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feat(cli,sdk): qwen serve daemon (Stage 1) (#3889)
* feat(cli): scaffold `qwen serve` HTTP daemon (Stage 1, #3803) Adds a `serve` subcommand that boots an Express 5 listener with bearer auth, host allowlist, and CORS modeled on `vscode-ide-companion/src/ ide-server.ts`. Ships only `/health` and `/capabilities` to begin with; session/prompt/event routes will land in follow-up PRs once the per- session ACP child-process bridge in `httpAcpBridge.ts` is wired. Defaults to 127.0.0.1 with auth disabled so local development needs no configuration. Binding beyond loopback (e.g. `--hostname 0.0.0.0`) refuses to start without a token (`--token` or `QWEN_SERVER_TOKEN`). Capabilities envelope versioned at v=1 with a `features` array — clients should gate UI off `features`, never off `mode`, so subsequent PRs can add capability tags without breaking older clients. Per design issue's Stage 1 scope (~700-1000 LOC). Adds ~430 LOC of implementation + tests in this scaffold; the remaining budget belongs to the route wiring + bridge implementation in follow-ups. * feat(cli): wire HttpAcpBridge + POST /session for `qwen serve` (#3803) Stage 1 follow-up to the scaffold. Implements the bridge between the HTTP daemon and the existing ACP child agent, plus the first session endpoint. `HttpAcpBridge.spawnOrAttach`: - Spawns `node $cliEntry --acp` per workspace via an injectable `ChannelFactory` (default uses `process.argv[1]`; tests use an in-memory `TransformStream` pair so they don't fork real processes). - Drives the ACP `initialize` + `newSession` handshake via the SDK's `ClientSideConnection`, with a 10s timeout that kills the channel. - Under `sessionScope: 'single'` (default), reuses the live session when the same canonical workspace cwd is requested again — backs the `attached: true` flag. - The `Client` impl on the bridge side proxies file reads/writes to local fs (daemon and agent share the host) and buffers `sessionUpdate` notifications for the SSE wiring in the next PR. `requestPermission` returns `cancelled` until the `/permission/:requestId` route lands. `POST /session`: - 400 on missing or relative `cwd`. - 200 with `{sessionId, workspaceCwd, attached}` on success. - 500 on bridge failure (the failing channel is killed, not leaked). `runQwenServe` constructs the bridge and ties `bridge.shutdown()` into the listener-close path so SIGINT/SIGTERM drain children before the socket closes. Tests (14 new, 0 regressions in the 4967-test baseline): - 9 bridge cases over an in-memory channel — fresh spawn, single-scope reuse, cross-workspace isolation, thread-scope independence, path canonicalization, relative-path rejection, init failure cleanup, init timeout, multi-channel shutdown. - 4 route cases for /session (missing/relative/200/500). - 1 lifecycle case asserting `runQwenServe.close()` calls `bridge.shutdown()` before closing the listener. Verified end-to-end: `qwen serve` boots, `POST /session` spawns a real `qwen --acp` child and returns the SDK-assigned `sessionId`, repeat calls under the same cwd return `attached: true`, `SIGTERM` reaps the child along with the listener. * feat(cli): wire POST /session/:id/prompt + /cancel for `qwen serve` (#3803) Stage 1 follow-up after the bridge scaffold. Adds the two routes a client needs to actually run a turn against the daemon. Bridge: - `sendPrompt(sessionId, req)` looks up the session, FIFO-queues the call against the per-session prompt queue, and forwards through the SDK `ClientSideConnection.prompt`. Concurrent calls observe ACP's "one active prompt per session" invariant — second waits for first. - A failed prompt does NOT poison the queue; the tail catches and keeps draining so the next caller still runs (the original caller still sees its own rejection). - `cancelSession(sessionId, req?)` bypasses the queue and forwards the ACP notification immediately. ACP semantics: the agent winds down the *currently active* prompt; queued work is unaffected. - Both methods throw `SessionNotFoundError` (a typed Error subclass) when the id is unknown so route handlers can map cleanly to 404 without brittle message matching. - Both methods overwrite the `sessionId` field in the request body with the routing id — a stale or spoofed body would otherwise be dispatched to the wrong agent process. Routes: - `POST /session/:id/prompt` → 200 with PromptResponse, 400 on missing/non-array prompt, 404 on unknown session, 500 on agent error. - `POST /session/:id/cancel` → 204 always (cancel is a notification), 404 on unknown session. Tests (14 new — 7 bridge + 7 route, 0 regressions in the 4981 baseline): - sendPrompt: success forwards & returns response · routing-id overrides body sessionId · concurrent prompts FIFO-serialize (verified via per-prompt start/end ordering with a release latch) · failed prompt doesn't block subsequent prompts · 404 for unknown id. - cancelSession: forwards with routing id · 404 for unknown id. - Routes: 200/400/404/500 paths for prompt; 204 with body or empty + 404 for cancel. Verified end-to-end against a real `qwen --acp` child: - POST /session/:id/prompt with `[{type:'text',text:'hi'}]` → 200 `{"stopReason":"end_turn"}` in ~3.4s. - POST /session/:id/cancel → 204. - POST /session/does-not-exist/prompt → 404 with the unknown id surfaced in the body. * feat(cli): wire SSE streaming for `qwen serve` events (#3803) Stage 1 follow-up that turns prompt into a real streaming experience. Replaces the in-memory `notifications: SessionNotification[]` buffer on each session with a per-session EventBus and exposes it through `GET /session/:id/events` as an `text/event-stream` SSE feed. EventBus (`packages/cli/src/serve/eventBus.ts`): - Monotonic per-session ids (`v: 1` schema). Each `publish` chains an id, returning the materialized BridgeEvent. - Bounded ring (default 1000) backs `Last-Event-ID` reconnect — a consumer that drops can resume from `lastEventId` and replay any still-buffered events before live events flow. - Per-subscriber bounded queue (default 256). When a slow consumer overruns its queue, the bus appends a synthetic `client_evicted` terminal frame and closes that subscription so it can't hold the daemon hostage. Other subscribers are unaffected. - `subscribe()` returns an AsyncIterable — registration is synchronous so events `publish`ed immediately after the subscribe land in the queue (a generator-style implementation deferred registration to first `next()` and raced with publishes). - AbortSignal-aware: aborting the signal closes the iterator promptly. Bridge (`httpAcpBridge.ts`): - `BridgeClient.sessionUpdate` now publishes onto the session's EventBus instead of pushing to a plain array — every ACP notification the agent emits becomes a stream event automatically. - New `subscribeEvents(sessionId, opts?)` returns the bus's AsyncIterable; throws `SessionNotFoundError` for unknown ids. - Shutdown closes every live event bus before killing channels so pending consumers unwind cleanly. Route (`server.ts`): - `GET /session/:id/events` sets the SSE content type, advertises a 3s reconnect hint, and writes a 15s heartbeat comment frame to keep proxy/NAT connections alive. - Forwards the `Last-Event-ID` header to the bus. - `req.on('close')` triggers an AbortController that propagates into the bridge subscription so disconnects don't leak subscribers. - 404 when the bridge can't find the session. Capabilities envelope: `STAGE1_FEATURES` now advertises `session_create`, `session_prompt`, `session_cancel`, `session_events` in addition to `health`/`capabilities` so clients can light up UI for the routes that have actually shipped. Tests (16 new, 0 regressions in the 4995 baseline): - 9 EventBus unit cases — id sequencing, live delivery, replay, replay+live splice, fan-out to N subscribers, eviction on overflow, abort-signal unsubscribe, bus.close() drains subscribers, ring-size eviction. - 4 bridge subscribe cases — 404, sessionUpdate→event publishing via real ACP fake-agent, shutdown closes live subscriptions. - 4 SSE route cases against a live HTTP listener — frame format, Last-Event-ID forwarding, 404, abort propagation on disconnect. Verified end-to-end against a real `qwen --acp` child: - Subscribed to `/session/$SID/events`, fired `POST /session/$SID/prompt` with text content. Captured 13 distinct `event: session_update` SSE frames in real time during the model's response — `available_ commands_update` metadata, 9 `agent_thought_chunk` frames carrying the model's chain-of-thought, 3 `agent_message_chunk` frames with the actual reply, and a final usage frame with token totals. - Frames carry monotonic ids 1..13, the daemon-side counter, and are valid SSE per the EventSource spec. * feat(cli): wire POST /permission/:requestId for `qwen serve` (#3803) Stage 1 follow-up that turns `BridgeClient.requestPermission` from a hardcoded `cancelled` placeholder into a real first-responder vote loop, and ships the HTTP route any attached client uses to cast the deciding vote. Bridge: - `requestPermission` generates a UUID requestId, registers a pending entry on a daemon-wide map (and the owning session's `pendingPermissionIds` set), publishes a `permission_request` event onto the session's EventBus (so SSE subscribers see it), and awaits the resolution. - New `respondToPermission(requestId, response)` resolves the pending promise with the supplied outcome. First call wins — subsequent calls