Add note how AI is accelerating things.

Signed-off-by: Kurt Garloff <kurt@garloff.de>

Author: garloff

blog/2026-05-10-kernel-root-exploits.md

@@ -265,10 +265,40 @@ in the meantime, as advised above.
 The SCS community infrastructure was secured on May 8 by disabling the
 relevant modules.
 
+## Outlook
+
+The density with which severe issues are currently found is notable.  While the
+research in the referenced issues originated from human beings being suspicious
+that certain things were not handled correctly everywhere, they were assisted
+by AI tools in the search. This pattern is likely to turn up a relevant number
+of such issues which are reachable now using such help until we may enjoy a
+more quiet time again. Until a new class of weaknesses comes into the reach of
+yet more powerful AI tools.
+
+The other notable thing is that the quiet closing of issues within the Linux
+Kernel no longer works which has broken the responsible disclosure process
+that gave defenders some headway against attackers. One reason is that
+once a pattern emerges, several teams compete for speed to find related issues
+and decide in favor of disclosing before someone else finds it also. Another
+reason is that there are people that now use AI tools to analyze merged bugfixes
+to the kernel using AI tools -- the fact that they are not flagged as security
+issues no longer is a good cover. So software distributors need to expect more
+of these occurences where they are struggling to patch software, validate the
+fixes and ship to customers before large-scale attacks happen. Operators will
+need to be fast as well.
+
+So yes, the times are changing in software security and open source software is
+hit first being the most accessible to security researchers. On the proprietary
+side, we can suspect similar research is happening, but whether the research
+teams also go for fame and visibility or maybe have other prevalent incentives
+is an open question.
+
 ## Thanks
 
 The authors would like to thank Taeyang Lee at Xint (who initiated the
 research on copy.fail) and Hyunwoo Kim (@v4bel, who discovered Dirty Frag).
+Update 2026-05-15: They would also like to acknowledge William Bowling (V12) for Fragnesia 
+and Jann Horn and Qualys for ssh-keysign-pwn.
 They would also like to thank the upstream Linux kernel maintainers and
 Linux distributors for their reliable work no handling the issues and
 getting fixes out.
@@ -286,3 +316,4 @@ SCS security contact is [security@scs.community](mailto:security@scs.community),
 - Correct facts on the failure of the responsible disclosure. Release as v1.0, 2026-05-09, 20:00 CEST.
 - Update on final rxrpc fix in stable kernels. v1.1, 2026-05-12, 08:45 CEST.
 - Add Fragnesia and ssh-keysign-pwn LPEs. v1.2, 2026-05-15, 17:15 CEST.
+- Add note on AI changing the game (outlook). v1.3, 2026-05-15, 17:30 CEST.