Update dependency @angular/platform-server to v21.2.9 [SECURITY]

[SuperSandroBot]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
@angular/platform-server (source)	21.2.8 -> 21.2.9

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-41423

Impact

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in @angular/platform-server due to improper handling of URLs during Server-Side Rendering (SSR).

When an attacker sends a request such as GET /\evil.com/ HTTP/1.1 the server engine (Express, etc.) passes the URL string to Angular’s rendering functions.

Because the URL parser normalizes the backslash to a forward slash for HTTP/HTTPS schemes, the internal state of the application is hijacked to believe the current origin is evil.com. This misinterpretation tricks the application into treating the attacker’s domain as the local origin. Consequently, any relative HttpClient requests or PlatformLocation.hostname references are redirected to the attacker controlled server, potentially exposing internal APIs or metadata services.

Affected APIs:

• renderModule
• renderApplication
• CommonEngine (from @angular/ssr)

Non-Affected APIs:

• AngularAppEngine (from @angular/ssr)
• AngularNodeAppEngine (from @angular/ssr)

Attack Preconditions

• The server has outbound network access.
• The application uses Angular SSR via the affected APIs.
• A pathname is passed as URL to the rendering method (e.g. using req.url).
• The server-side code performs HTTP requests using HttpClient with relative URLs or uses PlatformLocation.hostname to build URLs.

Patches

• 22.0.0-next.8
• 21.2.9
• 20.3.19
• 19.2.21

Workarounds

Developers should implement a middleware to sanitize the request URL before it reaches Angular. This involves stripping or normalizing leading slashes:

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  // Sanitize the URL to ensure it starts with a single forward slash
  if (req.url.startsWith('//') || req.url.startsWith('/\\') || req.url.startsWith('\\')) {
     req.url = '/' + req.url.replace(/^[/\\]+/, '');
  }
  next();
});

References

• Fix

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Angular: SSRF via protocol-relative and backslash URLs in Angular Platform-Server

CVE-2026-41423 / GHSA-45q2-gjvg-7973

More information

Details

Impact

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in @angular/platform-server due to improper handling of URLs during Server-Side Rendering (SSR).

When an attacker sends a request such as GET /\evil.com/ HTTP/1.1 the server engine (Express, etc.) passes the URL string to Angular’s rendering functions.

Because the URL parser normalizes the backslash to a forward slash for HTTP/HTTPS schemes, the internal state of the application is hijacked to believe the current origin is evil.com. This misinterpretation tricks the application into treating the attacker’s domain as the local origin. Consequently, any relative HttpClient requests or PlatformLocation.hostname references are redirected to the attacker controlled server, potentially exposing internal APIs or metadata services.

Affected APIs:

• renderModule
• renderApplication
• CommonEngine (from @angular/ssr)

Non-Affected APIs:

• AngularAppEngine (from @angular/ssr)
• AngularNodeAppEngine (from @angular/ssr)

Attack Preconditions

• The server has outbound network access.
• The application uses Angular SSR via the affected APIs.
• A pathname is passed as URL to the rendering method (e.g. using req.url).
• The server-side code performs HTTP requests using HttpClient with relative URLs or uses PlatformLocation.hostname to build URLs.

Patches

• 22.0.0-next.8
• 21.2.9
• 20.3.19
• 19.2.21

Workarounds

Developers should implement a middleware to sanitize the request URL before it reaches Angular. This involves stripping or normalizing leading slashes:

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  // Sanitize the URL to ensure it starts with a single forward slash
  if (req.url.startsWith('//') || req.url.startsWith('/\\') || req.url.startsWith('\\')) {
     req.url = '/' + req.url.replace(/^[/\\]+/, '');
  }
  next();
});

References

• Fix

Severity

• CVSS Score: Unknown
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-45q2-gjvg-7973
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41423
• https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/68194
• https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/ede7c58a2aa13fdccc8f0b67ce93ba1c11749412
• https://github.com/angular/angular

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Release Notes

angular/angular (@​angular/platform-server)

v21.2.9

Compare Source

core

Commit	Type	Description
f603d4714f	fix	escape forward slashes in transfer state to prevent crawler indexing

http

Commit	Type	Description
540536c386	fix	add CSP nonce support to JsonpClientBackend
63a857b874	fix	Don't on Passthru outside of reactive context

platform-server

Commit	Type	Description
e0b5078cf2	fix	prevent SSRF bypasses via protocol-relative and backslash URLs

router

Commit	Type	Description
684e9fd53d	fix	normalize multiple leading slashes in URL parser

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