diag: test Linux 4.14.287 midpoint kernel only - #78
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commit bbda6e0f1303953c855ee3669655a81b69fbe899 upstream. Address the following checkpatch warning: WARNING: Use #include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8786841bc2020f7f2513a6c74e64912f07b9c0dc upstream. Use the full path in the include guards for the BLAKE2s headers to avoid ambiguity and to match the convention for most files in include/crypto/. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2b6c6e3d9ce3aa0e547ac25d60e06fe035cd9f79 upstream. The section at the top of random.c which documents the input functions available does not document add_hwgenerator_randomness() which might lead a reader to overlook it. Add a brief note about it. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> [Jason: reorganize position of function in doc comment and also document add_bootloader_randomness() while we're at it.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 703f7066f40599c290babdb79dd61319264987e9 upstream. Since commit ee3e00e ("random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter") the irq_flags argument is no longer used. Remove unused irq_flags. Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9f9eff85a008b095eafc5f4ecbaf5aca689271c1 upstream.
This commit addresses one of the lower hanging fruits of the RNG: its
usage of SHA1.
BLAKE2s is generally faster, and certainly more secure, than SHA1, which
has [1] been [2] really [3] very [4] broken [5]. Additionally, the
current construction in the RNG doesn't use the full SHA1 function, as
specified, and allows overwriting the IV with RDRAND output in an
undocumented way, even in the case when RDRAND isn't set to "trusted",
which means potential malicious IV choices. And its short length means
that keeping only half of it secret when feeding back into the mixer
gives us only 2^80 bits of forward secrecy. In other words, not only is
the choice of hash function dated, but the use of it isn't really great
either.
This commit aims to fix both of these issues while also keeping the
general structure and semantics as close to the original as possible.
Specifically:
a) Rather than overwriting the hash IV with RDRAND, we put it into
BLAKE2's documented "salt" and "personal" fields, which were
specifically created for this type of usage.
b) Since this function feeds the full hash result back into the
entropy collector, we only return from it half the length of the
hash, just as it was done before. This increases the
construction's forward secrecy from 2^80 to a much more
comfortable 2^128.
c) Rather than using the raw "sha1_transform" function alone, we
instead use the full proper BLAKE2s function, with finalization.
This also has the advantage of supplying 16 bytes at a time rather than
SHA1's 10 bytes, which, in addition to having a faster compression
function to begin with, means faster extraction in general. On an Intel
i7-11850H, this commit makes initial seeding around 131% faster.
BLAKE2s itself has the nice property of internally being based on the
ChaCha permutation, which the RNG is already using for expansion, so
there shouldn't be any issue with newness, funkiness, or surprising CPU
behavior, since it's based on something already in use.
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/010.pdf
[2] https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2005/36210017/36210017.pdf
[3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/967.pdf
[4] https://shattered.io/static/shattered.pdf
[5] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-leurent.pdf
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0d9488ffbf2faddebc6bac055bfa6c93b94056a3 upstream. By using `char` instead of `unsigned char`, certain platforms will sign extend the byte when `w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate)` is called, meaning that bit 7 is overrepresented when mixing. This isn't a real problem (unless the mixer itself is already broken) since it's still invertible, but it's not quite correct either. Fix this by using an explicit unsigned type. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9c3ddde3f811aabbb83778a2a615bf141b4909ef upstream. If the bootloader supplies sufficient material and crng_reseed() is called very early on, but not too early that wqs aren't available yet, then we might transition to crng_init==2 before rand_initialize()'s call to crng_initialize_primary() made. Then, when crng_initialize_primary() is called, if we're trusting the CPU's RDRAND instructions, we'll needlessly reinitialize the RNG and emit a message about it. This is mostly harmless, as numa_crng_init() will allocate and then free what it just allocated, and excessive calls to invalidate_batched_entropy() aren't so harmful. But it is funky and the extra message is confusing, so avoid the re-initialization all together by checking for crng_init < 2 in crng_initialize_primary(), just as we already do in crng_reseed(). Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 57826feeedb63b091f807ba8325d736775d39afd upstream. If we're trusting bootloader randomness, crng_fast_load() is called by add_hwgenerator_randomness(), which sets us to crng_init==1. However, usually it is only called once for an initial 64-byte push, so bootloader entropy will not mix any bytes into the input pool. So it's conceivable that crng_init==1 when crng_initialize_primary() is called later, but then the input pool is empty. When that happens, the crng state key will be overwritten with extracted output from the empty input pool. That's bad. In contrast, if we're not trusting bootloader randomness, we call crng_slow_load() *and* we call mix_pool_bytes(), so that later crng_initialize_primary() isn't drawing on nothing. In order to prevent crng_initialize_primary() from extracting an empty pool, have the trusted bootloader case mirror that of the untrusted bootloader case, mixing the input into the pool. [linux@dominikbrodowski.net: rewrite commit message] Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 161212c7fd1d9069b232785c75492e50941e2ea8 upstream. We print out "crng init done" for !TRUST_CPU, so we should also print out the same for TRUST_CPU. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7b87324112df2e1f9b395217361626362dcfb9fb upstream. Rather than an awkward combination of ifdefs and __maybe_unused, we can ensure more source gets parsed, regardless of the configuration, by using IS_ENABLED for the CONFIG_NUMA conditional code. This makes things cleaner and easier to follow. I've confirmed that on !CONFIG_NUMA, we don't wind up with excess code by accident; the generated object file is the same. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a181e0fdb2164268274453b5b291589edbb9b22d upstream. On big endian CPUs, the ChaCha20-based CRNG is using the wrong endianness for the ChaCha20 constants. This doesn't matter cryptographically, but technically it means it's not ChaCha20 anymore. Fix it to always use the standard constants. Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 96562f286884e2db89c74215b199a1084b5fb7f7 upstream. Previously, the ChaCha constants for the primary pool were only initialized in crng_initialize_primary(), called by rand_initialize(). However, some randomness is actually extracted from the primary pool beforehand, e.g. by kmem_cache_create(). Therefore, statically initialize the ChaCha constants for the primary pool. Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2ee25b6968b1b3c66ffa408de23d023c1bce81cf upstream.
