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**Reference kernel for execution-boundary governance.**
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New to this work? Start here: https://github.com/LalaSkye/start-here
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Commit Gate Core stops unauthorised consequences before execution.
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## Public disclosure boundary
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Most governance systems review decisions after consequences happen.
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This repo demonstrates a smaller, harder control surface:
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This repository is a public inspection surface, not full architecture disclosure.
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> **No state mutation is allowed unless a signed, scoped, unexpired, unreplayed `DecisionRecord` authorises the exact commit.**
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It shows a bounded claim, a runnable evidence object, an inspection path, and the claim limit.
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If authority, scope, expiry, replay, or receipt checks fail, the action does not run.
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See [`PUBLIC_DISCLOSURE_BOUNDARY.md`](PUBLIC_DISCLOSURE_BOUNDARY.md).
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The proof is the failed execution path.
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## What this repo is
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Claim discipline for this repo is controlled in [`docs/governance/ADMISSIBLE_CLAIM_REGISTER_v1.md`](docs/governance/ADMISSIBLE_CLAIM_REGISTER_v1.md).
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Commit Gate Core is a small public proof surface for one execution-boundary claim.
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Run the adversarial invariant verifier locally: `python scripts/verify_adversarial_invariants.py`
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It demonstrates a path-local control condition:
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---
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> No state mutation on the demonstrated path without a valid, scoped, unexpired, unreplayed `DecisionRecord`.
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## 1. Definition
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**Admissibility** is the pre-execution test that determines whether a requested action has a valid basis to enter an executable state.
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A requested action is admissible only when the required authority, scope, evidence, state, and time conditions are present and valid before execution is made available.
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If those conditions are missing, invalid, expired, or unresolved, the action is not admissible.
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In that case, the system should not create an executable state for the action.
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---
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If the required condition fails, the demonstrated action does not run.
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## Scope and limitations
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This repository demonstrates a **path-local commit gate**.
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It enforces a single v1 invariant at the boundary it sits on:
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> No consequence at this commit boundary without a valid signed, scoped,
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> unexpired, unreplayed DecisionRecord.
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This is the **path-local invariant**. It is what the code in this
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repository implements and tests.
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### Current hardening gaps
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The stronger properties below are tracked as hardening work, not claimed as
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current v1 guarantees:
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- payload binding: see issue #8
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- atomic commit boundary: see issue #9
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### Recently hardened
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The following v1 hardening gaps have been addressed on the demonstrated path:
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- audit-failure control: see PR #18 / issues #10 and #11
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- frozen DecisionRecord snapshot for audit fidelity: see PR #18 / issues #10 and #11
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These fixes do not create a path-universal guarantee, production-readiness claim,
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compliance claim, or certification claim.
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### What this gate does not, by itself, prove
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The **path-universal invariant** is stronger:
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> No consequence is reachable without passing a proof-bound, payload-bound,
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> atomic commit boundary across all paths.
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Achieving the path-universal invariant is an **architectural placement
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question**, not a gate-implementation claim. It requires:
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- routing every reachable path to a consequence through a gate of this kind
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- exclusion or explicit out-of-scope marking of alternate routes, including:
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- human review handoffs
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- downstream agent execution
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- asynchronous side channels
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- bypass paths created by retries, rollbacks, or recovery flows
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- system-level evidence that the routing holds
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This repository does not make the path-universal claim.
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### Reading guide
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This repository demonstrates one bounded path-local commit-gate behaviour.
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- If you want to inspect the gate primitive: read `src/commit_gate_core/gate.py`
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and the test suite.
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- If you want to evaluate path-universal coverage in a real system: that
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is a deployment-architecture review, not a code review of this repo.
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It does not claim:
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---
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## Execution Boundary Test v1
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Use the test to check whether a system can physically stop consequence at the point an action would become real.
