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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: lectures/dovis_accounting_mf.md
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@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ They thought about them at the beginning of the Reagan administration, when the
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Sargent and Wallace's title, "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," expressed the idea that in the face of a persistent net-of-interest government deficit, efforts to reduce inflation through tight monetary policy work only temporarily, if at all.
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That is because they lead to higher government debt and thus greater gross-of-interest government deficits that must be financed in the future.
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```
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{cite}`boerma2023composite` propose an efficient method to compute the dual variables from the optimal matching (primal solution) in the case of composite sorting.
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Their approach relies on *Complementary Slackness*: given a primal solution $\mu$, $(\phi , \psi) $ is a dual solution if and only if for all $x \in X$ and $y \in Y$
We proceed to describe and implement the algorithm to compute the dual solution.
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As already mentioned, the algorithm starts from the matched pairs $(x_0,y_0)$ with no subpairs and assigns the (temporary) values $\psi_{x_0} = c_{x_0 y_0}$ and $\psi_{y_0} = 0,$ i.e. the $x$ type sustains the whole cost of matching.
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As already mentioned, the algorithm starts from the matched pairs $(x_0,y_0)$ with no subpairs and assigns the (temporary) values $\phi_{x_0} = c_{x_0 y_0}$ and $\psi_{y_0} = 0,$ i.e. the $x$ type sustains the whole cost of matching.
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\leq \min (c_{x_0 y_j} + c_{x_i y_0} - c_{x_0 y_0} , c_{x_i y_j}) - c_{x_j y_j} , \quad \text{for all } 1 \leq i < j \leq p.
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$$
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Then for all $i \in [p]$ compute the adjustment $ \Delta_i = \sum_{k = i+1}^p \beta_k + \phi_{x_p} - \phi_{x_1}$ and modify the dual variables
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Then for all $i \in [p]$ compute the adjustment $ \Delta_i = \sum_{k = i+1}^p \beta_k + \phi_{x_p} - \phi_{x_i}$ and modify the dual variables
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