RDRAND is not fast. RDRAND is actually quite slow. We've known this for
a while, which is why functions like get_random_u{32,64} were converted
to use batching of our ChaCha-based CRNG instead.
Yet CRNG extraction still includes a call to RDRAND, in the hot path of
every call to get_random_bytes(), /dev/urandom, and getrandom(2).
This call to RDRAND here seems quite superfluous. CRNG is already
extracting things based on a 256-bit key, based on good entropy, which
is then reseeded periodically, updated, backtrack-mutated, and so
forth. The CRNG extraction construction is something that we're already
relying on to be secure and solid. If it's not, that's a serious
problem, and it's unlikely that mixing in a measly 32 bits from RDRAND
is going to alleviate things.
And in the case where the CRNG doesn't have enough entropy yet, we're
already initializing the ChaCha key row with RDRAND in
crng_init_try_arch_early().
Removing the call to RDRAND improves performance on an i7-11850H by
370%. In other words, the vast majority of the work done by
extract_crng() prior to this commit was devoted to fetching 32 bits of
RDRAND.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6c8e11e08a5b74bb8a5cdd5cbc1e5143df0fba72 upstream. At the moment, urandom_read() (used for /dev/urandom) resets crng_init_cnt to zero when it is called at crng_init<2. This is inconsistent: We do it for /dev/urandom reads, but not for the equivalent getrandom(GRND_INSECURE). (And worse, as Jason pointed out, we're only doing this as long as maxwarn>0.) crng_init_cnt is only read in crng_fast_load(); it is relevant at crng_init==0 for determining when to switch to crng_init==1 (and where in the RNG state array to write). As far as I understand: - crng_init==0 means "we have nothing, we might just be returning the same exact numbers on every boot on every machine, we don't even have non-cryptographic randomness; we should shove every bit of entropy we can get into the RNG immediately" - crng_init==1 means "well we have something, it might not be cryptographic, but at least we're not gonna return the same data every time or whatever, it's probably good enough for TCP and ASLR and stuff; we now have time to build up actual cryptographic entropy in the input pool" - crng_init==2 means "this is supposed to be cryptographically secure now, but we'll keep adding more entropy just to be sure". The current code means that if someone is pulling data from /dev/urandom fast enough at crng_init==0, we'll keep resetting crng_init_cnt, and we'll never make forward progress to crng_init==1. It seems to be intended to prevent an attacker from bruteforcing the contents of small individual RNG inputs on the way from crng_init==0 to crng_init==1, but that's misguided; crng_init==1 isn't supposed to provide proper cryptographic security anyway, RNG users who care about getting secure RNG output have to wait until crng_init==2. This code was inconsistent, and it probably made things worse - just get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c0a8a61e7abbf66729687ee63659ee25983fbb1e upstream. s/or/for Signed-off-by: Schspa Shi <schspa@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 91ec0fe138f107232cb36bc6112211db37cb5306 upstream. Now that we're only using one polynomial, we can cleanup its representation into constants, instead of passing around pointers dynamically to select different polynomials. This improves the codegen and makes the code a bit more straightforward. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a5e9f557098e54af44ade5d501379be18435bfbf ] In commit 9f480fa ("crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for chacha20_block()"), I had missed that chacha20_block() can be called directly on the buffer passed to get_random_bytes(), which can have any alignment. So, while my commit didn't break anything, it didn't fully solve the alignment problems. Revert my solution and just update chacha20_block() to use put_unaligned_le32(), so the output buffer need not be aligned. This is simpler, and on many CPUs it's the same speed. But, I kept the 'tmp' buffers in extract_crng_user() and _get_random_bytes() 4-byte aligned, since that alignment is actually needed for _crng_backtrack_protect() too. Reported-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d38bb0853589c939573ea50e9cb64f733e0e273d upstream. Rather than using the userspace type, __uXX, switch to using uXX. And rather than using variously chosen `char *` or `unsigned char *`, use `u8 *` uniformly for things that aren't strings, in the case where we are doing byte-by-byte traversal. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a4bfa9b31802c14ff5847123c12b98d5e36b3985 upstream. There were a few things added under the "if (fips_enabled)" banner, which never really got completed, and the FIPS people anyway are choosing a different direction. Rather than keep around this halfbaked code, get rid of it so that we can focus on a single design of the RNG rather than two designs. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8b2d953b91e7f60200c24067ab17b77cc7bfd0d4 upstream. This argument is always set to zero, as a result of us not caring about keeping a certain amount reserved in the pool these days. So just remove it and cleanup the function signatures. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 50ee7529ec4500c88f8664560770a7a1b65db72b upstream. For 5.3 we had to revert a nice ext4 IO pattern improvement, because it caused a bootup regression due to lack of entropy at bootup together with arguably broken user space that was asking for secure random numbers when it really didn't need to. See commit 72dbcf721566 (Revert "ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug"). This aims to solve the issue by actively generating entropy noise using the CPU cycle counter when waiting for the random number generator to initialize. This only works when you have a high-frequency time stamp counter available, but that's the case on all modern x86 CPU's, and on most other modern CPU's too. What we do is to generate jitter entropy from the CPU cycle counter under a somewhat complex load: calling the scheduler while also guaranteeing a certain amount of timing noise by also triggering a timer. I'm sure we can tweak this, and that people will want to look at other alternatives, but there's been a number of papers written on jitter entropy, and this should really be fairly conservative by crediting one bit of entropy for every timer-induced jump in the cycle counter. Not because the timer itself would be all that unpredictable, but because the interaction between the timer and the loop is going to be. Even if (and perhaps particularly if) the timer actually happens on another CPU, the cacheline interaction between the loop that reads the cycle counter and the timer itself firing is going to add perturbations to the cycle counter values that get mixed into the entropy pool. As Thomas pointed out, with a modern out-of-order CPU, even quite simple loops show a fair amount of hard-to-predict timing variability even in the absense of external interrupts. But this tries to take that further by actually having a fairly complex interaction. This is not going to solve the entropy issue for architectures that have no CPU cycle counter, but it's not clear how (and if) that is solvable, and the hardware in question is largely starting to be irrelevant. And by doing this we can at least avoid some of the even more contentious approaches (like making the entropy waiting time out in order to avoid the possibly unbounded waiting). Cc: Ahmed Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Nicholas Mc Guire <hofrat@opentech.at> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Alexander E. Patrakov <patrakov@gmail.com> Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de> Cc: Noah Meyerhans <noahm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 90ed1e67e896cc8040a523f8428fc02f9b164394 upstream. Originally, the RNG used several pools, so having things abstracted out over a generic entropy_store object made sense. These days, there's only one input pool, and then an uneven mix of usage via the abstraction and usage via &input_pool. Rather than this uneasy mixture, just get rid of the abstraction entirely and have things always use the global. This simplifies the code and makes reading it a bit easier. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0f63702718c91d89c922081ac1e6baeddc2d8b1a upstream. We no longer have an output pool. Rather, we have just a wakeup bits threshold for /dev/random reads, presumably so that processes don't hang. This value, random_write_wakeup_bits, is configurable anyway. So all the no longer usefully named OUTPUT_POOL constants were doing was setting a reasonable default for random_write_wakeup_bits. This commit gets rid of the constants and just puts it all in the default value of random_write_wakeup_bits. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5b87adf30f1464477169a1d653e9baf8c012bbfe upstream. We already had the POOL_* constants, so deduplicate the older INPUT_POOL ones. As well, fold EXTRACT_SIZE into the poolinfo enum, since it's related. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b3d51c1f542113342ddfbf6007e38a684b9dbec9 upstream. The other pool constants are prepended with POOL_, but not these last ones. Rename them. This will then let us move them into the enum in the following commit. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 18263c4e8e62f7329f38f5eadc568751242ca89c upstream. The entropy estimator is calculated in terms of 1/8 bits, which means there are various constants where things are shifted by 3. Move these into our pool info enum with the other relevant constants. While we're at it, move an English assertion about sizes into a proper BUILD_BUG_ON so that the compiler can ensure this invariant. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6c0eace6e1499712583b6ee62d95161e8b3449f5 upstream. This gets rid of another abstraction we no longer need. It would be nice if we could instead make pool an array rather than a pointer, but the latent entropy plugin won't be able to do its magic in that case. So instead we put all accesses to the input pool's actual data through the input_pool_data array directly. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a254a0e4093fce8c832414a83940736067eed515 upstream. Now that have_bytes is never modified, we can simplify this function. First, we move the check for negative entropy_count to be first. That ensures that subsequent reads of this will be non-negative. Then, have_bytes and ibytes can be folded into their one use site in the min_t() function. Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c321e907aa4803d562d6e70ebed9444ad082f953 upstream. The rngd kernel thread may sleep indefinitely if the entropy count is kept above random_write_wakeup_bits by other entropy sources. To make best use of multiple sources of randomness, mix entropy from hardware RNGs into the pool at least once within CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL. Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ebf7606388732ecf2821ca21087e9446cb4a5b57 upstream. Both crng_initialize_primary() and crng_init_try_arch_early() are only called for the primary_pool. Accessing it directly instead of through a function parameter simplifies the code. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 617b365872a247480e9dcd50a32c8d1806b21861 upstream. There's a KASAN warning in raid5_add_disk when running the LVM testsuite. The warning happens in the test lvconvert-raid-reshape-linear_to_raid6-single-type.sh. We fix the warning by verifying that rdev->saved_raid_disk is within limits. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e4f74400308cb8abde5fdc9cad609c2aba32110c upstream.
