fix(lec1,labs): repair Slide 5 mermaid syntax; 4-backtick template fences; lab1 /api/Products endpoint

- lec1 Slide 5: '-.-->'  is not valid mermaid (use '-.->'), quote emoji labels
- all submission templates with nested code blocks now use 4-backtick outer
  fences so GitHub stops closing them at the first inner fence
- lab1 template + acceptance criteria still referenced /rest/products,
  which 404s in Juice Shop v20.0.0 (moved to /api/Products)

Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Creed <creeed22@gmail.com>

Author: Cre-eD

labs/lab1.md

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Open `http://127.0.0.1:3000` in your browser. Note what you see:
 
 Create `submissions/lab1.md` and **fill in the template below** with your real observations. Don't paraphrase — record what you actually saw.
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 # Lab 1 — Submission
 
 ## Triage Report: OWASP Juice Shop
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ Create `submissions/lab1.md` and **fill in the template below** with your real o
 
 ### Health Check
 - HTTP code on `/`: <should be 200>
-- API check (first 200 chars of `/rest/products`):
+- API check (first 200 chars of `/api/Products`):
   ```
   <paste output>
   ```
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ Which of these are MISSING? (cross-reference Lecture 1 OWASP Top 10:2025 — A06
 1. **<risk name>** — <why it matters; map to one OWASP Top 10:2025 category>
 2. **<risk name>** — <why; map to OWASP>
 3. **<risk name>** — <why; map to OWASP>
-```
+````
 
 ### 1.4: Cleanup (when done)
 
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ A "GitHub Community" section with 1-2 sentences explaining:
 
 ### B.3: Document in `submissions/lab1.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Bonus: CI Smoke Test
 
 - Workflow file: `.github/workflows/lab1-smoke.yml`
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ A "GitHub Community" section with 1-2 sentences explaining:
   ```
   <paste your "HTTP/1.1 200 OK ..." block>
   ```
-```
+````
 
 ---
 
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ PR checklist (paste this into your PR body):
 
 ### Task 1 (6 pts)
 - ✅ Juice Shop v20.0.0 container running on `127.0.0.1:3000` (proof: `docker ps` output in submission)
-- ✅ Homepage returns HTTP 200; `/rest/products` returns a JSON list
+- ✅ Homepage returns HTTP 200; `/api/Products` returns a JSON list
 - ✅ Triage report has all six sections filled in with **real** values (no template placeholders left)
 - ✅ At least three security headers are correctly identified as present or missing
 - ✅ Top 3 risks each mapped to an OWASP Top 10:2025 category (A01–A10)

labs/lab11.md

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ curl -skI https://localhost | tee labs/lab11/results/headers.txt
 
 ### 11.4: Document in `submissions/lab11.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 # Lab 11 — BONUS — Submission
 
 ## Task 1: TLS + Security Headers
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ curl -skI https://localhost | tee labs/lab11/results/headers.txt
 - Referrer-Policy: ...
 - Permissions-Policy: ...
 - Content-Security-Policy: ...
-```
+````
 
 ---
 
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ Write the 7-step runbook described in Reading 11 (Detect expiry → Order → Va
 
 ### 11.8: Document in `submissions/lab11.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Task 2: Production Posture
 
 ### Rate limit proof
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ Write the 7-step runbook described in Reading 11 (Detect expiry → Order → Va
 
 ### What OCSP stapling buys you (2-3 sentences, reference Reading 11)
 Why is OCSP stapling useful for production but not for a self-signed lab cert?
-```
+````
 
 ---
 
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ docker compose exec waf cat /var/log/modsec/audit.log | tail -50 \
 
 ### B.5: Document in `submissions/lab11.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Bonus: WAF Sidecar with OWASP CRS
 
 ### Setup choice
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ Rule ID: **<e.g. 942100>** — OWASP CRS rule name: **<e.g. SQL Injection Attack
 What does the WAF buy you that Lecture 5's SAST + DAST + the L7 Conftest gate didn't already?
 What does it COST you? (FP risk at higher paranoia levels; ops overhead; cert/config sprawl.)
 When would you NOT deploy a WAF in front of a service?
-```
+````
 