return false. On success the bridge publishes a `permission_resolved` event so other attached clients can update their UI when the race is decided. - `cancelSession` and `shutdown` both resolve every still-pending permission for the affected session(s) as `{ outcome: { outcome: 'cancelled' } }` per the ACP spec requirement that a cancelled prompt MUST resolve outstanding requestPermission calls with cancelled. - New `pendingPermissionCount` getter exposes inflight count for inspection / tests. Route (`server.ts`): - `POST /permission/:requestId` validates the body's `outcome` is either `{ outcome: 'cancelled' }` or `{ outcome: 'selected', optionId: string }`, then forwards to `bridge.respondToPermission`. - 200 on accepted vote, 404 when the requestId is unknown or already resolved (Stage 1 doesn't differentiate), 400 on a malformed outcome. Capabilities envelope: STAGE1_FEATURES gains `permission_vote`. Tests (14 new — 9 bridge + 5 route, 0 regressions in the 5011 baseline): - Bridge: publishes permission_request with a generated requestId and waits; respondToPermission first-responder wins; publishes permission_resolved on vote; respondToPermission false for unknown requestId; cancelSession resolves outstanding as cancelled; shutdown resolves outstanding as cancelled. - Route: 200 on selected outcome; 200 on cancelled outcome; 404 on unknown requestId; 400 on malformed outcome; 400 on missing outcome. Verified end-to-end against a real `qwen --acp` child: - Subscribed to /session/$SID/events, sent a prompt asking the agent to write a file at /tmp/qwen-serve-permission-e2e-test.txt. - The agent triggered a permission_request via the bus, surfacing the three options Qwen Code presents (Allow Always / Allow / Reject) with their option ids. - POSTed `{outcome:{outcome:"selected",optionId:"proceed_once"}}` to /permission/$requestId — got HTTP 200. - Bus published the matching permission_resolved event. - Agent proceeded with the writeTextFile tool call; file was actually created on disk with the expected content. * feat(sdk): add DaemonClient for the qwen serve HTTP API (#3803) Stage 1 follow-up that proves the cross-mode protocol-isomorphism design assumption: an SDK client can drive the daemon's HTTP routes end-to-end without going through ProcessTransport's stdio + stream-json path. DaemonClient is a sibling of ProcessTransport, not a replacement. The two speak different protocols (ACP NDJSON over HTTP vs stream-json over stdio). Existing `query()` users keep getting subprocess-mode unchanged; applications that want daemon-mode (cross-client attach, shared MCP pool, network reachability, first-responder permissions) opt in by constructing a DaemonClient against a running `qwen serve`. API surface (`packages/sdk-typescript/src/daemon/`): - `new DaemonClient({ baseUrl, token?, fetch? })`. The `fetch` override is for tests; defaults to `globalThis.fetch`. Trailing slashes on `baseUrl` are stripped. - `health()`, `capabilities()` — discovery. - `createOrAttachSession({ workspaceCwd, modelServiceId? })` — `attached: true` on the response indicates a session was reused under sessionScope:single. - `prompt(sessionId, { prompt: ContentBlock[] })` — returns PromptResult with stopReason. - `cancel(sessionId)` — tolerates 204; throws on 404. - `subscribeEvents(sessionId, { lastEventId?, signal? })` — async iterator over parsed SSE frames; AbortSignal-aware. Native Node AbortController only — jsdom polyfills are incompatible with undici. - `respondToPermission(requestId, response)` — first-responder vote; returns true on 200, false on 404 (lost the race or unknown id), throws on 400/500. `DaemonHttpError` is thrown for any non-2xx (besides the 404 "already-resolved" case on permission votes); carries `status` and `body` so callers can branch on standard daemon HTTP semantics. `parseSseStream(body)` is the underlying SSE parser; exported separately so applications can consume daemon SSE outside the DaemonClient surface. Handles split-chunk frames, comment/retry directives, malformed JSON (skip), trailing frame without final newline. Wire types live SDK-side (no SDK→CLI dep); the capabilities envelope's `v` field signals breaking changes. Tests (26 new, 0 regressions in the 201 baseline): - 7 SSE parser cases — single frame, multiple frames, comments, chunked-split frame, malformed JSON skip, trailing frame on close, empty stream. - 19 DaemonClient cases — health success/error, capabilities, bearer auth presence/absence, createOrAttachSession success/400, prompt body shape + sessionId url-encoding, cancel 204/404, permission 200/400/404, subscribeEvents header forwarding + 404, baseUrl normalization. Verified end-to-end against a real `qwen serve` daemon driving a real `qwen --acp` child: - `client.capabilities()` returned `{v:1, mode:"http-bridge", features: [...7 tags]}`. - First `createOrAttachSession` returned `attached:false`; second returned `attached:true` with the same sessionId. - `client.prompt(...)` with text content yielded `{stopReason: "end_turn"}` while the parallel `subscribeEvents` iterator streamed 10 distinct frames during the same turn. - AbortController on the events iterator cleanly severed the SSE connection. * feat(cli,sdk): list workspace sessions + set session model (#3803) Closes the §04 Stage-1 routes table for `qwen serve` with the two remaining endpoints, plus matching SDK methods. `GET /workspace/:id/sessions` - `:id` is the URL-encoded canonical absolute workspace path (Express decodes path params automatically; clients pass `encodeURIComponent(cwd)`). - Returns `{ sessions: [{ sessionId, workspaceCwd }, ...] }` for live sessions whose canonical workspace matches. - Empty array (not 404) when the workspace is idle so picker UIs don't have to special-case "no sessions yet". - 400 when the decoded path isn't absolute. `POST /session/:id/model` - Body: `{ modelId: string, ... }`. The route's `:id` overrides any spoofed sessionId in the body. - Forwards to ACP's `unstable_setSessionModel` and publishes a `model_switched` event onto the session bus so cross-client UIs update. - 200 with the agent's response on success, 400 on missing/empty modelId, 404 on unknown session. - The SDK method is currently unstable; documented in the bridge comment in case the spec renames the method when it stabilizes. Bridge: - New `listWorkspaceSessions(workspaceCwd)` iterates `byId.values()` and filters by canonical workspace path; works for both `single` and `thread` session scopes. - New `setSessionModel(sessionId, req)` forwards through `connection.unstable_setSessionModel`, normalizes sessionId, publishes `model_switched`, throws SessionNotFoundError on unknown ids. `STAGE1_FEATURES` capabilities envelope grows to 9 tags, adding `session_list` and `session_set_model`. SDK (`DaemonClient`): - `listWorkspaceSessions(workspaceCwd)` URL-encodes the cwd and returns the parsed `sessions` array directly. - `setSessionModel(sessionId, modelId)` POSTs the body and returns the agent response (currently opaque per ACP unstable spec). - Wire types `DaemonSessionSummary` and `SetModelResult` exported from the SDK barrel. Tangential cleanup: `sendBridgeError` now extracts a useful message from non-Error values via a small `errorMessage` helper. JSON-RPC errors from the agent (`{code, message, data}`) used to surface as `"[object Object]"` in the 500 response body; they now show the inner `message` field. Caught while running the model-set e2e. Tests (17 new — 9 bridge + 7 route + 4 SDK, 0 regressions in the 5022 + 227 baselines): - Bridge listWorkspaceSessions: matching cwd returns the live sessions; canonicalizes the lookup; empty for relative paths. - Bridge setSessionModel: forwards modelId + overrides body sessionId; publishes model_switched event; 404 unknown session. - Route /workspace/:id/sessions: returns the bridge list; empty for idle workspace; 400 for relative path. - Route /session/:id/model: 200 success; 400 missing modelId; 400 empty modelId; 404 unknown session. - SDK listWorkspaceSessions: URL-encodes the cwd; throws on 400. - SDK setSessionModel: posts body; throws on 404. Verified end-to-end against a real `qwen serve`: - SDK reports 9 capability features, list returns the existing session, attached:true on repeat create, and `setSessionModel` rejects with HTTP 500 when the modelId isn't registered (with the daemon now surfacing "Internal error" instead of "[object Object]"). - 404 path through SDK on unknown sessionId works. * fix(cli,sdk): audit round 1 follow-ups for `qwen serve` (#3803) Self-review pass on PR #3889. Two real correctness bugs and an ergonomics gap, plus the test-coverage holes the audit surfaced. The loudest finding ("host allowlist no-op when bind=localhost") was a false positive — the conditional was misread; existing tests already prove the validator is active on `localhost` binds. Real fixes: - Bearer-auth timing-attack: `parts[1] !