diff --git a/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.md b/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.md
index 96045cdee6..cb3c1a910f 100644
--- a/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.md
+++ b/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.md
@@ -245,11 +245,11 @@ Error disclosure can also be used as a discrepancy factor, consult the [error ha
 
 There are a number of different types of automated attacks that attackers can use to try and compromise user accounts. The most common types are listed below:
 
-| Attack Type | Description |
-|-------------|-------------|
-| Brute Force | Testing multiple passwords from a dictionary or other source against a single account. |
-| Credential Stuffing | Testing username/password pairs obtained from the breach of another site. |
-| Password Spraying | Testing a single weak password against a large number of different accounts.|
+| Attack Type         | Description                                                                                      |
+|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Brute Force         | Testing multiple passwords from a dictionary or other source against a single account.           |
+| Credential Stuffing | Testing username/password pairs obtained from the breach of another site.                        |
+| Password Spraying   | Testing a single weak password against a large number of different accounts.                     |
 
 Different protection mechanisms can be implemented to protect against these attacks. In many cases, these defenses do not provide complete protection, but when a number of them are implemented in a defense-in-depth approach, a reasonable level of protection can be achieved.
 
@@ -341,7 +341,13 @@ UAF takes advantage of existing security technologies present on devices for aut
 
 U2F augments password-based authentication using a hardware token (typically USB) that stores cryptographic authentication keys and uses them for signing. The user can use the same token as a second factor for multiple applications. U2F works with web applications. It provides **protection against phishing** by using the URL of the website to look up the stored authentication key.
 
-**FIDO2**: FIDO2 and WebAuthn, encompassing previous standards (UAF/U2F), form the foundation of modern **Passkeys** technology. Passkeys enable users to securely log in using local user verification (such as biometrics or device PINs) and often supporting cloud synchronization across devices. This technology is widely supported by major platforms. (Windows Hello/Mac Touch ID)
+**FIDO2**: FIDO2 and WebAuthn, encompassing previous standards (UAF/U2F), form the foundation of modern **Passkeys** technology. Passkeys enable users to securely log in using local user verification (such as biometrics or device PINs), often with credential synchronization across devices.
+
+#### Hardware-backed Key Storage
+
+For many authenticators, including common platform passkeys, the private key is generated and stored by the operating system's secure key manager. Depending on the platform and authenticator, keys may be protected using hardware-backed components such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) on Windows, Secure Enclave on Apple devices, or the Android Keystore/StrongBox on Android, or by other software-based mechanisms.
+
+In typical implementations, the private key is intended to be non-exportable and bound to the authenticator, and the platform security module signs a server challenge using this key. However, some authenticators support credential synchronization or backup that may involve export or server-side storage, and not all implementations are hardware-backed. Relying parties should not assume that keys are hardware-backed and non-exportable unless this is verified (for example, via authenticator properties or attestation).
 
 ## Password Managers