Pin release signing key and verify by default

Pin the production release signing public key in install.sh and
install.ps1 and require signature verification by default on the
release channel, so downloaded archives are checked against the pinned
trust root before install.

Guard the key end to end: release_readiness.py verifies built archives
against the configured signing public key (a key mismatch fails at
build time, not on users' machines), and verify_pinned_keys.py asserts
the pinned constants match the canonical docs/keys file and the CI
signing key. Both run in CI.

Metadata pinning and the production-trust CI gate are wired but dormant
(empty sentinel / unset variable) until their inputs exist.

Signed-off-by: Eugene Volen <Eugene.Volen@amd.com>

Author: volen-silo

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -147,6 +147,12 @@ jobs:
         if: needs.changes.outputs.heavy == 'true'
         run: python scripts/release_readiness.py --self-test
 
+      - name: Pinned key consistency (self-test + repo check)
+        if: needs.changes.outputs.heavy == 'true'
+        run: |
+          python scripts/verify_pinned_keys.py --self-test
+          python scripts/verify_pinned_keys.py
+
       - name: Acceptance install lifecycle
         if: needs.changes.outputs.heavy == 'true'
         run: ./scripts/acceptance-install-upgrade-tui-uninstall.sh
@@ -266,6 +272,13 @@ jobs:
         shell: pwsh
         run: python .\scripts\release_readiness.py --self-test
 
+      - name: Pinned key consistency (self-test + repo check)
+        if: needs.changes.outputs.heavy == 'true'
+        shell: pwsh
+        run: |
+          python .\scripts\verify_pinned_keys.py --self-test
+          python .\scripts\verify_pinned_keys.py
+
       - name: Check PowerShell installer syntax
         if: needs.changes.outputs.heavy == 'true'
         shell: pwsh

.github/workflows/nightly.yml

@@ -10,6 +10,19 @@ permissions:
 
 env:
   CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+  # Production trust gate — dormant until the owner sets the repository variable
+  # ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_PRODUCTION_TRUST (e.g. "1") and provides the trust inputs
+  # below. While the variable is unset/falsy, release_readiness.py skips
+  # validate_production_trust() and behavior is unchanged. The values are public
+  # keys and paths (not the private signing key, which stays step-scoped). When
+  # enabling the gate, the recipe-index inputs also require a step that
+  # materializes the hosted index + its .sig into the workspace. See
+  # plans/release-production-trust-rollout.md.
+  ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_PRODUCTION_TRUST: ${{ vars.ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_PRODUCTION_TRUST }}
+  ROCM_CLI_SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM: ${{ secrets.ROCM_CLI_SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM }}
+  ROCM_CLI_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM: ${{ secrets.ROCM_CLI_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM }}
+  ROCM_CLI_MODEL_RECIPE_INDEX_PATH: ${{ vars.ROCM_CLI_MODEL_RECIPE_INDEX_PATH }}
+  ROCM_CLI_MODEL_RECIPE_INDEX_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH: ${{ vars.ROCM_CLI_MODEL_RECIPE_INDEX_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH }}
 
 jobs:
   nightly:
@@ -23,6 +36,9 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v6
 
+      - name: Verify pinned keys match the signing key
+        run: python scripts/verify_pinned_keys.py
+
       - name: Check for changes since last nightly
         id: check
         env:
@@ -180,6 +196,10 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v6
 
+      - name: Verify pinned keys match the signing key
+        shell: pwsh
+        run: python .\scripts\verify_pinned_keys.py
+
       - uses: actions-rust-lang/setup-rust-toolchain@v1
 