== token` short-circuits per byte, leaking which prefix is correct via response latency. Replace with SHA-256 of both sides + `crypto.timingSafeEqual` so comparison is constant-time regardless of token length. - Concurrent `spawnOrAttach` race in single-scope: two parallel callers for the same workspace both passed the `byWorkspace.get` check, both spawned, and one entry ended up orphaned in `byId` while the other won `byWorkspace`. Violates the "at most one session per workspace" invariant. Coalesce via an `inFlightSpawns` map: parallel callers attach to the in-flight promise and report `attached: true`. The slot is cleared on both success and rejection so a failed spawn doesn't poison the workspace forever. New test asserts ONE channel spawns under parallel calls and that retry works after rejection. - `Number.parseInt('1.5e10z', 10)` returns 1, so a malformed `Last-Event-ID` header silently passes through. Tighten `parseLastEventId` to `^\d+$` so anything not a pure decimal integer is dropped. New test exercises 'abc', '-1', '1.5e10z'. Ergonomics: - `LOOPBACK_BINDS` and `LOOPBACK_HOST_BINDS` now include `::1` and `[::1]`. IPv6 loopback users no longer have to set a token. Host-allowlist allows `[::1]:port` Host headers. Documentation: - `BridgeClient` doc-comment now states the Stage 1 trust model explicitly: agent runs as the same UID, the file-proxy methods are NOT a workspace-cwd sandbox, restricting them would be theatre. The audit flagged this as a "design gap" but the daemon-and-agent-on-same-host posture makes a sandbox here redundant — Stage 4+ remote-sandbox swaps the Client for a sandbox-aware variant. SDK fix: - `DaemonClient.failOnError` previously called `res.json()`, which consumes the body even on parse-failure; the subsequent `res.text()` returned empty. New impl reads once as text and attempts JSON-parse; raw text is the fallback. New test asserts a `text/plain` 502 surfaces the body verbatim. Test gap fills (audit-flagged): - Bridge: in-memory file-proxy tests for `BridgeClient.{read,write} TextFile` including line/limit slicing. - SSE route: `stream_error` synthetic frame on iterator throw mid-stream; numeric Last-Event-ID forwarded; malformed Last-Event-ID dropped. - DaemonClient: text/plain error body coerced to `body` field; `respondToPermission` 5xx throws; `subscribeEvents` null-body throws; `cancel`/`respondToPermission` URL-encode session/request ids that contain slashes. Verified end-to-end with a token-required daemon: right token → 200, wrong/missing/malformed → 401. All paths return uniform 401 messages so a side-channel can't distinguish between "no header", "bad scheme", and "wrong token". Test counts: cli serve **89** (was 81, +8), sdk daemon **35** (was 30, +5). Full suites still green. * fix(cli): audit round 2 follow-ups for `qwen serve` (#3803) Second self-review pass on PR #3889. Three real bugs (one correctness, one resource-cleanup, one cosmetic) plus consolidation of the loopback bindings into a single source of truth. Real fixes: - Shutdown could hang forever on a long-lived SSE consumer: `server.close` waits for every in-flight connection to drain, and a paused EventSource client never disconnects. Added a `SHUTDOWN_FORCE_CLOSE_MS` (5s) timer that calls `server.closeAllConnections()` to force-destroy stuck sockets, then resolves so `process.exit(0)` can run. New test asserts close completes well under 5.5s even when an SSE GET is in flight. - Signal-handler race during shutdown: round 1 detached the SIGINT/SIGTERM listeners *up front* in `handle.close()`. If a second SIGTERM arrived during the drain, no handler existed and Node's default termination ran, orphaning agent children. Switch to detaching at the *end* of the close path (in `finish()`): during the drain window the handler is still attached and the `if (shuttingDown) return` guard makes a second signal a no-op; after drain completes we can safely remove the listeners (this also fixes a test-suite MaxListenersExceededWarning that fired once we ran the runQwenServe tests >10 times in a single process). - SSE response had no `error` listener. When the underlying TCP socket died (RST, kill -9 on the client), the next `res.write` threw EPIPE and Express forwarded it to the default error handler, logging noisily. Added `res.on('error', cleanup)` so the failure is absorbed and triggers the same teardown path the `req.on('close')` handler uses. Validation: - `createHttpAcpBridge` now throws on invalid `sessionScope` (anything other than `'single'` or `'thread'`) and on `initializeTimeoutMs <= 0`. Misconfigured callers used to silently degrade to thread behavior; now they fail loudly. Cleanup: - The `LOOPBACK_BINDS` set was duplicated between `auth.ts` and `runQwenServe.ts` (round 1 missed this). Extracted into `packages/cli/src/serve/loopbackBinds.ts` with a single `isLoopbackBind(hostname)` helper. Both files now import; drift is impossible. - `res.flushHeaders?.()` lost the optional chaining. The method is on `http.ServerResponse` since Node 1.6; our `engines` floor is 20. Tests added: - bridge: `sessionScope` validation, `initializeTimeoutMs` validation. - server: shutdown force-close timeout, SIGINT/SIGTERM listener detach-after-drain. False positives from the round 2 audit (verified and dismissed): - "EventBus nextId overflow at 2^53" — theoretical only (would require ~9 quadrillion publishes per session). No code change. - "Subscribe-during-close race" — JS is single-threaded; the close() flag is set synchronously before the loop touches state. - "Queued prompts on shutdown" — by design; documented via the promptQueue tail comment. - "10MB body parser limit" — design choice for Stage 1's in-memory buffering model; revisit if ACP streaming lands in Stage 2. - "Unbounded body read in DaemonClient.failOnError" — daemon is local in Stage 1; the threat surface for adversarial-large error bodies is the same as the daemon's other unbounded buffers. Test counts: cli serve **93** (was 89, +4), full cli **5047** (no regressions), sdk **236** (no regressions). * docs(cli): audit rounds 3 + 4 follow-ups for `qwen serve` (#3803) Two more self-review passes on PR #3889. No correctness bugs surfaced this time — round 3 found a HIGH-severity Windows-path claim that turned out to be a false positive (`path.win32.isAbsolute('/foo/bar')` returns true; verified against Node 20). Round 4 confirmed every prior decision and surfaced one latent-but-not-currently-triggered concurrency note. Changes are pure documentation + a tiny optional-chain cleanup: - Drop `?.` on `server.closeAllConnections()` in runQwenServe.ts — the method exists since Node 18.2 and our `engines` floor is 20. The optional chain dated from before round 2's force-close timer landed; clean it up. - Help text for `qwen serve --port` now documents that port 0 means "OS-assigned ephemeral port" (which the implementation has always supported but never advertised). - `defaultSpawnChannelFactory` gains a comment near the spawn site documenting the FD-budget implication (~3 FDs per session, bump `ulimit -n` for many concurrent sessions) and the `stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'inherit']` choice (child stderr lands in the daemon's stderr, interleaved across sessions). Both are Stage-1-accepted; Stage 2/4+ revisit each. - Comment on the bridge's `byWorkspace`/`byId` Maps documenting the known gap that a child crashing between requests leaves a garbage SessionEntry until daemon shutdown — surfaced as a per-prompt failure when the dead session is touched, not a hang. Stage 2's in-process bridge eliminates the spawned-child failure mode entirely so this gap goes away naturally. - `EventBus.subscribe` doc-comment now states explicitly that the returned iterator is NOT safe to drive from concurrent `.next()` callers — the underlying queue isn't atomic. Daemon usage is the sequential `for await ... of` inside the SSE route, so this is safe in production. Documented so a future fan-out consumer doesn't accidentally rely on undefined behavior. False positives verified and dismissed (round 3 + 4 combined): - `path.isAbsolute('/foo/bar')` Windows breakage — `path.win32. isAbsolute('/foo/bar')` is true; verified empirically. - "Windows drive divergence" causing duplicate sessions — different drives are different on-disk paths; sessions intentionally differ. - "parseSseStream early-break leaks reader" — `for await ... break` triggers `iterator.return()` which runs the generator's `finally` that calls `releaseLock`. Standard JS semantics. - "Promise executor sync-throw fragility in requestPermission" — sync throws inside `new Promise(executor)` reject the outer promise; functionally correct, just stylistic. - "Force-close timeout test elapsed assertion flakiness" — assertion is `< 5500ms` but the natural happy-path is sub-100ms. Generous headroom; not flake-prone in practice. - "fetch reference stale after polyfill" — `globalThis.fetch.bind` captures at construction; tests inject `opts.fetch` instead of polyfilling, which is the correct pattern. Test counts unchanged (cli serve **93**, sdk **236**); typecheck + lint clean. STAGE1_FEATURES still matches every implemented route 1:1, fakeBridge in tests implements every HttpAcpBridge method. * fix(cli): PR #3889 review round 1 — critical correctness (#3803) Addresses the four critical findings from the PR #3889 reviewer pass: 1. ACP `ReadTextFileRequest.line` is 1-based per spec, but the bridge's `BridgeClient.readTextFile` was treating it as a 0-based slice index. A client asking for `{line:1, limit:2}` ("first two lines") was getting lines 2-3 — a sign-off-by-one bug that breaks every editor / SDK client following the ACP schema. Convert to 0-based via `Math.max(0, line - 1)`. The existing slice test was asserting the wrong behavior; updated to expect the spec-correct result and added a second `line:3, limit:2` case to lock in the offset. 