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index f50539bdf5be..bf6f4513c81f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -1025,10 +1025,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif .macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti .align 7 1: - .if \kpti == 1 .if \regsize == 64 msr tpidrro_el0, x30 // Restored in kernel_ventry .endif + + .if \kpti == 1 /* * Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy * entry onto the return stack and using a RET instruction to @@ -1111,6 +1112,37 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start: #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */ #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */ +/* + * Exception vectors for spectre mitigations on entry from EL1 when + * kpti is not in use. + */ + .macro generate_el1_vector +.Lvector_start\@: + kernel_ventry 1, sync_invalid // Synchronous EL1t + kernel_ventry 1, irq_invalid // IRQ EL1t + kernel_ventry 1, fiq_invalid // FIQ EL1t + kernel_ventry 1, error_invalid // Error EL1t + + kernel_ventry 1, sync // Synchronous EL1h + kernel_ventry 1, irq // IRQ EL1h + kernel_ventry 1, fiq_invalid // FIQ EL1h + kernel_ventry 1, error_invalid // Error EL1h + + .rept 4 + tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64, kpti=0 + .endr + .rept 4 + tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32, kpti=0 + .endr + .endm + + .pushsection ".entry.text", "ax" + .align 11 +ENTRY(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) + generate_el1_vector +END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) + .popsection + /* * Special system call wrappers. */ From 6932c82566e23aca000a60fd2d6e80c04140d119 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 161/908] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences commit ba2689234be92024e5635d30fe744f4853ad97db upstream. Some CPUs affected by Spectre-BHB need a sequence of branches, or a firmware call to be run before any indirect branch. This needs to go in the vectors. No CPU needs both. While this can be patched in, it would run on all CPUs as there is a single set of vectors. If only one part of a big/little combination is affected, the unaffected CPUs have to run the mitigation too. Create extra vectors that include the sequence. Subsequent patches will allow affected CPUs to select this set of vectors. Later patches will modify the loop count to match what the CPU requires. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 25 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h | 34 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 7 ++++ 4 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index 02d73d83f0de..93316937f9ce 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -549,4 +549,29 @@ alternative_endif .Ldone\@: .endm + .macro __mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop tmp +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY + mov \tmp, #32 +.Lspectre_bhb_loop\@: + b . + 4 + subs \tmp, \tmp, #1 + b.ne .Lspectre_bhb_loop\@ + dsb nsh + isb +#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ + .endm + + /* Save/restores x0-x3 to the stack */ + .macro __mitigate_spectre_bhb_fw +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY + stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]! + stp x2, x3, [sp, #-16]! + mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 +alternative_cb arm64_update_smccc_conduit + nop // Patched to SMC/HVC #0 +alternative_cb_end + ldp x2, x3, [sp], #16 + ldp x0, x1, [sp], #16 +#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ + .endm #endif /* __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..16ca74260375 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2022 ARM Ltd. + */ +#ifndef __ASM_VECTORS_H +#define __ASM_VECTORS_H + +/* + * Note: the order of this enum corresponds to two arrays in entry.S: + * tramp_vecs and __bp_harden_el1_vectors. By default the canonical + * 'full fat' vectors are used directly. + */ +enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors { +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY + /* + * Perform the BHB loop mitigation, before branching to the canonical + * vectors. + */ + EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP, + + /* + * Make the SMC call for firmware mitigation, before branching to the + * canonical vectors. + */ + EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW, +#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ + + /* + * Remap the kernel before branching to the canonical vectors. + */ + EL1_VECTOR_KPTI, +}; + +#endif /* __ASM_VECTORS_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index bf6f4513c81f..caf6f9cb8fd6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -1022,13 +1022,26 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif sub \dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE .endm - .macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti + +#define BHB_MITIGATION_NONE 0 +#define BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP 1 +#define BHB_MITIGATION_FW 2 + + .macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti, bhb .align 7 1: .if \regsize == 64 msr tpidrro_el0, x30 // Restored in kernel_ventry .endif + .if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP + /* + * This sequence must appear before the first indirect branch. i.e. the + * ret out of tramp_ventry. It appears here because x30 is free. + */ + __mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop x30 + .endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP + .if \kpti == 1 /* * Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy @@ -1053,6 +1066,15 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 ldr x30, =vectors .endif // \kpti == 1 + .if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_FW + /* + * The firmware sequence must appear before the first indirect branch. + * i.e. the ret out of tramp_ventry. But it also needs the stack to be + * mapped to save/restore the registers the SMC clobbers. + */ + __mitigate_spectre_bhb_fw + .endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_FW + add x30, x30, #(1b - \vector_start + 4) ret .org 1b + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot? @@ -1060,6 +1082,9 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 .macro tramp_exit, regsize = 64 adr x30, tramp_vectors +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY + add x30, x30, SZ_4K +#endif msr vbar_el1, x30 ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] tramp_unmap_kernel x29 @@ -1070,26 +1095,32 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 eret .endm - .macro generate_tramp_vector, kpti + .macro generate_tramp_vector, kpti, bhb .Lvector_start\@: .space 0x400 .rept 4 - tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64, \kpti + tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64, \kpti, \bhb .endr .rept 4 - tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32, \kpti + tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32, \kpti, \bhb .endr .endm #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 /* * Exception vectors trampoline. + * The order must match __bp_harden_el1_vectors and the + * arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors enum. */ .pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax" .align 11 ENTRY(tramp_vectors) - generate_tramp_vector kpti=1 +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY + generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP + generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW +#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ + generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_NONE END(tramp_vectors) ENTRY(tramp_exit_native) @@ -1116,7 +1147,7 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start: * Exception vectors for spectre mitigations on entry from EL1 when * kpti is not in use. */ - .macro generate_el1_vector + .macro generate_el1_vector, bhb .Lvector_start\@: kernel_ventry 1, sync_invalid // Synchronous EL1t kernel_ventry 1, irq_invalid // IRQ EL1t @@ -1129,17 +1160,21 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start: kernel_ventry 1, error_invalid // Error EL1h .rept 4 - tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64, kpti=0 + tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64, 0, \bhb .endr .rept 4 - tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32, kpti=0 + tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32, 0, \bhb .endr .endm +/* The order must match tramp_vecs and the arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors enum. */ .pushsection ".entry.text", "ax" .align 11 ENTRY(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) - generate_el1_vector +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY + generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP + generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW +#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) .popsection diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h index 6366b04c7d5f..040266891414 100644 --- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h @@ -85,6 +85,13 @@ ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ 0, 0x7fff) +#define ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ + ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + 0, 0x3fff) + +#define SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED 1 + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ #include From 1291f9f7eb8ad19652e64869f66ba60f9f3e0ec4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 162/908] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline commit b28a8eebe81c186fdb1a0078263b30576c8e1f42 upstream. The trampoline code needs to use the address of symbols in the wider kernel, e.g. vectors. PC-relative addressing wouldn't work as the trampoline code doesn't run at the address the linker expected. tramp_ventry uses a literal pool, unless CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is set, in which case it uses the data page as a literal pool because the data page can be unmapped when running in user-space, which is required for CPUs vulnerable to meltdown. Pull this logic out as a macro, instead of adding a third copy of it. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas [ Removed SDEI for stable backport ] Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index caf6f9cb8fd6..4fe25954fbb0 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -1022,6 +1022,15 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif sub \dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE .endm + .macro tramp_data_read_var dst, var +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE + tramp_data_page \dst + add \dst, \dst, #:lo12:__entry_tramp_data_\var + ldr \dst, [\dst] +#else + ldr \dst, =\var +#endif + .endm #define BHB_MITIGATION_NONE 0 #define BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP 1 @@ -1052,13 +1061,8 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif b . 2: tramp_map_kernel x30 -#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE - tramp_data_page x30 alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 - ldr x30, [x30] -#else - ldr x30, =vectors -#endif + tramp_data_read_var x30, vectors prfm plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - \vector_start)] msr vbar_el1, x30 isb @@ -1138,7 +1142,12 @@ END(tramp_exit_compat) .align PAGE_SHIFT .globl __entry_tramp_data_start __entry_tramp_data_start: +__entry_tramp_data_vectors: .quad vectors +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE +__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler: + .quad __sdei_asm_handler +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */ .popsection // .rodata #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */ #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */ From 913fa37cc50d27c55b8c075980b4bbf6c6482a5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 163/908] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 commit bd09128d16fac3c34b80bd6a29088ac632e8ce09 upstream. The Spectre-BHB workaround adds a firmware call to the vectors. This is needed on some CPUs, but not others. To avoid the unaffected CPU in a big/little pair from making the firmware call, create per cpu vectors. The per-cpu vectors only apply when returning from EL0. Systems using KPTI can use the canonical 'full-fat' vectors directly at EL1, the trampoline exit code will switch to this_cpu_vector on exit to EL0. Systems not using KPTI should always use this_cpu_vector. this_cpu_vector will point at a vector in tramp_vecs or __bp_harden_el1_vectors, depending on whether KPTI is in use. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 16 ++++++++++------ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 9 +++++++-- 5 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h index 6dd83d75b82a..db77543a5688 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ typedef struct { */ #define ASID(mm) ((mm)->context.id.counter & 0xffff) -static inline bool arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(void) +static __always_inline bool arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(void) { return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0) && cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h index 16ca74260375..3f76dfd9e074 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h @@ -5,6 +5,15 @@ #ifndef __ASM_VECTORS_H #define __ASM_VECTORS_H +#include +#include + +#include + +extern char vectors[]; +extern char tramp_vectors[]; +extern char __bp_harden_el1_vectors[]; + /* * Note: the order of this enum corresponds to two arrays in entry.S: * tramp_vecs and __bp_harden_el1_vectors. By default the canonical @@ -31,4 +40,22 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors { EL1_VECTOR_KPTI, }; +/* The vectors to use on return from EL0. e.g. to remap the kernel */ +DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, this_cpu_vector); + +#ifndef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 +#define TRAMP_VALIAS 0 +#endif + +static inline const char * +arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot) +{ + if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) + return (char *)TRAMP_VALIAS + SZ_2K * slot; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(slot == EL1_VECTOR_KPTI); + + return __bp_harden_el1_vectors + SZ_2K * slot; +} + #endif /* __ASM_VECTORS_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 1481e18aa5ca..47fdabeec98e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -20,11 +20,13 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include + #include #include #include @@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include unsigned long elf_hwcap __read_mostly; @@ -50,6 +53,8 @@ unsigned int compat_elf_hwcap2 __read_mostly; DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_hwcaps, ARM64_NCAPS); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_hwcaps); +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, this_cpu_vector) = vectors; + static int dump_cpu_hwcaps(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long v, void *p) { /* file-wide pr_fmt adds "CPU features: " prefix */ @@ -892,6 +897,12 @@ kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) static bool kpti_applied = false; int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + if (__this_cpu_read(this_cpu_vector) == vectors) { + const char *v = arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(EL1_VECTOR_KPTI); + + __this_cpu_write(this_cpu_vector, v); + } + if (kpti_applied) return; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 4fe25954fbb0..54f9d95e4909 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ .macro kernel_ventry, el, label, regsize = 64 .align 7 .Lventry_start\@: -#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 .if \el == 0 /* * This must be the first instruction of the EL0 vector entries. It is @@ -90,7 +89,6 @@ .endif .Lskip_tramp_vectors_cleanup\@: .endif -#endif sub sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK @@ -1085,10 +1083,14 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 .endm .macro tramp_exit, regsize = 64 - adr x30, tramp_vectors -#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY - add x30, x30, SZ_4K -#endif + tramp_data_read_var x30, this_cpu_vector +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN + mrs x29, tpidr_el1 +alternative_else + mrs x29, tpidr_el2 +alternative_endif + ldr x30, [x30, x29] + msr vbar_el1, x30 ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] tramp_unmap_kernel x29 @@ -1148,6 +1150,8 @@ __entry_tramp_data_vectors: __entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler: .quad __sdei_asm_handler #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */ +__entry_tramp_data_this_cpu_vector: + .quad this_cpu_vector .popsection // .rodata #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */ #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c index 99ae75a43985..0f05f402e04a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include extern struct exception_table_entry __start___kvm_ex_table; extern struct exception_table_entry __stop___kvm_ex_table; @@ -110,17 +111,21 @@ static void __hyp_text __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static void __hyp_text __deactivate_traps_vhe(void) { - extern char vectors[]; /* kernel exception vectors */ + const char *host_vectors = vectors; u64 mdcr_el2 = read_sysreg(mdcr_el2); mdcr_el2 &= MDCR_EL2_HPMN_MASK | MDCR_EL2_E2PB_MASK << MDCR_EL2_E2PB_SHIFT | MDCR_EL2_TPMS; + write_sysreg(mdcr_el2, mdcr_el2); write_sysreg(HCR_HOST_VHE_FLAGS, hcr_el2); write_sysreg(CPACR_EL1_FPEN, cpacr_el1); - write_sysreg(vectors, vbar_el1); + + if (!arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) + host_vectors = __this_cpu_read(this_cpu_vector); + write_sysreg(host_vectors, vbar_el1); } static void __hyp_text __deactivate_traps_nvhe(void) From e2ee0b0d9677bfec26bfd22187cdd479f9789f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 164/908] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 commit dee435be76f4117410bbd90573a881fd33488f37 upstream. Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can make use of branch history to influence future speculation as part of a spectre-v2 attack. This is not mitigated by CSV2, meaning CPUs that previously reported 'Not affected' are now moderately mitigated by CSV2. Update the value in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 to also show the state of the BHB mitigation. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas [ code move to cpu_errata.c for backport ] Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 8 ++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 166f81b7afee..5f9f40a02784 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -495,6 +495,14 @@ static inline int arm64_get_ssbd_state(void) void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state); +/* Watch out, ordering is important here. */ +enum mitigation_state { + SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED, + SPECTRE_MITIGATED, + SPECTRE_VULNERABLE, +}; + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void); #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index d75c4f4144f4..41caf2f01814 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -730,14 +730,39 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } +static const char *get_bhb_affected_string(enum mitigation_state bhb_state) +{ + switch (bhb_state) { + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: + return ""; + default: + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + return ", but not BHB"; + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + return ", BHB"; + } +} + ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - if (__spectrev2_safe) - return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + enum mitigation_state bhb_state = arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(); + const char *bhb_str = get_bhb_affected_string(bhb_state); + const char *v2_str = "Branch predictor hardening"; + + if (__spectrev2_safe) { + if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + + /* + * Platforms affected by Spectre-BHB can't report + * "Not affected" for Spectre-v2. + */ + v2_str = "CSV2"; + } if (__hardenbp_enab) - return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s%s\n", v2_str, bhb_str); return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); } @@ -758,3 +783,10 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); } + +static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state; + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void) +{ + return spectre_bhb_state; +} From 0b1c660d8516e8960227a92b9ee890e9e3682b31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 165/908] KVM: arm64: Add templates for BHB mitigation sequences KVM writes the Spectre-v2 mitigation template at the beginning of each vector when a CPU requires a specific sequence to run. Because the template is copied, it can not be modified by the alternatives at runtime. As the KVM template code is intertwined with the bp-hardening callbacks, all templates must have a bp-hardening callback. Add templates for calling ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 and one for each value of K in the brancy-loop. Identify these sequences by a new parameter template_start, and add a copy of install_bp_hardening_cb() that is able to install them. Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 6 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h index 626e895dc008..20ca422eb094 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ #define ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE 26 #define ARM64_SSBS 27 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1188873 28 +#define ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB 29 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 29 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 30 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h index 47ba6a57dc45..04c7c4596240 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void) struct bp_hardening_data *data = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(); void *vect = kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector); - if (data->fn) { + if (data->template_start) { vect = __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start + data->hyp_vectors_slot * SZ_2K; diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h index db77543a5688..5a77dc775cc3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void); struct bp_hardening_data { int hyp_vectors_slot; bp_hardening_cb_t fn; + + /* + * template_start is only used by the BHB mitigation to identify the + * hyp_vectors_slot sequence. + */ + const char *template_start; }; #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S index 4cae34e5a24e..81f15b49429a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S @@ -66,3 +66,53 @@ ENTRY(__smccc_workaround_1_smc_start) ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 2)] add sp, sp, #(8 * 4) ENTRY(__smccc_workaround_1_smc_end) + +ENTRY(__smccc_workaround_3_smc_start) + sub sp, sp, #(8 * 4) + stp x2, x3, [sp, #(8 * 0)] + stp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 2)] + mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 + smc #0 + ldp x2, x3, [sp, #(8 * 0)] + ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 2)] + add sp, sp, #(8 * 4) +ENTRY(__smccc_workaround_3_smc_end) + +ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start) + sub sp, sp, #(8 * 2) + stp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] + mov x0, #8 +2: b . + 4 + subs x0, x0, #1 + b.ne 2b + dsb nsh + isb + ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] + add sp, sp, #(8 * 2) +ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_end) + +ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start) + sub sp, sp, #(8 * 2) + stp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] + mov x0, #24 +2: b . + 4 + subs x0, x0, #1 + b.ne 2b + dsb nsh + isb + ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] + add sp, sp, #(8 * 2) +ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end) + +ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start) + sub sp, sp, #(8 * 2) + stp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] + mov x0, #32 +2: b . + 4 + subs x0, x0, #1 + b.ne 2b + dsb nsh + isb + ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] + add sp, sp, #(8 * 2) +ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 41caf2f01814..b10fc7b5e6b4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -85,6 +85,14 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); #ifdef CONFIG_KVM extern char __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start[]; extern char __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end[]; +extern char __smccc_workaround_3_smc_start[]; +extern char __smccc_workaround_3_smc_end[]; +extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start[]; +extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k8_end[]; +extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start[]; +extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end[]; +extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start[]; +extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end[]; static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, const char *hyp_vecs_end) @@ -98,12 +106,14 @@ static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K); } +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); +static int last_slot = -1; + static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, const char *hyp_vecs_start, const char *hyp_vecs_end) { - static int last_slot = -1; - static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); + int cpu, slot = -1; spin_lock(&bp_lock); @@ -124,6 +134,7 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot); __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start); spin_unlock(&bp_lock); } #else @@ -790,3 +801,59 @@ enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void) { return spectre_bhb_state; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM +static const char *kvm_bhb_get_vecs_end(const char *start) +{ + if (start == __smccc_workaround_3_smc_start) + return __smccc_workaround_3_smc_end; + else if (start == __spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start) + return __spectre_bhb_loop_k8_end; + else if (start == __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start) + return __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end; + else if (start == __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start) + return __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end; + + return NULL; +} + +void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) +{ + int cpu, slot = -1; + const char *hyp_vecs_end; + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM) || !is_hyp_mode_available()) + return; + + hyp_vecs_end = kvm_bhb_get_vecs_end(hyp_vecs_start); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hyp_vecs_start || !hyp_vecs_end)) + return; + + spin_lock(&bp_lock); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + if (per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.template_start, cpu) == hyp_vecs_start) { + slot = per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, cpu); + break; + } + } + + if (slot == -1) { + last_slot++; + BUG_ON(((__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end - __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) + / SZ_2K) <= last_slot); + slot = last_slot; + __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); + } + + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot); + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start); + spin_unlock(&bp_lock); +} +#else +#define __smccc_workaround_3_smc_start NULL +#define __spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start NULL +#define __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start NULL +#define __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start NULL + +void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) { }; +#endif From 3e3904125fccd042fda24294624e8f66699fd06d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 166/908] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels commit 558c303c9734af5a813739cd284879227f7297d2 upstream. Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can make use of branch history to influence future speculation. When taking an exception from user-space, a sequence of branches or a firmware call overwrites or invalidates the branch history. The sequence of branches is added to the vectors, and should appear before the first indirect branch. For systems using KPTI the sequence is added to the kpti trampoline where it has a free register as the exit from the trampoline is via a 'ret'. For systems not using KPTI, the same register tricks are used to free up a register in the vectors. For the firmware call, arch-workaround-3 clobbers 4 registers, so there is no choice but to save them to the EL1 stack. This only happens for entry from EL0, so if we take an exception due to the stack access, it will not become re-entrant. For KVM, the existing branch-predictor-hardening vectors are used. When a spectre version of these vectors is in use, the firmware call is sufficient to mitigate against Spectre-BHB. For the non-spectre versions, the sequence of branches is added to the indirect vector. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Cc: # # # Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 10 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 18 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 8 + arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h | 6 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 4 + 8 files changed, 316 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 729384f19c7f..7605d2f00d55 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -872,6 +872,16 @@ config ARM64_SSBD If unsure, say Y. +config MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY + bool "Mitigate Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT + default y + depends on HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || !KVM + help + Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can + make use of branch history to influence future speculation. + When taking an exception from user-space, a sequence of branches + or a firmware call overwrites the branch history. + menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions" depends on COMPAT diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index 93316937f9ce..b84e367e2720 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -551,7 +551,9 @@ alternative_endif .macro __mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop tmp #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY - mov \tmp, #32 +alternative_cb spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter + mov \tmp, #32 // Patched to correct the immediate +alternative_cb_end .Lspectre_bhb_loop\@: b . + 4 subs \tmp, \tmp, #1 diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 5f9f40a02784..4c23c5778030 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -456,6 +456,21 @@ static inline bool cpu_supports_mixed_endian_el0(void) return id_aa64mmfr0_mixed_endian_el0(read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1)); } +static inline bool supports_csv2p3(int scope) +{ + u64 pfr0; + u8 csv2_val; + + if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) + pfr0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); + else + pfr0 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); + + csv2_val = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, + ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); + return csv2_val == 3; +} + static inline bool system_supports_32bit_el0(void) { return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0); @@ -503,6 +518,9 @@ enum mitigation_state { }; enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void); +bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope); +u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope); +void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h index de5cbd7614f8..401088d9cd82 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h @@ -90,9 +90,13 @@ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76 0xD0B #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1 0xD0C #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77 0xD0D +#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1 0xD40 +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78 0xD41 +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1 0xD44 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710 0xD47 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2 0xD48 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2 0xD49 +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C 0xD4B #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA 0x000 @@ -121,9 +125,13 @@ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A76 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76) #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A77 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77) +#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_X1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710) #define MIDR_CORTEX_X2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2) #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78C MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C) #define MIDR_THUNDERX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX) #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h index 2564dd429ab6..7567b0e8c00b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h @@ -448,6 +448,7 @@ #define ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN16_SUPPORTED 0x1 /* id_aa64mmfr1 */ +#define ID_AA64MMFR1_ECBHB_SHIFT 60 #define ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT 20 #define ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT 16 #define ID_AA64MMFR1_HPD_SHIFT 12 diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h index 3f76dfd9e074..f222d8e033b3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include +#include extern char vectors[]; extern char tramp_vectors[]; @@ -40,6 +41,11 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors { EL1_VECTOR_KPTI, }; +#ifndef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY +#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP -1 +#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW -1 +#endif /* !CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ + /* The vectors to use on return from EL0. e.g. to remap the kernel */ DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, this_cpu_vector); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index b10fc7b5e6b4..b8f87041f792 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static bool __maybe_unused is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) @@ -731,6 +732,13 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A76, 0, 0, 2, 0), }, #endif + { + .desc = "Spectre-BHB", + .capability = ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, + .matches = is_spectre_bhb_affected, + .cpu_enable = spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation, + }, { } }; @@ -795,6 +803,33 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); } +/* + * We try to ensure that the mitigation state can never change as the result of + * onlining a late CPU. + */ +static void update_mitigation_state(enum mitigation_state *oldp, + enum mitigation_state new) +{ + enum mitigation_state state; + + do { + state = READ_ONCE(*oldp); + if (new <= state) + break; + } while (cmpxchg_relaxed(oldp, state, new) != state); +} + +/* + * Spectre BHB. + * + * A CPU is either: + * - Mitigated by a branchy loop a CPU specific number of times, and listed + * in our "loop mitigated list". + * - Mitigated in software by the firmware Spectre v2 call. + * - Has the 'Exception Clears Branch History Buffer' (ECBHB) feature, so no + * software mitigation in the vectors is needed. + * - Has CSV2.3, so is unaffected. + */ static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state; enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void) @@ -802,6 +837,163 @@ enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void) return spectre_bhb_state; } +/* + * This must be called with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU for each type of CPU, before any + * SCOPE_SYSTEM call will give the right answer. + */ +u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope) +{ + u8 k = 0; + static u8 max_bhb_k; + + if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) { + static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k32_list[] = { + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78C), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A710), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X2), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1), + {}, + }; + static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k24_list[] = { + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A77), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1), + {}, + }; + static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k8_list[] = { + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), + {}, + }; + + if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k32_list)) + k = 32; + else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k24_list)) + k = 24; + else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k8_list)) + k = 8; + + max_bhb_k = max(max_bhb_k, k); + } else { + k = max_bhb_k; + } + + return k; +} + +static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void) +{ + int ret; + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + + switch (psci_ops.conduit) { + case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: + arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3, &res); + break; + + case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3, &res); + break; + + default: + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } + + ret = res.a0; + switch (ret) { + case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS: + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED: + return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + default: + case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } +} + +static bool is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(int scope) +{ + static bool system_affected; + enum mitigation_state fw_state; + bool has_smccc = (psci_ops.smccc_version >= SMCCC_VERSION_1_1); + static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list[] = { + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), + {}, + }; + bool cpu_in_list = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), + spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list); + + if (scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) + return system_affected; + + fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(); + if (cpu_in_list || (has_smccc && fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)) { + system_affected = true; + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +static bool supports_ecbhb(int scope) +{ + u64 mmfr1; + + if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) + mmfr1 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1); + else + mmfr1 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1); + + return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(mmfr1, + ID_AA64MMFR1_ECBHB_SHIFT); +} + +bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, + int scope) +{ + WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); + + if (supports_csv2p3(scope)) + return false; + + if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(scope)) + return true; + + if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(scope)) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot) +{ + const char *v = arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(slot); + + if (slot < 0) + return; + + __this_cpu_write(this_cpu_vector, v); + + /* + * When KPTI is in use, the vectors are switched when exiting to + * user-space. + */ + if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) + return; + + write_sysreg(v, vbar_el1); + isb(); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_KVM static const char *kvm_bhb_get_vecs_end(const char *start) { @@ -817,7 +1009,7 @@ static const char *kvm_bhb_get_vecs_end(const char *start) return NULL; } -void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) +static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) { int cpu, slot = -1; const char *hyp_vecs_end; @@ -855,5 +1047,77 @@ void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start NULL #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start NULL -void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) { }; +static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) { }; #endif + +void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) +{ + enum mitigation_state fw_state, state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + + if (!is_spectre_bhb_affected(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) + return; + + if (!__spectrev2_safe && !__hardenbp_enab) { + /* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */ + } else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) { + pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n"); + } else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) { + pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n"); + } else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + } else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { + switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) { + case 8: + kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start); + break; + case 24: + kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start); + break; + case 32: + kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start); + break; + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + } + this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP); + + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + } else if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { + fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(); + if (fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED) { + kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__smccc_workaround_3_smc_start); + this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW); + + /* + * With WA3 in the vectors, the WA1 calls can be + * removed. + */ + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, NULL); + + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + } + } + + update_mitigation_state(&spectre_bhb_state, state); +} + +/* Patched to correct the immediate */ +void __init spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter(struct alt_instr *alt, + __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst) +{ + u8 rd; + u32 insn; + u16 loop_count = spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM); + + BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); /* MOV -> MOV */ + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) + return; + + insn = le32_to_cpu(*origptr); + rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD, insn); + insn = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, loop_count, 0, + AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT, + AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_ZERO); + *updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(insn); +} diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S index 5e041eabdd03..8086294aedea 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S @@ -135,6 +135,10 @@ el1_hvc_guest: /* ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 handling */ eor w1, w1, #(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 ^ \ ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2) + cbz w1, wa_epilogue + + eor w1, w1, #(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 ^ \ + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3) cbnz w1, el1_trap #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD From 067b8175245d97dacb5d459ef10ab7639916d7c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 167/908] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated commit a5905d6af492ee6a4a2205f0d550b3f931b03d03 upstream. KVM allows the guest to discover whether the ARCH_WORKAROUND SMCCC are implemented, and to preserve that state during migration through its firmware register interface. Add the necessary boiler plate for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas [ kvm code moved to virt/kvm/arm, removed fw regs ABI. Added 32bit stub ] Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++++ virt/kvm/arm/psci.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h index b60232639984..dbd9615b428c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_INTC_INITIALIZED @@ -324,4 +325,9 @@ static inline int kvm_arm_have_ssbd(void) return KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN; } +static inline int kvm_arm_get_spectre_bhb_state(void) +{ + /* 32bit guests don't need firmware for this */ + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; /* aka SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED */ +} #endif /* __ARM_KVM_HOST_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 8d94404829f0..be82119ed24a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -450,4 +450,9 @@ static inline int kvm_arm_have_ssbd(void) } } +static inline enum mitigation_state kvm_arm_get_spectre_bhb_state(void) +{ + return arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(); +} + #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HOST_H__ */ diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c b/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c index c95ab4c5a475..129b755824e1 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c +++ b/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c @@ -433,6 +433,18 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) break; } break; + case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3: + switch (kvm_arm_get_spectre_bhb_state()) { + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + break; + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS; + break; + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: + val = SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED; + break; + } + break; } break; default: From c20917a7ad4a2f926bfc82317a7d352e356f5c1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 168/908] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register commit 9e45365f1469ef2b934f9d035975dbc9ad352116 upstream. This is a new ID register, introduced in 8.7. Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Marc Zyngier Cc: James Morse Cc: Alexandru Elisei Cc: Suzuki K Poulose Cc: Reiji Watanabe Acked-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210165432.8106-3-joey.gouly@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 9 +++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h index 889226b4c6e1..c7f17e663e72 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct cpuinfo_arm64 { u64 reg_id_aa64dfr1; u64 reg_id_aa64isar0; u64 reg_id_aa64isar1; + u64 reg_id_aa64isar2; u64 reg_id_aa64mmfr0; u64 reg_id_aa64mmfr1; u64 reg_id_aa64mmfr2; diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h index 7567b0e8c00b..2ea15f078354 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h @@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ #define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 0) #define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 1) +#define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 2) #define SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 7, 0) #define SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 7, 1) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 47fdabeec98e..8c655a9dabfc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -134,6 +134,10 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { ARM64_FTR_END, }; +static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar2[] = { + ARM64_FTR_END, +}; + static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = { ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT, 4, 0), @@ -361,6 +365,7 @@ static const struct __ftr_reg_entry { /* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 6 */ ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar0), ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar1), + ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar2), /* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 7 */ ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr0), @@ -506,6 +511,7 @@ void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info) init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64dfr1); init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar0); init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar1); + init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar2); init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr0); init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr1); init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr2); @@ -617,6 +623,8 @@ void update_cpu_features(int cpu, info->reg_id_aa64isar0, boot->reg_id_aa64isar0); taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, cpu, info->reg_id_aa64isar1, boot->reg_id_aa64isar1); + taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, cpu, + info->reg_id_aa64isar2, boot->reg_id_aa64isar2); /* * Differing PARange support is fine as long as all peripherals and @@ -737,6 +745,7 @@ static u64 __read_sysreg_by_encoding(u32 sys_id) read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1); read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1); read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1); + read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); read_sysreg_case(SYS_CNTFRQ_EL0); read_sysreg_case(SYS_CTR_EL0); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c index 9ff64e04e63d..6b7db546efda 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c @@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ static void __cpuinfo_store_cpu(struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info) info->reg_id_aa64dfr1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64DFR1_EL1); info->reg_id_aa64isar0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1); info->reg_id_aa64isar1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1); + info->reg_id_aa64isar2 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); info->reg_id_aa64mmfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1); info->reg_id_aa64mmfr1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1); info->reg_id_aa64mmfr2 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1); From 2e53c83ea673b657d33cc4fa0018fe41b500afe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:34:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 169/908] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations commit 228a26b912287934789023b4132ba76065d9491c upstream. Future CPUs may implement a clearbhb instruction that is sufficient to mitigate SpectreBHB. CPUs that implement this instruction, but not CSV2.3 must be affected by Spectre-BHB. Add support to use this instruction as the BHB mitigation on CPUs that support it. The instruction is in the hint space, so it will be treated by a NOP as older CPUs. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas [ modified for stable: Use a KVM vector template instead of alternatives ] Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 7 +++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 3 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h | 7 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 8 ++++++++ 8 files changed, 58 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index b84e367e2720..6b38f3b3095a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -103,6 +103,13 @@ hint #20 .endm +/* + * Clear Branch History instruction + */ + .macro clearbhb + hint #22 + .endm + /* * Sanitise a 64-bit bounded index wrt speculation, returning zero if out * of bounds. diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 4c23c5778030..3e9d042d1b1e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -471,6 +471,19 @@ static inline bool supports_csv2p3(int scope) return csv2_val == 3; } +static inline bool supports_clearbhb(int scope) +{ + u64 isar2; + + if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) + isar2 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); + else + isar2 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); + + return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(isar2, + ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT); +} + static inline bool system_supports_32bit_el0(void) { return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h index 2ea15f078354..3bbf0dc5ecad 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h @@ -404,6 +404,9 @@ #define ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT 12 #define ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT 0 +/* id_aa64isar2 */ +#define ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT 28 + /* id_aa64pfr0 */ #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT 60 #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT 56 diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h index f222d8e033b3..695583b9a145 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h @@ -33,6 +33,12 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors { * canonical vectors. */ EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW, + + /* + * Use the ClearBHB instruction, before branching to the canonical + * vectors. + */ + EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN, #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ /* @@ -44,6 +50,7 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors { #ifndef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY #define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP -1 #define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW -1 +#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN -1 #endif /* !CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ /* The vectors to use on return from EL0. e.g. to remap the kernel */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S index 81f15b49429a..bd6ef8750f44 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S @@ -116,3 +116,8 @@ ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start) ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] add sp, sp, #(8 * 2) ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end) + +ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start) + hint #22 /* aka clearbhb */ + isb +ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index b8f87041f792..ed627d44746a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start[]; extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end[]; extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start[]; extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end[]; +extern char __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start[]; +extern char __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end[]; static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, const char *hyp_vecs_end) @@ -826,6 +828,7 @@ static void update_mitigation_state(enum mitigation_state *oldp, * - Mitigated by a branchy loop a CPU specific number of times, and listed * in our "loop mitigated list". * - Mitigated in software by the firmware Spectre v2 call. + * - Has the ClearBHB instruction to perform the mitigation. * - Has the 'Exception Clears Branch History Buffer' (ECBHB) feature, so no * software mitigation in the vectors is needed. * - Has CSV2.3, so is unaffected. @@ -965,6 +968,9 @@ bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, if (supports_csv2p3(scope)) return false; + if (supports_clearbhb(scope)) + return true; + if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(scope)) return true; @@ -1005,6 +1011,8 @@ static const char *kvm_bhb_get_vecs_end(const char *start) return __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end; else if (start == __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start) return __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end; + else if (start == __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start) + return __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end; return NULL; } @@ -1046,6 +1054,7 @@ static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start NULL #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start NULL #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start NULL +#define __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start NULL static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) { }; #endif @@ -1064,6 +1073,11 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) } else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) { pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n"); } else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + } else if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { + kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start); + this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN); + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; } else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 8c655a9dabfc..b6922f33d306 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { }; static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar2[] = { + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_END, }; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 54f9d95e4909..f526148d14bd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -1033,6 +1033,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif #define BHB_MITIGATION_NONE 0 #define BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP 1 #define BHB_MITIGATION_FW 2 +#define BHB_MITIGATION_INSN 3 .macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti, bhb .align 7 @@ -1049,6 +1050,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif __mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop x30 .endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP + .if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN + clearbhb + isb + .endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN + .if \kpti == 1 /* * Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy @@ -1125,6 +1131,7 @@ ENTRY(tramp_vectors) #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW + generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_NONE END(tramp_vectors) @@ -1187,6 +1194,7 @@ ENTRY(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW + generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) .popsection From 74766a973637a02c32c04c1c6496e114e4855239 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2022 12:41:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 170/908] Linux 4.14.275 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401063624.232282121@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index a06abc38f35d..cad522127bb9 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 14 -SUBLEVEL = 274 +SUBLEVEL = 275 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Petit Gorille From 1848ba7e357cd757a8d264e509cb96fb92a39634 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Brauner Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 12:01:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 171/908] UPSTREAM: binderfs: use __u32 for device numbers We allow more then 255 binderfs binder devices to be created since there are workloads that require more than that. If we use __u8 we'll overflow after 255. So let's use a __u32. Note that there's no released kernel with binderfs out there so this is not a regression. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman (cherry picked from commit 7d0174065f4903fb0ce0bab3d5047284faa7226d) Bug: 228263403 Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas Change-Id: If143c0d6511946fac6349c5db7c013535950de4a --- include/uapi/linux/android/binderfs.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/android/binderfs.h b/include/uapi/linux/android/binderfs.h index 65b2efd1a0a5..b638098b29dd 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/android/binderfs.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/android/binderfs.h @@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ */ struct binderfs_device { char name[BINDERFS_MAX_NAME + 1]; - __u8 major; - __u8 minor; + __u32 major; + __u32 minor; }; /** From 6e240531fb7835c44adc4577c3d02d9da8bf9e0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tadeusz Struk Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 17:20:15 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 172/908] ANDROID: incremental-fs: limit mount stack depth Syzbot recently found a number of issues related to incremental-fs (see bug numbers below). All have to do with the fact that incr-fs allows mounts of the same source and target multiple times. This is a design decision and the user space component "Data Loader" expects this to work for app re-install use case. The mounting depth needs to be controlled, however, and only allowed to be two levels deep. In case of more than two mount attempts the driver needs to return an error. In case of the issues listed below the common pattern is that the reproducer calls: mount("./file0", "./file0", "incremental-fs", 0, NULL) many times and then invokes a file operation like chmod, setxattr, or open on the ./file0. This causes a recursive call for all the mounted instances, which eventually causes a stack overflow and a kernel crash: BUG: stack guard page was hit at ffffc90000c0fff8 kernel stack overflow (double-fault): 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN This change also cleans up the mount error path to properly clean allocated resources and call deactivate_locked_super(), which causes the incfs_kill_sb() to be called, where the sb is freed. Bug: 211066171 Bug: 213140206 Bug: 213215835 Bug: 211914587 Bug: 211213635 Bug: 213137376 Bug: 211161296 Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk Change-Id: I08d9b545a2715423296bf4beb67bdbbed78d1be1 --- fs/incfs/data_mgmt.h | 3 ++ fs/incfs/vfs.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/incfs/data_mgmt.h b/fs/incfs/data_mgmt.h index 2726867835a8..a98858afb138 100644 --- a/fs/incfs/data_mgmt.h +++ b/fs/incfs/data_mgmt.h @@ -109,6 +109,9 @@ struct mount_info { struct path mi_backing_dir_path; struct dentry *mi_index_dir; + /* For stacking mounts, if true, this indicates if the index dir needs + * to be freed for this SB otherwise it was created by lower level SB */ + bool mi_index_free; const struct cred *mi_owner; diff --git a/fs/incfs/vfs.c b/fs/incfs/vfs.c index 194c3b08a0bd..b1f6c701b7eb 100644 --- a/fs/incfs/vfs.c +++ b/fs/incfs/vfs.c @@ -760,7 +760,8 @@ static struct dentry *incfs_lookup_dentry(struct dentry *parent, return result; } -static struct dentry *open_or_create_index_dir(struct dentry *backing_dir) +static struct dentry *open_or_create_index_dir(struct dentry *backing_dir, + bool *created) { static const char name[] = ".index"; struct dentry *index_dentry; @@ -774,6 +775,7 @@ static struct dentry *open_or_create_index_dir(struct dentry *backing_dir) return index_dentry; } else if (d_really_is_positive(index_dentry)) { /* Index already exists. */ + *created = false; return index_dentry; } @@ -792,6 +794,7 @@ static struct dentry *open_or_create_index_dir(struct dentry *backing_dir) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } + *created = true; return index_dentry; } @@ -2180,6 +2183,7 @@ struct dentry *incfs_mount_fs(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, struct super_block *src_fs_sb = NULL; struct inode *root_inode = NULL; struct super_block *sb = sget(type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL); + bool dir_created = false; int error = 0; if (IS_ERR(sb)) @@ -2196,17 +2200,23 @@ struct dentry *incfs_mount_fs(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE != INCFS_DATA_FILE_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (!dev_name) { + pr_err("incfs: Backing dir is not set, filesystem can't be mounted.\n"); + error = -ENOENT; + goto err_deactivate; + } + error = parse_options(&options, (char *)data); if (error != 0) { pr_err("incfs: Options parsing error. %d\n", error); - goto err; + goto err_deactivate; } sb->s_bdi->ra_pages = options.readahead_pages; if (!dev_name) { pr_err("incfs: Backing dir is not set, filesystem can't be mounted.\n"); error = -ENOENT; - goto err; + goto err_deactivate; } error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, @@ -2215,55 +2225,64 @@ struct dentry *incfs_mount_fs(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, !d_really_is_positive(backing_dir_path.dentry)) { pr_err("incfs: Error accessing: %s.\n", dev_name); - goto err; + goto err_deactivate; } src_fs_sb = backing_dir_path.dentry->d_sb; sb->s_maxbytes = src_fs_sb->s_maxbytes; + sb->s_stack_depth = src_fs_sb->s_stack_depth + 1; - mi = incfs_alloc_mount_info(sb, &options, &backing_dir_path); + if (sb->s_stack_depth > FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH) { + error = -EINVAL; + goto err_put_path; + } + mi = incfs_alloc_mount_info(sb, &options, &backing_dir_path); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mi)) { error = PTR_ERR(mi); pr_err("incfs: Error allocating mount info. %d\n", error); - mi = NULL; - goto err; + goto err_put_path; } - index_dir = open_or_create_index_dir(backing_dir_path.dentry); + sb->s_fs_info = mi; + mi->mi_backing_dir_path = backing_dir_path; + index_dir = open_or_create_index_dir(backing_dir_path.dentry, + &dir_created); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(index_dir)) { error = PTR_ERR(index_dir); pr_err("incfs: Can't find or create .index dir in %s\n", dev_name); - goto err; + goto err_put_path; } + mi->mi_index_dir = index_dir; + mi->mi_index_free = dir_created; - sb->s_fs_info = mi; root_inode = fetch_regular_inode(sb, backing_dir_path.dentry); if (IS_ERR(root_inode)) { error = PTR_ERR(root_inode); - goto err; + goto err_put_path; } sb->s_root = d_make_root(root_inode); if (!sb->s_root) { error = -ENOMEM; - goto err; + goto err_put_path; } error = incfs_init_dentry(sb->s_root, &backing_dir_path); if (error) - goto err; + goto err_put_path; path_put(&backing_dir_path); sb->s_flags |= SB_ACTIVE; pr_debug("incfs: mount\n"); return dget(sb->s_root); -err: - sb->s_fs_info = NULL; + +err_put_path: path_put(&backing_dir_path); - incfs_free_mount_info(mi); +err_deactivate: deactivate_locked_super(sb); + pr_err("incfs: mount failed %d\n", error); return ERR_PTR(error); } @@ -2289,10 +2308,22 @@ static int incfs_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) void incfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb) { struct mount_info *mi = sb->s_fs_info; + struct inode *dinode = NULL; pr_debug("incfs: unmount\n"); - incfs_free_mount_info(mi); - generic_shutdown_super(sb); + + if (mi) { + if (mi->mi_backing_dir_path.dentry) + dinode = d_inode(mi->mi_backing_dir_path.dentry); + + if (dinode) { + if (mi->mi_index_dir && mi->mi_index_free) + vfs_rmdir(dinode, mi->mi_index_dir); + } + incfs_free_mount_info(mi); + sb->s_fs_info = NULL; + } + kill_anon_super(sb); } static int show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) From 6485772ca4d0f7eab266f9d363d7715c339f2223 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eddie James Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 16:44:46 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 173/908] USB: serial: pl2303: add IBM device IDs commit e1d15646565b284e9ef2433234d6cfdaf66695f1 upstream. IBM manufactures a PL2303 device for UPS communications. Add the vendor and product IDs so that the PL2303 driver binds to the device. Signed-off-by: Eddie James Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley Signed-off-by: Eddie James Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220301224446.21236-1-eajames@linux.ibm.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [ johan: amend the SoB chain ] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c b/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c index f37dc4cfce27..103b77f56aec 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(ADLINK_VENDOR_ID, ADLINK_ND6530GC_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(SMART_VENDOR_ID, SMART_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(AT_VENDOR_ID, AT_VTKIT3_PRODUCT_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(IBM_VENDOR_ID, IBM_PRODUCT_ID) }, { } /* Terminating entry */ }; diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h b/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h index c65c6c079544..c1b93d101990 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ #define ATEN_PRODUCT_UC232B 0x2022 #define ATEN_PRODUCT_ID2 0x2118 +#define IBM_VENDOR_ID 0x04b3 +#define IBM_PRODUCT_ID 0x4016 + #define IODATA_VENDOR_ID 0x04bb #define IODATA_PRODUCT_ID 0x0a03 #define IODATA_PRODUCT_ID_RSAQ5 0x0a0e From 4c0cfd551d5fa7f79d2184959cff6143c9dee240 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 09:49:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 174/908] USB: serial: simple: add Nokia phone driver commit c4b9c570965f75d0d55e639747f1e5ccdad2fae0 upstream. Add a new "simple" driver for certain Nokia phones, including Nokia 130 (RM-1035) which exposes two serial ports in "charging only" mode: Bus 001 Device 009: ID 0421:069a Nokia Mobile Phones 130 [RM-1035] (Charging only) Device Descriptor: bLength 18 bDescriptorType 1 bcdUSB 2.00 bDeviceClass 0 bDeviceSubClass 0 bDeviceProtocol 0 bMaxPacketSize0 8 idVendor 0x0421 Nokia Mobile Phones idProduct 0x069a 130 [RM-1035] (Charging only) bcdDevice 1.00 iManufacturer 1 Nokia iProduct 2 Nokia 130 (RM-1035) iSerial 0 bNumConfigurations 1 Configuration Descriptor: bLength 9 bDescriptorType 2 wTotalLength 0x0037 bNumInterfaces 2 bConfigurationValue 1 iConfiguration 0 bmAttributes 0x80 (Bus Powered) MaxPower 500mA Interface Descriptor: bLength 9 bDescriptorType 4 bInterfaceNumber 0 bAlternateSetting 0 bNumEndpoints 2 bInterfaceClass 255 Vendor Specific Class bInterfaceSubClass 255 Vendor Specific Subclass bInterfaceProtocol 255 Vendor Specific Protocol iInterface 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x81 EP 1 IN bmAttributes 2 Transfer Type Bulk Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0040 1x 64 bytes bInterval 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x01 EP 1 OUT bmAttributes 2 Transfer Type Bulk Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0040 1x 64 bytes bInterval 0 Interface Descriptor: bLength 9 bDescriptorType 4 bInterfaceNumber 1 bAlternateSetting 0 bNumEndpoints 2 bInterfaceClass 255 Vendor Specific Class bInterfaceSubClass 255 Vendor Specific Subclass bInterfaceProtocol 255 Vendor Specific Protocol iInterface 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x82 EP 2 IN bmAttributes 2 Transfer Type Bulk Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0040 1x 64 bytes bInterval 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x02 EP 2 OUT bmAttributes 2 Transfer Type Bulk Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0040 1x 64 bytes bInterval 0 Device Status: 0x0000 (Bus Powered) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220228084919.10656-1-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/Kconfig b/drivers/usb/serial/Kconfig index c508e2d7104b..72d5de424d49 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/Kconfig @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ config USB_SERIAL_SIMPLE - Libtransistor USB console - a number of Motorola phones - Motorola Tetra devices + - Nokia mobile phones - Novatel Wireless GPS receivers - Siemens USB/MPI adapter. - ViVOtech ViVOpay USB device. diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c b/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c index 15e05ebf37ac..3681e6418262 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c @@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ DEVICE(moto_modem, MOTO_IDS); { USB_DEVICE(0x0cad, 0x9016) } /* TPG2200 */ DEVICE(motorola_tetra, MOTOROLA_TETRA_IDS); +/* Nokia mobile phone driver */ +#define NOKIA_IDS() \ + { USB_DEVICE(0x0421, 0x069a) } /* Nokia 130 (RM-1035) */ +DEVICE(nokia, NOKIA_IDS); + /* Novatel Wireless GPS driver */ #define NOVATEL_IDS() \ { USB_DEVICE(0x09d7, 0x0100) } /* NovAtel FlexPack GPS */ @@ -126,6 +131,7 @@ static struct usb_serial_driver * const serial_drivers[] = { &vivopay_device, &moto_modem_device, &motorola_tetra_device, + &nokia_device, &novatel_gps_device, &hp4x_device, &suunto_device, @@ -143,6 +149,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = { VIVOPAY_IDS(), MOTO_IDS(), MOTOROLA_TETRA_IDS(), + NOKIA_IDS(), NOVATEL_IDS(), HP4X_IDS(), SUUNTO_IDS(), From 46291a4f2cdb817a7f7c991a9ec0d7a3882c2421 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yajun Deng Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 19:54:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 175/908] netdevice: add the case if dev is NULL commit b37a466837393af72fe8bcb8f1436410f3f173f3 upstream. Add the case if dev is NULL in dev_{put, hold}, so the caller doesn't need to care whether dev is NULL or not. Signed-off-by: Yajun Deng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Pavel Machek Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/netdevice.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h index 7972aac9264c..1edc2af51e03 100644 --- a/include/linux/netdevice.h +++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h @@ -3378,7 +3378,8 @@ void netdev_run_todo(void); */ static inline void dev_put(struct net_device *dev) { - this_cpu_dec(*dev->pcpu_refcnt); + if (dev) + this_cpu_dec(*dev->pcpu_refcnt); } /** @@ -3389,7 +3390,8 @@ static inline void dev_put(struct net_device *dev) */ static inline void dev_hold(struct net_device *dev) { - this_cpu_inc(*dev->pcpu_refcnt); + if (dev) + this_cpu_inc(*dev->pcpu_refcnt); } /* Carrier loss detection, dial on demand. The functions netif_carrier_on From ce1a7ed741357c08c520a44734afb51567fb0b07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Tue, 5 Oct 2021 03:04:10 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 176/908] virtio_console: break out of buf poll on remove [ Upstream commit 0e7174b9d5877130fec41fb4a16e0c2ee4958d44 ] A common pattern for device reset is currently: vdev->config->reset(vdev); .. cleanup .. reset prevents new interrupts from arriving and waits for interrupt handlers to finish. However if - as is common - the handler queues a work request which is flushed during the cleanup stage, we have code adding buffers / trying to get buffers while device is reset. Not good. This was reproduced by running modprobe virtio_console modprobe -r virtio_console in a loop. Fix this up by calling virtio_break_device + flush before reset. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1786239 Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c index 0fb3a8e62e62..2140d401523f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c +++ b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c @@ -2001,6 +2001,13 @@ static void virtcons_remove(struct virtio_device *vdev) list_del(&portdev->list); spin_unlock_irq(&pdrvdata_lock); + /* Device is going away, exit any polling for buffers */ + virtio_break_device(vdev); + if (use_multiport(portdev)) + flush_work(&portdev->control_work); + else + flush_work(&portdev->config_work); + /* Disable interrupts for vqs */ vdev->config->reset(vdev); /* Finish up work that's lined up */ From e4ba28fbe9035e79ac5c397c67fcb404aa439ec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheyu Ma Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2022 14:55:04 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 177/908] ethernet: sun: Free the coherent when failing in probing [ Upstream commit bb77bd31c281f70ec77c9c4f584950a779e05cf8 ] When the driver fails to register net device, it should free the DMA region first, and then do other cleanup. Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/sun/sunhme.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/sunhme.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/sunhme.c index 9e983e1d8249..7522f277e912 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/sunhme.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/sunhme.c @@ -3165,7 +3165,7 @@ static int happy_meal_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, if (err) { printk(KERN_ERR "happymeal(PCI): Cannot register net device, " "aborting.\n"); - goto err_out_iounmap; + goto err_out_free_coherent; } pci_set_drvdata(pdev, hp); @@ -3198,6 +3198,10 @@ static int happy_meal_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, return 0; +err_out_free_coherent: + dma_free_coherent(hp->dma_dev, PAGE_SIZE, + hp->happy_block, hp->hblock_dvma); + err_out_iounmap: iounmap(hp->gregs); From fa13ca630e73184cbda684fef7d33e8edc698041 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Biju Das Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 18:48:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 178/908] spi: Fix invalid sgs value [ Upstream commit 1a4e53d2fc4f68aa654ad96d13ad042e1a8e8a7d ] max_seg_size is unsigned int and it can have a value up to 2^32 (for eg:-RZ_DMAC driver sets dma_set_max_seg_size as U32_MAX) When this value is used in min_t() as an integer type, it becomes -1 and the value of sgs becomes 0. Fix this issue by replacing the 'int' data type with 'unsigned int' in min_t(). Signed-off-by: Biju Das Reviewed-by: Lad Prabhakar Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307184843.9994-1-biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/spi/spi.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi.c b/drivers/spi/spi.c index 71f74015efb9..d26aefed16ac 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi.c @@ -774,10 +774,10 @@ static int spi_map_buf(struct spi_controller *ctlr, struct device *dev, int i, ret; if (vmalloced_buf || kmap_buf) { - desc_len = min_t(int, max_seg_size, PAGE_SIZE); + desc_len = min_t(unsigned int, max_seg_size, PAGE_SIZE); sgs = DIV_ROUND_UP(len + offset_in_page(buf), desc_len); } else if (virt_addr_valid(buf)) { - desc_len = min_t(int, max_seg_size, ctlr->max_dma_len); + desc_len = min_t(unsigned int, max_seg_size, ctlr->max_dma_len); sgs = DIV_ROUND_UP(len, desc_len); } else { return -EINVAL; From 7a3d208f349de65e82a913a560edda002d1dc54d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Biju Das Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 17:53:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 179/908] spi: Fix erroneous sgs value with min_t() [ Upstream commit ebc4cb43ea5ada3db46c80156fca58a54b9bbca8 ] While computing sgs in spi_map_buf(), the data type used in min_t() for max_seg_size is 'unsigned int' where as that of ctlr->max_dma_len is 'size_t'. min_t(unsigned int,x,y) gives wrong results if one of x/y is 'size_t' Consider the below examples on a 64-bit machine (ie size_t is 64-bits, and unsigned int is 32-bit). case 1) min_t(unsigned int, 5, 0x100000001); case 2) min_t(size_t, 5, 0x100000001); Case 1 returns '1', where as case 2 returns '5'. As you can see the result from case 1 is wrong. This patch fixes the above issue by using the data type of the parameters that are used in min_t with maximum data length. Fixes: commit 1a4e53d2fc4f68aa ("spi: Fix invalid sgs value") Reported-by: Linus Torvalds Suggested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Biju Das Reviewed-by: Lad Prabhakar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220316175317.465-1-biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/spi/spi.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi.c b/drivers/spi/spi.c index d26aefed16ac..1031c8e38144 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi.c @@ -774,10 +774,10 @@ static int spi_map_buf(struct spi_controller *ctlr, struct device *dev, int i, ret; if (vmalloced_buf || kmap_buf) { - desc_len = min_t(unsigned int, max_seg_size, PAGE_SIZE); + desc_len = min_t(unsigned long, max_seg_size, PAGE_SIZE); sgs = DIV_ROUND_UP(len + offset_in_page(buf), desc_len); } else if (virt_addr_valid(buf)) { - desc_len = min_t(unsigned int, max_seg_size, ctlr->max_dma_len); + desc_len = min_t(size_t, max_seg_size, ctlr->max_dma_len); sgs = DIV_ROUND_UP(len, desc_len); } else { return -EINVAL; From fcdaaeb7eb5d52941ceb2fdcec0e2170c9bf3031 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haimin Zhang Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:20:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 180/908] af_key: add __GFP_ZERO flag for compose_sadb_supported in function pfkey_register [ Upstream commit 9a564bccb78a76740ea9d75a259942df8143d02c ] Add __GFP_ZERO flag for compose_sadb_supported in function pfkey_register to initialize the buffer of supp_skb to fix a kernel-info-leak issue. 1) Function pfkey_register calls compose_sadb_supported to request a sk_buff. 2) compose_sadb_supported calls alloc_sbk to allocate a sk_buff, but it doesn't zero it. 3) If auth_len is greater 0, then compose_sadb_supported treats the memory as a struct sadb_supported and begins to initialize. But it just initializes the field sadb_supported_len and field sadb_supported_exttype without field sadb_supported_reserved. Reported-by: TCS Robot Signed-off-by: Haimin Zhang Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/key/af_key.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index a10336cd7f97..9b3756aa7ca2 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -1709,7 +1709,7 @@ static int pfkey_register(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sad xfrm_probe_algs(); - supp_skb = compose_sadb_supported(hdr, GFP_KERNEL); + supp_skb = compose_sadb_supported(hdr, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!supp_skb) { if (hdr->sadb_msg_satype != SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC) pfk->registered &= ~(1<sadb_msg_satype); From 0ab55e14cf5fd40c39109969c8b04a25870f5d1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 16:30:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 181/908] fuse: fix pipe buffer lifetime for direct_io commit 0c4bcfdecb1ac0967619ee7ff44871d93c08c909 upstream. In FOPEN_DIRECT_IO mode, fuse_file_write_iter() calls fuse_direct_write_iter(), which normally calls fuse_direct_io(), which then imports the write buffer with fuse_get_user_pages(), which uses iov_iter_get_pages() to grab references to userspace pages instead of actually copying memory. On the filesystem device side, these pages can then either be read to userspace (via fuse_dev_read()), or splice()d over into a pipe using fuse_dev_splice_read() as pipe buffers with &nosteal_pipe_buf_ops. This is wrong because after fuse_dev_do_read() unlocks the FUSE request, the userspace filesystem can mark the request as completed, causing write() to return. At that point, the userspace filesystem should no longer have access to the pipe buffer. Fix by copying pages coming from the user address space to new pipe buffers. Reported-by: Jann Horn Fixes: c3021629a0d8 ("fuse: support splice() reading from fuse device") Cc: Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Zach O'Keefe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev.c | 12 +++++++++++- fs/fuse/file.c | 1 + fs/fuse/fuse_i.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c index db7d746633cf..1c98b5b7bead 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c @@ -991,7 +991,17 @@ static int fuse_copy_page(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, struct page **pagep, while (count) { if (cs->write && cs->pipebufs && page) { - return fuse_ref_page(cs, page, offset, count); + /* + * Can't control lifetime of pipe buffers, so always + * copy user pages. + */ + if (cs->req->user_pages) { + err = fuse_copy_fill(cs); + if (err) + return err; + } else { + return fuse_ref_page(cs, page, offset, count); + } } else if (!cs->len) { if (cs->move_pages && page && offset == 0 && count == PAGE_SIZE) { diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c index 5f5da2911cea..a32b2ca3de6f 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/file.c +++ b/fs/fuse/file.c @@ -1325,6 +1325,7 @@ static int fuse_get_user_pages(struct fuse_req *req, struct iov_iter *ii, (PAGE_SIZE - ret) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); } + req->user_pages = true; if (write) req->in.argpages = 1; else diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h index fac1f08dd32e..30fdede2ea64 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h +++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h @@ -312,6 +312,8 @@ struct fuse_req { /** refcount */ refcount_t count; + bool user_pages; + /** Unique ID for the interrupt request */ u64 intr_unique; From 473a66f99cb8173c14138c5a5c69bfad04e8f9ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lino Sanfilippo Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 10:43:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 182/908] tpm: fix reference counting for struct tpm_chip commit 7e0438f83dc769465ee663bb5dcf8cc154940712 upstream. The following sequence of operations results in a refcount warning: 1. Open device /dev/tpmrm. 2. Remove module tpm_tis_spi. 3. Write a TPM command to the file descriptor opened at step 1. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1161 at lib/refcount.c:25 kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: tpm_tis_spi tpm_tis_core tpm mdio_bcm_unimac brcmfmac sha256_generic libsha256 sha256_arm hci_uart btbcm bluetooth cfg80211 vc4 brcmutil ecdh_generic ecc snd_soc_core crc32_arm_ce libaes raspberrypi_hwmon ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bcm2711_thermal snd_pcm snd_timer genet snd phy_generic soundcore [last unloaded: spi_bcm2835] CPU: 3 PID: 1161 Comm: hold_open Not tainted 5.10.0ls-main-dirty #2 Hardware name: BCM2711 [] (unwind_backtrace) from [] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [] (show_stack) from [] (dump_stack+0xc4/0xd8) [] (dump_stack) from [] (__warn+0x104/0x108) [] (__warn) from [] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xb8) [] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [] (kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4) [] (kobject_get) from [] (tpm_try_get_ops+0x14/0x54 [tpm]) [] (tpm_try_get_ops [tpm]) from [] (tpm_common_write+0x38/0x60 [tpm]) [] (tpm_common_write [tpm]) from [] (vfs_write+0xc4/0x3c0) [] (vfs_write) from [] (ksys_write+0x58/0xcc) [] (ksys_write) from [] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x4c) Exception stack(0xc226bfa8 to 0xc226bff0) bfa0: 00000000 000105b4 00000003 beafe664 00000014 00000000 bfc0: 00000000 000105b4 000103f8 00000004 00000000 00000000 b6f9c000 beafe684 bfe0: 0000006c beafe648 0001056c b6eb6944 ---[ end trace d4b8409def9b8b1f ]--- The reason for this warning is the attempt to get the chip->dev reference in tpm_common_write() although the reference counter is already zero. Since commit 8979b02aaf1d ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") the extra reference used to prevent a premature zero counter is never taken, because the required TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag is never set. Fix this by moving the TPM 2 character device handling from tpm_chip_alloc() to tpm_add_char_device() which is called at a later point in time when the flag has been set in case of TPM2. Commit fdc915f7f719 ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm") already introduced function tpm_devs_release() to release the extra reference but did not implement the required put on chip->devs that results in the call of this function. Fix this by putting chip->devs in tpm_chip_unregister(). Finally move the new implementation for the TPM 2 handling into a new function to avoid multiple checks for the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag in the good case and error cases. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fdc915f7f719 ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm") Fixes: 8979b02aaf1d ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") Co-developed-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Lino Sanfilippo Tested-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 46 +++++-------------------- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 ++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 11ec5c2715a9..d91a795ad432 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -134,14 +134,6 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip); } -static void tpm_devs_release(struct device *dev) -{ - struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, devs); - - /* release the master device reference */ - put_device(&chip->dev); -} - /** * tpm_class_shutdown() - prepare the TPM device for loss of power. * @dev: device to which the chip is associated. @@ -205,7 +197,6 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev, chip->dev_num = rc; device_initialize(&chip->dev); - device_initialize(&chip->devs); chip->dev.class = tpm_class; chip->dev.class->shutdown_pre = tpm_class_shutdown; @@ -213,29 +204,12 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev, chip->dev.parent = pdev; chip->dev.groups = chip->groups; - chip->devs.parent = pdev; - chip->devs.class = tpmrm_class; - chip->devs.release = tpm_devs_release; - /* get extra reference on main device to hold on - * behalf of devs. This holds the chip structure - * while cdevs is in use. The corresponding put - * is in the tpm_devs_release (TPM2 only) - */ - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) - get_device(&chip->dev); - if (chip->dev_num == 0) chip->dev.devt = MKDEV(MISC_MAJOR, TPM_MINOR); else chip->dev.devt = MKDEV(MAJOR(tpm_devt), chip->dev_num); - chip->devs.devt = - MKDEV(MAJOR(tpm_devt), chip->dev_num + TPM_NUM_DEVICES); - rc = dev_set_name(&chip->dev, "tpm%d", chip->dev_num); - if (rc) - goto out; - rc = dev_set_name(&chip->devs, "tpmrm%d", chip->dev_num); if (rc) goto out; @@ -243,9 +217,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev, chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL; cdev_init(&chip->cdev, &tpm_fops); - cdev_init(&chip->cdevs, &tpmrm_fops); chip->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE; - chip->cdevs.owner = THIS_MODULE; rc = tpm2_init_space(&chip->work_space, TPM2_SPACE_BUFFER_SIZE); if (rc) { @@ -257,7 +229,6 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev, return chip; out: - put_device(&chip->devs); put_device(&chip->dev); return ERR_PTR(rc); } @@ -306,14 +277,9 @@ static int tpm_add_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip) } if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { - rc = cdev_device_add(&chip->cdevs, &chip->devs); - if (rc) { - dev_err(&chip->devs, - "unable to cdev_device_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n", - dev_name(&chip->devs), MAJOR(chip->devs.devt), - MINOR(chip->devs.devt), rc); - return rc; - } + rc = tpm_devs_add(chip); + if (rc) + goto err_del_cdev; } /* Make the chip available. */ @@ -321,6 +287,10 @@ static int tpm_add_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip) idr_replace(&dev_nums_idr, chip, chip->dev_num); mutex_unlock(&idr_lock); + return 0; + +err_del_cdev: + cdev_device_del(&chip->cdev, &chip->dev); return rc; } @@ -449,7 +419,7 @@ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip); tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip); if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) - cdev_device_del(&chip->cdevs, &chip->devs); + tpm_devs_remove(chip); tpm_del_char_device(chip); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_unregister); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 019fe80fedd8..7436da043040 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -593,4 +593,6 @@ int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc, u8 *cmd); int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc, u8 *buf, size_t *bufsiz); +int tpm_devs_add(struct tpm_chip *chip); +void tpm_devs_remove(struct tpm_chip *chip); #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c index c7763a96cbaf..8e42bc096e83 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c @@ -540,3 +540,68 @@ int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, return 0; } + +/* + * Put the reference to the main device. + */ +static void tpm_devs_release(struct device *dev) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, devs); + + /* release the master device reference */ + put_device(&chip->dev); +} + +/* + * Remove the device file for exposed TPM spaces and release the device + * reference. This may also release the reference to the master device. + */ +void tpm_devs_remove(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + cdev_device_del(&chip->cdevs, &chip->devs); + put_device(&chip->devs); +} + +/* + * Add a device file to expose TPM spaces. Also take a reference to the + * main device. + */ +int tpm_devs_add(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + int rc; + + device_initialize(&chip->devs); + chip->devs.parent = chip->dev.parent; + chip->devs.class = tpmrm_class; + + /* + * Get extra reference on main device to hold on behalf of devs. + * This holds the chip structure while cdevs is in use. The + * corresponding put is in the tpm_devs_release. + */ + get_device(&chip->dev); + chip->devs.release = tpm_devs_release; + chip->devs.devt = MKDEV(MAJOR(tpm_devt), chip->dev_num + TPM_NUM_DEVICES); + cdev_init(&chip->cdevs, &tpmrm_fops); + chip->cdevs.owner = THIS_MODULE; + + rc = dev_set_name(&chip->devs, "tpmrm%d", chip->dev_num); + if (rc) + goto err_put_devs; + + rc = cdev_device_add(&chip->cdevs, &chip->devs); + if (rc) { + dev_err(&chip->devs, + "unable to cdev_device_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n", + dev_name(&chip->devs), MAJOR(chip->devs.devt), + MINOR(chip->devs.devt), rc); + goto err_put_devs; + } + + return 0; + +err_put_devs: + put_device(&chip->devs); + + return rc; +} From cb55a760a24b1458e856141c43922e88bd1fbcd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xie Yongji Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 22:40:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 183/908] block: Add a helper to validate the block size commit 570b1cac477643cbf01a45fa5d018430a1fddbce upstream. There are some duplicated codes to validate the block size in block drivers. This limitation actually comes from block layer, so this patch tries to add a new block layer helper for that. Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026144015.188-2-xieyongji@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Lee Jones Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/blkdev.h | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/blkdev.h b/include/linux/blkdev.h index 1c3d774d3c83..afbe2fcc476a 100644 --- a/include/linux/blkdev.h +++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h @@ -56,6 +56,14 @@ struct blk_stat_callback; */ #define BLKCG_MAX_POLS 3 +static inline int blk_validate_block_size(unsigned int bsize) +{ + if (bsize < 512 || bsize > PAGE_SIZE || !is_power_of_2(bsize)) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + typedef void (rq_end_io_fn)(struct request *, blk_status_t); #define BLK_RL_SYNCFULL (1U << 0) From 87dbe0322c6f7831df351d341489d58c29ef32a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xie Yongji Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 22:40:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 184/908] virtio-blk: Use blk_validate_block_size() to validate block size commit 57a13a5b8157d9a8606490aaa1b805bafe6c37e1 upstream. The block layer can't support a block size larger than page size yet. And a block size that's too small or not a power of two won't work either. If a misconfigured device presents an invalid block size in configuration space, it will result in the kernel crash something like below: [ 506.154324] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 506.160416] RIP: 0010:create_empty_buffers+0x24/0x100 [ 506.174302] Call Trace: [ 506.174651] create_page_buffers+0x4d/0x60 [ 506.175207] block_read_full_page+0x50/0x380 [ 506.175798] ? __mod_lruvec_page_state+0x60/0xa0 [ 506.176412] ? __add_to_page_cache_locked+0x1b2/0x390 [ 506.177085] ? blkdev_direct_IO+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 506.177644] ? scan_shadow_nodes+0x30/0x30 [ 506.178206] ? lru_cache_add+0x42/0x60 [ 506.178716] do_read_cache_page+0x695/0x740 [ 506.179278] ? read_part_sector+0xe0/0xe0 [ 506.179821] read_part_sector+0x36/0xe0 [ 506.180337] adfspart_check_ICS+0x32/0x320 [ 506.180890] ? snprintf+0x45/0x70 [ 506.181350] ? read_part_sector+0xe0/0xe0 [ 506.181906] bdev_disk_changed+0x229/0x5c0 [ 506.182483] blkdev_get_whole+0x6d/0x90 [ 506.183013] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x122/0x2d0 [ 506.183562] device_add_disk+0x39e/0x3c0 [ 506.184472] virtblk_probe+0x3f8/0x79b [virtio_blk] [ 506.185461] virtio_dev_probe+0x15e/0x1d0 [virtio] So let's use a block layer helper to validate the block size. Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026144015.188-5-xieyongji@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Lee Jones Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c index 437d43747c6d..7e8f58c2f65b 100644 --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c @@ -822,9 +822,17 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE, struct virtio_blk_config, blk_size, &blk_size); - if (!err) + if (!err) { + err = blk_validate_block_size(blk_size); + if (err) { + dev_err(&vdev->dev, + "virtio_blk: invalid block size: 0x%x\n", + blk_size); + goto out_free_tags; + } + blk_queue_logical_block_size(q, blk_size); - else + } else blk_size = queue_logical_block_size(q); /* Use topology information if available */ From afed7e5f7e1b84995598f0bf71e99408c3d1194e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Stern Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 16:39:10 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 185/908] USB: usb-storage: Fix use of bitfields for hardware data in ene_ub6250.c commit 1892bf90677abcad7f06e897e308f5c3e3618dd4 upstream. The kernel test robot found a problem with the ene_ub6250 subdriver in usb-storage: It uses structures containing bitfields to represent hardware bits in its SD_STATUS, MS_STATUS, and SM_STATUS bytes. This is not safe; it presumes a particular bit ordering and it assumes the compiler will not insert padding, neither of which is guaranteed. This patch fixes the problem by changing the structures to simple u8 values, with the bitfields replaced by bitmask constants. CC: Signed-off-by: Alan Stern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YjOcbuU106UpJ/V8@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c | 155 +++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c b/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c index 28100374f7bd..79f77179fd9b 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c +++ b/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c @@ -251,36 +251,33 @@ static struct us_unusual_dev ene_ub6250_unusual_dev_list[] = { #define memstick_logaddr(logadr1, logadr0) ((((u16)(logadr1)) << 8) | (logadr0)) -struct SD_STATUS { - u8 Insert:1; - u8 Ready:1; - u8 MediaChange:1; - u8 IsMMC:1; - u8 HiCapacity:1; - u8 HiSpeed:1; - u8 WtP:1; - u8 Reserved:1; -}; - -struct MS_STATUS { - u8 Insert:1; - u8 Ready:1; - u8 MediaChange:1; - u8 IsMSPro:1; - u8 IsMSPHG:1; - u8 Reserved1:1; - u8 WtP:1; - u8 Reserved2:1; -}; - -struct SM_STATUS { - u8 Insert:1; - u8 Ready:1; - u8 MediaChange:1; - u8 Reserved:3; - u8 WtP:1; - u8 IsMS:1; -}; +/* SD_STATUS bits */ +#define SD_Insert BIT(0) +#define SD_Ready BIT(1) +#define SD_MediaChange BIT(2) +#define SD_IsMMC BIT(3) +#define SD_HiCapacity BIT(4) +#define SD_HiSpeed BIT(5) +#define SD_WtP BIT(6) + /* Bit 7 reserved */ + +/* MS_STATUS bits */ +#define MS_Insert BIT(0) +#define MS_Ready BIT(1) +#define MS_MediaChange BIT(2) +#define MS_IsMSPro BIT(3) +#define MS_IsMSPHG BIT(4) + /* Bit 5 reserved */ +#define MS_WtP BIT(6) + /* Bit 7 reserved */ + +/* SM_STATUS bits */ +#define SM_Insert BIT(0) +#define SM_Ready BIT(1) +#define SM_MediaChange BIT(2) + /* Bits 3-5 reserved */ +#define SM_WtP BIT(6) +#define SM_IsMS BIT(7) struct ms_bootblock_cis { u8 bCistplDEVICE[6]; /* 0 */ @@ -451,9 +448,9 @@ struct ene_ub6250_info { u8 *bbuf; /* for 6250 code */ - struct SD_STATUS SD_Status; - struct MS_STATUS MS_Status; - struct SM_STATUS SM_Status; + u8 SD_Status; + u8 MS_Status; + u8 SM_Status; /* ----- SD Control Data ---------------- */ /*SD_REGISTER SD_Regs; */ @@ -616,7 +613,7 @@ static int sd_scsi_test_unit_ready(struct us_data *us, struct scsi_cmnd *srb) { struct ene_ub6250_info *info = (struct ene_ub6250_info *) us->extra; - if (info->SD_Status.Insert && info->SD_Status.Ready) + if ((info->SD_Status & SD_Insert) && (info->SD_Status & SD_Ready)) return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_GOOD; else { ene_sd_init(us); @@ -636,7 +633,7 @@ static int sd_scsi_mode_sense(struct us_data *us, struct scsi_cmnd *srb) 0x0b, 0x00, 0x80, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x71, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00 }; - if (info->SD_Status.WtP) + if (info->SD_Status & SD_WtP) usb_stor_set_xfer_buf(mediaWP, 12, srb); else usb_stor_set_xfer_buf(mediaNoWP, 12, srb); @@ -655,9 +652,9 @@ static int sd_scsi_read_capacity(struct us_data *us, struct scsi_cmnd *srb) struct ene_ub6250_info *info = (struct ene_ub6250_info *) us->extra; usb_stor_dbg(us, "sd_scsi_read_capacity\n"); - if (info->SD_Status.HiCapacity) { + if (info->SD_Status & SD_HiCapacity) { bl_len = 0x200; - if (info->SD_Status.IsMMC) + if (info->SD_Status & SD_IsMMC) bl_num = info->HC_C_SIZE-1; else bl_num = (info->HC_C_SIZE + 1) * 1024 - 1; @@ -707,7 +704,7 @@ static int sd_scsi_read(struct us_data *us, struct scsi_cmnd *srb) return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; } - if (info->SD_Status.HiCapacity) + if (info->SD_Status & SD_HiCapacity) bnByte = bn; /* set up the command wrapper */ @@ -747,7 +744,7 @@ static int sd_scsi_write(struct us_data *us, struct scsi_cmnd *srb) return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; } - if (info->SD_Status.HiCapacity) + if (info->SD_Status & SD_HiCapacity) bnByte = bn; /* set up the command wrapper */ @@ -1461,7 +1458,7 @@ static int ms_scsi_test_unit_ready(struct us_data *us, struct scsi_cmnd *srb) struct ene_ub6250_info *info = (struct ene_ub6250_info *)(us->extra); /* pr_info("MS_SCSI_Test_Unit_Ready\n"); */ - if (info->MS_Status.Insert && info->MS_Status.Ready) { + if ((info->MS_Status & MS_Insert) && (info->MS_Status & MS_Ready)) { return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_GOOD; } else { ene_ms_init(us); @@ -1481,7 +1478,7 @@ static int ms_scsi_mode_sense(struct us_data *us, struct scsi_cmnd *srb) 0x0b, 0x00, 0x80, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x71, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00 }; - if (info->MS_Status.WtP) + if (info->MS_Status & MS_WtP) usb_stor_set_xfer_buf(mediaWP, 12, srb); else usb_stor_set_xfer_buf(mediaNoWP, 12, srb); @@ -1500,7 +1497,7 @@ static int ms_scsi_read_capacity(struct us_data *us, struct scsi_cmnd *srb) usb_stor_dbg(us, "ms_scsi_read_capacity\n"); bl_len = 0x200; - if (info->MS_Status.IsMSPro) + if (info->MS_Status & MS_IsMSPro) bl_num = info->MSP_TotalBlock - 1; else bl_num = info->MS_Lib.NumberOfLogBlock * info->MS_Lib.blockSize * 2 - 1; @@ -1655,7 +1652,7 @@ static int ms_scsi_read(struct us_data *us, struct scsi_cmnd *srb) if (bn > info->bl_num) return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; - if (info->MS_Status.IsMSPro) { + if (info->MS_Status & MS_IsMSPro) { result = ene_load_bincode(us, MSP_RW_PATTERN); if (result != USB_STOR_XFER_GOOD) { usb_stor_dbg(us, "Load MPS RW pattern Fail !!