       - name: Build release binaries

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -14,6 +14,19 @@ permissions:
 
 env:
   CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+  # Production trust gate — dormant until the owner sets the repository variable
+  # ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_PRODUCTION_TRUST (e.g. "1") and provides the trust inputs
+  # below. While the variable is unset/falsy, release_readiness.py skips
+  # validate_production_trust() and behavior is unchanged. The values are public
+  # keys and paths (not the private signing key, which stays step-scoped). When
+  # enabling the gate, the recipe-index inputs also require a step that
+  # materializes the hosted index + its .sig into the workspace. See
+  # plans/release-production-trust-rollout.md.
+  ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_PRODUCTION_TRUST: ${{ vars.ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_PRODUCTION_TRUST }}
+  ROCM_CLI_SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM: ${{ secrets.ROCM_CLI_SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM }}
+  ROCM_CLI_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM: ${{ secrets.ROCM_CLI_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM }}
+  ROCM_CLI_MODEL_RECIPE_INDEX_PATH: ${{ vars.ROCM_CLI_MODEL_RECIPE_INDEX_PATH }}
+  ROCM_CLI_MODEL_RECIPE_INDEX_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH: ${{ vars.ROCM_CLI_MODEL_RECIPE_INDEX_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH }}
 
 jobs:
   release:
@@ -24,6 +37,9 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v6
 
+      - name: Verify pinned keys match the signing key
+        run: python scripts/verify_pinned_keys.py
+
       - name: Determine version
         id: version
         run: |
@@ -164,6 +180,10 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v6
 
+      - name: Verify pinned keys match the signing key
+        shell: pwsh
+        run: python .\scripts\verify_pinned_keys.py
+
       - uses: actions-rust-lang/setup-rust-toolchain@v1
 
       - name: Build release binaries

apps/rocm/src/therock.rs

@@ -1702,12 +1702,48 @@ fn select_latest_version(versions: &[String], channel: TheRockChannel) -> Option
     }
 }
 
+/// Pinned production metadata signing public key (trust root). Empty until the
+/// repository owner publishes production keys (see docs/release-trust.md,
+/// "Remaining Owner Step"). While empty, metadata verification stays opt-in
+/// (enabled only via the `ROCM_CLI_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_*` env vars). Once
+/// populated, metadata signatures are verified by default with this key as the
+/// trust root.
+const PINNED_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM: &str = "";
+
+/// The pinned metadata trust root, or `None` while the sentinel is still empty.
+fn pinned_metadata_public_key() -> Option<String> {
+    let pem = PINNED_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM.trim();
+    (!pem.is_empty()).then(|| pem.to_owned())
+}
+
 impl MetadataSignaturePolicy {
     fn from_env() -> Self {
+        Self::resolve(
+            truthy_env("ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_METADATA_SIGNATURE"),
+            env_path("ROCM_CLI_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH"),
+            env_nonempty("ROCM_CLI_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM"),
+            pinned_metadata_public_key(),
+        )
+    }
+
+    /// Combine the env-provided inputs with the pinned trust root. An explicit
+    /// env key (path or PEM) wins as an escape hatch; otherwise the pinned key is
+    /// used, and its presence makes verification required by default.
+    fn resolve(
+        env_required: bool,
+        env_path: Option<PathBuf>,
+        env_pem: Option<String>,
+        pinned_pem: Option<String>,
+    ) -> Self {
+        let pinned = if env_path.is_none() && env_pem.is_none() {
+            pinned_pem
+        } else {
+            None
+        };
         Self {
-            required: truthy_env("ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_METADATA_SIGNATURE"),
-            public_key_path: env_path("ROCM_CLI_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH"),
-            public_key_pem: env_nonempty("ROCM_CLI_METADATA_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM"),
+            required: env_required || pinned.is_some(),
+            public_key_path: env_path,
+            public_key_pem: env_pem.or(pinned),
         }
     }
 