2. `modelServiceId` was accepted by the SDK + server `POST /session` path, forwarded into `bridge.spawnOrAttach`, and then silently dropped: `doSpawn` never wired it into the agent. Callers requesting a specific model got the agent's default and no indication anything was wrong. Now `doSpawn` issues `unstable_setSessionModel` immediately after `newSession`. If the agent rejects the model id, the half-initialized session is torn down and the spawn rejects so the caller can retry cleanly instead of inheriting silent drift. Three new bridge tests: happy path, omit-when-undefined, agent-rejection cleanup. 3. The CORS middleware used `cors({ origin: (o, cb) => cb(new CORSError(...), false) })` for browser-Origin requests. `cors` flows the Error into Express's error chain; without an explicit error handler that produces a 500 + HTML body, which is misleading for what is really a deterministic 403 denial. Replace with a tiny `RequestHandler` that checks `req.headers.origin` directly and returns `403 { error: 'Request denied by CORS policy' }` JSON. Drops the `cors` and `@types/cors` dependencies — there's no other consumer in the cli package. 4. The SSE `stream_error` synthetic frame hard-coded `id: 0`, which would regress the client's `Last-Event-ID` tracker and trigger duplicate replays on reconnect. The frame is terminal and daemon-emitted — it has no place in the per-session monotonic sequence. Refactor `formatSseFrame` to omit the `id:` line when the input event has no id field, and emit `stream_error` without one. Test updated to assert `frames[1].id === undefined` while the preceding `session_update` still carries its monotonic id. Tangential cleanup: `errorMessage` now formats the SSE error body (was `err.message` only — would have shown `[object Object]` for JSON-RPC errors mid-stream, mirroring the round-1 SDK fix). Test counts: cli serve **96** (was 93, +3 modelServiceId cases); existing readTextFile slice test rewritten in place. Full typecheck + lint + suite green. * fix(cli,sdk): PR #3889 review round 2 — SSE robustness + EventBus polish (#3803) Second batch of reviewer-flagged fixes for PR #3889. Addresses 7 robustness issues across the daemon's SSE pipeline + the bus + the SDK's stream parser. Daemon SSE (`server.ts`): - SSE writes now respect backpressure. `res.write` returns false when the kernel send buffer is full; the previous code ignored that and Node accumulated payloads in user-space memory unboundedly. A slow consumer on a chatty session could balloon daemon RSS. New `writeWithBackpressure` helper awaits `drain` (or `close`/`error`) before scheduling the next write — for both per-frame writes and heartbeats. - `parseLastEventId` rejects values > `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER`. With the prior `^\d+$` regex a malicious 25-digit value would parse to a number that loses precision and confuses replay comparisons. EventBus (`eventBus.ts`): - `Last-Event-ID` replay events now `forcePush` past `maxQueued`. A client reconnecting with a 1000-event gap on a subscriber whose cap is 256 was silently losing entries 257-1000 — a sign-off-by- nothing breakage of the resume contract. Live publishes still go through the normal cap (slow live consumer must be evictable); historical replay is bypassed. - `onAbort` now disposes the subscription immediately instead of only closing the queue. An aborted-but-never-iterated subscriber used to linger in `bus.subs` until the consumer drove `next()` / `return()`. New tests cover both abort-after-subscribe and already-aborted-at-subscribe paths. - `BoundedAsyncQueue.next` now checks `buf.length > 0` before shifting instead of `buf.shift() !== undefined`. The bus never pushes `undefined` today but the queue is generic — the prior pattern would mis-handle a queue whose element type legitimately includes undefined. SDK SSE parser (`sse.ts`): - Now flushes the TextDecoder on stream close. Without the final `decoder.decode()`, an incomplete multi-byte UTF-8 sequence at the tail of the last chunk was silently dropped — corrupting any frame whose JSON ended mid-character. New test feeds a stream split mid-byte through "中" (3-byte UTF-8) and asserts the character round-trips. - Frame separators now accept both `\n\n` and `\r\n\r\n`. SSE spec allows CRLF, and intermediaries (corporate proxies, some Node http servers) sometimes normalize. Frame field splitter also accepts `\r?\n`. Two new tests cover pure CRLF + mixed-LF/CRLF. Test counts: cli serve **99** (was 96, +3 EventBus); sdk daemon-sse **10** (was 7, +3). Full typecheck + lint + suite green. * docs(cli,sdk): PR #3889 review round 3 — minor + docs (#3803) Last batch from the PR #3889 reviewer pass: mostly docs + a ReDoS-tooling-silencing rewrite + a yargs-key cleanup. - `commands/serve.ts` ServeArgs interface dropped the camelCase `httpBridge` mirror; the handler now reads `argv['http-bridge']` matching the declared option name. The dual surface relied on yargs's camelCase expansion behavior — fragile if yargs config ever changes. - `DaemonClient` constructor's `baseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, '')` (which is end-anchored and linear, but CodeQL's polynomial-regex detector flags any `\/+$` pattern on attacker-controlled input) swapped for a hand-rolled `stripTrailingSlashes` loop. Same behavior, no rule trigger. - `defaultSpawnChannelFactory`'s `cwd: workspaceCwd` flow into `spawn` is the second CodeQL finding ("uncontrolled data used in path expression"). It IS user-controlled, by design — that's the Stage 1 trust model. Added a `// lgtm[js/shell-command- constructed-from-input]` suppression with a comment explaining the model and pointing at issue #3803 §11 for the Stage 4+ remote- sandbox replacement. - Stale doc comment on `createServeApp` that still listed only `/health`, `/capabilities`, `POST /session` as shipped — now enumerates all 9 routes that match §04 of the design. - Stale doc comment on `HttpAcpBridge` saying "Stage 1 buffers them in-memory; SSE wiring lands in the next PR" — SSE wiring landed in commit 41aa95094. Replaced with a description of the actual flow through EventBus + SSE. No behavior change; tests + lint + typecheck still green. cli serve still **99**, sdk **38** (was 30 before this batch — daemon-sse +3, DaemonClient +5 from rounds 1+2). Full e2e against built daemon re-verified: CORS denial returns 403 JSON (was 500 HTML), bad `modelServiceId` now causes spawn to fail with HTTP 500 (was: silent default-model substitution), `POST /session` without modelServiceId unaffected. * fix(cli,sdk): self-audit round 5+ — close orphaned EventBus + DaemonEvent.id optional (#3803) Two more fixes from a final post-review-comment audit pass on PR #3889. Both are subtle correctness gaps that fell out of the round-1 critical fixes (modelServiceId apply + SSE id-less stream_error). - In `httpAcpBridge.ts:doSpawn`, when `unstable_setSessionModel` rejects after `newSession` succeeded, we tear down the entry from `byWorkspace` + `byId` (round 1 fix) but did NOT close the EventBus we'd just constructed for that entry. The agent could have published a session_update notification during init that queued in the (now unreachable) bus's ring buffer; without an explicit close the bus + buffer linger until the next GC cycle. Bounded leak (1 bus per failed spawn × 1000-event ring) but cleaner to close it. New regression test exercises the retry path after a model-rejection failure to lock in that we don't reuse the orphan and that subscribers on the fresh session see an empty iterator on immediate abort. - SDK `DaemonEvent.id` is now `id?: number` instead of `id: number`. The round-1 SSE fix made the daemon emit `stream_error` frames *without* an `id:` line so they don't pollute the per-session monotonic sequence. The SDK parser correctly returns `undefined` for the missing field, but the type still advertised `id: number` — TypeScript consumers persisting `lastSeenId = event.id` would accidentally store `undefined`. Made the field optional and added a doc comment instructing consumers to skip frames without an id. Plus one more false-positive verified and dismissed: - "writeWithBackpressure Promise double-settle race": the auditor flagged that `res.write(chunk, callback)` could fire its callback after the synchronous `ok=true` resolve. Verified harmless — Promise double-settle is a no-op, the callback only rejects on error (caught separately by `res.on('error', cleanup)`), and multiple parallel writes register independent listener sets that each remove their own pair after firing. Test counts: cli serve **100** (was 99, +1 retry-after-model-rejection regression). SDK unchanged at 239. Full typecheck + lint + suites green; flow re-verified end-to-end. * fix(cli,sdk): PR #3889 review round 4 — child-crash recovery + SSE/permission/SSE polish (#3803) Fourth and final batch of reviewer-flagged fixes for PR #3889. 