 ---
 

labs/lab12.md

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ cat labs/lab12/results/kata-kernel.txt
 
 ### 12.3: Document in `submissions/lab12.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 # Lab 12 — BONUS — Submission
 
 ## Task 1: Install + Hello-World
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ cat labs/lab12/results/kata-kernel.txt
 ### Why the kernel differs (Reading 12)
 Reading 12 explains the model. Reference Lecture 7 slide 14 — runc CVE-2024-21626 ("Leaky Vessels").
 What does the kernel difference imply for that attack class? (2-3 sentences.)
-```
+````
 
 ---
 
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ done | tee labs/lab12/results/io-bench.txt
 
 ### 12.6: Document in `submissions/lab12.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Task 2: Isolation + Performance
 
 ### Isolation: /dev diff
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ kata:
 When is the security gain (separate kernel, runc-CVE class blocked) worth the cost?
 When isn't it? Give one example each (e.g., "multi-tenant SaaS workloads = yes;
 single-tenant batch jobs = no").
-```
+````
 
 ---
 
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ sudo cat /tmp/lab12-target
 
 ### B.4: Document in `submissions/lab12.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Bonus: Container-Escape PoC
 
 ### Vector chosen
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ Host verification:
 - Why does Kata block what runc allows? (Reference: Kata's micro-VM filesystem IS NOT the host filesystem — bind mounts are virtualized via virtio-fs/9p inside the VM.)
 - What real-world threat does this map to? (Multi-tenant CI runners running `--privileged` containers; misconfigured Kubernetes pods.)
 - What does this NOT block? (Pure side-channel attacks on the kernel itself, cross-tenant timing attacks. Reading 12's "Confidential Containers" section is where THOSE get defenses.)
-```
+````
 
 ---
 

labs/lab6.md

@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ jq '.results.failed_checks[] | select(.check_id | startswith("CKV2_CUSTOM_"))' \
 
 ### B.5: Document in `submissions/lab6.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Bonus: Custom Checkov Policy
 
 ### Policy file (paste full contents of labs/lab6/policies/my-custom-policy.yaml)
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ Output of `jq '.results.failed_checks[] | select(.check_id | startswith("CKV2_CU
 ### Why this rule matters
 2-3 sentences: what real-world incident or compliance requirement does your custom policy address?
 (References to specific incidents or NIST/CIS controls strengthen the answer.)
-```
+````
 
 ---
 

labs/lab7.md

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ trivy k8s --namespace juice-shop \
 
 ### 7.8: Document in `submissions/lab7.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Task 2: Kubernetes Hardening
 
 ### Manifests (paste relevant snippets)
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ Output of `kubectl get pod -n juice-shop -l app=juice-shop`:
 ### What broke and how you fixed it (2-3 sentences)
 `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` likely broke Juice Shop. What paths did it need to write?
 How did you fix it (which emptyDir mounts)?
-```
+````
 
 ---
 
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ conftest test /tmp/bad-pod.yaml --policy labs/lab7/policies
 
 ### B.3: Document in `submissions/lab7.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Bonus: Conftest Policy
 
 ### Policy (paste labs/lab7/policies/pod-hardening.rego)
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ conftest test /tmp/bad-pod.yaml --policy labs/lab7/policies
 ### What this prevents at CI time (2-3 sentences)
 Reference Lecture 7 slide 16 (admission control diagram). What Class of bug does this
 policy catch BEFORE `kubectl apply` runs? Why is catching at CI-time better than at admission-time?
-```
+````
 