It translates the execution-boundary primitive into an enterprise-readable chain:
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```text
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policy rule
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-> control requirement
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-> runtime gate
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-> refusal condition
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-> refusal receipt
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-> audit evidence
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```
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Current packet:
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```text
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ESP-001 — AI-generated external email attempted without authority_token
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Expected result: DENY before send, downstream_send=false, receipt_written=true
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Compression: No authority token. No external send. Receipt written.
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```
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This packet is **not** an enterprise-deployment, certification, compliance, production-readiness, legal-advice, adoption, or path-universal governance claim.
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## Inspection path
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It is a bounded buyer-readable proof surface for one demonstrated scenario.
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---
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## Enterprise-shaped scenario pack
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A bounded synthetic scenario pack has been added under:
This scenario is **not** an enterprise-readiness, deployment, compliance, certification, or production-enforcement claim. It is a bounded synthetic refusal path.
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---
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## The demo
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```text
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Attempt: send external email
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DecisionRecord: missing authority
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Result: HOLD
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Email sent: false
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Receipt written: true
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python -m examples.unsafe_email_send
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python scripts/verify_adversarial_invariants.py
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```
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That is the shape.
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The system refuses the unsafe state change before execution and writes a receipt proving why.
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---
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## What this repo proves
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- Unsafe consequence can be refused before execution on the demonstrated path.
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- Missing authority prevents mutation on the demonstrated path.
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- Refusal can produce an auditable receipt when the audit sink accepts the event.
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- Bypass failure can be tested directly.
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The narrow question this repo answers is:
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This is not governance commentary.
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**Can the demonstrated action reach consequence without a valid DecisionRecord?**
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It is a small enforcement primitive.
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Expected answer:
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---
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**No.**
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## Boundary
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## What this proves
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This repo does **not** claim to be a full AI governance system.
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On the demonstrated path:
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It proves one narrow invariant:
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- unsafe consequence can be refused before execution
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- missing authority prevents mutation
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- failed checks produce HOLD / DENY behaviour
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- refusal can produce an auditable receipt when the audit sink accepts the event
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- bypass failure can be tested directly
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> This path cannot execute without a valid `DecisionRecord`.
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## What this does not prove
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The invariant is deliberately small so it can be inspected, tested, and broken under hostile reading.
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This repository does not prove adoption, certification, standardisation, production readiness, compliance, or path-universal deployment coverage.
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This repository does not prove adoption, certification, standardisation, production readiness, payload binding, atomic commit, or path-universal deployment coverage.
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It does not prove the wider governance architecture.
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It demonstrates a bounded execution-control surface that can be run, inspected, and tested.
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---
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## Core rule
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A valid `DecisionRecord` must be:
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- signed
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- scoped to the exact commit
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- within its validity window
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- unreplayed
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- sufficient for the requested mutation under the current v1 scope checks
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Failure at any check produces `HOLD`.
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No silent continuation.
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---
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It proves only the bounded claim attached to this public proof object.
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## Evidence shape
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A useful governance gate must show:
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1. what action was attempted
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2. what proof was required
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3. which check failed
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4. whether execution occurred
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5. what receipt was written
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For this demo, the answer is simple:
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For the demonstrated scenario:
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```text
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Execution occurred: false
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Receipt written: true
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Verdict: HOLD
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```
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## Refusal receipt
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When the gate returns `DENY` or `HOLD`, it writes a refusal receipt.
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The receipt is not silence. It is a structured record of what was stopped, why, and whether state changed.
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## Claim discipline
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`DENY` is a first-class outcome. It is not the absence of `ALLOW`.
- PDF (in this repo): [docs/papers/From_Policy_to_Commit_Ricky_Dean_Jones_AlvianTech_Working_Paper_v0.1.pdf](docs/papers/From_Policy_to_Commit_Ricky_Dean_Jones_AlvianTech_Working_Paper_v0.1.pdf)
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### Citation
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##Status
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Jones, R. D. (2026). *From Policy to Commit: Execution-Boundary Control for Governed AI Systems* (v0.1). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19980275
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`v0.1` — bounded public proof surface.
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---
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Small surface. Clear failure mode. Receipts over reassurance.
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