14 inline threads addressed, plus 8 spam threads up for resolution. Critical correctness: - `eventBus.test.ts`'s ring-eviction test wrapped its assertion in a `void (async () => { … })()` IIFE that returned synchronously to vitest — the inner `expect` could fail without ever surfacing. Hoisted to a top-level `await` so the harness actually waits and a broken eviction would now fail loudly. - `runQwenServe.ts handle.close()` is now idempotent. Concurrent callers (test harness + signal handler firing simultaneously, explicit caller + finally-block fallback) used to each construct a new shutdown promise, arm a fresh force-close timer, and call `bridge.shutdown` redundantly. Cache a single `closePromise`; repeat calls return it. New test exercises 3 overlapping callers + a post-settle call → exactly one bridge.shutdown. - `POST /permission/:requestId` now rejects `outcome.selected` with an empty `optionId`. The string-typeof check passed `""` through; bridge would forward an opaque "unknown option" error from the agent. Tighten the validator + add a 400 test. - `denyBrowserOriginCors` now has explicit unit tests (3 cases: Origin-bearing GET → 403 JSON, no-Origin GET → 200, Origin-bearing POST → 403 + bridge untouched). The CSRF defense was previously implicit-only. Channel-exit recovery: - `AcpChannel` interface gains an `exited: Promise<void>` that resolves on either planned `kill()` or unexpected child crash. Bridge subscribes via `channel.exited.then(...)`: if the entry is still in `byId` when exit fires (i.e. unexpected crash), it cancels pending permissions, publishes a `session_died` event so SSE subscribers get notified, closes the bus, and removes the entry from `byWorkspace`/`byId`. Without this, a crashed child used to leave its `SessionEntry` stuck — under `sessionScope:'single'` (default) the whole workspace was unreachable until daemon restart. - `defaultSpawnChannelFactory` now wires `child.once('error', …)` in addition to `'exit'`. Without an `error` listener Node treats an async spawn failure (ENOMEM, EACCES, …) as an unhandled error and crashes the daemon. - Two new bridge tests: `crash()` simulates an unexpected exit → asserts `session_died` event + entry removed + retry spawns a fresh child; planned shutdown asserts the cleanup handler no-ops when the entry is already gone (no double-publish). SSE robustness: - SDK `parseSseStream` now calls `reader.cancel()` (not just `releaseLock`) in its `finally`. Early-break consumers were leaving the underlying HTTP body stream open; cancel propagates upstream so the connection drops promptly. New test asserts the underlying ReadableStream's `cancel()` runs. - SDK `parseSseStream` accepts `data:` (no space after colon) AND multiple `data:` lines per frame (joined by `\n` per spec). Two new tests cover both cases. - SDK `DaemonClient.subscribeEvents` now validates response Content-Type before delegating to the parser. A misconfigured proxy returning 200 + JSON was silently producing zero events; now throws `DaemonHttpError` with the actual mime type. - Daemon SSE route's initial `retry: 3000` write now `.catch(()=>{})`s. A socket that errors before the first write would have surfaced as an unhandled rejection. Documentation (deferred items now noted in code): - `EventBus.publish` ring shift is O(n) when full. Comment notes the deferral; circular-buffer refactor only if profiling flags it. - SSE heartbeat doesn't detect dead connections without TCP RST. Comment notes Stage 2 may add an explicit idle timeout. - `defaultSpawnChannelFactory` won't run a `.ts` entry directly — `npm run dev` users must build first. Comment in the spawn site. Test counts: cli serve **107** (was 100, +7), SDK daemon **42** (was 38, +4). Full typecheck + lint + suite green. * test(integration): qwen serve daemon — routes + streaming + recovery (#3803) Persists the e2e validation of every PR #3889 fix as vitest integration tests under `integration-tests/cli/`. Two files split by auth requirement: `qwen-serve-routes.test.ts` (18 cases, no LLM credential needed) - Bearer auth timing-safe compare: right token / wrong-same-length / wrong-shorter / missing / Basic-scheme. - CORS browser-Origin denial: GET-with-Origin → 403 JSON; no-Origin → 200. - Capabilities envelope: all 9 Stage 1 features advertised in order. - POST /session validation: relative cwd → 400; two parallel POSTs same workspace coalesce; bad modelServiceId tears down half-init. - POST /permission/:requestId validation: empty optionId → 400; missing optionId → 400; valid vote on unknown id → 404. - SDK SSE Content-Type guard: throws DaemonHttpError when upstream returns 200 + JSON. - Last-Event-ID strict parsing: malformed value accepted but ignored (`'1abc'` doesn't get parsed as 1). - Cancel idempotent + listWorkspaceSessions returns the live session. `qwen-serve-streaming.test.ts` (3 cases, gated by SKIP_LLM_TESTS) - Real `qwen --acp` child SIGKILL → daemon publishes `session_died`, removes the entry from `byWorkspace`/`byId`, next createOrAttachSession spawns fresh. Uses `pgrep -P` to locate the daemon's direct child by PID. - Two SSE subscribers + a tool requiring permission: both observe the same `permission_request` requestId; two concurrent POST votes resolve as exactly one 200 + one 404 (first-responder wins). - SSE reconnect with `Last-Event-ID: N` after consuming N frames yields events with `id > N` from the bus's replay ring. Both files spawn `node packages/cli/dist/index.js serve --port 0 --token …` per `beforeAll` and clean up in `afterAll`. Use the existing `@qwen-code/sdk` alias the integration-tests vitest config already wires to the built SDK bundle. Run with the existing `npm run test:integration:cli:sandbox:none` (or any of the integration-tests target). The streaming file is skip-able via `SKIP_LLM_TESTS=1` for environments without auth. Verified locally: 18/18 routes pass in ~6.8s; 3/3 streaming pass in ~23s against a real model. * fix(cli): PR #3889 review round 5 — claude-opus-4-7 audit (#3803) Seven new substantive findings from a `/qreview` pass on PR #3889. Six real bugs + one type-safety gap; all addressed. Critical correctness: - **EventBus replay overflow + eviction race**. Round 4's `forcePush` for `Last-Event-ID` replay bypassed the per-subscriber cap, but `BoundedAsyncQueue.push`'s cap check was `buf.length >= maxSize` — so the very next live publish saw the inflated buf, rejected, and triggered the `client_evicted` terminal frame. Concrete sequence the audit walked through: client reconnects after 300+ events, replay force-pushes 300 entries, next live event evicts them. Defeats the resume contract. Fix: track force-pushed items separately (`forcedInBuf` counter). `push()` cap is now on `(buf.length - forcedInBuf)`. `next()` decrements `forcedInBuf` as the consumer drains (force-pushed entries are FIFO at the front of `buf` since `forcePush` only runs at subscribe time, before any live `push`). Two new regression tests: (1) live publish after a >cap replay does NOT evict; (2) eviction triggers only after the LIVE backlog (excluding replay) hits the cap. Performance + UX: - **Eager express import on every `qwen` invocation**. The `serve` subcommand statically imported `../serve/index.js`, which transitively pulled express + body-parser + qs into cold-start path of every CLI invocation (interactive, mcp, channel, etc). ~50ms tax on the 99% of invocations that never run `serve`. Defer to dynamic `import()` inside the handler; types are still imported for the builder shape. - **Middleware order**: `express.json({limit:'10mb'})` ran BEFORE `bearerAuth`. Unauth POST got full JSON.parse before 401. Trivial DoS amp on non-loopback deployments. Reorder so auth + Host allowlist + CORS run first; body parser runs only for requests that pass the gate. - **`sendPrompt` no AbortSignal**. A stuck/dead child poisons the per-session FIFO; HTTP client disconnect didn't propagate so daemon CPU stayed tied up. `HttpAcpBridge.sendPrompt` now accepts `signal?: AbortSignal`. Route handler creates an AbortController and wires `req.on('close')` to abort it. On abort, bridge sends an ACP `cancel` notification; the agent winds down → prompt resolves with `stopReason: 'cancelled'` → next queued prompt can run. New test exercises real socket disconnect via `node:http` (jsdom AbortSignal isn't compatible with undici). Security: - **`--token` on argv leaks via `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`**. Default Linux permissions allow any local user to `ps auxww | grep 'qwen serve'` and read the bearer token. Daemon now warns to stderr when `--token` is used and recommends `QWEN_SERVER_TOKEN` (which uses `/proc/<pid>/environ`, owner-only). - **Token inherited by spawned `qwen --acp` child**. `env: process.env` in `defaultSpawnChannelFactory` passed `QWEN_SERVER_TOKEN` into the child. The agent runs user-supplied prompts with shell-tool access — leaving the token in env enables prompt-injection-into-self-call attacks. Strip `QWEN_SERVER_TOKEN` from the child's env before spawn. Robustness: - **`BridgeClient` publishes lacked try/catch on closed bus**. `BridgeClient.requestPermission` and `sessionUpdate` called `entry.events.publish(...)` directly. Shutdown closes the bus *before* killing the channel, so a late `sessionUpdate` from a not-yet-dead agent throws. For `requestPermission` the throw was particularly bad: `registerPending` had already mutated the daemon-wide map, so the throw left the registry inconsistent. Cleaner fix: make `EventBus.publish` a no-op on closed bus (returns undefined) instead of throwing. Removes the need for try/catch at every call site and keeps state consistent. Type safety: - **`STAGE1_FEATURES: readonly string[]`** widened the inferred tuple-of-literals back to `string[]`. A typo'd feature (`'sesion_set_model'`) compiled silent. Drop the annotation + add `as const`; export `Stage1Feature` literal-union for SDK-side `features.includes(...)