\n"); @@ -1756,7 +1753,7 @@ static int ms_scsi_write(struct us_data *us, struct scsi_cmnd *srb) if (bn > info->bl_num) return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; - if (info->MS_Status.IsMSPro) { + if (info->MS_Status & MS_IsMSPro) { result = ene_load_bincode(us, MSP_RW_PATTERN); if (result != USB_STOR_XFER_GOOD) { pr_info("Load MSP RW pattern Fail !!\n"); @@ -1864,12 +1861,12 @@ static int ene_get_card_status(struct us_data *us, u8 *buf) tmpreg = (u16) reg4b; reg4b = *(u32 *)(&buf[0x14]); - if (info->SD_Status.HiCapacity && !info->SD_Status.IsMMC) + if ((info->SD_Status & SD_HiCapacity) && !(info->SD_Status & SD_IsMMC)) info->HC_C_SIZE = (reg4b >> 8) & 0x3fffff; info->SD_C_SIZE = ((tmpreg & 0x03) << 10) | (u16)(reg4b >> 22); info->SD_C_SIZE_MULT = (u8)(reg4b >> 7) & 0x07; - if (info->SD_Status.HiCapacity && info->SD_Status.IsMMC) + if ((info->SD_Status & SD_HiCapacity) && (info->SD_Status & SD_IsMMC)) info->HC_C_SIZE = *(u32 *)(&buf[0x100]); if (info->SD_READ_BL_LEN > SD_BLOCK_LEN) { @@ -2081,6 +2078,7 @@ static int ene_ms_init(struct us_data *us) u16 MSP_BlockSize, MSP_UserAreaBlocks; struct ene_ub6250_info *info = (struct ene_ub6250_info *) us->extra; u8 *bbuf = info->bbuf; + unsigned int s; printk(KERN_INFO "transport --- ENE_MSInit\n"); @@ -2105,15 +2103,16 @@ static int ene_ms_init(struct us_data *us) return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; } /* the same part to test ENE */ - info->MS_Status = *(struct MS_STATUS *) bbuf; - - if (info->MS_Status.Insert && info->MS_Status.Ready) { - printk(KERN_INFO "Insert = %x\n", info->MS_Status.Insert); - printk(KERN_INFO "Ready = %x\n", info->MS_Status.Ready); - printk(KERN_INFO "IsMSPro = %x\n", info->MS_Status.IsMSPro); - printk(KERN_INFO "IsMSPHG = %x\n", info->MS_Status.IsMSPHG); - printk(KERN_INFO "WtP= %x\n", info->MS_Status.WtP); - if (info->MS_Status.IsMSPro) { + info->MS_Status = bbuf[0]; + + s = info->MS_Status; + if ((s & MS_Insert) && (s & MS_Ready)) { + printk(KERN_INFO "Insert = %x\n", !!(s & MS_Insert)); + printk(KERN_INFO "Ready = %x\n", !!(s & MS_Ready)); + printk(KERN_INFO "IsMSPro = %x\n", !!(s & MS_IsMSPro)); + printk(KERN_INFO "IsMSPHG = %x\n", !!(s & MS_IsMSPHG)); + printk(KERN_INFO "WtP= %x\n", !!(s & MS_WtP)); + if (s & MS_IsMSPro) { MSP_BlockSize = (bbuf[6] << 8) | bbuf[7]; MSP_UserAreaBlocks = (bbuf[10] << 8) | bbuf[11]; info->MSP_TotalBlock = MSP_BlockSize * MSP_UserAreaBlocks; @@ -2174,17 +2173,17 @@ static int ene_sd_init(struct us_data *us) return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; } - info->SD_Status = *(struct SD_STATUS *) bbuf; - if (info->SD_Status.Insert && info->SD_Status.Ready) { - struct SD_STATUS *s = &info->SD_Status; + info->SD_Status = bbuf[0]; + if ((info->SD_Status & SD_Insert) && (info->SD_Status & SD_Ready)) { + unsigned int s = info->SD_Status; ene_get_card_status(us, bbuf); - usb_stor_dbg(us, "Insert = %x\n", s->Insert); - usb_stor_dbg(us, "Ready = %x\n", s->Ready); - usb_stor_dbg(us, "IsMMC = %x\n", s->IsMMC); - usb_stor_dbg(us, "HiCapacity = %x\n", s->HiCapacity); - usb_stor_dbg(us, "HiSpeed = %x\n", s->HiSpeed); - usb_stor_dbg(us, "WtP = %x\n", s->WtP); + usb_stor_dbg(us, "Insert = %x\n", !!(s & SD_Insert)); + usb_stor_dbg(us, "Ready = %x\n", !!(s & SD_Ready)); + usb_stor_dbg(us, "IsMMC = %x\n", !!(s & SD_IsMMC)); + usb_stor_dbg(us, "HiCapacity = %x\n", !!(s & SD_HiCapacity)); + usb_stor_dbg(us, "HiSpeed = %x\n", !!(s & SD_HiSpeed)); + usb_stor_dbg(us, "WtP = %x\n", !!(s & SD_WtP)); } else { usb_stor_dbg(us, "SD Card Not Ready --- %x\n", bbuf[0]); return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; @@ -2206,14 +2205,14 @@ static int ene_init(struct us_data *us) misc_reg03 = bbuf[0]; if (misc_reg03 & 0x01) { - if (!info->SD_Status.Ready) { + if (!(info->SD_Status & SD_Ready)) { result = ene_sd_init(us); if (result != USB_STOR_XFER_GOOD) return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; } } if (misc_reg03 & 0x02) { - if (!info->MS_Status.Ready) { + if (!(info->MS_Status & MS_Ready)) { result = ene_ms_init(us); if (result != USB_STOR_XFER_GOOD) return USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; @@ -2312,14 +2311,14 @@ static int ene_transport(struct scsi_cmnd *srb, struct us_data *us) /*US_DEBUG(usb_stor_show_command(us, srb)); */ scsi_set_resid(srb, 0); - if (unlikely(!(info->SD_Status.Ready || info->MS_Status.Ready))) + if (unlikely(!(info->SD_Status & SD_Ready) || (info->MS_Status & MS_Ready))) result = ene_init(us); if (result == USB_STOR_XFER_GOOD) { result = USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; - if (info->SD_Status.Ready) + if (info->SD_Status & SD_Ready) result = sd_scsi_irp(us, srb); - if (info->MS_Status.Ready) + if (info->MS_Status & MS_Ready) result = ms_scsi_irp(us, srb); } return result; @@ -2383,7 +2382,6 @@ static int ene_ub6250_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, static int ene_ub6250_resume(struct usb_interface *iface) { - u8 tmp = 0; struct us_data *us = usb_get_intfdata(iface); struct ene_ub6250_info *info = (struct ene_ub6250_info *)(us->extra); @@ -2395,17 +2393,16 @@ static int ene_ub6250_resume(struct usb_interface *iface) mutex_unlock(&us->dev_mutex); info->Power_IsResum = true; - /*info->SD_Status.Ready = 0; */ - info->SD_Status = *(struct SD_STATUS *)&tmp; - info->MS_Status = *(struct MS_STATUS *)&tmp; - info->SM_Status = *(struct SM_STATUS *)&tmp; + /* info->SD_Status &= ~SD_Ready; */ + info->SD_Status = 0; + info->MS_Status = 0; + info->SM_Status = 0; return 0; } static int ene_ub6250_reset_resume(struct usb_interface *iface) { - u8 tmp = 0; struct us_data *us = usb_get_intfdata(iface); struct ene_ub6250_info *info = (struct ene_ub6250_info *)(us->extra); @@ -2417,10 +2414,10 @@ static int ene_ub6250_reset_resume(struct usb_interface *iface) * the device */ info->Power_IsResum = true; - /*info->SD_Status.Ready = 0; */ - info->SD_Status = *(struct SD_STATUS *)&tmp; - info->MS_Status = *(struct MS_STATUS *)&tmp; - info->SM_Status = *(struct SM_STATUS *)&tmp; + /* info->SD_Status &= ~SD_Ready; */ + info->SD_Status = 0; + info->MS_Status = 0; + info->SM_Status = 0; return 0; } From 0ee84d706cd363eafd43ef4cdc15c642ab44df36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Clark Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 11:30:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 186/908] coresight: Fix TRCCONFIGR.QE sysfs interface commit ea75a342aed5ed72c87f38fbe0df2f5df7eae374 upstream. It's impossible to program a valid value for TRCCONFIGR.QE when TRCIDR0.QSUPP==0b10. In that case the following is true: Q element support is implemented, and only supports Q elements without instruction counts. TRCCONFIGR.QE can only take the values 0b00 or 0b11. Currently the low bit of QSUPP is checked to see if the low bit of QE can be written to, but as you can see when QSUPP==0b10 the low bit is cleared making it impossible to ever write the only valid value of 0b11 to QE. 0b10 would be written instead, which is a reserved QE value even for all values of QSUPP. The fix is to allow writing the low bit of QE for any non zero value of QSUPP. This change also ensures that the low bit is always set, even when the user attempts to only set the high bit. Signed-off-by: James Clark Reviewed-by: Mike Leach Fixes: d8c66962084f ("coresight-etm4x: Controls pertaining to the reset, mode, pe and events") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220120113047.2839622-2-james.clark@arm.com Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-sysfs.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-sysfs.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-sysfs.c index 2f021c1a2fa6..c51447344393 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-sysfs.c @@ -379,8 +379,12 @@ static ssize_t mode_store(struct device *dev, mode = ETM_MODE_QELEM(config->mode); /* start by clearing QE bits */ config->cfg &= ~(BIT(13) | BIT(14)); - /* if supported, Q elements with instruction counts are enabled */ - if ((mode & BIT(0)) && (drvdata->q_support & BIT(0))) + /* + * if supported, Q elements with instruction counts are enabled. + * Always set the low bit for any requested mode. Valid combos are + * 0b00, 0b01 and 0b11. + */ + if (mode && drvdata->q_support) config->cfg |= BIT(13); /* * if supported, Q elements with and without instruction From bfa6a051e70db3031ab1bbb32249517d096d2cc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liam Beguin Date: Sat, 8 Jan 2022 15:53:04 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 187/908] iio: inkern: apply consumer scale on IIO_VAL_INT cases commit 1bca97ff95c732a516ebb68da72814194980e0a5 upstream. When a consumer calls iio_read_channel_processed() and the channel has an integer scale, the scale channel scale is applied and the processed value is returned as expected. On the other hand, if the consumer calls iio_convert_raw_to_processed() the scaling factor requested by the consumer is not applied. This for example causes the consumer to process mV when expecting uV. Make sure to always apply the scaling factor requested by the consumer. Fixes: 48e44ce0f881 ("iio:inkern: Add function to read the processed value") Signed-off-by: Liam Beguin Reviewed-by: Peter Rosin Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220108205319.2046348-2-liambeguin@gmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/inkern.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/inkern.c b/drivers/iio/inkern.c index 069defcc6d9b..04221c42ff69 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/inkern.c +++ b/drivers/iio/inkern.c @@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ static int iio_convert_raw_to_processed_unlocked(struct iio_channel *chan, switch (scale_type) { case IIO_VAL_INT: - *processed = raw64 * scale_val; + *processed = raw64 * scale_val * scale; break; case IIO_VAL_INT_PLUS_MICRO: if (scale_val2 < 0) From 40e7d18871f3237bce2e49e56ce7e59a9f2d0c65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liam Beguin Date: Sat, 8 Jan 2022 15:53:05 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 188/908] iio: inkern: apply consumer scale when no channel scale is available commit 14b457fdde38de594a4bc4bd9075019319d978da upstream. When a consumer calls iio_read_channel_processed() and no channel scale is available, it's assumed that the scale is one and the raw value is returned as expected. On the other hand, if the consumer calls iio_convert_raw_to_processed() the scaling factor requested by the consumer is not applied. This for example causes the consumer to process mV when expecting uV. Make sure to always apply the scaling factor requested by the consumer. Fixes: adc8ec5ff183 ("iio: inkern: pass through raw values if no scaling") Signed-off-by: Liam Beguin Reviewed-by: Peter Rosin Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220108205319.2046348-3-liambeguin@gmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/inkern.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/inkern.c b/drivers/iio/inkern.c index 04221c42ff69..d6368a1901c4 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/inkern.c +++ b/drivers/iio/inkern.c @@ -603,10 +603,10 @@ static int iio_convert_raw_to_processed_unlocked(struct iio_channel *chan, IIO_CHAN_INFO_SCALE); if (scale_type < 0) { /* - * Just pass raw values as processed if no scaling is - * available. + * If no channel scaling is available apply consumer scale to + * raw value and return. */ - *processed = raw; + *processed = raw * scale; return 0; } From 969a2985a1084add885d6d693d61d3af6e12edc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liam Beguin Date: Sat, 8 Jan 2022 15:53:06 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 189/908] iio: inkern: make a best effort on offset calculation commit ca85123354e1a65a22170286387b4791997fe864 upstream. iio_convert_raw_to_processed_unlocked() assumes the offset is an integer. Make a best effort to get a valid offset value for fractional cases without breaking implicit truncations. Fixes: 48e44ce0f881 ("iio:inkern: Add function to read the processed value") Signed-off-by: Liam Beguin Reviewed-by: Peter Rosin Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220108205319.2046348-4-liambeguin@gmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/inkern.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/inkern.c b/drivers/iio/inkern.c index d6368a1901c4..f12bad60a581 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/inkern.c +++ b/drivers/iio/inkern.c @@ -591,13 +591,35 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iio_read_channel_average_raw); static int iio_convert_raw_to_processed_unlocked(struct iio_channel *chan, int raw, int *processed, unsigned int scale) { - int scale_type, scale_val, scale_val2, offset; + int scale_type, scale_val, scale_val2; + int offset_type, offset_val, offset_val2; s64 raw64 = raw; - int ret; - ret = iio_channel_read(chan, &offset, NULL, IIO_CHAN_INFO_OFFSET); - if (ret >= 0) - raw64 += offset; + offset_type = iio_channel_read(chan, &offset_val, &offset_val2, + IIO_CHAN_INFO_OFFSET); + if (offset_type >= 0) { + switch (offset_type) { + case IIO_VAL_INT: + break; + case IIO_VAL_INT_PLUS_MICRO: + case IIO_VAL_INT_PLUS_NANO: + /* + * Both IIO_VAL_INT_PLUS_MICRO and IIO_VAL_INT_PLUS_NANO + * implicitely truncate the offset to it's integer form. + */ + break; + case IIO_VAL_FRACTIONAL: + offset_val /= offset_val2; + break; + case IIO_VAL_FRACTIONAL_LOG2: + offset_val >>= offset_val2; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + raw64 += offset_val; + } scale_type = iio_channel_read(chan, &scale_val, &scale_val2, IIO_CHAN_INFO_SCALE); From c2fbfa0769bb847501291a6415383a82f7380522 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kunihiko Hayashi Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 15:55:18 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 190/908] clk: uniphier: Fix fixed-rate initialization commit ca85a66710a8a1f6b0719397225c3e9ee0abb692 upstream. Fixed-rate clocks in UniPhier don't have any parent clocks, however, initial data "init.flags" isn't initialized, so it might be determined that there is a parent clock for fixed-rate clock. This sets init.flags to zero as initialization. Cc: Fixes: 734d82f4a678 ("clk: uniphier: add core support code for UniPhier clock driver") Signed-off-by: Kunihiko Hayashi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1646808918-30899-1-git-send-email-hayashi.kunihiko@socionext.com Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/clk/uniphier/clk-uniphier-fixed-rate.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/clk/uniphier/clk-uniphier-fixed-rate.c b/drivers/clk/uniphier/clk-uniphier-fixed-rate.c index 0ad0d46173c0..225de2302cb7 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/uniphier/clk-uniphier-fixed-rate.c +++ b/drivers/clk/uniphier/clk-uniphier-fixed-rate.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ struct clk_hw *uniphier_clk_register_fixed_rate(struct device *dev, init.name = name; init.ops = &clk_fixed_rate_ops; + init.flags = 0; init.parent_names = NULL; init.num_parents = 0; From f1442ed84c43610ca8ab77deb9ca991e7354746c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2022 02:08:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 191/908] ptrace: Check PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP permission on PTRACE_SEIZE commit ee1fee900537b5d9560e9f937402de5ddc8412f3 upstream. Setting PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is supposed to be a highly privileged operation because it allows the tracee to completely bypass all seccomp filters on kernels with CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y. It is only supposed to be settable by a process with global CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and only if that process is not subject to any seccomp filters at all. However, while these permission checks were done on the PTRACE_SETOPTIONS path, they were missing on the PTRACE_SEIZE path, which also sets user-specified ptrace flags. Move the permissions checks out into a helper function and let both ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() call it. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 13c4a90119d2 ("seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220319010838.1386861-1-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/ptrace.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index b28f3c66c6fe..cf03de0a7cc6 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -370,6 +370,26 @@ bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) return !err; } +static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data) +{ + if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + + if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) { + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (seccomp_mode(¤t->seccomp) != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED || + current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP) + return -EPERM; + } + return 0; +} + static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags) @@ -381,8 +401,16 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, if (seize) { if (addr != 0) goto out; + /* + * This duplicates the check in check_ptrace_options() because + * ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() have historically + * used different error codes for unknown ptrace options. + */ if (flags & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK) goto out; + retval = check_ptrace_options(flags); + if (retval) + return retval; flags = PT_PTRACED | PT_SEIZED | (flags << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT); } else { flags = PT_PTRACED; @@ -655,22 +683,11 @@ int ptrace_writedata(struct task_struct *tsk, char __user *src, unsigned long ds static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long data) { unsigned flags; + int ret; - if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK) - return -EINVAL; - - if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) { - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || - !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP)) - return -EINVAL; - - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - - if (seccomp_mode(¤t->seccomp) != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED || - current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP) - return -EPERM; - } + ret = check_ptrace_options(data); + if (ret) + return ret; /* Avoid intermediate state when all opts are cleared */ flags = child->ptrace; From baa81082167dda509ec5ece53e9cd697f841af11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bagas Sanjaya Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 18:33:28 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 192/908] Documentation: add link to stable release candidate tree commit 587d39b260c4d090166314d64be70b1f6a26b0b5 upstream. There is also stable release candidate tree. Mention it, however with a warning that the tree is for testing purposes. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Sasha Levin Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314113329.485372-5-bagasdotme@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst b/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst index 36a2dded525b..54fbc64adb06 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst @@ -173,6 +173,15 @@ Trees https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git + - The release candidate of all stable kernel versions can be found at: + + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git/ + + .. warning:: + The -stable-rc tree is a snapshot in time of the stable-queue tree and + will change frequently, hence will be rebased often. It should only be + used for testing purposes (e.g. to be consumed by CI systems). + Review committee ---------------- From 2b54b8a6d704d398c2b2c4179fbe32a149109181 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bagas Sanjaya Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 18:33:29 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 193/908] Documentation: update stable tree link commit 555d44932c67e617d89bc13c81c7efac5b51fcfa upstream. The link to stable tree is redirected to https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git. Update accordingly. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Sasha Levin Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314113329.485372-6-bagasdotme@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst b/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst index 54fbc64adb06..09a269fb8aa2 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ Trees - The finalized and tagged releases of all stable kernels can be found in separate branches per version at: - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git - The release candidate of all stable kernel versions can be found at: From dd7d3a609aac160bf3cbce5a4bc52358da346d10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: NeilBrown Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 13:42:17 +1100 Subject: [PATCH 194/908] SUNRPC: avoid race between mod_timer() and del_timer_sync() commit 3848e96edf4788f772d83990022fa7023a233d83 upstream. xprt_destory() claims XPRT_LOCKED and then calls del_timer_sync(). Both xprt_unlock_connect() and xprt_release() call ->release_xprt() which drops XPRT_LOCKED and *then* xprt_schedule_autodisconnect() which calls mod_timer(). This may result in mod_timer() being called *after* del_timer_sync(). When this happens, the timer may fire long after the xprt has been freed, and run_timer_softirq() will probably crash. The pairing of ->release_xprt() and xprt_schedule_autodisconnect() is always called under ->transport_lock. So if we take ->transport_lock to call del_timer_sync(), we can be sure that mod_timer() will run first (if it runs at all). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NeilBrown Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sunrpc/xprt.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprt.c b/net/sunrpc/xprt.c index 7b1213be3e81..e7d55d63d4f1 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprt.c @@ -1520,7 +1520,14 @@ static void xprt_destroy(struct rpc_xprt *xprt) */ wait_on_bit_lock(&xprt->state, XPRT_LOCKED, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); + /* + * xprt_schedule_autodisconnect() can run after XPRT_LOCKED + * is cleared. We use ->transport_lock to ensure the mod_timer() + * can only run *before* del_time_sync(), never after. + */ + spin_lock(&xprt->transport_lock); del_timer_sync(&xprt->timer); + spin_unlock(&xprt->transport_lock); /* * Destroy sockets etc from the system workqueue so they can From 438068f4912183a59fcb6b7496a06437f7fd4e2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 13:30:09 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 195/908] NFSD: prevent underflow in nfssvc_decode_writeargs() commit 184416d4b98509fb4c3d8fc3d6dc1437896cc159 upstream. Smatch complains: fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c:341 nfssvc_decode_writeargs() warn: no lower bound on 'args->len' Change the type to unsigned to prevent this issue. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c | 2 +- fs/nfsd/xdr.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c index fc6282181a1f..65d1aae9bfde 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ nfsd_proc_write(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) __be32 nfserr; unsigned long cnt = argp->len; - dprintk("nfsd: WRITE %s %d bytes at %d\n", + dprintk("nfsd: WRITE %s %u bytes at %d\n", SVCFH_fmt(&argp->fh), argp->len, argp->offset); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/xdr.h b/fs/nfsd/xdr.h index 2f4f22e6b8cb..046454a62156 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/xdr.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/xdr.h @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct nfsd_readargs { struct nfsd_writeargs { svc_fh fh; __u32 offset; - int len; + __u32 len; int vlen; }; From e4bc03a96374556962a3ba560ca5c9f8c99a72c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 21:13:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 196/908] pinctrl: samsung: drop pin banks references on error paths commit 50ebd19e3585b9792e994cfa8cbee8947fe06371 upstream. The driver iterates over its devicetree children with for_each_child_of_node() and stores for later found node pointer. This has to be put in error paths to avoid leak during re-probing. Fixes: ab663789d697 ("pinctrl: samsung: Match pin banks with their device nodes") Cc: Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Reviewed-by: Sam Protsenko Reviewed-by: Chanho Park Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220111201426.326777-2-krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pinctrl/samsung/pinctrl-samsung.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/samsung/pinctrl-samsung.c b/drivers/pinctrl/samsung/pinctrl-samsung.c index ab04d4c4941d..eecc024a96a5 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/samsung/pinctrl-samsung.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/samsung/pinctrl-samsung.c @@ -975,6 +975,16 @@ samsung_pinctrl_get_soc_data_for_of_alias(struct platform_device *pdev) return &(of_data->ctrl[id]); } +static void samsung_banks_of_node_put(struct samsung_pinctrl_drv_data *d) +{ + struct samsung_pin_bank *bank; + unsigned int i; + + bank = d->pin_banks; + for (i = 0; i < d->nr_banks; ++i, ++bank) + of_node_put(bank->of_node); +} + /* retrieve the soc specific data */ static const struct samsung_pin_ctrl * samsung_pinctrl_get_soc_data(struct samsung_pinctrl_drv_data *d, @@ -1089,19 +1099,19 @@ static int samsung_pinctrl_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (ctrl->retention_data) { drvdata->retention_ctrl = ctrl->retention_data->init(drvdata, ctrl->retention_data); - if (IS_ERR(drvdata->retention_ctrl)) - return PTR_ERR(drvdata->retention_ctrl); + if (IS_ERR(drvdata->retention_ctrl)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(drvdata->retention_ctrl); + goto err_put_banks; + } } ret = samsung_pinctrl_register(pdev, drvdata); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_put_banks; ret = samsung_gpiolib_register(pdev, drvdata); - if (ret) { - samsung_pinctrl_unregister(pdev, drvdata); - return ret; - } + if (ret) + goto err_unregister; if (ctrl->eint_gpio_init) ctrl->eint_gpio_init(drvdata); @@ -1111,6 +1121,12 @@ static int samsung_pinctrl_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) platform_set_drvdata(pdev, drvdata); return 0; + +err_unregister: + samsung_pinctrl_unregister(pdev, drvdata); +err_put_banks: + samsung_banks_of_node_put(drvdata); + return ret; } /** From 29d967c18737ce04f372831c4542e71da1a8d5c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 16:36:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 197/908] can: ems_usb: ems_usb_start_xmit(): fix double dev_kfree_skb() in error path commit c70222752228a62135cee3409dccefd494a24646 upstream. There is no need to call dev_kfree_skb() when usb_submit_urb() fails beacause can_put_echo_skb() deletes the original skb and can_free_echo_skb() deletes the cloned skb. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220228083639.38183-1-hbh25y@gmail.com Fixes: 702171adeed3 ("ems_usb: Added support for EMS CPC-USB/ARM7 CAN/USB interface") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Sebastian Haas Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c index d62d61d734ea..4d01b6cbf0eb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c @@ -834,7 +834,6 @@ static netdev_tx_t ems_usb_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ne usb_unanchor_urb(urb); usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, size, buf, urb->transfer_dma); - dev_kfree_skb(skb); atomic_dec(&dev->active_tx_urbs); From 3bd2454162ec6bbb5503233c804fce6e4b6dcec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baokun Li Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 20:54:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 198/908] jffs2: fix use-after-free in jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem commit 4c7c44ee1650677fbe89d86edbad9497b7679b5c upstream. When we mount a jffs2 image, assume that the first few blocks of the image are normal and contain at least one xattr-related inode, but the next block is abnormal. As a result, an error is returned in jffs2_scan_eraseblock(). jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() is then called in jffs2_build_filesystem() and then again in jffs2_do_fill_super(). Finally we can observe the following report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem+0x95/0x6ac Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881243384e0 by task mount/719 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x115/0x16b jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem+0x95/0x6ac jffs2_do_fill_super+0x84f/0xc30 jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 mtd_get_sb+0x254/0x400 mtd_get_sb_by_nr+0x4f/0xd0 get_tree_mtd+0x498/0x840 jffs2_get_tree+0x25/0x30 vfs_get_tree+0x8d/0x2e0 path_mount+0x50f/0x1e50 do_mount+0x107/0x130 __se_sys_mount+0x1c5/0x2f0 __x64_sys_mount+0xc7/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x45/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Allocated by task 719: kasan_save_stack+0x23/0x60 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x10b/0x120 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1c0/0x870 jffs2_alloc_xattr_ref+0x2f/0xa0 jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x3713/0x4794 jffs2_do_mount_fs.cold+0xa7/0x2253 jffs2_do_fill_super+0x383/0xc30 jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 [...] Freed by task 719: kmem_cache_free+0xcc/0x7b0 jffs2_free_xattr_ref+0x78/0x98 jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem+0xa1/0x6ac jffs2_do_mount_fs.cold+0x5e6/0x2253 jffs2_do_fill_super+0x383/0xc30 jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 [...] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881243384b8 which belongs to the cache jffs2_xattr_ref of size 48 The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of 48-byte region [ffff8881243384b8, ffff8881243384e8) [...] ================================================================== The triggering of the BUG is shown in the following stack: ----------------------------------------------------------- jffs2_fill_super jffs2_do_fill_super jffs2_do_mount_fs jffs2_build_filesystem jffs2_scan_medium jffs2_scan_eraseblock <--- ERROR jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem <--- free jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem <--- free again ----------------------------------------------------------- An error is returned in jffs2_do_mount_fs(). If the error is returned by jffs2_sum_init(), the jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() does not need to be executed. If the error is returned by jffs2_build_filesystem(), the jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() also does not need to be executed again. So move jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() from 'out_inohash' to 'out_root' to fix this UAF problem. Fixes: aa98d7cf59b5 ("[JFFS2][XATTR] XATTR support on JFFS2 (version. 5)") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Baokun Li Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/jffs2/fs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/fs.c b/fs/jffs2/fs.c index 3c96f4bdc549..b7df9e34ccfd 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/fs.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/fs.c @@ -597,8 +597,8 @@ int jffs2_do_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) jffs2_free_ino_caches(c); jffs2_free_raw_node_refs(c); kvfree(c->blocks); - out_inohash: jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem(c); + out_inohash: kfree(c->inocache_list); out_wbuf: jffs2_flash_cleanup(c); From 9a0f6610c7daedd2eace430beeb08a8b7ac80699 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baokun Li Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 18:28:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 199/908] jffs2: fix memory leak in jffs2_do_mount_fs commit d051cef784de4d54835f6b6836d98a8f6935772c upstream. If jffs2_build_filesystem() in jffs2_do_mount_fs() returns an error, we can observe the following kmemleak report: -------------------------------------------- unreferenced object 0xffff88811b25a640 (size 64): comm "mount", pid 691, jiffies 4294957728 (age 71.952s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x584/0x880 [] jffs2_sum_init+0x86/0x130 [] jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x798/0xac0 [] jffs2_do_fill_super+0x383/0xc30 [] jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 [...] unreferenced object 0xffff88812c760000 (size 65536): comm "mount", pid 691, jiffies 4294957728 (age 71.952s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................ bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................ backtrace: [] __kmalloc+0x6b9/0x910 [] jffs2_sum_init+0xd7/0x130 [] jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x798/0xac0 [] jffs2_do_fill_super+0x383/0xc30 [] jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 [...] -------------------------------------------- This is because the resources allocated in jffs2_sum_init() are not released. Call jffs2_sum_exit() to release these resources to solve the problem. Fixes: e631ddba5887 ("[JFFS2] Add erase block summary support (mount time improvement)") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/jffs2/build.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/build.c b/fs/jffs2/build.c index b288c8ae1236..837cd55fd4c5 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/build.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/build.c @@ -415,13 +415,15 @@ int jffs2_do_mount_fs(struct jffs2_sb_info *c) jffs2_free_ino_caches(c); jffs2_free_raw_node_refs(c); ret = -EIO; - goto out_free; + goto out_sum_exit; } jffs2_calc_trigger_levels(c); return 0; + out_sum_exit: + jffs2_sum_exit(c); out_free: kvfree(c->blocks); From b36bccb04e14cc0c1e2d0e92d477fe220314fad6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baokun Li Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 18:28:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 200/908] jffs2: fix memory leak in jffs2_scan_medium commit 9cdd3128874f5fe759e2c4e1360ab7fb96a8d1df upstream. If an error is returned in jffs2_scan_eraseblock() and some memory has been added to the jffs2_summary *s, we can observe the following kmemleak report: -------------------------------------------- unreferenced object 0xffff88812b889c40 (size 64): comm "mount", pid 692, jiffies 4294838325 (age 34.288s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 40 48 b5 14 81 88 ff ff 01 e0 31 00 00 00 50 00 @H........1...P. 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 09 08 ................ backtrace: [] __kmalloc+0x613/0x910 [] jffs2_sum_add_dirent_mem+0x5c/0xa0 [] jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x36e5/0x4794 [] jffs2_do_mount_fs.cold+0xa7/0x2267 [] jffs2_do_fill_super+0x383/0xc30 [] jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 [] mtd_get_sb+0x254/0x400 [] mtd_get_sb_by_nr+0x4f/0xd0 [] get_tree_mtd+0x498/0x840 [] jffs2_get_tree+0x25/0x30 [] vfs_get_tree+0x8d/0x2e0 [] path_mount+0x50f/0x1e50 [] do_mount+0x107/0x130 [] __se_sys_mount+0x1c5/0x2f0 [] __x64_sys_mount+0xc7/0x160 [] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x70 unreferenced object 0xffff888114b54840 (size 32): comm "mount", pid 692, jiffies 4294838325 (age 34.288s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): c0 75 b5 14 81 88 ff ff 02 e0 02 00 00 00 02 00 .u.............. 00 00 84 00 00 00 44 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 ......D...kkkkk. backtrace: [] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x584/0x880 [] jffs2_sum_add_inode_mem+0x54/0x90 [] jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x4481/0x4794 [...] unreferenced object 0xffff888114b57280 (size 32): comm "mount", pid 692, jiffies 4294838393 (age 34.357s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 10 d5 6c 11 81 88 ff ff 08 e0 05 00 00 00 01 00 ..l............. 00 00 38 02 00 00 28 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 ..8...(...kkkkk. backtrace: [] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x584/0x880 [] jffs2_sum_add_xattr_mem+0x54/0x90 [] jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x298c/0x4794 [...] unreferenced object 0xffff8881116cd510 (size 16): comm "mount", pid 692, jiffies 4294838395 (age 34.355s) hex dump (first 16 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 e0 60 02 00 00 6b a5 ..........`...k. backtrace: [] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x584/0x880 [] jffs2_sum_add_xref_mem+0x54/0x90 [] jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x3a20/0x4794 [...] -------------------------------------------- Therefore, we should call jffs2_sum_reset_collected(s) on exit to release the memory added in s. In addition, a new tag "out_buf" is added to prevent the NULL pointer reference caused by s being NULL. (thanks to Zhang Yi for this analysis) Fixes: e631ddba5887 ("[JFFS2] Add erase block summary support (mount time improvement)") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Co-developed-with: Zhihao Cheng Signed-off-by: Baokun Li Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/jffs2/scan.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/scan.c b/fs/jffs2/scan.c index 08813789fcf0..664384dac6e5 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/scan.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/scan.c @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int jffs2_scan_medium(struct jffs2_sb_info *c) if (!s) { JFFS2_WARNING("Can't allocate memory for summary\n"); ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; + goto out_buf; } } @@ -274,13 +274,15 @@ int jffs2_scan_medium(struct jffs2_sb_info *c) } ret = 0; out: + jffs2_sum_reset_collected(s); + kfree(s); + out_buf: if (buf_size) kfree(flashbuf); #ifndef __ECOS else mtd_unpoint(c->mtd, 0, c->mtd->size); #endif - kfree(s); return ret; } From 4d6d259e5fa3647b5bc41a17276464ab8c2e1a44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alistair Popple Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 14:43:26 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 201/908] mm/pages_alloc.c: don't create ZONE_MOVABLE beyond the end of a node commit ddbc84f3f595cf1fc8234a191193b5d20ad43938 upstream. ZONE_MOVABLE uses the remaining memory in each node. Its starting pfn is also aligned to MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES. It is possible for the remaining memory in a node to be less than MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES, meaning there is not enough room for ZONE_MOVABLE on that node. Unfortunately this condition is not checked for. This leads to zone_movable_pfn[] getting set to a pfn greater than the last pfn in a node. calculate_node_totalpages() then sets zone->present_pages to be greater than zone->spanned_pages which is invalid, as spanned_pages represents the maximum number of pages in a zone assuming no holes. Subsequently it is possible free_area_init_core() will observe a zone of size zero with present pages. In this case it will skip setting up the zone, including the initialisation of free_lists[]. However populated_zone() checks zone->present_pages to see if a zone has memory available. This is used by iterators such as walk_zones_in_node(). pagetypeinfo_showfree() uses this to walk the free_list of each zone in each node, which are assumed to be initialised due to the zone not being empty. As free_area_init_core() never initialised the free_lists[] this results in the following kernel crash when trying to read /proc/pagetypeinfo: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 456 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.16.0 #461 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:pagetypeinfo_show+0x163/0x460 Code: 9e 82 e8 80 57 0e 00 49 8b 06 b9 01 00 00 00 4c 39 f0 75 16 e9 65 02 00 00 48 83 c1 01 48 81 f9 a0 86 01 00 0f 84 48 02 00 00 <48> 8b 00 4c 39 f0 75 e7 48 c7 c2 80 a2 e2 82 48 c7 c6 79 ef e3 82 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001c4bd10 EFLAGS: 00010003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88801105f638 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000068b RDI: ffff8880163dc68b RBP: ffffc90001c4bd90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880163dc67e R10: 656c6261766f6d6e R11: 6c6261766f6d6e55 R12: ffff88807ffb4a00 R13: ffff88807ffb49f8 R14: ffff88807ffb4580 R15: ffff88807ffb3000 FS: 00007f9c83eff5c0(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000013c8e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: seq_read_iter+0x128/0x460 proc_reg_read_iter+0x51/0x80 new_sync_read+0x113/0x1a0 vfs_read+0x136/0x1d0 ksys_read+0x70/0xf0 __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Fix this by checking that the aligned zone_movable_pfn[] does not exceed the end of the node, and if it does skip creating a movable zone on this node. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220215025831.2113067-1-apopple@nvidia.com Fixes: 2a1e274acf0b ("Create the ZONE_MOVABLE zone") Signed-off-by: Alistair Popple Acked-by: David Hildenbrand Acked-by: Mel Gorman Cc: John Hubbard Cc: Zi Yan Cc: Anshuman Khandual Cc: Oscar Salvador Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/page_alloc.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index 9c467ac4b72d..7d283f269b1e 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -6502,10 +6502,17 @@ static void __init find_zone_movable_pfns_for_nodes(void) out2: /* Align start of ZONE_MOVABLE on all nids to MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES */ - for (nid = 0; nid < MAX_NUMNODES; nid++) + for (nid = 0; nid < MAX_NUMNODES; nid++) { + unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn; + zone_movable_pfn[nid] = roundup(zone_movable_pfn[nid], MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES); + get_pfn_range_for_nid(nid, &start_pfn, &end_pfn); + if (zone_movable_pfn[nid] >= end_pfn) + zone_movable_pfn[nid] = 0; + } + out: /* restore the node_state */ node_states[N_MEMORY] = saved_node_state; From ce6d45f1fb605a58999538dcfb1c82e379ce75bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 14:45:59 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 202/908] mempolicy: mbind_range() set_policy() after vma_merge() commit 4e0906008cdb56381638aa17d9c32734eae6d37a upstream. v2.6.34 commit 9d8cebd4bcd7 ("mm: fix mbind vma merge problem") introduced vma_merge() to mbind_range(); but unlike madvise, mlock and mprotect, it put a "continue" to next vma where its precedents go to update flags on current vma before advancing: that left vma with the wrong setting in the infamous vma_merge() case 8. v3.10 commit 1444f92c8498 ("mm: merging memory blocks resets mempolicy") tried to fix that in vma_adjust(), without fully understanding the issue. v3.11 commit 3964acd0dbec ("mm: mempolicy: fix mbind_range() && vma_adjust() interaction") reverted that, and went about the fix in the right way, but chose to optimize out an unnecessary mpol_dup() with a prior mpol_equal() test. But on tmpfs, that also pessimized out the vital call to its ->set_policy(), leaving the new mbind unenforced. The user visible effect was that the pages got allocated on the local node (happened to be 0), after the mbind() caller had specifically asked for them to be allocated on node 1. There was not any page migration involved in the case reported: the pages simply got allocated on the wrong node. Just delete that optimization now (though it could be made conditional on vma not having a set_policy). Also remove the "next" variable: it turned out to be blameless, but also pointless. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/319e4db9-64ae-4bca-92f0-ade85d342ff@google.com Fixes: 3964acd0dbec ("mm: mempolicy: fix mbind_range() && vma_adjust() interaction") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/mempolicy.c | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c index 4e30d23943d5..88a36661bba4 100644 --- a/mm/mempolicy.c +++ b/mm/mempolicy.c @@ -727,7 +727,6 @@ static int vma_replace_policy(struct vm_area_struct *vma, static int mbind_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, struct mempolicy *new_pol) { - struct vm_area_struct *next; struct vm_area_struct *prev; struct vm_area_struct *vma; int err = 0; @@ -743,8 +742,7 @@ static int mbind_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, if (start > vma->vm_start) prev = vma; - for (; vma && vma->vm_start < end; prev = vma, vma = next) { - next = vma->vm_next; + for (; vma && vma->vm_start < end; prev = vma, vma = vma->vm_next) { vmstart = max(start, vma->vm_start); vmend = min(end, vma->vm_end); @@ -758,10 +756,6 @@ static int mbind_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, new_pol, vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx); if (prev) { vma = prev; - next = vma->vm_next; - if (mpol_equal(vma_policy(vma), new_pol)) - continue; - /* vma_merge() joined vma && vma->next, case 8 */ goto replace; } if (vma->vm_start != vmstart) { From 2bf80bc8ab9ef4e60a17829f85464f11045d08ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Le Moal Date: Sun, 20 Feb 2022 12:17:40 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 203/908] scsi: libsas: Fix sas_ata_qc_issue() handling of NCQ NON DATA commands commit 8454563e4c2aafbfb81a383ab423ea8b9b430a25 upstream. To detect for the DMA_NONE (no data transfer) DMA direction, sas_ata_qc_issue() tests if the command protocol is ATA_PROT_NODATA. This test does not include the ATA_CMD_NCQ_NON_DATA command as this command protocol is defined as ATA_PROT_NCQ_NODATA (equal to ATA_PROT_FLAG_NCQ) and not as ATA_PROT_NODATA. To include both NCQ and non-NCQ commands when testing for the DMA_NONE DMA direction, use "!ata_is_data()". Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220031810.738362-2-damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com Fixes: 176ddd89171d ("scsi: libsas: Reset num_scatter if libata marks qc as NODATA") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: John Garry Reviewed-by: Jack Wang Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_ata.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_ata.c b/drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_ata.c index 9eb61a41be24..1afb4402a799 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_ata.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_ata.c @@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static unsigned int sas_ata_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) task->total_xfer_len = qc->nbytes; task->num_scatter = qc->n_elem; task->data_dir = qc->dma_dir; - } else if (qc->tf.protocol == ATA_PROT_NODATA) { + } else if (!ata_is_data(qc->tf.protocol)) { task->data_dir = DMA_NONE; } else { for_each_sg(qc->sg, sg, qc->n_elem, si) From a45b2074a669fa3ba19932bddd0ea733b3e11515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Manish Chopra Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 02:52:21 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 204/908] qed: display VF trust config commit 4e6e6bec7440b9b76f312f28b1f4e944eebb3abc upstream. Driver does support SR-IOV VFs trust configuration but it does not display it when queried via ip link utility. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f990c82c385b ("qed*: Add support for ndo_set_vf_trust") Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c index 5e7e977c62b6..daea47c1d4da 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c @@ -4587,6 +4587,7 @@ static int qed_get_vf_config(struct qed_dev *cdev, tx_rate = vf_info->tx_rate; ivi->max_tx_rate = tx_rate ? tx_rate : link.speed; ivi->min_tx_rate = qed_iov_get_vf_min_rate(hwfn, vf_id); + ivi->trusted = vf_info->is_trusted_request; return 0; } From 5305bf6043d6edd1bf4da8e24a13e799e7a07239 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Manish Chopra Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 02:52:22 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 205/908] qed: validate and restrict untrusted VFs vlan promisc mode commit cbcc44db2cf7b836896733acc0e5ea966136ed22 upstream. Today when VFs are put in promiscuous mode, they can request PF to configure device for them to receive all VLANs traffic regardless of what vlan is configured by the PF (via ip link) and PF allows this config request regardless of whether VF is trusted or not. From security POV, when VLAN is configured for VF through PF (via ip link), honour such config requests from VF only when they are configured to be trusted, otherwise restrict such VFs vlan promisc mode config. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f990c82c385b ("qed*: Add support for ndo_set_vf_trust") Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c index daea47c1d4da..3dbea6be4e55 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c @@ -2996,12 +2996,16 @@ static int qed_iov_pre_update_vport(struct qed_hwfn *hwfn, u8 mask = QED_ACCEPT_UCAST_UNMATCHED | QED_ACCEPT_MCAST_UNMATCHED; struct qed_filter_accept_flags *flags = ¶ms->accept_flags; struct qed_public_vf_info *vf_info; + u16 tlv_mask; + + tlv_mask = BIT(QED_IOV_VP_UPDATE_ACCEPT_PARAM) | + BIT(QED_IOV_VP_UPDATE_ACCEPT_ANY_VLAN); /* Untrusted VFs can't even be trusted to know that fact. * Simply indicate everything is configured fine, and trace * configuration 'behind their back'. */ - if (!(*tlvs & BIT(QED_IOV_VP_UPDATE_ACCEPT_PARAM))) + if (!(*tlvs & tlv_mask)) return 0; vf_info = qed_iov_get_public_vf_info(hwfn, vfid, true); @@ -3018,6 +3022,13 @@ static int qed_iov_pre_update_vport(struct qed_hwfn *hwfn, flags->tx_accept_filter &= ~mask; } + if (params->update_accept_any_vlan_flg) { + vf_info->accept_any_vlan = params->accept_any_vlan; + + if (vf_info->forced_vlan && !vf_info->is_trusted_configured) + params->accept_any_vlan = false; + } + return 0; } @@ -4920,6 +4931,12 @@ static void qed_iov_handle_trust_change(struct qed_hwfn *hwfn) params.update_ctl_frame_check = 1; params.mac_chk_en = !vf_info->is_trusted_configured; + params.update_accept_any_vlan_flg = 0; + + if (vf_info->accept_any_vlan && vf_info->forced_vlan) { + params.update_accept_any_vlan_flg = 1; + params.accept_any_vlan = vf_info->accept_any_vlan; + } if (vf_info->rx_accept_mode & mask) { flags->update_rx_mode_config = 1; @@ -4935,13 +4952,20 @@ static void qed_iov_handle_trust_change(struct qed_hwfn *hwfn) if (!vf_info->is_trusted_configured) { flags->rx_accept_filter &= ~mask; flags->tx_accept_filter &= ~mask; + params.accept_any_vlan = false; } if (flags->update_rx_mode_config || flags->update_tx_mode_config || - params.update_ctl_frame_check) + params.update_ctl_frame_check || + params.update_accept_any_vlan_flg) { + DP_VERBOSE(hwfn, QED_MSG_IOV, + "vport update config for %s VF[abs 0x%x rel 0x%x]\n", + vf_info->is_trusted_configured ? "trusted" : "untrusted", + vf->abs_vf_id, vf->relative_vf_id); qed_sp_vport_update(hwfn, ¶ms, QED_SPQ_MODE_EBLOCK, NULL); + } } } diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.h index 3955929ba892..a17ac595331f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.h @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ struct qed_public_vf_info { bool is_trusted_request; u8 rx_accept_mode; u8 tx_accept_mode; + bool accept_any_vlan; }; struct qed_iov_vf_init_params { From 385cc5a91d4c0479408837ee92e94d015bbdba49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 21:15:36 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 206/908] Revert "Input: clear BTN_RIGHT/MIDDLE on buttonpads" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 8b188fba75195745026e11d408e4a7e94e01d701 upstream. This reverts commit 37ef4c19b4c659926ce65a7ac709ceaefb211c40. The touchpad present in the Dell Precision 7550 and 7750 laptops reports a HID_DG_BUTTONTYPE of type MT_BUTTONTYPE_CLICKPAD. However, the device is not a clickpad, it is a touchpad with physical buttons. In order to fix this issue, a quirk for the device was introduced in libinput [1] [2] to disable the INPUT_PROP_BUTTONPAD property: [Precision 7x50 Touchpad] MatchBus=i2c MatchUdevType=touchpad MatchDMIModalias=dmi:*svnDellInc.:pnPrecision7?50* AttrInputPropDisable=INPUT_PROP_BUTTONPAD However, because of the change introduced in 37ef4c19b4 ("Input: clear BTN_RIGHT/MIDDLE on buttonpads") the BTN_RIGHT key bit is not mapped anymore breaking the device right click button and making impossible to workaround it in user space. In order to avoid breakage on other present or future devices, revert the patch causing the issue. Signed-off-by: José Expósito Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Acked-by: Peter Hutterer Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220321184404.20025-1-jose.exposito89@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/input.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/input.c b/drivers/input/input.c index cb8ff919ba82..cadb368be8ef 100644 --- a/drivers/input/input.c +++ b/drivers/input/input.c @@ -2120,12 +2120,6 @@ int input_register_device(struct input_dev *dev) /* KEY_RESERVED is not supposed to be transmitted to userspace. */ __clear_bit(KEY_RESERVED, dev->keybit); - /* Buttonpads should not map BTN_RIGHT and/or BTN_MIDDLE. */ - if (test_bit(INPUT_PROP_BUTTONPAD, dev->propbit)) { - __clear_bit(BTN_RIGHT, dev->keybit); - __clear_bit(BTN_MIDDLE, dev->keybit); - } - /* Make sure that bitmasks not mentioned in dev->evbit are clean. */ input_cleanse_bitmasks(dev); From db9a101f93cab51ccf28adb7e2a6aa5a5e2ef3b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaomeng Tong Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:08:22 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 207/908] ALSA: cs4236: fix an incorrect NULL check on list iterator commit 0112f822f8a6d8039c94e0bc9b264d7ffc5d4704 upstream. The bug is here: err = snd_card_cs423x_pnp(dev, card->private_data, pdev, cdev); The list iterator value 'cdev' will *always* be set and non-NULL by list_for_each_entry(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator value will be NULL if the list is empty or no element is found. To fix the bug, use a new variable 'iter' as the list iterator, while use the original variable 'cdev' as a dedicated pointer to point to the found element. And snd_card_cs423x_pnp() itself has NULL check for cdev. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c2b73d1458014 ("ALSA: cs4236: cs4232 and cs4236 driver merge to solve PnP BIOS detection") Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220327060822.4735-1-xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/isa/cs423x/cs4236.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/isa/cs423x/cs4236.c b/sound/isa/cs423x/cs4236.c index 7d4e18cb6351..6fff77fe34a8 100644 --- a/sound/isa/cs423x/cs4236.c +++ b/sound/isa/cs423x/cs4236.c @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int snd_cs423x_pnpbios_detect(struct pnp_dev *pdev, static int dev; int err; struct snd_card *card; - struct pnp_dev *cdev; + struct pnp_dev *cdev, *iter; char cid[PNP_ID_LEN]; if (pnp_device_is_isapnp(pdev)) @@ -575,9 +575,11 @@ static int snd_cs423x_pnpbios_detect(struct pnp_dev *pdev, strcpy(cid, pdev->id[0].id); cid[5] = '1'; cdev = NULL; - list_for_each_entry(cdev, &(pdev->protocol->devices), protocol_list) { - if (!strcmp(cdev->id[0].id, cid)) + list_for_each_entry(iter, &(pdev->protocol->devices), protocol_list) { + if (!strcmp(iter->id[0].id, cid)) { + cdev = iter; break; + } } err = snd_cs423x_card_new(&pdev->dev, dev, &card); if (err < 0) From 0452d32bfb419df65f8e200f5ddbf460fef48082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lars Ellenberg Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 20:55:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 208/908] drbd: fix potential silent data corruption MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit f4329d1f848ac35757d9cc5487669d19dfc5979c upstream. Scenario: --------- bio chain generated by blk_queue_split(). Some split bio fails and propagates its error status to the "parent" bio. But then the (last part of the) parent bio itself completes without error. We would clobber the already recorded error status with BLK_STS_OK, causing silent data corruption. Reproducer: ----------- How to trigger this in the real world within seconds: DRBD on top of degraded parity raid, small stripe_cache_size, large read_ahead setting. Drop page cache (sysctl vm.drop_caches=1, fadvise "DONTNEED", umount and mount again, "reboot"). Cause significant read ahead. Large read ahead request is split by blk_queue_split(). Parts of the read ahead that are already in the stripe cache, or find an available stripe cache to use, can be serviced. Parts of the read ahead that would need "too much work", would need to wait for a "stripe_head" to become available, are rejected immediately. For larger read ahead requests that are split in many pieces, it is very likely that some "splits" will be serviced, but then the stripe cache is exhausted/busy, and the remaining ones will be rejected. Signed-off-by: Lars Ellenberg Signed-off-by: Christoph Böhmwalder Cc: # 4.13.x Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220330185551.3553196-1-christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/block/drbd/drbd_req.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_req.c b/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_req.c index c72071c300bb..9b179b3d203a 100644 --- a/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_req.c +++ b/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_req.c @@ -207,7 +207,8 @@ void start_new_tl_epoch(struct drbd_connection *connection) void complete_master_bio(struct drbd_device *device, struct bio_and_error *m) { - m->bio->bi_status = errno_to_blk_status(m->error); + if (unlikely(m->error)) + m->bio->bi_status = errno_to_blk_status(m->error); bio_endio(m->bio); dec_ap_bio(device); } From 923339c722f9f0557cec1fd6ea1e5e05a124e3a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sakari Ailus Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 13:24:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 209/908] ACPI: properties: Consistently return -ENOENT if there are no more references commit babc92da5928f81af951663fc436997352e02d3a upstream. __acpi_node_get_property_reference() is documented to return -ENOENT if the caller requests a property reference at an index that does not exist, not -EINVAL which it actually does. Fix this by returning -ENOENT consistenly, independently of whether the property value is a plain reference or a package. Fixes: c343bc2ce2c6 ("ACPI: properties: Align return codes of __acpi_node_get_property_reference()") Cc: 4.14+ # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/property.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/property.c b/drivers/acpi/property.c index da39117032df..94e1cac3997d 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/property.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/property.c @@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ int __acpi_node_get_property_reference(const struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, */ if (obj->type == ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_REFERENCE) { if (index) - return -EINVAL; + return -ENOENT; ret = acpi_bus_get_device(obj->reference.handle, &device); if (ret) From a2793cb58444d4411810cc555eb45b8f4a228018 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 09:43:03 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 210/908] drivers: hamradio: 6pack: fix UAF bug caused by mod_timer() commit efe4186e6a1b54bf38b9e05450d43b0da1fd7739 upstream. When a 6pack device is detaching, the sixpack_close() will act to cleanup necessary resources. Although del_timer_sync() in sixpack_close() won't return if there is an active timer, one could use mod_timer() in sp_xmit_on_air() to wake up timer again by calling userspace syscall such as ax25_sendmsg(), ax25_connect() and ax25_ioctl(). This unexpected waked handler, sp_xmit_on_air(), realizes nothing about the undergoing cleanup and may still call pty_write() to use driver layer resources that have already been released. One of the possible race conditions is shown below: (USE) | (FREE) ax25_sendmsg() | ax25_queue_xmit() | ... | sp_xmit() | sp_encaps() | sixpack_close() sp_xmit_on_air() | del_timer_sync(&sp->tx_t) mod_timer(&sp->tx_t,...) | ... | unregister_netdev() | ... (wait a while) | tty_release() | tty_release_struct() | release_tty() sp_xmit_on_air() | tty_kref_put(tty_struct) //FREE pty_write(tty_struct) //USE | ... The corresponding fail log is shown below: =============================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __run_timers.part.0+0x170/0x470 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800a652ab8 by task swapper/2/0 ... Call Trace: ... queue_work_on+0x3f/0x50 pty_write+0xcd/0xe0pty_write+0xcd/0xe0 sp_xmit_on_air+0xb2/0x1f0 call_timer_fn+0x28/0x150 __run_timers.part.0+0x3c2/0x470 run_timer_softirq+0x3b/0x80 __do_softirq+0xf1/0x380 ... This patch reorders the del_timer_sync() after the unregister_netdev() to avoid UAF bugs. Because the unregister_netdev() is well synchronized, it flushs out any pending queues, waits the refcount of net_device decreases to zero and removes net_device from kernel. There is not any running routines after executing unregister_netdev(). Therefore, we could not arouse timer from userspace again. Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Reviewed-by: Lin Ma Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c index 7e430300818e..3d5b2b4899ec 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c @@ -685,14 +685,14 @@ static void sixpack_close(struct tty_struct *tty) */ netif_stop_queue(sp->dev); + unregister_netdev(sp->dev); + del_timer_sync(&sp->tx_t); del_timer_sync(&sp->resync_t); /* Free all 6pack frame buffers. */ kfree(sp->rbuff); kfree(sp->xbuff); - - unregister_netdev(sp->dev); } /* Perform I/O control on an active 6pack channel. */ From 2a616cc4513217c850865482cbc0bc6e7188580c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Helge Deller Date: Sun, 27 Feb 2022 08:43:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 211/908] video: fbdev: sm712fb: Fix crash in smtcfb_read() commit bd771cf5c4254511cc4abb88f3dab3bd58bdf8e8 upstream. Zheyu Ma reported this crash in the sm712fb driver when reading three bytes from the framebuffer: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90001ffffff RIP: 0010:smtcfb_read+0x230/0x3e0 Call Trace: vfs_read+0x198/0xa00 ? do_sys_openat2+0x27d/0x350 ? __fget_light+0x54/0x340 ksys_read+0xce/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 Fix it by removing the open-coded endianess fixup-code and by moving the pointer post decrement out the fb_readl() function. Reported-by: Zheyu Ma Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Tested-by: Zheyu Ma Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/sm712fb.c | 25 +++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/sm712fb.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/sm712fb.c index 1781ca697f66..0d80ee9766a6 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/sm712fb.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/sm712fb.c @@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ static ssize_t smtcfb_read(struct fb_info *info, char __user *buf, if (count + p > total_size) count = total_size - p; - buffer = kmalloc((count > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : count, GFP_KERNEL); + buffer = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buffer) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1059,24 +1059,13 @@ static ssize_t smtcfb_read(struct fb_info *info, char __user *buf, while (count) { c = (count > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : count; dst = buffer; - for (i = c >> 2; i--;) { - *dst = fb_readl(src++); - *dst = big_swap(*dst); - dst++; - } - if (c & 3) { - u8 *dst8 = (u8 *)dst; - u8 __iomem *src8 = (u8 __iomem *)src; + for (i = (c + 3) >> 2; i--;) { + u32 val; - for (i = c & 3; i--;) { - if (i & 1) { - *dst8++ = fb_readb(++src8); - } else { - *dst8++ = fb_readb(--src8); - src8 += 2; - } - } - src = (u32 __iomem *)src8; + val = fb_readl(src); + *dst = big_swap(val); + src++; + dst++; } if (copy_to_user(buf, buffer, c)) { From 36ffb3d203fa42408c59553d47e371a692c3dcf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Schmitz Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 20:26:25 +1300 Subject: [PATCH 212/908] video: fbdev: atari: Atari 2 bpp (STe) palette bugfix commit c8be5edbd36ceed2ff3d6b8f8e40643c3f396ea3 upstream. The code to set the shifter STe palette registers has a long standing operator precedence bug, manifesting as colors set on a 2 bits per pixel frame buffer coming up with a distinctive blue tint. Add parentheses around the calculation of the per-color palette data before shifting those into their respective bit field position. This bug goes back a long way (2.4 days at the very least) so there won't be a Fixes: tag. Tested on ARAnyM as well on Falcon030 hardware. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMuHMdU3ievhXxKR_xi_v3aumnYW7UNUO6qMdhgfyWTyVSsCkQ@mail.gmail.com Tested-by: Michael Schmitz Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Michael Schmitz Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/atafb.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/atafb.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/atafb.c index fcd2dd670a65..770f77055682 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/atafb.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/atafb.c @@ -1713,9 +1713,9 @@ static int falcon_setcolreg(unsigned int regno, unsigned int red, ((blue & 0xfc00) >> 8)); if (regno < 16) { shifter_tt.color_reg[regno] = - (((red & 0xe000) >> 13) | ((red & 0x1000) >> 12) << 8) | - (((green & 0xe000) >> 13) | ((green & 0x1000) >> 12) << 4) | - ((blue & 0xe000) >> 13) | ((blue & 0x1000) >> 12); + ((((red & 0xe000) >> 13) | ((red & 0x1000) >> 12)) << 8) | + ((((green & 0xe000) >> 13) | ((green & 0x1000) >> 12)) << 4) | + ((blue & 0xe000) >> 13) | ((blue & 0x1000) >> 12); ((u32 *)info->pseudo_palette)[regno] = ((red & 0xf800) | ((green & 0xfc00) >> 5) | ((blue & 0xf800) >> 11)); @@ -2001,9 +2001,9 @@ static int stste_setcolreg(unsigned int regno, unsigned int red, green >>= 12; if (ATARIHW_PRESENT(EXTD_SHIFTER)) shifter_tt.color_reg[regno] = - (((red & 0xe) >> 1) | ((red & 1) << 3) << 8) | - (((green & 0xe) >> 1) | ((green & 1) << 3) << 4) | - ((blue & 0xe) >> 1) | ((blue & 1) << 3); + ((((red & 0xe) >> 1) | ((red & 1) << 3)) << 8) | + ((((green & 0xe) >> 1) | ((green & 1) << 3)) << 4) | + ((blue & 0xe) >> 1) | ((blue & 1) << 3); else shifter_tt.color_reg[regno] = ((red & 0xe) << 7) | From 75cb145a8b6497f849b489c322b9ce03b1cd18eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tudor Ambarus Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 15:23:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 213/908] ARM: dts: at91: sama5d2: Fix PMERRLOC resource size commit 0fb578a529ac7aca326a9fa475b4a6f58a756fda upstream. PMERRLOC resource size was set to 0x100, which resulted in HSMC_ERRLOCx register being truncated to offset x = 21, causing error correction to fail if more than 22 bit errors and if 24 or 32 bit error correction was supported. Fixes: d9c41bf30cf8 ("ARM: dts: at91: Declare EBI/NAND controllers") Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus Cc: # 4.13.x Acked-by: Alexander Dahl Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220111132301.906712-1-tudor.ambarus@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi index d6e3f975323d..4c9869750efd 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi @@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ pmecc: ecc-engine@f8014070 { compatible = "atmel,sama5d2-pmecc"; reg = <0xf8014070 0x490>, - <0xf8014500 0x100>; + <0xf8014500 0x200>; }; }; From edea262690a788429c0f3fa66c100add8c033ec2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 20:53:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 214/908] ARM: dts: exynos: fix UART3 pins configuration in Exynos5250 commit 372d7027fed43c8570018e124cf78b89523a1f8e upstream. The gpa1-4 pin was put twice in UART3 pin configuration of Exynos5250, instead of proper pin gpa1-5. Fixes: f8bfe2b050f3 ("ARM: dts: add pin state information in client nodes for Exynos5 platforms") Cc: Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski Reviewed-by: Alim Akhtar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230195325.328220-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-pinctrl.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-pinctrl.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-pinctrl.dtsi index 1fd122db18e6..48096768e33a 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-pinctrl.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-pinctrl.dtsi @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ }; uart3_data: uart3-data { - samsung,pins = "gpa1-4", "gpa1-4"; + samsung,pins = "gpa1-4", "gpa1-5"; samsung,pin-function = ; samsung,pin-pud = ; samsung,pin-drv = ; From 42c50c5071e722d53fd5e3273ea74c021dc5471c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 18:18:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 215/908] ARM: dts: exynos: add missing HDMI supplies on SMDK5250 commit 60a9914cb2061ba612a3f14f6ad329912b486360 upstream. Add required VDD supplies to HDMI block on SMDK5250. Without them, the HDMI driver won't probe. Because of lack of schematics, use same supplies as on Arndale 5250 board (voltage matches). Cc: # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Reviewed-by: Alim Akhtar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220208171823.226211-2-krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-smdk5250.dts | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-smdk5250.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-smdk5250.dts index 5065e6bf3778..a3c4b9e03fbf 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-smdk5250.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-smdk5250.dts @@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ &hdmi { hpd-gpios = <&gpx3 7 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; + vdd-supply = <&ldo8_reg>; + vdd_osc-supply = <&ldo10_reg>; + vdd_pll-supply = <&ldo8_reg>; }; &i2c_0 { From 5dbda4d93a2016178a0b1adece9d3d74a2f21e1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 18:18:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 216/908] ARM: dts: exynos: add missing HDMI supplies on SMDK5420 commit 453a24ded415f7fce0499c6b0a2c7b28f84911f2 upstream. Add required VDD supplies to HDMI block on SMDK5420. Without them, the HDMI driver won't probe. Because of lack of schematics, use same supplies as on Arndale Octa and Odroid XU3 boards (voltage matches). Cc: # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Reviewed-by: Alim Akhtar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220208171823.226211-3-krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5420-smdk5420.dts | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5420-smdk5420.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5420-smdk5420.dts index 08c8ab173e87..9bd317aee6a1 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5420-smdk5420.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5420-smdk5420.dts @@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ hpd-gpios = <&gpx3 7 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; pinctrl-names = "default"; pinctrl-0 = <&hdmi_hpd_irq>; + vdd-supply = <&ldo6_reg>; + vdd_osc-supply = <&ldo7_reg>; + vdd_pll-supply = <&ldo6_reg>; }; &hsi2c_4 { From f02e2636a92f01116a5a86ad4cf2456019dddbc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 00:44:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 217/908] carl9170: fix missing bit-wise or operator for tx_params commit 02a95374b5eebdbd3b6413fd7ddec151d2ea75a1 upstream. Currently tx_params is being re-assigned with a new value and the previous setting IEEE80211_HT_MCS_TX_RX_DIFF is being overwritten. The assignment operator is incorrect, the original intent was to bit-wise or the value in. Fix this by replacing the = operator with |= instead. Kudos to Christian Lamparter for suggesting the correct fix. Fixes: fe8ee9ad80b2 ("carl9170: mac80211 glue and command interface") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Cc: Acked-by: Christian Lamparter Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220125004406.344422-1-colin.i.king@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c index 80312b2fddb1..39f4bde6c2a0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c @@ -1922,7 +1922,7 @@ static int carl9170_parse_eeprom(struct ar9170 *ar) WARN_ON(!(tx_streams >= 1 && tx_streams <= IEEE80211_HT_MCS_TX_MAX_STREAMS)); - tx_params = (tx_streams - 1) << + tx_params |= (tx_streams - 1) << IEEE80211_HT_MCS_TX_MAX_STREAMS_SHIFT; carl9170_band_2GHz.ht_cap.mcs.tx_params |= tx_params; From 4339a4a6ae4866a16907b2cb02125e0cc98db3c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Srinivas Pandruvada Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 15:08:55 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 218/908] thermal: int340x: Increase bitmap size commit 668f69a5f863b877bc3ae129efe9a80b6f055141 upstream. The number of policies are 10, so can't be supported by the bitmap size of u8. Even though there are no platfoms with these many policies, but for correctness increase to u32. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada Fixes: 16fc8eca1975 ("thermal/int340x_thermal: Add additional UUIDs") Cc: 5.1+ # 5.1+ Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c b/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c index d7cd86116084..72fd878b20f8 100644 --- a/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct int3400_thermal_priv { struct art *arts; int trt_count; struct trt *trts; - u8 uuid_bitmap; + u32 uuid_bitmap; int rel_misc_dev_res; int current_uuid_index; }; From 1c01f607228829b12481e62ad7ce61d249b466b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Dirk=20M=C3=BCller?= Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 17:50:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 219/908] lib/raid6/test: fix multiple definition linking error MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit a5359ddd052860bacf957e65fe819c63e974b3a6 upstream. GCC 10+ defaults to -fno-common, which enforces proper declaration of external references using "extern". without this change a link would fail with: lib/raid6/test/algos.c:28: multiple definition of `raid6_call'; lib/raid6/test/test.c:22: first defined here the pq.h header that is included already includes an extern declaration so we can just remove the redundant one here. Cc: Signed-off-by: Dirk Müller Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel Signed-off-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- lib/raid6/test/test.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/raid6/test/test.c b/lib/raid6/test/test.c index b07f4d8e6b03..a7e937248299 100644 --- a/lib/raid6/test/test.c +++ b/lib/raid6/test/test.c @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ #define NDISKS 16 /* Including P and Q */ const char raid6_empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE))); -struct raid6_calls raid6_call; char *dataptrs[NDISKS]; char data[NDISKS][PAGE_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE))); From ba12400ed8b90bbdc1579efceba8cb67361ace60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 20:16:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 220/908] DEC: Limit PMAX memory probing to R3k systems commit 244eae91a94c6dab82b3232967d10eeb9dfa21c6 upstream. Recent tightening of the opcode table in binutils so as to consistently disallow the assembly or disassembly of CP0 instructions not supported by the processor architecture chosen has caused a regression like below: arch/mips/dec/prom/locore.S: Assembler messages: arch/mips/dec/prom/locore.S:29: Error: opcode not supported on this processor: r4600 (mips3) `rfe' in a piece of code used to probe for memory with PMAX DECstation models, which have non-REX firmware. Those computers always have an R2000 CPU and consequently the exception handler used in memory probing uses the RFE instruction, which those processors use. While adding 64-bit support this code was correctly excluded for 64-bit configurations, however it should have also been excluded for irrelevant 32-bit configurations. Do this now then, and only enable PMAX memory probing for R3k systems. Reported-by: Jan-Benedict Glaw Reported-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.12+ Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/dec/prom/Makefile | 2 +- arch/mips/include/asm/dec/prom.h | 15 +++++---------- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/dec/prom/Makefile b/arch/mips/dec/prom/Makefile index ae73e42ac20b..4c369359cdab 100644 --- a/arch/mips/dec/prom/Makefile +++ b/arch/mips/dec/prom/Makefile @@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ lib-y += init.o memory.o cmdline.o identify.o console.o -lib-$(CONFIG_32BIT) += locore.o +lib-$(CONFIG_CPU_R3000) += locore.o diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/dec/prom.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/dec/prom.h index b59a2103b61a..09538ff5e924 100644 --- a/arch/mips/include/asm/dec/prom.h +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/dec/prom.h @@ -47,16 +47,11 @@ */ #define REX_PROM_MAGIC 0x30464354 -#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT - -#define prom_is_rex(magic) 1 /* KN04 and KN05 are REX PROMs. */ - -#else /* !CONFIG_64BIT */ - -#define prom_is_rex(magic) ((magic) == REX_PROM_MAGIC) - -#endif /* !CONFIG_64BIT */ - +/* KN04 and KN05 are REX PROMs, so only do the check for R3k systems. */ +static inline bool prom_is_rex(u32 magic) +{ + return !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R3000) || magic == REX_PROM_MAGIC; +} /* * 3MIN/MAXINE PROM entry points for DS5000/1xx's, DS5000/xx's and From 8e720f0fa49e13cffa5a7d61411ad819266af84c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2021 15:20:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 221/908] media: davinci: vpif: fix unbalanced runtime PM get commit 4a321de239213300a714fa0353a5f1272d381a44 upstream. Make sure to balance the runtime PM usage counter on driver unbind. Fixes: 407ccc65bfd2 ("[media] davinci: vpif: add pm_runtime support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9 Cc: Lad, Prabhakar Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Reviewed-by: Lad Prabhakar Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/platform/davinci/vpif.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/davinci/vpif.c b/drivers/media/platform/davinci/vpif.c index 07e89a4985a6..4ac0893282f5 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/davinci/vpif.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/davinci/vpif.c @@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ static int vpif_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) static int vpif_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) { + pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev); pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev); return 0; } From c4c7172431c776135eec5b06480171300b38acab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hector Martin Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 01:07:06 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 222/908] brcmfmac: firmware: Allocate space for default boardrev in nvram commit d19d8e3ba256f81ea4a27209dbbd1f0a00ef1903 upstream. If boardrev is missing from the NVRAM we add a default one, but this might need more space in the output buffer than was allocated. Ensure we have enough padding for this in the buffer. Fixes: 46f2b38a91b0 ("brcmfmac: insert default boardrev in nvram data if missing") Reviewed-by: Arend van Spriel Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hector Martin Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131160713.245637-3-marcan@marcan.st Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c index 091b52979e03..13c25798f39a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c @@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ static int brcmf_init_nvram_parser(struct nvram_parser *nvp, size = BRCMF_FW_MAX_NVRAM_SIZE; else size = data_len; + /* Add space for properties we may add */ + size += strlen(BRCMF_FW_DEFAULT_BOARDREV) + 1; /* Alloc for extra 0 byte + roundup by 4 + length field */ size += 1 + 3 + sizeof(u32); nvp->nvram = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); From fb223974f4d737ddb29fb54d098935691e1df8e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hector Martin Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 01:07:09 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 223/908] brcmfmac: pcie: Replace brcmf_pcie_copy_mem_todev with memcpy_toio commit 9466987f246758eb7e9071ae58005253f631271e upstream. The alignment check was wrong (e.g. & 4 instead of & 3), and the logic was also inefficient if the length was not a multiple of 4, since it would needlessly fall back to copying the entire buffer bytewise. We already have a perfectly good memcpy_toio function, so just call that instead of rolling our own copy logic here. brcmf_pcie_init_ringbuffers was already using it anyway. Fixes: 9e37f045d5e7 ("brcmfmac: Adding PCIe bus layer support.") Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Reviewed-by: Arend van Spriel Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hector Martin Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131160713.245637-6-marcan@marcan.st Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c | 48 ++----------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c index e6e9b00b79d7..fbaec4ea5988 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -428,47 +429,6 @@ brcmf_pcie_write_ram32(struct brcmf_pciedev_info *devinfo, u32 mem_offset, } -static void -brcmf_pcie_copy_mem_todev(struct brcmf_pciedev_info *devinfo, u32 mem_offset, - void *srcaddr, u32 len) -{ - void __iomem *address = devinfo->tcm + mem_offset; - __le32 *src32; - __le16 *src16; - u8 *src8; - - if (((ulong)address & 4) || ((ulong)srcaddr & 4) || (len & 4)) { - if (((ulong)address & 2) || ((ulong)srcaddr & 2) || (len & 2)) { - src8 = (u8 *)srcaddr; - while (len) { - iowrite8(*src8, address); - address++; - src8++; - len--; - } - } else { - len = len / 2; - src16 = (__le16 *)srcaddr; - while (len) { - iowrite16(le16_to_cpu(*src16), address); - address += 2; - src16++; - len--; - } - } - } else { - len = len / 4; - src32 = (__le32 *)srcaddr; - while (len) { - iowrite32(le32_to_cpu(*src32), address); - address += 4; - src32++; - len--; - } - } -} - - static void brcmf_pcie_copy_dev_tomem(struct brcmf_pciedev_info *devinfo, u32 mem_offset, void *dstaddr, u32 len) @@ -1454,8 +1414,8 @@ static int brcmf_pcie_download_fw_nvram(struct brcmf_pciedev_info *devinfo, return err; brcmf_dbg(PCIE, "Download FW %s\n", devinfo->fw_name); - brcmf_pcie_copy_mem_todev(devinfo, devinfo->ci->rambase, - (void *)fw->data, fw->size); + memcpy_toio(devinfo->tcm + devinfo->ci->rambase, + (void *)fw->data, fw->size); resetintr = get_unaligned_le32(fw->data); release_firmware(fw); @@ -1469,7 +1429,7 @@ static int brcmf_pcie_download_fw_nvram(struct brcmf_pciedev_info *devinfo, brcmf_dbg(PCIE, "Download NVRAM %s\n", devinfo->nvram_name); address = devinfo->ci->rambase + devinfo->ci->ramsize - nvram_len; - brcmf_pcie_copy_mem_todev(devinfo, address, nvram, nvram_len); + memcpy_toio(devinfo->tcm + address, nvram, nvram_len); brcmf_fw_nvram_free(nvram); } else { brcmf_dbg(PCIE, "No matching NVRAM file found %s\n", From 312366a68163f26b2ab2c4a5cd0c0a3b741d14b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liguang Zhang Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 13:42:58 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 224/908] PCI: pciehp: Clear cmd_busy bit in polling mode commit 92912b175178c7e895f5e5e9f1e30ac30319162b upstream. Writes to a Downstream Port's Slot Control register are PCIe hotplug "commands." If the Port supports Command Completed events, software must wait for a command to complete before writing to Slot Control again. pcie_do_write_cmd() sets ctrl->cmd_busy when it writes to Slot Control. If software notification is enabled, i.e., PCI_EXP_SLTCTL_HPIE and PCI_EXP_SLTCTL_CCIE are set, ctrl->cmd_busy is cleared by pciehp_isr(). But when software notification is disabled, as it is when pcie_init() powers off an empty slot, pcie_wait_cmd() uses pcie_poll_cmd() to poll for command completion, and it neglects to clear ctrl->cmd_busy, which leads to spurious timeouts: pcieport 0000:00:03.0: pciehp: Timeout on hotplug command 0x01c0 (issued 2264 msec ago) pcieport 0000:00:03.0: pciehp: Timeout on hotplug command 0x05c0 (issued 2288 msec ago) Clear ctrl->cmd_busy in pcie_poll_cmd() when it detects a Command Completed event (PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_CC). [bhelgaas: commit log] Fixes: a5dd4b4b0570 ("PCI: pciehp: Wait for hotplug command completion where necessary") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111054258.7309-1-zhangliguang@linux.alibaba.com Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215143 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211126173309.GA12255@wunner.de Signed-off-by: Liguang Zhang Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c b/drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c index 2fa830727362..c2dd297d4007 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c @@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ static int pcie_poll_cmd(struct controller *ctrl, int timeout) if (slot_status & PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_CC) { pcie_capability_write_word(pdev, PCI_EXP_SLTSTA, PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_CC); + ctrl->cmd_busy = 0; + smp_mb(); return 1; } if (timeout < 0) From 582ba2867994da3ecd1ef90d1c0b4b2170cfc0fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2022 17:58:40 +1100 Subject: [PATCH 225/908] crypto: authenc - Fix sleep in atomic context in decrypt_tail [ Upstream commit 66eae850333d639fc278d6f915c6fc01499ea893 ] The function crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail discards its flags argument and always relies on the flags from the original request when starting its sub-request. This is clearly wrong as it may cause the SLEEPABLE flag to be set when it shouldn't. Fixes: 92d95ba91772 ("crypto: authenc - Convert to new AEAD interface") Reported-by: Corentin Labbe Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Tested-by: Corentin Labbe Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- crypto/authenc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/authenc.c b/crypto/authenc.c index 053287dfad65..533e811a0899 100644 --- a/crypto/authenc.c +++ b/crypto/authenc.c @@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static int crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail(struct aead_request *req, dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(areq_ctx->dst, req->dst, req->assoclen); skcipher_request_set_tfm(skreq, ctx->enc); - skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, aead_request_flags(req), + skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, flags, req->base.complete, req->base.data); skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, src, dst, req->cryptlen - authsize, req->iv); From f655997dcfa0c44ce05c1a3c7ff7a69f36f72cdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tomas Paukrt Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2022 18:07:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 226/908] crypto: mxs-dcp - Fix scatterlist processing [ Upstream commit 28e9b6d8199a3f124682b143800c2dacdc3d70dd ] This patch fixes a bug in scatterlist processing that may cause incorrect AES block encryption/decryption. Fixes: 2e6d793e1bf0 ("crypto: mxs-dcp - Use sg_mapping_iter to copy data") Signed-off-by: Tomas Paukrt Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c index e986be405411..3e4068badffd 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt(struct crypto_async_request *arq) memset(key + AES_KEYSIZE_128, 0, AES_KEYSIZE_128); } - for_each_sg(req->src, src, sg_nents(src), i) { + for_each_sg(req->src, src, sg_nents(req->src), i) { src_buf = sg_virt(src); len = sg_dma_len(src); tlen += len; From 99fc432a7b9e62e0878699bda56d9000ea415997 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 16:52:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 227/908] spi: tegra114: Add missing IRQ check in tegra_spi_probe [ Upstream commit 4f92724d4b92c024e721063f520d66e11ca4b54b ] This func misses checking for platform_get_irq()'s call and may passes the negative error codes to request_threaded_irq(), which takes unsigned IRQ #, causing it to fail with -EINVAL, overriding an original error code. Stop calling request_threaded_irq() with invalid IRQ #s. Fixes: f333a331adfa ("spi/tegra114: add spi driver") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220128165238.25615-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c b/drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c index 0e1a8d7aa322..9758b7f7e92f 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c @@ -1136,6 +1136,10 @@ static int tegra_spi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) tspi->phys = r->start; spi_irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); + if (spi_irq < 0) { + ret = spi_irq; + goto exit_free_master; + } tspi->irq = spi_irq; tspi->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "spi"); From 0fec07650159483203b1f19267958d1f36433772 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Usama Anjum Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 23:41:08 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 228/908] selftests/x86: Add validity check and allow field splitting [ Upstream commit b06e15ebd5bfb670f93c7f11a29b8299c1178bc6 ] Add check to test if CC has a string. CC can have multiple sub-strings like "ccache gcc". Erorr pops up if it is treated as single string and double quotes are used around it. This can be fixed by removing the quotes and not treating CC as a single string. Fixes: e9886ace222e ("selftests, x86: Rework x86 target architecture detection") Reported-by: "kernelci.org bot" Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220214184109.3739179-2-usama.anjum@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/x86/check_cc.sh | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/check_cc.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/check_cc.sh index 172d3293fb7b..356689c56397 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/check_cc.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/check_cc.sh @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ CC="$1" TESTPROG="$2" shift 2 -if "$CC" -o /dev/null "$TESTPROG" -O0 "$@" 2>/dev/null; then +if [ -n "$CC" ] && $CC -o /dev/null "$TESTPROG" -O0 "$@" 2>/dev/null; then echo 1 else echo 0 From f4ba8ad2c91b6b3114676f0a83fa3924cee28425 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Shevchenko Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 21:16:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 229/908] spi: pxa2xx-pci: Balance reference count for PCI DMA device [ Upstream commit 609d7ffdc42199a0ec949db057e3b4be6745d6c5 ] The pci_get_slot() increases its reference count, the caller must decrement the reference count by calling pci_dev_put(). Fixes: 743485ea3bee ("spi: pxa2xx-pci: Do a specific setup in a separate function") Fixes: 25014521603f ("spi: pxa2xx-pci: Enable DMA for Intel Merrifield") Reported-by: Wang Qing Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220223191637.31147-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx-pci.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx-pci.c b/drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx-pci.c index 1736a48bbcce..54e316eb0891 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx-pci.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx-pci.c @@ -72,14 +72,23 @@ static bool lpss_dma_filter(struct dma_chan *chan, void *param) return true; } +static void lpss_dma_put_device(void *dma_dev) +{ + pci_dev_put(dma_dev); +} + static int lpss_spi_setup(struct pci_dev *dev, struct pxa_spi_info *c) { struct pci_dev *dma_dev; + int ret; c->num_chipselect = 1; c->max_clk_rate = 50000000; dma_dev = pci_get_slot(dev->bus, PCI_DEVFN(PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn), 0)); + ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&dev->dev, lpss_dma_put_device, dma_dev); + if (ret) + return ret; if (c->tx_param) { struct dw_dma_slave *slave = c->tx_param; @@ -103,8 +112,9 @@ static int lpss_spi_setup(struct pci_dev *dev, struct pxa_spi_info *c) static int mrfld_spi_setup(struct pci_dev *dev, struct pxa_spi_info *c) { - struct pci_dev *dma_dev = pci_get_slot(dev->bus, PCI_DEVFN(21, 0)); struct dw_dma_slave *tx, *rx; + struct pci_dev *dma_dev; + int ret; switch (PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn)) { case 0: @@ -129,6 +139,11 @@ static int mrfld_spi_setup(struct pci_dev *dev, struct pxa_spi_info *c) return -ENODEV; } + dma_dev = pci_get_slot(dev->bus, PCI_DEVFN(21, 0)); + ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&dev->dev, lpss_dma_put_device, dma_dev); + if (ret) + return ret; + tx = c->tx_param; tx->dma_dev = &dma_dev->dev; From 282e179192d7583a8f74090e1f477bd9509bfae5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Rudolph Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 17:06:09 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 230/908] hwmon: (pmbus) Add mutex to regulator ops [ Upstream commit 686d303ee6301261b422ea51e64833d7909a2c36 ] On PMBUS devices with multiple pages, the regulator ops need to be protected with the update mutex. This prevents accidentally changing the page in a separate thread while operating on the PMBUS_OPERATION register. Tested on Infineon xdpe11280 while a separate thread polls for sensor data. Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph Signed-off-by: Marcello Sylvester Bauer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b991506bcbf665f7af185945f70bf9d5cf04637c.1645804976.git.sylv@sylv.io Fixes: ddbb4db4ced1b ("hwmon: (pmbus) Add regulator support") Cc: Alan Tull Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c b/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c index cb9064ac4977..66c72aedde5e 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c @@ -1861,10 +1861,14 @@ static int pmbus_regulator_is_enabled(struct regulator_dev *rdev) { struct device *dev = rdev_get_dev(rdev); struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(dev->parent); + struct pmbus_data *data = i2c_get_clientdata(client); u8 page = rdev_get_id(rdev); int ret; + mutex_lock(&data->update_lock); ret = pmbus_read_byte_data(client, page, PMBUS_OPERATION); + mutex_unlock(&data->update_lock); + if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -1875,11 +1879,17 @@ static int _pmbus_regulator_on_off(struct regulator_dev *rdev, bool enable) { struct device *dev = rdev_get_dev(rdev); struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(dev->parent); + struct pmbus_data *data = i2c_get_clientdata(client); u8 page = rdev_get_id(rdev); + int ret; - return pmbus_update_byte_data(client, page, PMBUS_OPERATION, - PB_OPERATION_CONTROL_ON, - enable ? PB_OPERATION_CONTROL_ON : 0); + mutex_lock(&data->update_lock); + ret = pmbus_update_byte_data(client, page, PMBUS_OPERATION, + PB_OPERATION_CONTROL_ON, + enable ? PB_OPERATION_CONTROL_ON : 0); + mutex_unlock(&data->update_lock); + + return ret; } static int pmbus_regulator_enable(struct regulator_dev *rdev) From eb0276376ec9675368f60e0bdef93617904b7451 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Armin Wolf Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 22:19:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 231/908] hwmon: (sch56xx-common) Replace WDOG_ACTIVE with WDOG_HW_RUNNING [ Upstream commit 647d6f09bea7dacf4cdb6d4ea7e3051883955297 ] If the watchdog was already enabled by the BIOS after booting, the watchdog infrastructure needs to regularly send keepalives to prevent a unexpected reset. WDOG_ACTIVE only serves as an status indicator for userspace, we want to use WDOG_HW_RUNNING instead. Since my Fujitsu Esprimo P720 does not support the watchdog, this change is compile-tested only. Suggested-by: Guenter Roeck Fixes: fb551405c0f8 (watchdog: sch56xx: Use watchdog core) Signed-off-by: Armin Wolf Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131211935.3656-5-W_Armin@gmx.de Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/hwmon/sch56xx-common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/sch56xx-common.c b/drivers/hwmon/sch56xx-common.c index bda3d5285586..e1c4e6937a64 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/sch56xx-common.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/sch56xx-common.c @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ struct sch56xx_watchdog_data *sch56xx_watchdog_register(struct device *parent, if (nowayout) set_bit(WDOG_NO_WAY_OUT, &data->wddev.status); if (output_enable & SCH56XX_WDOG_OUTPUT_ENABLE) - set_bit(WDOG_ACTIVE, &data->wddev.status); + set_bit(WDOG_HW_RUNNING, &data->wddev.status); /* Since the watchdog uses a downcounter there is no register to read the BIOS set timeout from (if any was set at all) -> From 566dee27c204396208edd24019b619922de69a30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 14:05:32 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 232/908] PM: hibernate: fix __setup handler error handling [ Upstream commit ba7ffcd4c4da374b0f64666354eeeda7d3827131 ] If an invalid value is used in "resumedelay=", it is silently ignored. Add a warning message and then let the __setup handler return 1 to indicate that the kernel command line option has been handled. Fixes: 317cf7e5e85e3 ("PM / hibernate: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoul") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/power/hibernate.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c index e68b1c20ad3d..f4ecb23c9194 100644 --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c @@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ static int __init resumedelay_setup(char *str) int rc = kstrtouint(str, 0, &resume_delay); if (rc) - return rc; + pr_warn("resumedelay: bad option string '%s'\n", str); return 1; } From 0f009684e368ef3f10b039c5620da0d75f32c472 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 14:05:44 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 233/908] PM: suspend: fix return value of __setup handler [ Upstream commit 7a64ca17e4dd50d5f910769167f3553902777844 ] If an invalid option is given for "test_suspend=