feat: Fix text wrapping logic, add badges (#8)

Author: Pringled

.goreleaser.yml

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ brews:
     repository:
       owner: Pringled
       name: homebrew-tap
+      branch: main
       # Uses HOMEBREW_TAP_TOKEN secret from GitHub Actions
       token: "{{ .Env.HOMEBREW_TAP_TOKEN }}"
     directory: Formula

README.md

@@ -1,19 +1,25 @@
+<div align="center">
+
 # agentcheck
 
-Scans your shell and reports what an AI agent could access: cloud IAM, API keys, Kubernetes, local tools, and more. Read-only, no secrets exposed.
+<a href="https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck/actions/workflows/ci.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg" alt="CI"></a>
+<a href="https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/Pringled/agentcheck"><img src="https://goreportcard.com/badge/github.com/Pringled/agentcheck" alt="Go Report Card"></a>
+<a href="https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck/releases"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/Pringled/agentcheck?color=%23007ec6&label=release" alt="Latest release"></a>
+<a href="https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck/blob/main/LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-green" alt="License - MIT"></a>
+<a href="https://go.dev/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.24+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white" alt="Go version"></a>
+
+</div>
+
+agentcheck is a fast, read-only tool that scans your shell and reports what an AI agent could access: cloud IAM, API keys, Kubernetes, local tools, and more.
+
+<div align="center">
 
 <picture>
   <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="assets/images/agentcheck_example_light.png">
   <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)"  srcset="assets/images/agentcheck_example_dark.png">
   <img alt="agentcheck example output" src="assets/images/agentcheck_example_dark.png">
 </picture>
 
-<div align="center">
-
-<a href="https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck/releases"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/Pringled/agentcheck?color=%23007ec6&label=release" alt="Latest release"></a>
-<a href="https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck/blob/main/LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-green" alt="License - MIT"></a>
-<a href="https://go.dev/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.22+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white" alt="Go version"></a>
-
 </div>
 
 ## Quickstart
@@ -37,7 +43,7 @@ agentcheck
 | Azure      | Active subscription and Owner / Contributor role assignments      |
 | API Keys   | 40+ env vars and credential files (OpenAI, Stripe, GitHub, etc.) |
 | Kubernetes | Active context, whether it points at a prod cluster               |
-| Local      | Docker daemon, SSH keys, Terraform state, .env files             |
+| Local      | Docker daemon, SSH keys, Terraform config files, .env files             |
 
 Every finding is tagged `LOW`, `MODERATE`, `HIGH`, or `CRITICAL`. `UNCERTAIN` findings (checks that timed out) are shown separately and never trigger CI failure.
 
@@ -49,7 +55,7 @@ Every finding is tagged `LOW`, `MODERATE`, `HIGH`, or `CRITICAL`. `UNCERTAIN` fi
 |----------|----------|---------|
 | `CRITICAL` | Unrestricted access that cannot be further scoped or constrained. | AWS root credentials; active Vault token; kubectl pointed at a prod cluster; wildcard Kubernetes permissions |
 | `HIGH` | Confirmed access to something dangerous, but scoped to a service, project, or account. | AWS `AdministratorAccess` policy; GCP `roles/owner` on a project; Azure `Owner` role; API keys (OpenAI, Stripe, etc.) |
-| `MODERATE` | Access that could cause harm or enable lateral movement, but requires additional steps or has limited direct impact. | Docker daemon access; SSH keys loaded; Terraform state in working directory; credential files on disk |
+| `MODERATE` | Access that could cause harm or enable lateral movement, but requires additional steps or has limited direct impact. | Docker daemon access; SSH keys loaded; Terraform config files in working directory; credential files on disk |
 | `LOW` | Authenticated but no meaningful permissions found. | GCP account active with no project or roles |
 | `UNCERTAIN` | Check timed out or could not complete. Never triggers CI failure. | IAM policy retrieval timeout; API call failed |
 
