Skip to content

Commit b8425f9

Browse files
committed
adding recursive multimodel notebook and its answers
1 parent e46a172 commit b8425f9

2 files changed

Lines changed: 512 additions & 26 deletions

File tree

2_open_source_models/recursive_multimodel/readme.md

Lines changed: 91 additions & 26 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -137,34 +137,99 @@ This avoids adding hallucinations and ensures correctness.
137137

138138
You can include your own examples below.
139139

140-
### Example 1: [Your Question Here]
140+
### Example: [Summarization]
141141

142142
- **Prompt:**
143-
> **Paste your question here**
144-
145-
- **Draft Answer:**
146-
> **Paste model output here**
147-
148-
- **Critic Response:**
149-
> **Paste critic evaluation here**
150-
151-
- **Refined Answer (Final):**
152-
> **Paste LAmini rewrite here**
153-
154-
- **My Analysis:**
155-
> [Your notes]
156-
157-
---
158-
159-
### Example 2: [Your Question Here]
160-
161-
(Same structure)
162-
163-
---
164-
165-
### Example 3: [Your Question Here]
166-
167-
(Same structure)
143+
> In your own words, describe what happened when the computer alarms
144+
appeared during the landing.
145+
146+
### **Cycle 1:**
147+
148+
- **Draft Answer:**
149+
>As the descent began, Armstrong and Aldrin found themselves
150+
passing landmarks on the surface two or three seconds early. The problem could
151+
have been mascons, concentrations of high mass in a region or regions of the
152+
Moon's crust that contains a gravitational anomaly, potentially altering Eagle's
153+
trajectory. Five minutes into the descent, the burn and 6,000 feet (1,800 m)
154+
above the surface of the moon, the LM guidance computer (LGC) distracted the
155+
crew with the first of several unexpected 1201 and 1202 program alarms. Inside
156+
Mission Control Center, computer engineer Jack Garman told Guidance Officer
157+
Steve Bales it was safe to continue the descent. The program alarm indicated
158+
"executive overflows," meaning the guidance computer could not complete all its
159+
tasks in real-time and had to postpone some of them. Margaret Hamilton, the
160+
Director of Apollo Flight Computer Programming at the MIT Charles Stark Draper
161+
Laboratory later recalled: "To blame the computer for the Apollo 11 problems is
162+
like blaming the person who spots a fire and calls the fire department.
163+
Actually, the computer was programmed to do more than recognize error
164+
conditions. A complete set of recovery programs was incorporated into the
165+
software. The software's action, in this case, was to eliminate lower priority
166+
tasks and re-establish the more important ones. The computer, rather than almost
167+
forcing an abort, prevented an abourt. If the computer hadn't recognized this
168+
problem and took recovery action, I doubt if Apollo 11 would have been the
169+
successful Moon landing it was.
170+
171+
- **Critic Response:**
172+
173+
>- The draft does not accurately describe the computer alarms that appeared
174+
during the landing. The draft should include the specific computer alarms
175+
(1201 and 1202) and the crew's reaction to them.
176+
>- The draft does not mention the specific actions taken by the crew in
177+
response to the computer alarms, such as Armstrong taking semi-automatic control.
178+
>- The draft does not include the details about Mission Control's role in
179+
addressing the alarms and the reassurance given to the crew.
180+
>- The draft does not mention the post-mission analysis showing the real fuel
181+
remaining was probably closer to 50 seconds, which is critical information.
182+
183+
### **Cycle 2:**
184+
185+
- **Draft Answer:**
186+
>The LM guidance computer (LGC) distracted the crew with the first
187+
of several unexpected 1201 and 1202 program alarms during the Apollo 11 mission.
188+
The program alarm indicated "executive overflows," meaning the guidance computer
189+
could not complete all its tasks in real-time and had to postpone some of them.
190+
The recovery programs were incorporated into the software, eliminating lower
191+
priority tasks and re-establishing the more important ones. Margaret Hamilton,
192+
the Director of Apollo Flight Computer Programming at the MIT Charles Stark
193+
Draper Laboratory later recalled that to blame the computer for the Apollo 11,
194+
problems is like blaming the person who spots a fire and calls the fire
195+
department. Actually, the computer was programmed to do more than recognize
196+
error conditions. The software's action, in this case, was to eliminate lower
197+
priority jobs and regain the more significant ones. If the computer hadn't
198+
recognized this problem and took recovery action, I doubt if Apollo 11 would
199+
have been the successful Moon landing it was.
200+
201+
- **Critic Response:**
202+
203+
>- The draft does not mention the specific computer alarms (1201 and 1202)
204+
that appeared during the landing.
205+
>- The draft does not reference the exact timing of the alarms (five minutes
206+
into the descent, 6,000 feet above the surface).
207+
>- The draft does not include the specific actions taken by Mission Control
208+
to address the alarms.
209+
>- The draft does not mention the critical role of the guidance computer in
210+
safely continuing the descent despite the alarms.
211+
>- The draft does not include the perspective of the astronauts experiencing
212+
the alarms.
213+
>- The draft does not provide the exact quote from Jack Garman to Steve Bales.
214+
>- The draft does not mention Margaret Hamilton's role or her specific
215+
recollection of the event.
216+
217+
- **Refined Answer (Final):**
218+
219+
>The LM guidance computer (LGC) distracted the crew with the first
220+
of several unexpected 1201 and 1202 program alarms during the Apollo 11 mission.
221+
The program alarm indicated "executive overflows," meaning the guidance computer
222+
could not complete all its tasks in real-time and had to postpone some of them.
223+
The recovery programs were incorporated into the software, eliminating lower
224+
priority tasks and re-establishing the more important ones. Margaret Hamilton,
225+
the Director of Apollo Flight Computer Programming at the MIT Charles Stark
226+
Draper Laboratory later recalled that to blame the computer for the Apollo 11,
227+
problems is like blaming the person who spots a fire and calls the fire
228+
department. Actually, the computer was programmed to do more than recognize
229+
error conditions. The software's action, in this case, was to eliminate lower
230+
priority jobs and regain the more significant ones. If the computer hadn't
231+
recognized this problem and took recovery action, I doubt if Apollo 11 would
232+
have been the successful Moon landing it was.
168233

169234
---
170235

0 commit comments

Comments
 (0)