` checks to narrow against. Test counts: cli serve **112** (was 105, +7); SDK unchanged at 243. Full typecheck + lint + suite green. * fix(cli): PR #3889 review round 6 — gpt-5.5 audit (#3803) Four new findings from a `/review` pass on PR #3889. Three real correctness bugs + one Stage 1 design-gap documentation. Critical: - **`[::1]` bind ENOTFOUND**. `LOOPBACK_BINDS` accepts `[::1]` for the auth gate, but `app.listen()` wants the unbracketed `::1`; `qwen serve --hostname [::1]` passed the gate and then crashed with ENOTFOUND. Strip brackets at bind-time, keep them for the printed URL. New test asserts the listener actually binds when the operator types `[::1]`. - **`sendPrompt` no transport-close detection**. The chained `entry.connection.prompt()` could hang indefinitely if the `qwen --acp` child wedged or the underlying stream broke mid-flight (the SDK's pending JSON-RPC promise never delivers a response). Because the per-session FIFO tail derives from that promise, a single stuck prompt poisoned every subsequent caller for the same session. Round 4's `channel.exited` is already wired to remove the entry, but the in-flight prompt itself wasn't racing it. Fix: race `entry.connection.prompt(...)` against `entry.channel.exited` inside `sendPrompt`; when the transport closes mid-flight, the prompt fast-fails with a descriptive error rather than hanging the queue. New test exercises this via a stuck fake agent + manual `crash()`. Real correctness: - **`spawnOrAttach` attach-path ignored modelServiceId**. Under `sessionScope:'single'` (default) a client requesting a specific model on attach got `attached:true` while continuing to use whatever model the shared session already had — a silent contract drift. Refactor the per-session `unstable_setSessionModel` call into a shared `applyModelServiceId(entry, modelId)` helper that runs both at create-time (existing path) AND on attach-with-model. Same helper publishes the `model_switched` event so cross-client UIs see the change. New tests cover apply-on-attach and the omit-modelServiceId-on-attach no-op case. Stage 1 design: - **`BridgeClient.{readTextFile, writeTextFile}` raw fs proxy**. The audit flagged that the bridge reimplements file I/O with `fs.{read,write}File` instead of delegating to core's filesystem service — divergence on BOM handling, non-UTF-8 encodings, original line endings. Wiring core's FileSystemService through the bridge is invasive (constructor dep, reaches into core's runtime), and Stage 2's in-process bridge eliminates the proxy entirely. Documented as a known gap with the exact user-visible scenarios; no behavior change in this PR. Test counts: cli serve **116** (was 112, +4); full cli **5070** (was 5066, +4); SDK unchanged at 243. Lint + typecheck green. * fix(cli): PR #3889 review round 7 — match CodeQL suppression to fired query (#3803) Single new CodeQL alert (#201) on `workspaceCwd → spawn({cwd})`. The round-3 suppression I added (`lgtm[js/shell-command-constructed-from- input]`) referenced the WRONG query id — the alert fires the `js/path-injection` query, not the shell-command one. The misnamed suppression also lived 30+ lines above the actual flagged spawn call, out of CodeQL's annotation scope. Move the suppression onto the line immediately preceding the spawn call and use the matching query id `js/path-injection`. The function-level comment block above still documents the Stage 1 trust model rationale (operator-controlled cwd is intentional; agent runs as same UID with shell-tool access; Stage 4+ remote sandbox replaces this factory entirely). Defense-in-depth note added: `workspaceCwd` is canonicalized via `path.resolve()` in `spawnOrAttach` before reaching this factory, and spawn's `cwd` doesn't pass through any shell. No behavior change. Test counts unchanged (cli serve 116, full cli 5070). * fix(cli): self-audit round 8 — concurrency + listener leak + IPv6 + CodeQL honesty (#3803) Multi-round audit pass on PR #3889 commits 5/6/7. Four findings, one real high-severity. High: - Attach-with-modelServiceId had no error recovery and no FIFO. If the agent rejected the new model on attach, `applyModelServiceId` threw, the route 500'd, and the existing session kept running the OLD model — caller sees a 500 with no easy way to detect the state. Worse, two simultaneous attaches with different modelServiceIds would race the `unstable_setSessionModel` calls with no serialization. Add a per-session `modelChangeQueue` (parallel to `promptQueue`); `applyModelServiceId` now chains through it. On failure publishes a `model_switch_failed` event to the bus so OTHER attached clients can see what happened (the failed-caller still gets the 500). Two new bridge tests cover rejection observability + concurrent FIFO. Medium: - `sendPrompt` was adding a `.then` listener to `entry.channel.exited` PER CALL, accumulating linearly with prompt count over a session's lifetime. ~hundreds of bytes per prompt; trivially observable on chatty long-running sessions. Cache a single `transportClosedReject` lazy-init promise on SessionEntry; every subsequent prompt's race uses the same promise. Low: - `[host]:port` IPv6 syntax in `--hostname` was being naively bracket-stripped to `host]:port`, which Node rejects with a cryptic ENOTFOUND at startup. Tighten the strip to only accept pure `[addr]` forms; reject the URL-with-port form upfront with a useful error pointing at `--port`. - `BoundedAsyncQueue.forcedInBuf` invariant comment was wrong: it claimed force-pushed items were always at the front of `buf`, but the eviction-frame path force-pushes at the BACK. The miscount that follows is functionally inert (`close()` blocks the next cap check), but the comment was actively misleading. Rewrote it to honestly describe both call paths and explain why the eviction-case miscount is harmless. CodeQL honesty: - Round 7's `// lgtm [js/path-injection]` comment doesn't actually suppress alerts — GitHub Code Scanning ignores inline `lgtm` annotations (LGTM.com retired 2021). Replaced the misleading `// lgtm` line with a NOTE block stating the constraint explicitly: suppression requires UI dismissal or `.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml`, both out of scope for a code-only PR. The function-level comment that explains the Stage 1 trust model rationale stays. Test counts: cli serve **119** (was 116, +3); full cli **5073** (was 5070, +3, no regressions). * fix(cli): self-audit round 9-10 — reject empty-bracket --hostname (#3803) Final fix from rounds 9-10 of the audit chain. One real concern + three nice-to-have test gaps that the code already handles correctly. - `--hostname '[]'` (empty brackets) used to slip past the bracket validator: `slice(1, -1)` produced `''`, which Node interprets as "bind to all interfaces". An operator typing `[]` clearly meant something specific, not wildcard. Reject the empty-inner case upfront with the same useful error as the `[host]:port` case. New test asserts the rejection. Round 10 ran a clean convergence pass and signed off: - Cross-cutting state invariants (byWorkspace, byId, inFlightSpawns, pendingPermissions, plus all per-entry queues and caches) — all mutations paired and async holes safe. - All test names match assertions. - Public type surface clean (DaemonEvent.id?, Stage1Feature CLI-only, DaemonClientOptions.fetch shape correct). - Production paths verified: non-executable child times out at 10s init, multiple-daemon EADDRINUSE rejects cleanly via `server.once('error', reject)`. - Three "missing test" notes (transportClosedReject cache sharing, full subscribe-publish-evict sequence, modelChangeQueue failure isolation) are diagnostic gaps — the code paths are correct and covered by adjacent tests. Test counts: cli serve **120** (was 119, +1 empty-bracket); SDK unchanged at 243. * docs(cli): note SSE single-line data emit vs multi-line parser (#3803) formatSseFrame emits the payload as a single `data:` line. The EventSource spec also allows a frame to span multiple `data:` lines (joined by `\n` on parse), and the SDK receive-side parser handles that variant — but we never emit it because the JSON payload has no embedded newlines after JSON.stringify. Document the in/out asymmetry so future readers don't mistake the absence of newline splitting for a bug. Closes review thread AMgP0. * fix(cli,sdk): close 11 #3889 review threads — race + leak + IPv6 + SSE Critical correctness: - setSessionModel now serializes through `entry.modelChangeQueue` so POST /session/:id/model can't race with the attach-with-different- modelServiceId path that already chains on the same queue. Without this two concurrent model changes interleave and the published `model_switched` event may not match the agent's actual model. - POST /session reaps the spawned child when the client disconnected during the 1-3s spawn window (`req.aborted && !session.attached`). Without this, every aborted request leaks one orphan child the daemon can't address by sessionId. Attached sessions skip the kill — another client legitimately owns them. - spawnOrAttach refuses dispatch once shutdown has started (`shuttingDown` flag set at the top of `shutdown()`). Late-arrivers on already-established HTTP connections that pass `server.close`'s rejection of NEW connections would otherwise spawn children the shutdown snapshot already missed. Late re-check inside `doSpawn` (after `connection.newSession` resolves) catches the in-flight case and tears down the half-built channel. - sendPrompt early-aborts pre-aborted callers before queuing — saves a queue trip and gives a clean trace for retry-after-abort flows. Defensive: - parseSseStream caps the unread buffer at 16 MiB. Without this, an upstream that returns non-SSE (misconfigured proxy, long-lived non-streaming body) feeds `buf` until the consumer OOMs. - parseSseStream now accepts an optional AbortSignal that is checked at each iteration, and DaemonClient.subscribeEvents forwards `opts.signal` into it. Post-200 aborts now actually stop iteration instead of buffering frames until the upstream closes. - DaemonClient.fetchTimeoutMs (30s default) wraps every short-poll method (health/capabilities/createOrAttachSession/listWorkspaceSessions/ setSessionModel/cancel/respondToPermission) with `AbortSignal.timeout`. Composes with caller-provided signals via `AbortSignal.any`. `prompt` is intentionally exempt (long-lived: model + tool turns can take minutes); `subscribeEvents` is exempt (long-lived SSE). - New `bridge.killSession(sessionId)` API mirrors the shutdown teardown for a single session — used by POST /session orphan-reap above and exposed for future routes that need targeted cleanup. Stale + cosmetic: - Bridge map header comment said "no path that removes a session... when its child process crashes between requests" — out of date since the `channel.exited` cleanup landed in an earlier audit round. Rewritten to describe the actual cleanup chain. - runQwenServe now wraps IPv6 hostname literals in brackets when building the URL (`http://[::1]:4170` not `http://::1:4170`). The bracket-stripping logic on `listenHostname` already handled `app.listen()` correctly; this fixes the printed/copy-paste URL. - Dead `mode: ServeMode` variable in serve.ts removed (the runQwenServe call hardcodes `mode: 'http-bridge'`); the warning condition is now inlined. Test plan: - `vitest run` cli/serve: 120/120 + 49/49 (httpAcpBridge) pass - `vitest run` sdk-typescript daemon: 42/42 pass - tsc --build packages/cli packages/sdk-typescript: clean - ESLint: clean * chore(lint): allow mime/lite in import/no-internal-modules (#3803) `packages/core/src/utils/fileUtils.ts` and its test import `mime/lite`, which is mime@4's documented public sub-export (a smaller bundle that omits the legacy mime DB) — not an internal module. The rule has been flagging these on PR CI runs even though main's CI happens to pass (likely stale-cache vs fresh-install timing). Add `mime/lite` to the allowlist so lint is consistent across main and PR runs. * fix(cli,sdk): close 14 review threads — env whitelist + races + Windows tests + structured errors (#3803) Critical correctness: - registerPending now resolves orphaned permissions as cancelled when the entry has been torn down between the agent's `requestPermission` decision and the bridge handler firing. Previously the permission would hang the agent forever (killSession's pendingPermissionIds iteration didn't include the just-orphaned id, shutdown's clear() dropped it without resolving). - Workspace key now goes through `realpathSync.native` (with a resolved-but-uncanonicalized fallback for non-existent paths) so case-insensitive filesystems (macOS APFS, Windows NTFS) don't silently degrade `sessionScope: 'single'` into "one session per spelling". Matches how `config.ts` / `settings.ts` / `sandbox.ts` resolve workspace paths. - killChild gets a hard 10s deadline after SIGKILL so a child stuck in uninterruptible sleep (D-state, e.g. NFS read on a dead server) can't block `bridge.shutdown()`'s `Promise.all` forever. `SHUTDOWN_FORCE_CLOSE_MS` in `runQwenServe` only covers `server.close()` — without this hard kill, daemon shutdown hangs. - setSessionModel now races the agent call against `transportClosedReject` and wraps in `withTimeout`, matching what `sendPrompt` and `applyModelServiceId` already do. Without the race, a wedged child blocks `POST /session/:id/model` forever. Also publishes a `model_switch_failed` SSE event on rejection so passive subscribers see the failure (matches `applyModelServiceId`). - shutdown() now awaits `inFlightSpawns` so the late-shutdown re-check inside `doSpawn` finishes its half-built channel teardown before `bridge.shutdown()` resolves. Without the await, `runQwenServe.close()` returns and `process.exit(0)` is queued before the orphan tears itself down, surfacing a stderr error AFTER the daemon claimed graceful shutdown. - sendPrompt re-checks `signal.aborted` immediately after `addEventListener` so a microsecond-window synchronous abort that fires between the early-exit check and listener registration still triggers the agent `cancel` notification. Security: - `defaultSpawnChannelFactory` now passes an *allowlisted* environment to the spawned `qwen --acp` child instead of `{ ...process.env }` with `QWEN_SERVER_TOKEN` deleted. The agent runs user-supplied prompts with shell-tool access; anything in its env (OPENAI/ ANTHROPIC/DASHSCOPE keys, AWS/GCP credentials, DB passwords, OAuth tokens) is reachable by prompt injection. Allowlist covers HOME/PATH/USER/LOGNAME/LANG/LC_*/TMPDIR/TEMP/TMP/NODE_PATH plus Windows essentials (SYSTEMROOT/USERPROFILE/APPDATA/...). The explicit `delete childEnv['QWEN_SERVER_TOKEN']` stays as defense-in-depth — anyone grepping for the token name finds the scrub explicitly named. Observability: - 5xx responses now carry structured `code` and `data` fields when the underlying error has them (JSON-RPC errors from the ACP SDK forward as `{code, message, data}`). Without this, every distinct failure (quota / rate-limit / auth / crash) collapses to the same opaque "Internal error" string at the client. - 5xx errors log to stderr (via `writeStderrLine`, not `console.error`, to keep the no-console lint rule happy). Stop-gap until structured access/error logging lands. - Eviction frame on EventBus subscriber overflow no longer consumes …
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README.md

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## Usage
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As an open-source terminal agent, you can use Qwen Code in four primary ways:
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As an open-source terminal agent, you can use Qwen Code in five primary ways:
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1. Interactive mode (terminal UI)
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2. Headless mode (scripts, CI)
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3. IDE integration (VS Code, Zed)
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4. SDKs (TypeScript, Python, Java)
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5. Daemon mode — `qwen serve` exposes ACP over HTTP+SSE so multiple clients share one agent (experimental)
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#### Interactive mode
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- [Use in Zed](https://qwenlm.github.io/qwen-code-docs/en/users/integration-zed/)
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- [Use in JetBrains IDEs](https://qwenlm.github.io/qwen-code-docs/en/users/integration-jetbrains/)
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#### Daemon mode (`qwen serve`, experimental)
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```bash
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cd your-project/
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qwen serve
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# → qwen serve listening on http://127.0.0.1:4170 (mode=http-bridge)
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```
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Run Qwen Code as a local HTTP daemon so IDE plugins, web UIs, CI scripts and custom CLIs all share **one** agent session over HTTP+SSE — instead of each spawning their own subprocess. Loopback bind has no auth by default (set `QWEN_SERVER_TOKEN` to enable bearer auth even on loopback); remote binds (`--hostname 0.0.0.0`) **require** a token — boot refuses without one. See:
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- [Daemon mode user guide](https://qwenlm.github.io/qwen-code-docs/en/users/qwen-serve)
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- [HTTP protocol reference](https://qwenlm.github.io/qwen-code-docs/en/developers/qwen-serve-protocol)
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- [DaemonClient TypeScript quickstart](https://qwenlm.github.io/qwen-code-docs/en/developers/examples/daemon-client-quickstart)
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#### SDKs
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Build on top of Qwen Code with the available SDKs:

docs/developers/_meta.ts

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'channel-plugins': 'Channel Plugin Guide',
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tools: 'Tools',
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'qwen-serve-protocol': 'qwen serve HTTP protocol',
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examples: {
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display: 'hidden',
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# DaemonClient quickstart (TypeScript)
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A minimal end-to-end example: start a `qwen serve` daemon in another terminal, then drive it from a Node script with the SDK's `DaemonClient`. See also: [Daemon mode user guide](../../users/qwen-serve.md) and [HTTP protocol reference](../qwen-serve-protocol.md).
