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Submit case: LiteLLM PyPI Supply Chain Poisoning (2026) #3

@Y0uYuGe

Description

@Y0uYuGe

Case title (English, concise) / 英文标题

LiteLLM PyPI Supply Chain Poisoning

中文标题(可选)

LiteLLM PyPI 供应链投毒事件

Submission bucket / 投稿类型

case (confirmed)

Risk category / 风险类别

supply-chain — Hallucination & Supply Chain

Severity / 严重度

high

Severity basis / 严重度依据

quantifiable-impact

CVE (if any)

N/A

AI tools involved / 涉及的 AI 工具

LiteLLM

TL;DR (one sentence) / 一句话摘要

Malicious LiteLLM 1.82.7/1.82.8 PyPI releases stole credentials and added host or Kubernetes persistence.

References / 参考来源

https://futuresearch.ai/blog/litellm-pypi-supply-chain-attack/
https://www.ionix.io/threat-center/litellm-supply-chain-compromise-backdoored-pypi-packages-1-82-7-1-82-8/
https://www.bitsight.com/blog/litellm-versions-1-82-7-1-82-8-supply-chain-compromise
https://www.itpro.com/security/litellm-pypi-compromise-everything-we-know-so-far
https://developer.aliyun.com/article/1719859

AI-attribution evidence / AI 参与证据

This is an AI toolchain supply-chain incident rather than a confirmed case of AI-generated code introducing a vulnerability. The public evidence links the incident to LiteLLM, a Python LLM gateway commonly used to route requests to OpenAI, Anthropic, Azure, Vertex AI and other model providers. The risk is AI-specific because the poisoned dependency sits in AI application infrastructure and may expose model API keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes credentials, and other secrets used by AI services.

Details / 详情

On 2026-03-24, public security reports disclosed that LiteLLM versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI had been maliciously published or compromised. The reported malicious behavior included Python startup-hook execution, credential and host information collection, encrypted exfiltration, persistence on regular hosts, and Kubernetes-oriented persistence or lateral movement behavior.

LiteLLM is often deployed as a unified LLM gateway in production environments. It may hold API keys for multiple model providers, cloud credentials, database connection strings, and Kubernetes service credentials. Therefore, a poisoned LiteLLM package can affect more than a local development environment. It may expose credentials used by downstream AI applications and infrastructure.

A draft PR with the normalized case files has been prepared here:

#2

Pre-flight self-check / 投稿前自查

  • I have personally opened each reference URL and confirmed it loads and says what I claim it says. / 我已逐条 fetch 过 URL 并确认内容与所声称的一致。
  • I have not conflated a controlled experiment / red-team test / hypothetical scenario with a real disclosed incident. / 我没有把研究 / 红队测试 / 假设场景包装成真实事件。
  • Loss / scope figures cited are from a primary source (or labelled clearly as estimates). / 引用的损失或规模数字来自一手来源(或明确标注为估计)。
  • I understand the repository is licensed under CC BY 4.0 and consent to my submission being licensed under the same terms. / 我理解本仓库使用 CC BY 4.0 协议,并同意以同样条款贡献内容。

How would you like to be credited? / 您希望如何署名?

Y0uYuGe

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