 ---
 

labs/lab8.md

@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ cosign verify \
 
 ### 8.6: Document in `submissions/lab8.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 # Lab 8 — Submission
 
 ## Task 1: Sign + Tamper Demo
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ Output of `cosign verify` on tampered digest:
 ### Why digest binding matters (Lecture 8 slide 6)
 2-3 sentences. The tampered re-tag pointed to a DIFFERENT digest; your signature was bound to the
 ORIGINAL digest. What would have broken if Cosign had signed the tag instead?
-```
+````
 
 ---
 
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ cosign verify-attestation \
 
 ### 8.9: Document in `submissions/lab8.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Task 2: SBOM + Provenance Attestations
 
 ### SBOM attestation
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ cosign verify-attestation \
 Lecture 8 slide 12 + Lecture 9 slide 4 — at K8s admission time, a Kyverno verify-images policy
 can require BOTH signatures AND specific attestation predicates. What's the operational difference
 between a "signed but no SBOM" image and a "signed with SBOM" image when the next Log4Shell hits?
-```
+````
 
 ---
 
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ cat /tmp/blob-tamper.txt    # paste this into submission
 
 ### B.5: Document in `submissions/lab8.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Bonus: Blob Signing (Codecov 2021 mitigation)
 
 ### Sign + verify
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ Codecov's bash uploader was distributed via `curl | bash` without signature veri
 If their CI consumers had been running `cosign verify-blob` before `bash`-ing the script,
 how would the attack have failed? Reference Lecture 8 slide 14 + the specific cosign command
 that would have caught it.
-```
+````
 
 ---
 

labs/lab9.md

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ grep "Write to /tmp by container" labs/lab9/falco/logs/falco.log | head -5
 
 ### 9.6: Document in `submissions/lab9.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 # Lab 9 — Submission
 
 ## Task 1: Runtime Detection with Falco
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ Falco log line showing your custom rule:
 Your custom "write to /tmp" rule will fire on legitimate uses too (logging frameworks
 often write to /tmp). What's your tuning approach? (2-3 sentences referencing the
 `exceptions:` block vs `and not proc.name=...` patterns from Lecture 9.)
-```
+````
 
 ---
 
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ conftest test labs/lab9/manifests/bad-pod-no-resources.yaml \
 
 ### 9.10: Document in `submissions/lab9.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Task 2: Conftest Policy-as-Code
 
 ### My policy file (paste labs/lab9/policies/extra/hardening.rego)
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ conftest test labs/lab9/manifests/bad-pod-no-resources.yaml \
 ### Why CI-time vs admission-time (Lecture 9 slide 9)
 2-3 sentences. CI-time Conftest happens during PR review; admission-time Conftest happens at
 `kubectl apply`. What's the operational benefit of running BOTH (defense in depth)?
-```
+````
 
 ---
 
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ grep "Cryptominer" labs/lab9/falco/logs/falco.log
 
 ### B.4: Document in `submissions/lab9.md`
 
-```markdown
+````markdown
 ## Bonus: Cryptominer Detection Rule
 
 ### Rule (paste)
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ grep "Cryptominer" labs/lab9/falco/logs/falco.log
 - Which 2 indicators did you use and why?
 - What does this miss? (i.e., the false-negative case — e.g., obfuscated mining over HTTPS)
 - How would you combine this with the Lecture 9 SLA matrix?
-```
+````
 
 ---
 

lectures/lec1.md

@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ graph LR
 
 ```mermaid
 flowchart LR
-    Dev[👩‍💻 Dev] -.--> Build[🏗️]
-    Ops[🖥️ Ops] -.--> Build
-    Sec[🛡️ Sec] -.--> Build
-    Build --> DevSecOps[🚀 DevSecOps<br/>Continuous, automated security<br/>at every stage]
+    Dev["👩‍💻 Dev"] -.-> Build["🏗️ Build"]
+    Ops["🖥️ Ops"] -.-> Build
+    Sec["🛡️ Sec"] -.-> Build
+    Build --> DevSecOps["🚀 DevSecOps<br/>Continuous, automated security<br/>at every stage"]
 
     style DevSecOps fill:#FF9800,color:#fff
 ```