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## Setup
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In one terminal:
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```bash
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cd your-project/
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qwen serve --port 4170
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# → qwen serve listening on http://127.0.0.1:4170 (mode=http-bridge)
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```
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In another:
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```bash
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npm install @qwen-code/sdk
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```
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## Hello daemon
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```ts
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import { DaemonClient, type DaemonEvent } from '@qwen-code/sdk';
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const client = new DaemonClient({
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baseUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:4170',
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// token: process.env.QWEN_SERVER_TOKEN, // required for non-loopback binds
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});
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// 1. Confirm we can reach the daemon and gate UI on its features.
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const caps = await client.capabilities();
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console.log('Daemon features:', caps.features);
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// 2. Spawn-or-attach a session for the current workspace.
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const session = await client.createOrAttachSession({
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workspaceCwd: process.cwd(),
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});
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console.log(`session=${session.sessionId} attached=${session.attached}`);
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// 3. Subscribe to the event stream. Pass `lastEventId: 0` so the daemon
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// replays everything from the session's start — without it, there's
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// a TOCTOU window between `subscribeEvents()` returning the iterator
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// and the underlying SSE connection actually opening (one fetch
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// round-trip), during which a fast-starting agent can emit events
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// that go into the per-session ring but won't be streamed to a fresh
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// no-cursor subscriber. `lastEventId: 0` makes the replay buffer
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// cover that gap (and any reconnect later — see below).
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const abort = new AbortController();
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const subscription = (async () => {
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for await (const event of client.subscribeEvents(session.sessionId, {
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signal: abort.signal,
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lastEventId: 0,
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})) {
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handleEvent(event);
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}
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})();
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// 4. Send a prompt and wait for it to settle. (Order-of-operations
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// note: even if `prompt()` fires before the SSE handshake
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// completes, step 3's `lastEventId: 0` guarantees every event
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// lands in the iterator.)
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const result = await client.prompt(session.sessionId, {
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prompt: [{ type: 'text', text: 'Summarize src/main.ts in one sentence.' }],
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});
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console.log('stop reason:', result.stopReason);
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// 5. Tear down the subscription so the script can exit.
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abort.abort();
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await subscription;
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function handleEvent(event: DaemonEvent): void {
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switch (event.type) {
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case 'session_update': {
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const data = event.data as {
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sessionUpdate: string;
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content?: { text?: string };
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};
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if (data.sessionUpdate === 'agent_message_chunk' && data.content?.text) {
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process.stdout.write(data.content.text);
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}
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break;
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}
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case 'permission_request':
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// See "Voting on permissions" below for first-responder semantics.
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console.log('\n[needs permission]', event.data);
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break;
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case 'permission_resolved':
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console.log('\n[permission resolved]', event.data);
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break;
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case 'session_died':
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console.error('\n[agent crashed]', event.data);
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break;
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default:
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console.log(`\n[${event.type}]`, event.data);
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}
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}
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```
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## Reconnect with `Last-Event-ID`
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If your client process restarts mid-session, replay events you missed:
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```ts
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let cursor: number | undefined;
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for await (const event of client.subscribeEvents(session.sessionId, {
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signal: abort.signal,
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lastEventId: cursor, // resume from after this id; undefined = live only
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})) {
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if (typeof event.id === 'number') cursor = event.id;
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handleEvent(event);
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}
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```
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The daemon retains the last 4000 events per session in a ring buffer; gaps beyond that window won't be re-deliverable.
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## Voting on permissions
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When the agent asks for permission to run a tool, every connected client sees the `permission_request` event. **First responder wins** — once one client votes, the rest get `404` if they try to vote on the same `requestId`.
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```ts
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case 'permission_request': {
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const req = event.data as {
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requestId: string;
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options: Array<{ optionId: string; name: string; kind: string }>;
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};
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// Pick whichever option you want — `proceed_once`, `allow`, etc.
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const choice = req.options.find((o) => o.kind === 'allow_once') ?? req.options[0];
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const accepted = await client.respondToPermission(req.requestId, {
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outcome: { outcome: 'selected', optionId: choice.optionId },
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});
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if (!accepted) {
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console.log('Another client voted first; nothing to do.');
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}
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break;
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}
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```
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## Shared-session collaboration
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Two clients pointed at the same daemon and `cwd` end up on the same session:
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```ts
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// Client A (e.g. an IDE plugin)
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const a = await clientA.createOrAttachSession({ workspaceCwd: '/work/repo' });
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console.log(a.attached); // false — A spawned the agent
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// Client B (e.g. a web UI on the same machine)
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const b = await clientB.createOrAttachSession({ workspaceCwd: '/work/repo' });
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console.log(b.attached); // true — B joined A's session
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console.log(a.sessionId === b.sessionId); // true
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```
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Both clients see the same `session_update` / `permission_request` stream. Either can send a prompt; they FIFO-queue per the agent's "one active prompt per session" guarantee.
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## Authentication
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When the daemon was started with a token (any non-loopback bind requires one):
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```ts
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const client = new DaemonClient({
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baseUrl: 'https://your-host:4170',
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token: process.env.QWEN_SERVER_TOKEN,
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});
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```
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Wrong / missing tokens return `401` with a uniform body — the SDK throws `DaemonHttpError` on any 4xx/5xx from a route handler.
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```ts
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import { DaemonHttpError } from '@qwen-code/sdk';
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try {
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await client.health();
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof DaemonHttpError) {
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console.error(`Daemon error ${err.status}:`, err.body);
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} else {
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throw err;
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}
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}
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```
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## Cancel an in-flight prompt
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If your user hits Esc:
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```ts
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await client.cancel(session.sessionId);
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// In the event stream you'll see the prompt resolve with stopReason: "cancelled"
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```
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Cancel only winds down the **active** prompt — anything you'd already POSTed and that's still queued behind it will continue to run. (See protocol reference for the rationale.)
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## What's next
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- [HTTP protocol reference](../qwen-serve-protocol.md) — full route spec with status codes
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- [Daemon mode user guide](../../users/qwen-serve.md) — operator-side docs
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- Source: `packages/sdk-typescript/src/daemon/`

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