@@ -3837,6 +3873,56 @@ echo Python 3.12.10
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn metadata_policy_uses_pinned_key_and_requires_by_default() {
+        // A pinned trust root with no env inputs: verification becomes required
+        // by default and the pinned PEM is used.
+        let pinned = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\npinned\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n";
+        let policy = MetadataSignaturePolicy::resolve(false, None, None, Some(pinned.to_owned()));
+        assert!(policy.required);
+        assert!(policy.active());
+        assert_eq!(policy.public_key_pem.as_deref(), Some(pinned));
+        assert!(policy.public_key_path.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn metadata_policy_env_key_overrides_pinned_key() {
+        // An explicit env PEM wins over the pinned root (escape hatch), and does
+        // not force `required` on its own.
+        let pinned = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\npinned\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n";
+        let env_pem = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nenv\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n";
+        let policy = MetadataSignaturePolicy::resolve(
+            false,
+            None,
+            Some(env_pem.to_owned()),
+            Some(pinned.to_owned()),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(policy.public_key_pem.as_deref(), Some(env_pem));
+
+        let env_path = PathBuf::from("/keys/metadata.pem");
+        let policy = MetadataSignaturePolicy::resolve(
+            false,
+            Some(env_path.clone()),
+            None,
+            Some(pinned.to_owned()),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(policy.public_key_path, Some(env_path));
+        assert!(policy.public_key_pem.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn metadata_policy_without_pinned_key_preserves_optin_behavior() {
+        // Empty pinned sentinel + no env inputs: verification stays inactive,
+        // exactly as before pinning was introduced.
+        let policy = MetadataSignaturePolicy::resolve(false, None, None, None);
+        assert!(!policy.required);
+        assert!(!policy.active());
+
+        // `ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_METADATA_SIGNATURE=1` alone still activates it.
+        let policy = MetadataSignaturePolicy::resolve(true, None, None, None);
+        assert!(policy.required);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn metadata_cache_revalidation_requires_cached_signature_when_policy_is_active() -> Result<()> {
         let (root, paths) = test_paths("metadata-signature-revalidate");

docs/keys/rocm-cli-release-current-public.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAxuyScR/BzV+kuXqWAHtE
++9xiPCWURUYnsio9MOrf2Xe01mBngP7qPcF13+5nrfT3EnuxOn5rSCYwjOndlS+c
+KzOw6GZXJD/ZqeojnbXxxsxlftAQHHEke1WCtga5ZEFxOauTeB5nTV/IbjMAl2Xc
+M4PaudpFFH/6j/E3gongDmt0hWdpMLbaCcd3i1vMTEsaHZooNoAbJ/dIAHR/dDNM
+pScZAZoy0LL3Afhn5Hiv71trfbfnnboVSdhnCoMmisl6/sK55zR7VM8hWDTTowl3
+ultUtiz4emTfXDCb2RptOgoydBA+mu9z6O4eVF8S5dVr/S834SK6dD2fWHNnT0dc
+JwIDAQAB
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

install.ps1

@@ -75,24 +75,63 @@ function Convert-FileUriToPath {
     return $null
 }
 
-function Resolve-SigningPublicKey {
+# Pinned production release signing public keys (trust roots). These stay empty
+# until the repository owner publishes production keys (see docs/release-trust.md,
+# "Remaining Owner Step"). While empty, release installs keep the opt-in behavior:
+# a signature is verified only when a key is supplied via the parameters/env vars
+# or ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE=1. Once populated, release-channel installs verify
+# signatures by default with these keys as trust roots. Two slots support
+# zero-downtime key rotation: a release signed with either the current or the
+# pre-staged next key verifies, so the next key is trusted before its first use.
+$PinnedReleasePublicKeyCurrent = @"
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAxuyScR/BzV+kuXqWAHtE
++9xiPCWURUYnsio9MOrf2Xe01mBngP7qPcF13+5nrfT3EnuxOn5rSCYwjOndlS+c
+KzOw6GZXJD/ZqeojnbXxxsxlftAQHHEke1WCtga5ZEFxOauTeB5nTV/IbjMAl2Xc
+M4PaudpFFH/6j/E3gongDmt0hWdpMLbaCcd3i1vMTEsaHZooNoAbJ/dIAHR/dDNM
+pScZAZoy0LL3Afhn5Hiv71trfbfnnboVSdhnCoMmisl6/sK55zR7VM8hWDTTowl3
+ultUtiz4emTfXDCb2RptOgoydBA+mu9z6O4eVF8S5dVr/S834SK6dD2fWHNnT0dc
+JwIDAQAB
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+"@
+$PinnedReleasePublicKeyNext = ""
+
+function Test-HasPinnedReleaseKeys {
+    return (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($PinnedReleasePublicKeyCurrent)) `
+        -or (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($PinnedReleasePublicKeyNext))
+}
+
+# Return the candidate signing public keys as an array of file paths. An explicit
+# parameter/env-provided key wins (an escape hatch for private mirrors); otherwise
+# the pinned production trust roots are used.
+function Resolve-SigningPublicKeys {
     param(
         [string] $KeyPath,
         [string] $KeyPem,
         [string] $TempRoot
     )
 