s390x appears to present two RNG interfaces:
- a "TRNG" that gathers entropy using some hardware function; and
- a "DRBG" that takes in a seed and expands it.
Previously, the TRNG was wired up to arch_get_random_{long,int}(), but
it was observed that this was being called really frequently, resulting
in high overhead. So it was changed to be wired up to arch_get_random_
seed_{long,int}(), which was a reasonable decision. Later on, the DRBG
was then wired up to arch_get_random_{long,int}(), with a complicated
buffer filling thread, to control overhead and rate.
Fortunately, none of the performance issues matter much now. The RNG
always attempts to use arch_get_random_seed_{long,int}() first, which
means a complicated implementation of arch_get_random_{long,int}() isn't
really valuable or useful to have around. And it's only used when
reseeding, which means it won't hit the high throughput complications
that were faced before.
So this commit returns to an earlier design of just calling the TRNG in
arch_get_random_seed_{long,int}(), and returning false in arch_get_
random_{long,int}().
Part of what makes the simplification possible is that the RNG now seeds
itself using the TRNG at bootup. But this only works if the TRNG is
detected early in boot, before random_init() is called. So this commit
also causes that check to happen in setup_arch().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610222023.378448-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a23dd544debcda4ee4a549ec7de59e85c3c8345c upstream. Looks like there are still cases when "space_left - frag1bytes" can legitimately exceed PAGE_SIZE. Ensure that xdr->end always remains within the current encode buffer. Reported-by: Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> Reported-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216151 Fixes: 6c254bf3b637 ("SUNRPC: Fix the calculation of xdr->end in xdr_get_next_encode_buffer()") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9cc02ede696272c5271a401e4f27c262359bc2f6 upstream.
There are UAF bugs in rose_heartbeat_expiry(), rose_timer_expiry()
and rose_idletimer_expiry(). The root cause is that del_timer()
could not stop the timer handler that is running and the refcount
of sock is not managed properly.
One of the UAF bugs is shown below:
(thread 1) | (thread 2)
| rose_bind
| rose_connect
| rose_start_heartbeat
rose_release | (wait a time)
case ROSE_STATE_0 |
rose_destroy_socket | rose_heartbeat_expiry
rose_stop_heartbeat |
sock_put(sk) | ...
sock_put(sk) // FREE |
| bh_lock_sock(sk) // USE
The sock is deallocated by sock_put() in rose_release() and
then used by bh_lock_sock() in rose_heartbeat_expiry().
Although rose_destroy_socket() calls rose_stop_heartbeat(),
it could not stop the timer that is running.
The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800ae59098 by task swapper/3/0
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0xbf/0xee
print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
print_report+0x101/0x230
? irq_work_single+0xbb/0x140
? _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
kasan_report+0xed/0x120
? _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
kasan_check_range+0x2bd/0x2e0
_raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
rose_heartbeat_expiry+0x39/0x370
? rose_start_heartbeat+0xb0/0xb0
call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x1c0
? rose_start_heartbeat+0xb0/0xb0
expire_timers+0x1f3/0x320
__run_timers+0x3ff/0x4d0
run_timer_softirq+0x41/0x80
__do_softirq+0x233/0x544
irq_exit_rcu+0x41/0xa0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xb0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xb/0x10
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000012fea0 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 000000000000bcae RBX: ffff888006660f00 RCX: 000000000000bcae
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff843a11c0 RDI: ffffffff843a1180
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: ffffed100da36d46
R10: dfffe9100da36d47 R11: ffffffff83cf0950 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 1ffff11000ccc1e0 R14: ffffffff8542af28 R15: dffffc0000000000
...
