demo.mjs

// Cross-language proof: the JS SDK drives a full ASPL flow against the (Python)
// reference node, including verifying the node's Ed25519 delivery signature in JS.
//
//   node sdk-js/demo.mjs http://127.0.0.1:5010
import { ASPLClient } from "./aspl.mjs";

const url = process.argv[2] || "http://127.0.0.1:5010";
const c = new ASPLClient(url);

const reg = await c.register("js-sdk-agent");
console.log("1. REGISTER  ->", reg.agent_id, "| node key learned:", !!c.nodePublicKey);

const pub = await c.publish({
  type: "knowledge", intent: "translate english text into french",
  description: "english to french translation guidance",
  content: { text: "translate carefully and preserve tone" }, intent_tags: ["fr"],
});
console.log("2. PUBLISH   ->", pub.id);

const matches = await c.need("english to french translation");
console.log("3. NEED      ->", matches.map(m => m.intent.slice(0, 32)));

const txn = await c.accept(pub.id);
const d = await c.deliver(txn.transaction_id);  // verifies Ed25519 sig in JS, throws on fail
console.log("4. DELIVER   -> signature verified in JS:", c.verifyDelivery(d).ok);

const conf = await c.confirm(txn.transaction_id, true);
console.log("5. CONFIRM   -> capability trust:", conf.capability_trust_updated);

// Negative control: tamper with the content, verification must fail.
const tampered = structuredClone(d);
tampered.content.text = "malicious replacement";
console.log("6. TAMPER    -> rejected as expected:", c.verifyDelivery(tampered).ok === false);

console.log("\nJS SDK ↔ Python node: OK");