Depone is the non-executing verifier and evidence-contract source of truth. It re-derives verdicts offline from signed evidence bytes. It never launches workers, mutates worktrees, executes recipes, or calls live APIs.

Depone verifies; witnessd executes; ORRO exposes the workflow.

Depone is pre-1.0. Only the latest published release is supported.

There is no LTS line yet. Once Depone reaches 1.0, this table will be revisited with a real support window.

Report privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository: Security → Report a vulnerability on Moonweave-Systems/Depone. If private vulnerability reporting is not enabled when you go to file a report, open a minimal, non-sensitive placeholder issue asking a maintainer to enable it, and hold the details until it is.

Do not open a public issue or pull request for a vulnerability report. Do not post exploit details, sensitive evidence bundles, or signing material in any public channel.

Depone is pre-1.0 and maintained without a formal SLA. Best effort: an acknowledgement within a few business days of a private report. Timelines for triage, fix, and release depend on severity and maintainer availability, and will be communicated in the report thread as they firm up.

We ask for a reasonable embargo period while a fix or mitigation is prepared and released. We will credit reporters in the fix notes unless the reporter asks not to be named. Please do not publicly disclose details before a fix or mitigation is available, or before we've agreed on a disclosure date.

High severity — anything that lets Depone assert a verdict the evidence does not support:

• Verdict-soundness bugs: the verifier returns pass or A2 assurance for evidence that should be blocked or refuted.
• Canonical-hash or DSSE/signature verification bypass: evidence that should fail hash or signature checks is accepted anyway.
• Trust-root confusion: a forged, copied, or stale verdict is accepted as if it were freshly and correctly derived.
• Isolation / observer re-derivation gaps: re-derivation accepts runner-writable observer paths instead of the isolated, tamper-evident paths it is supposed to require.
• Fail-open paths: any path that should fail-closed on missing, malformed, or ambiguous input instead proceeds as if the input were valid.

Lower severity — documentation errors, non-security bugs, CLI ergonomics, error-message clarity, and similar issues. File these as normal (public) issues rather than security reports, unless they hint at one of the high severity categories above.

Do not include secrets, private keys, signing material, tokens, or live credentials in a report. If a report needs to demonstrate a problem with real evidence, prefer evidence paths and redacted excerpts over raw bundles or full command output. Secret-looking material in a report is not, by itself, proof of anything — describe what the bytes show and how to reproduce the derivation.

Depone is non-executing. It does not:

• run workers or execute verification recipes,
• mutate worktrees,
• call live MCP servers, SaaS APIs, databases, or other external services, or
• approve merges.

Depone only decides what persisted, signed evidence bytes support, offline, using its own re-derivation. Its assurance vocabulary (A0 / A1 / A2) reflects what was actually re-derived from those bytes — nothing else counts as evidence.

Security reports must not ask Depone to reinterpret missing, failed, stale, or forged evidence as pass, and must not ask it to upgrade assurance based on prose, model confidence, skill text, MCP tool output, or operator intent. None of those are evidence Depone can verify; treating them as such would be the vulnerability, not the fix.

• Requests to treat wrapper artifacts, run reports, handoff prose, or agent session transcripts as proof of anything Depone hasn't independently re-derived from signed evidence bytes.
• Theoretical gaps already tracked on the roadmap, such as AAL-4 assurance or transparency-log support, unless you can show a concrete exploitable path today.
• Bugs in the witnessd runtime (the execution engine) or in third-party adapters/integrations, rather than in Depone's own verification logic. Report those against the relevant repository instead.
• General reliability, performance, or usability issues with no security impact — file these as normal issues.