Allocated by task 146:
__kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xf0
sk_prot_alloc+0xdd/0x1a0
sk_alloc+0x2d/0x4e0
rose_create+0x7b/0x330
__sock_create+0x2dd/0x640
__sys_socket+0xc7/0x270
__x64_sys_socket+0x71/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
Freed by task 152:
kasan_set_track+0x4c/0x70
kasan_set_free_info+0x1f/0x40
____kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x190
kfree+0xd3/0x270
__sk_destruct+0x314/0x460
rose_release+0x2fa/0x3b0
sock_close+0xcb/0x230
__fput+0x2d9/0x650
task_work_run+0xd6/0x160
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xc7/0xd0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x4e/0x80
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
This patch adds refcount of sock when we use functions
such as rose_start_heartbeat() and so on to start timer,
and decreases the refcount of sock when timer is finished
or deleted by functions such as rose_stop_heartbeat()
and so on. As a result, the UAF bugs could be mitigated.
Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629002640.5693-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f8ebb3ac881b17712e1d5967c97ab1806b16d3d6 upstream.
This patch corrects packet receiving in ax88179_rx_fixup.
- problem observed:
ifconfig shows allways a lot of 'RX Errors' while packets
are received normally.
This occurs because ax88179_rx_fixup does not recognise properly
the usb urb received.
The packets are normally processed and at the end, the code exits
with 'return 0', generating RX Errors.
(pkt_cnt==-2 and ptk_hdr over field rx_hdr trying to identify
another packet there)
This is a usb urb received by "tcpdump -i usbmon2 -X" on a
little-endian CPU:
0x0000: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800
^ packet 1 start (pkt_len = 0x05ec)
^^^^ IP alignment pseudo header
^ ethernet packet start
last byte ethernet packet v
padding (8-bytes aligned) vvvv vvvv
0x05e0: c92d d444 1420 8a69 83dd 272f e82b 9811
0x05f0: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800
... ^ packet 2
0x0be0: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800
...
0x1130: 9d41 9171 8a38 0ec5 eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0
...
0x1720: 8cfc 15ff 5e4c e85c eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0
...
0x1d10: ecfa 2a3a 19ab c78c eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0
...
0x2070: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800
... ^ packet 7
0x2120: 7c88 4ca5 5c57 7dcc 0d34 7577 f778 7e0a
0x2130: f032 e093 7489 0740 3008 ec05 0000 0080
====1==== ====2====
hdr_off ^
pkt_len = 0x05ec ^^^^
AX_RXHDR_*=0x00830 ^^^^ ^
pkt_len = 0 ^^^^
AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR=0x80000000 ^^^^ ^
0x2140: 3008 ec05 0000 0080 3008 5805 0000 0080
0x2150: 3008 ec05 0000 0080 3008 ec05 0000 0080
0x2160: 3008 5803 0000 0080 3008 c800 0000 0080
===11==== ===12==== ===13==== ===14====
0x2170: 0000 0000 0e00 3821
^^^^ ^^^^ rx_hdr
^^^^ pkt_cnt=14
^^^^ hdr_off=0x2138
^^^^ ^^^^ padding
The dump shows that pkt_cnt is the number of entrys in the
per-packet metadata. It is "2 * packet count".
Each packet have two entrys. The first have a valid
value (pkt_len and AX_RXHDR_*) and the second have a
dummy-header 0x80000000 (pkt_len=0 with AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR).
Why exists dummy-header for each packet?!?
My guess is that this was done probably to align the
entry for each packet to 64-bits and maintain compatibility
with old firmware.
There is also a padding (0x00000000) before the rx_hdr to
align the end of rx_hdr to 64-bit.
Note that packets have a alignment of 64-bits (8-bytes).
This patch assumes that the dummy-header and the last
padding are optional. So it preserves semantics and
recognises the same valid packets as the current code.
This patch was made using only the dumpfile information and
tested with only one device:
0b95:1790 ASIX Electronics Corp. AX88179 Gigabit Ethernet
Fixes: 57bc3d3ae8c1 ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup")
Fixes: e2ca90c ("ax88179_178a: ASIX AX88179_178A USB 3.0/2.0 to gigabit ethernet adapter driver")
Signed-off-by: Jose Alonso <joalonsof@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6970bb04bf67598af4d316eaeb1792040b18cfd.camel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 118f767413ada4eef7825fbd4af7c0866f883441 upstream. Make sure to save the passed QP timeout attribute when the QP gets modified, so when calling query QP the right value is reported and not the converted value that is required by the firmware. This issue was found while running the pyverbs tests. Fixes: cecbcdd ("qedr: Add support for QP verbs") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220525132029.84813-1-kamalheib1@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib <kamalheib1@gmail.com> Acked-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e65af5403e462ccd7dff6a045a886c64da598c2e upstream. usbnet provides some helper functions that are also used in the context of reset() operations. During a reset the other drivers on a device are unable to operate. As that can be block drivers, a driver for another interface cannot use paging in its memory allocations without risking a deadlock. Use GFP_NOIO in the helpers. Fixes: 877bd86 ("usbnet: introduce usbnet 3 command helpers") Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628093517.7469-1-oneukum@suse.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 53ad46169fe2996fe1b623ba6c9c4fa33847876f upstream.
