man: avoid unbounded copy in calc example#1493
Conversation
Automated security fix generated by Orbis Security AI
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AI slop. A better fix uses strncpy or strlcpy. It's in example code, so no
rush ... I can easily do a fix but I'm in the middle of some other things.
…On Sun, May 17, 2026, 08:55 OrbisAI Security ***@***.***> wrote:
Summary
Fix critical severity security issue in man/calc.c.
Vulnerability
Field Value
*ID* V-001
*Severity* CRITICAL
*Scanner* multi_agent_ai
*Rule* V-001
*File* man/calc.c:19
*Description*: Unbounded strcpy and strcat calls copy attacker-controlled
data into fixed-size stack or heap buffers without any length validation.
In man/calc.c:19, a command-line argument (argv[n]) is copied directly into
a fixed buffer with no size check. In src/pl-load.c:400-401, a symbol
prefix is copied then a filename is concatenated into a fixed symname
buffer. At lines 463-464, 'install_' is copied then an export name (ename)
is concatenated into fname without bounds checking. All three patterns
allow overwriting adjacent memory beyond the buffer boundary.
Changes
- man/calc.c
Verification
- Build passes
- Scanner re-scan confirms fix
- LLM code review passed
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*Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security <https://orbisappsec.com>*
------------------------------
You can view, comment on, or merge this pull request online at:
#1493
Commit Summary
- 0ae21d1
<0ae21d1>
fix: V-001 security vulnerability
File Changes
(1 file <https://github.com/SWI-Prolog/swipl-devel/pull/1493/files>)
- *M* man/calc.c
<https://github.com/SWI-Prolog/swipl-devel/pull/1493/files#diff-e659c41083720074b7aaa30031d3d88720a8d149ce56fcadf00da1953002d2c5>
(2)
Patch Links:
- https://github.com/SWI-Prolog/swipl-devel/pull/1493.patch
- https://github.com/SWI-Prolog/swipl-devel/pull/1493.diff
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Thanks for taking a look, agreed, calling this “critical” was overstated, especially since this is example code. The intent was to remove the unbounded copy from argv into the fixed-size expression buffer, but I agree the current patch is not the cleanest form, and the PR description also overreaches by mentioning other locations that this patch does not actually modify. I can revise this as a small defensive-hardening cleanup rather than a security-critical fix. I’ll update the description, remove the unsupported claims, and either use the project-preferred bounded-copy style or leave this for your local fix if that is easier. |
| { if ( n != 1 ) | ||
| *e++ = ' '; | ||
| strcpy(e, argv[n]); | ||
| snprintf(e, MAXLINE - (e - expression), "%s", argv[n]); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Better to do (untested code):
outside the loop:
char expression[MAXLINE] = "";
char *e = expression;
and inside the loop (ptrdiff_t can be used instead of ssize_t):
{ ssize_t len_rem = sizeof expression - (e - expression);
if (len_rem > 0)
e = strncpy(e, argv[n], len_rem);
}
// remove: e += strlen(e);
and after the loop:
expression[sizeof expression - 1] = '\0';
strlcpy() is an alternative but it's not available on all platforms and the test for len_rem is still needed because size_t is is unsigned.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
@orbisai0security can you address code review comments?
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✅ Changes Applied I've updated the code based on your feedback: Addressing @kamahen's review comment on
Files modified:
The changes have been pushed to this PR branch. Please review! |
| strcpy(e, argv[n]); | ||
| len_rem = sizeof expression - (e - expression); | ||
| if ( len_rem > 0 ) | ||
| strncpy(e, argv[n], len_rem); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Change this line to:
e = strncpy(e, argv[n], len_rem);
and remove e += strlen(e); two lines below.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
@orbisai0security can you address code review comments?
| { if ( n != 1 ) | ||
| { ptrdiff_t len_rem; | ||
| if ( n != 1 ) | ||
| *e++ = ' '; |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
This can also overflow the buffer; use strncpy() here or check that e is within bounds.
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✅ Changes Applied I've updated the code based on your feedback: Two code review comments from @kamahen need to be addressed in the
These changes bring the code in line with the reviewer's requested style while keeping the bounds guard on the space character. Files modified:
The changes have been pushed to this PR branch. Please review! |
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Pushed e613d02 to modernize the example. Not sure it is better or worse from a didactic point of view ... |
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Could you please re-open this PR? I'm curious to see if I can get the bot (I presume it's a bot) to generate the code I want. :) (There's also a C++ version of this, which is much simpler, using |
I guess you can get all relevant info from this PR. It correctly points at shaky code. The whole example is a but 1980s though. So, I've updated it, making this PR irrelevant. |
Summary
This is a small defensive-hardening cleanup for the calc example.
The previous code copied each command-line argument into the fixed-size
expressionbuffer usingstrcpy. This patch replaces the unbounded copy with a bounded copy so that overly long input cannot write past the remaining space in the buffer.This is not claimed as a critical vulnerability; it is a robustness improvement for example code.
Changes
man/calc.cVerification
Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security