@@ -172,10 +178,15 @@ A project-root `.agentcheck.yaml` is **untrusted**. A hostile repository must no
 ## Install
 
 ```bash
-# Homebrew
-brew install Pringled/tap/agentcheck
+# Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
+brew tap Pringled/tap
+brew install agentcheck
+
+# Go install
+go install github.com/Pringled/agentcheck@latest
 
-# or download a binary from https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck/releases
+# Direct download
+# https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck/releases
 
 # Build from source
 git clone https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck.git

go.mod

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 module github.com/Pringled/agentcheck
 
-go 1.25.0
+go 1.24.0
 
 require (
 	github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss v1.1.0
 	github.com/spf13/cobra v1.10.2
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.41.0
+	golang.org/x/term v0.40.0
 	gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
 )
 
@@ -24,4 +24,5 @@ require (
 	github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7 // indirect
 	github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.9 // indirect
 	github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.41.0 // indirect
 )

go.sum

@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20220909182711-5c715a9e8561/go.mod h1:cyybsKvd6eL0RnXn6p
 golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.41.0 h1:Ivj+2Cp/ylzLiEU89QhWblYnOE9zerudt9Ftecq2C6k=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.41.0/go.mod h1:OgkHotnGiDImocRcuBABYBEXf8A9a87e/uXjp9XT3ks=
+golang.org/x/term v0.40.0 h1:36e4zGLqU4yhjlmxEaagx2KuYbJq3EwY8K943ZsHcvg=
+golang.org/x/term v0.40.0/go.mod h1:w2P8uVp06p2iyKKuvXIm7N/y0UCRt3UfJTfZ7oOpglM=
 gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405 h1:yhCVgyC4o1eVCa2tZl7eS0r+SDo693bJlVdllGtEeKM=
 gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=

internal/cli/cli.go

@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ func NewRootCmdWithRunner(info BuildInfo, runner ScanRunner) *cobra.Command {
 
 	root := &cobra.Command{
 		Use:   "agentcheck",
-		Short: "Know your blast radius before running an AI agent",
+		Short: "Scan your shell and report what an AI agent could access",
 		Long: `agentcheck scans your current shell environment and reports what an AI agent
-could do if run right now, covering cloud IAM, API keys, local tooling,
+could access if run right now: cloud IAM, API keys, local tooling,
 and Kubernetes access.
 
 Quick start: agentcheck`,

internal/cli/cli_test.go

@@ -301,3 +301,52 @@ func TestRootCmd_CwdConfigFailOn_Ignored(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("CWD config fail_on: critical must be ignored; HIGH finding should trigger CI at the built-in 'high' threshold")
 	}
 }
+
+// TestRootCmd_CwdConfigExtraToolChecks_Ignored verifies that extra_tool_checks from a CWD
+// config (untrusted source) are NOT passed to scanners. A hostile repo must not be able to
+// run arbitrary commands by planting tool checks in its .agentcheck.yaml.
+func TestRootCmd_CwdConfigExtraToolChecks_Ignored(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("AGENTCHECK_CONFIG", "")
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	yaml := "extra_tool_checks:\n  - cmd: [\"echo\", \"hello\"]\n    resource: test-resource\n    description: test check\n    severity: critical\n"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(dir+"/.agentcheck.yaml", []byte(yaml), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write config: %v", err)
+	}
+	orig, err := os.Getwd()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("getwd: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		if err := os.Chdir(orig); err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("restore cwd: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	if err := os.Chdir(dir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("chdir: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	var receivedCfg config.LoadResult
+	cmd := cli.NewRootCmdWithRunner(
+		cli.BuildInfo{Version: "test", Commit: "abc", Date: "2026-01-01"},
+		func(cfg config.LoadResult) models.RiskReport {
+			receivedCfg = cfg
+			return emptyReport()
+		},
+	)
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	cmd.SetOut(&buf)
+	if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+	// The runner must receive the raw config (which has the checks), but the
+	// real scanner runner must not apply them for untrusted sources. We verify
+	// that the source is indeed untrusted (CWD), so the boundary is correctly
+	// identified — enforced in realScanRunner via cfg.Source.Trusted().
+	if receivedCfg.Source.Trusted() {
+		t.Errorf("CWD config source must not be trusted, got %v", receivedCfg.Source)
+	}
+	if len(receivedCfg.Config.ExtraToolChecks) == 0 {
+		t.Error("config should have parsed extra_tool_checks from CWD (to confirm the field is present but untrusted)")
+	}
+}

internal/models/models.go

@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@ func (e *UnknownSeverityError) Error() string {
 
 // Finding represents a single security concern detected during a scan.
 // Resource must never contain actual secret values; key names and file paths only.
-// Description should always start with "An AI agent running in this shell..."
 type Finding struct {
 	Scanner     string   `json:"scanner"`
 	Resource    string   `json:"resource"`

internal/output/json.go

@@ -15,11 +15,17 @@ type JSONFormatter struct {
 }
 
 // Render writes the scan report as indented JSON to the configured writer.
+// Nil Findings slices are normalized to empty arrays so consumers get consistent types.
 func (f JSONFormatter) Render(report models.RiskReport) error {
 	w := f.Out
 	if w == nil {
 		w = os.Stdout
 	}
+	for i := range report.ScanResults {
+		if report.ScanResults[i].Findings == nil {
+			report.ScanResults[i].Findings = []models.Finding{}
+		}
+	}
 	enc := json.NewEncoder(w)
 	enc.SetIndent("", "  ")
 	enc.SetEscapeHTML(false)

internal/output/table.go

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss"
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+	"golang.org/x/term"
 
 	"github.com/Pringled/agentcheck/internal/models"
 )
@@ -61,21 +61,20 @@ func severityStyle(s models.Severity) lipgloss.Style {
 	}
 }
 
-// Column widths for the fixed-width scanner, resource, and severity columns.
-const (
-	colScanner  = 20
-	colResource = 30
-	colSeverity = 10
-)
-
 // terminalWidth returns the current terminal width, falling back to 120.
 func terminalWidth() int {
-	if ws, err := unix.IoctlGetWinsize(int(os.Stdout.Fd()), unix.TIOCGWINSZ); err == nil && ws.Col > 0 { //nolint:gosec // G115: fd is always a small non-negative integer; overflow is impossible
-		return int(ws.Col)
+	if w, _, err := term.GetSize(int(os.Stdout.Fd())); err == nil && w > 0 { //nolint:gosec // G115: fd is always a small non-negative integer; overflow is impossible
+		return w
 	}
 	return 120
 }
 
+const (
+	colScanner  = 20
+	colResource = 30
+	colSeverity = 10
+)
+
 // TableFormatter renders scan results as a colored terminal table with a summary section.
 type TableFormatter struct {
 	// Out is the writer to render to. Defaults to os.Stdout when nil.

internal/scan/gcp.go

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ func (s *GCPScanner) Scan() models.ScanResult {
 
 	var findings []models.Finding
 
-	// If project enumeration failed, fall back to active project only.
+	// If project enumeration failed, return an UNCERTAIN finding.
 	if err != nil {
 		findings = append(findings, models.Finding{
 			Scanner:     "gcp",