As of commit 5801f064e351 ("net: ipv6: unexport __init-annotated seg6_hmac_init()"),
EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text
section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot
use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up
with kernel panic.
This remove the EXPORT_SYMBOL to fix modpost warning:
WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o(___ksymtab+seg6_hmac_net_init+0x0): Section mismatch in reference from the variable __ksymtab_seg6_hmac_net_init to the function .init.text:seg6_hmac_net_init()
The symbol seg6_hmac_net_init is exported and annotated __init
Fix this by removing the __init annotation of seg6_hmac_net_init or drop the export.
Fixes: bf355b8 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628033134.21088-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 11a37eb66812ce6a06b79223ad530eb0e1d7294d upstream. We currently depend on probe() calling virtio_device_ready() - which happens after netdev registration. Since ndo_open() can be called immediately after register_netdev, this means there exists a race between ndo_open() and virtio_device_ready(): the driver may start to use the device (e.g. TX) before DRIVER_OK which violates the spec. Fix this by switching to use register_netdevice() and protect the virtio_device_ready() with rtnl_lock() to make sure ndo_open() can only be called after virtio_device_ready(). Fixes: 0d2e1a2 ("caif_virtio: Introduce caif over virtio") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220620051115.3142-3-jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…date commit 05907f10e235680cc7fb196810e4ad3215d5e648 upstream. This patch fixes a race condition. nft_rhash_update() might fail for two reasons: - Element already exists in the hashtable. - Another packet won race to insert an entry in the hashtable. In both cases, new() has already bumped the counter via atomic_add_unless(), therefore, decrement the set element counter. Fixes: 22fe54d ("netfilter: nf_tables: add support for dynamic set updates") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ab84db251c04d38b8dc7ee86e13d4050bedb1c88 upstream. syzbot has two reports involving the same root cause. bond_alb_initialize() must not set bond->alb_info.rlb_enabled if a memory allocation error is detected. Report 1: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 0 PID: 12276 Comm: kworker/u4:10 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-syzkaller-00132-g3b89b511ea0c #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:rlb_clear_slave+0x10e/0x690 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:393 Code: 8e fc 83 fb ff 0f 84 74 02 00 00 e8 cc 2a 8e fc 48 8b 44 24 08 89 dd 48 c1 e5 06 4c 8d 34 28 49 8d 7e 14 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 14 20 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 RSP: 0018:ffffc90018a8f678 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88803375bb00 RSI: ffffffff84ec4ac4 RDI: 0000000000000014 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 00000000ffffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8880ac889000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88815a668c80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005597077e10b0 CR3: 0000000026668000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> bond_alb_deinit_slave+0x43c/0x6b0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1663 __bond_release_one.cold+0x383/0xd53 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2370 bond_slave_netdev_event drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3778 [inline] bond_netdev_event+0x993/0xad0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3889 notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:87 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1945 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1983 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1997 [inline] unregister_netdevice_many+0x948/0x18b0 net/core/dev.c:10839 default_device_exit_batch+0x449/0x590 net/core/dev.c:11333 ops_exit_list+0x125/0x170 net/core/net_namespace.c:167 cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb00 net/core/net_namespace.c:594 process_one_work+0x996/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:302 </TASK> Report 2: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 1 PID: 5206 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-12108-g58f9d52ff689 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:rlb_req_update_slave_clients+0x109/0x2f0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:502 Code: 5d 18 8f fc 41 80 3e 00 0f 85 a5 01 00 00 89 d8 48 c1 e0 06 49 03 84 24 68 01 00 00 48 8d 78 30 49 89 c7 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 2a 00 0f 85 98 01 00 00 4d 39 6f 30 75 83 e8 22 18 8f fc 49 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000300ee80 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90016c11000 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffffffff84eb6bf3 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 00000000ffffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888027c80c80 R13: ffff88807d7ff800 R14: ffffed1004f901bd R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f6f46c58700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020010000 CR3: 00000000516cc000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> alb_fasten_mac_swap+0x886/0xa80 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1070 bond_alb_handle_active_change+0x624/0x1050 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1765 bond_change_active_slave+0xfa1/0x29b0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1173 bond_select_active_slave+0x23f/0xa50 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1253 bond_enslave+0x3b34/0x53b0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2159 do_set_master+0x1c8/0x220 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2577 rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3380 [inline] __rtnl_newlink+0x13ac/0x17e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3580 rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3593 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x43a/0xc90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6089 