     if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($KeyPath)) {
-        return Resolve-InstallerPath $KeyPath
+        return @((Resolve-InstallerPath $KeyPath))
     }
 
     if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($KeyPem)) {
         $path = Join-Path $TempRoot "rocm-cli-signing-public-key.pem"
         Set-Content -LiteralPath $path -Value $KeyPem -Encoding ascii
-        return $path
+        return @($path)
     }
 
-    return ""
+    $paths = @()
+    $index = 0
+    foreach ($pinned in @($PinnedReleasePublicKeyCurrent, $PinnedReleasePublicKeyNext)) {
+        if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($pinned)) {
+            $index++
+            $path = Join-Path $TempRoot "rocm-cli-pinned-key-$index.pem"
+            Set-Content -LiteralPath $path -Value $pinned -Encoding ascii
+            $paths += $path
+        }
+    }
+    return $paths
 }
 
 function Save-File {
@@ -136,14 +175,17 @@ function Confirm-ArchiveSignature {
     param(
         [string] $ArchivePath,
         [string] $SignaturePath,
-        [string] $PublicKeyPath
+        [string[]] $PublicKeyPaths
     )
 
     Confirm-Command openssl
-    & openssl dgst -sha256 -verify $PublicKeyPath -signature $SignaturePath $ArchivePath | Out-Null
-    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
-        Fail "signature verification failed"
+    foreach ($key in $PublicKeyPaths) {
+        & openssl dgst -sha256 -verify $key -signature $SignaturePath $ArchivePath | Out-Null
+        if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0) {
+            return
+        }
     }
+    Fail "signature verification failed"
 }
 
 function Get-ExpectedSha256 {
@@ -380,10 +422,17 @@ $sigPath = "$archivePath.sig"
 $extractDir = Join-Path $tempRoot "extract"
 $manifestPath = Join-Path $InstallDir ".rocm-cli-manifest"
 $signatureRequired = $RequireSignature -or (Test-Truthy $env:ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE)
+# Production default: once release trust roots are pinned, release-channel installs
+# always verify. An unset or 0 ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE does not lower this
+# floor; pass -SigningPublicKeyPath/-Pem (or the env vars) to point at an
+# alternate key (e.g. a private mirror) instead.
+if ($Channel -eq "release" -and (Test-HasPinnedReleaseKeys)) {
+    $signatureRequired = $true
+}
 
 try {
     New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $tempRoot, $extractDir | Out-Null
-    $signingPublicKey = Resolve-SigningPublicKey $SigningPublicKeyPath $SigningPublicKeyPem $tempRoot
+    $signingPublicKeys = @(Resolve-SigningPublicKeys $SigningPublicKeyPath $SigningPublicKeyPem $tempRoot)
 
     Write-Host "rocm-cli installer"
     Write-Host "  repo: $Repo"
@@ -400,12 +449,12 @@ try {
         Fail "checksum verification failed"
     }
 
-    if ($signatureRequired -or -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($signingPublicKey)) {
-        if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($signingPublicKey)) {
+    if ($signatureRequired -or ($signingPublicKeys.Count -gt 0)) {
+        if ($signingPublicKeys.Count -eq 0) {
             Fail "signature verification requires ROCM_CLI_SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH, ROCM_CLI_SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM, -SigningPublicKeyPath, or -SigningPublicKeyPem"
         }
         Save-File $sigUrl $sigPath "required signature sidecar is missing or unavailable"
-        Confirm-ArchiveSignature $archivePath $sigPath $signingPublicKey
+        Confirm-ArchiveSignature $archivePath $sigPath $signingPublicKeys
         Write-Host "signature verified"
     }