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x543/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 netlink_sendmsg+0x917/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:734 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6eb/0x810 net/socket.c:2492 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2546 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x132/0x220 net/socket.c:2582 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7f6f45a89109 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f6f46c58168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f6f45b9c030 RCX: 00007f6f45a89109 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007f6f45ae308d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffed99029af R14: 00007f6f46c58300 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com> Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627102813.126264-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 050133e1aa2cb49bb17be847d48a4431598ef562 upstream. commit 0622cab ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection"), resolve case, when there is several aggregation groups in the same bond. bond_3ad_unbind_slave will invalidate (clear) aggregator when __agg_active_ports return zero. So, ad_clear_agg can be executed even, when num_of_ports!=0. Than bond_3ad_unbind_slave can be executed again for, previously cleared aggregator. NOTE: at this time bond_3ad_unbind_slave will not update slave ports list, because lag_ports==NULL. So, here we got slave ports, pointing to freed aggregator memory. Fix with checking actual number of ports in group (as was before commit 0622cab ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection") ), before ad_clear_agg(). The KASAN logs are as follows: [ 767.617392] ================================================================== [ 767.630776] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470 [ 767.638764] Read of size 2 at addr ffff00011ba9d430 by task kworker/u8:7/767 [ 767.647361] CPU: 3 PID: 767 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G O 5.15.11 #15 [ 767.655329] Hardware name: DNI AmazonGo1 A7040 board (DT) [ 767.660760] Workqueue: lacp_1 bond_3ad_state_machine_handler [ 767.666468] Call trace: [ 767.668930] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 [ 767.672625] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 767.675965] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 [ 767.679659] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b8 [ 767.685451] kasan_report+0x1f0/0x260 [ 767.689148] __asan_load2+0x94/0xd0 [ 767.692667] bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470 Fixes: 0622cab ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection") Co-developed-by: Maksym Glubokiy <maksym.glubokiy@plvision.eu> Signed-off-by: Maksym Glubokiy <maksym.glubokiy@plvision.eu> Signed-off-by: Yevhen Orlov <yevhen.orlov@plvision.eu> Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629012914.361-1-yevhen.orlov@plvision.eu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5a478a653b4cca148d5c89832f007ec0809d7e6d upstream. The irq_of_parse_and_map() returns 0 on failure, not a negative ERRNO. Reported-by: Lv Ruyi <lv.ruyi@zte.com.cn> Fixes: caf6e49 ("NFC: nfcmrvl: add spi driver") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627124048.296253-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eddd95b9423946aaacb55cac6a9b2cea8ab944fc upstream. There are packets which doesn't have a payload. In that case, the second i2c_master_read() will have a zero length. But because the NFC controller doesn't have any data left, it will NACK the I2C read and -ENXIO will be returned. In case there is no payload, just skip the second i2c master read. Fixes: 6be8867 ("NFC: nxp-nci_i2c: Add I2C support to NXP NCI driver") Signed-off-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dbe97cff7dd9f0f75c524afdd55ad46be3d15295 upstream. unmap_grant_pages() currently waits for the pages to no longer be used. In QubesOS/qubes-issues#7481, this lead to a deadlock against i915: i915 was waiting for gntdev's MMU notifier to finish, while gntdev was waiting for i915 to free its pages. I also believe this is responsible for various deadlocks I have experienced in the past. Avoid these problems by making unmap_grant_pages async. This requires making it return void, as any errors will not be available when the function returns. Fortunately, the only use of the return value is a WARN_ON(), which can be replaced by a WARN_ON when the error is detected. Additionally, a failed call will not prevent further calls from being made, but this is harmless. Because unmap_grant_pages is now async, the grant handle will be sent to INVALID_GRANT_HANDLE too late to prevent multiple unmaps of the same handle. Instead, a separate bool array is allocated for this purpose. This wastes memory, but stuffing this information in padding bytes is too fragile. Furthermore, it is necessary to grab a reference to the map before making the asynchronous call, and release the reference when the call returns. It is also necessary to guard against reentrancy in gntdev_map_put(), and to handle the case where userspace tries to map a mapping whose contents have not all been freed yet. Fixes: 7452822 ("xen/gntdev: safely unmap grants in case they are still in use") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220622022726.2538-1-demi@invisiblethingslab.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…dd() fails [ Upstream commit d0e51022a025ca5350fafb8e413a6fe5d4baf833 ] If platform_device_add() fails, it no need to call platform_device_del(), split platform_device_unregister() into platform_device_del/put(), so platform_device_put() can be called separately. Fixes: 8808a79 ("ibmaem: new driver for power/energy/temp meters in IBM System X hardware") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220701074153.4021556-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 284fda1eff8a8b27d2cafd7dc8fb423d13720f21 upstream. Opportunity for min() Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/minmax.cocci CC: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit adabdd8f6acabc0c3fdbba2e7f5a2edd9c5ef22d upstream.
When kcalloc fails, ipip6_tunnel_get_prl() should return -ENOMEM.
Move the position of label "out" to return correctly.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Fixes: 300aaee ("[IPV6] SIT: Add SIOCGETPRL ioctl to get/dump PRL.")
Signed-off-by: katrinzhou <katrinzhou@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet<edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628035030.1039171-1-zys.zljxml@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 08303c1 upstream. [ jgross@suse.com: added as needed by XSA-403 mitigation ] copy_skb_header is renamed to skb_copy_header and exported. Exposing this function give more flexibility in copying SKBs. skb_copy and skb_copy_expand do not give enough control over which parts are copied. Signed-off-by: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2f446ffe9d737e9a844b97887919c4fda18246e7 upstream. When allocating pages to be used for shared communication with the backend always zero them, this avoids leaking unintended data present on the pages. This is CVE-2022-26365, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 307c8de2b02344805ebead3440d8feed28f2f010 upstream. When allocating pages to be used for shared communication with the backend always zero them, this avoids leaking unintended data present on the pages. This is CVE-2022-33740, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4491001c2e0fa69efbb748c96ec96b100a5cdb7e upstream. Bounce all data on the skbs to be transmitted into zeroed pages if the backend is untrusted. This avoids leaking data present in the pages shared with the backend but not part of the skb fragments. This requires introducing a new helper in order to allocate skbs with a size multiple of XEN_PAGE_SIZE so we don't leak contiguous data on the granted pages. Reporting whether the backend is to be trusted can be done using a module parameter, or from the xenstore frontend path as set by the toolstack when adding the device. This is CVE-2022-33741, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2400617da7eebf9167d71a46122828bc479d64c9 upstream. Split the current bounce buffering logic used with persistent grants into it's own option, and allow enabling it independently of persistent grants. This allows to reuse the same code paths to perform the bounce buffering required to avoid leaking contiguous data in shared pages not part of the request fragments. Reporting whether the backend is to be trusted can be done using a module parameter, or from the xenstore frontend path as set by the toolstack when adding the device. This is CVE-2022-33742, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b75cd218274e01d026dc5240e86fdeb44bbed0c8 upstream. During the PV driver life cycle the mappings are added to the RB-tree by set_foreign_p2m_mapping(), which is called from gnttab_map_refs() and are removed by clear_foreign_p2m_mapping() which is called from gnttab_unmap_refs(). As both functions end up calling __set_phys_to_machine_multi() which updates the RB-tree, this function can be called concurrently. There is already a "p2m_lock" to protect against concurrent accesses, but the problem is that the first read of "phys_to_mach.rb_node" in __set_phys_to_machine_multi() is not covered by it, so this might lead to the incorrect mappings update (removing in our case) in RB-tree. In my environment the related issue happens rarely and only when PV net backend is running, the xen_add_phys_to_mach_entry() claims that it cannot add new pfn <-> mfn mapping to the tree since it is already exists which results in a failure when mapping foreign pages. But there might be other bad consequences related to the non-protected root reads such use-after-free, etc. While at it, also fix the similar usage in __pfn_to_mfn(), so initialize "struct rb_node *n" with the "p2m_lock" held in both functions to avoid possible bad consequences. This is CVE-2022-33744 / XSA-406. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8d17a33b076d24aa4861f336a125c888fb918605 upstream. This patch adds support for Telit LN920 0x1060 composition 0x1060: tty, adb, rmnet, tty, tty, tty, tty Signed-off-by: Carlo Lobrano <c.lobrano@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Fabio Porcedda <fabio.porcedda@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 94f2a444f28a649926c410eb9a38afb13a83ebe0 upstream. Add the following Telit FN990 composition: 0x1070: tty, adb, rmnet, tty, tty, tty, tty Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com> Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210095722.22269-1-dnlplm@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Fabio Porcedda <fabio.porcedda@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220705115606.333669144@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Physical bisect midpoint between confirmed boundaries:
Pinned identities:
61371a1024e341f434deaf61b79a05f73827260a705dd8a9d1e74a896a28d1a3efd6ff30fcc4e3b461535bdfee183ea82d3fe4a49b4b05ea710831f01048779a1d7dcf0b5c150188decafa21c19821e43c2ae48eceaa40f1ecb18ba31dda3f6fe755796cThis is a kernel-only physical diagnostic using the same proven architecture as the successful 4.14.283 and 4.14.291 diagnostics. It builds no external modules, permits zero
.kofiles, validates the exact five production DTBs, and emits a compactImage.gz-dtbtest ZIP only after compilation and payload validation pass.Physical classification:
DO NOT MERGE. This PR is diagnostic evidence only; production must not move.