fix: sanitize shell/subprocess call in mysql-manager.ts#28985
fix: sanitize shell/subprocess call in mysql-manager.ts#28985orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@e2e/helpers/environment/service-managers/mysql-manager.ts`:
- Around line 95-99: The cleanup path in MysqlManager still passes untrusted
schema names from the information_schema query into dropDatabase(), which then
constructs a shell command via exec/sh -c. Update the MysqlManager cleanup flow
so schema names are never interpolated into shell commands; instead,
validate/escape the schema identifier at the dropDatabase() boundary or switch
to a non-shell MySQL invocation/API for dropping databases. Ensure the fix
covers the values returned by the ghost_* query, not just DEV_PRIMARY_DATABASE.
- Around line 184-187: The database-name guard in MySQLManager is happening too
late, so setupTestDatabase() can still pass an unsafe databaseName into
createDatabase(), restoreDatabaseFromSnapshot(), and updateSiteUuid() before
validation. Move the same /^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/ check to the earliest entry point
that receives databaseName, ideally at the start of setupTestDatabase() before
any shell-command-based helpers are called, and keep the existing validation
near updateStripeSettings() only as a secondary safeguard if needed.
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e2e/helpers/environment/service-managers/mysql-manager.ts
| if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/.test(DEV_PRIMARY_DATABASE)) { | ||
| throw new Error(`Invalid DEV_PRIMARY_DATABASE value: ${DEV_PRIMARY_DATABASE}`); | ||
| } | ||
| const query = 'SELECT schema_name FROM information_schema.schemata WHERE schema_name LIKE \'ghost_%\' AND schema_name NOT IN (\'ghost_testing\', \'ghost_e2e_base\', \'' + DEV_PRIMARY_DATABASE + '\')'; | ||
| const output = await this.exec('mysql -uroot -proot -N -e "' + query + '"'); |
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🔒 Security & Privacy | 🔴 Critical | ⚡ Quick win
This still shells untrusted schema names during cleanup.
The new check only covers DEV_PRIMARY_DATABASE, but the values returned by this query are later fed into dropDatabase(), which still builds mysql ... "DROP DATABASE ..." and executes it via sh -c. A malicious ghost_* schema name from MySQL metadata would bypass this guard and still reach the command-injection sink.
🧰 Tools
🪛 OpenGrep (1.23.0)
[ERROR] 99-99: Dynamic command passed to child_process.exec/execSync. Use child_process.execFile or spawn with an argument array instead.
(coderabbit.command-injection.exec-js)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@e2e/helpers/environment/service-managers/mysql-manager.ts` around lines 95 -
99, The cleanup path in MysqlManager still passes untrusted schema names from
the information_schema query into dropDatabase(), which then constructs a shell
command via exec/sh -c. Update the MysqlManager cleanup flow so schema names are
never interpolated into shell commands; instead, validate/escape the schema
identifier at the dropDatabase() boundary or switch to a non-shell MySQL
invocation/API for dropping databases. Ensure the fix covers the values returned
by the ghost_* query, not just DEV_PRIMARY_DATABASE.
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@orbisai0security can you address code review comments?
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@anupamme yes — this review comment is still valid, and the cleanest fix is to move the database-name validation to the shell-command boundary instead of only checking DEV_PRIMARY_DATABASE.
- Add a shared database identifier validator inside
e2e/helpers/environment/service-managers/mysql-manager.ts - Use that validator in
dropDatabase()so names returned fromdropAllTestDatabases()cannot reachsh -cunchecked - Reuse the same validator in the other methods that interpolate database names into shell commands for consistency and defense-in-depth
- Keep the existing
DEV_PRIMARY_DATABASEvalidation indropAllTestDatabases()or route it through the same helper
🧠 Learnings used
Learnt from: JohnONolan
Repo: TryGhost/Ghost PR: 28368
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Timestamp: 2026-06-04T15:15:20.265Z
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| if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/.test(database)) { | ||
| throw new Error(`Invalid database name: ${database}`); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
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🔒 Security & Privacy | 🔴 Critical | ⚡ Quick win
The validation is too late to secure setupTestDatabase().
setupTestDatabase() calls createDatabase(), restoreDatabaseFromSnapshot(), and updateSiteUuid() with the same databaseName before this guard runs, and those methods still interpolate the name into shell commands executed with sh -c. That means a crafted database name can still trigger the original CWE-78 path before updateStripeSettings() ever validates it.
Suggested direction
export class MySQLManager {
+ private assertSafeDatabaseName(database: string): void {
+ if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/.test(database)) {
+ throw new Error(`Invalid database name: ${database}`);
+ }
+ }
+
async setupTestDatabase(databaseName: string, siteUuid: string, options: {
stripe?: {
secretKey: string;
publishableKey: string;
};
} = {}): Promise<void> {
+ this.assertSafeDatabaseName(databaseName);
debug('Setting up test database:', databaseName);
try {
await this.createDatabase(databaseName);
await this.restoreDatabaseFromSnapshot(databaseName);
await this.updateSiteUuid(databaseName, siteUuid);
@@
async updateStripeSettings(database: string, secretKey: string, publishableKey: string): Promise<void> {
- if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/.test(database)) {
- throw new Error(`Invalid database name: ${database}`);
- }
+ this.assertSafeDatabaseName(database);🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@e2e/helpers/environment/service-managers/mysql-manager.ts` around lines 184 -
187, The database-name guard in MySQLManager is happening too late, so
setupTestDatabase() can still pass an unsafe databaseName into createDatabase(),
restoreDatabaseFromSnapshot(), and updateSiteUuid() before validation. Move the
same /^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/ check to the earliest entry point that receives
databaseName, ideally at the start of setupTestDatabase() before any
shell-command-based helpers are called, and keep the existing validation near
updateStripeSettings() only as a secondary safeguard if needed.
|
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2 participants
Summary
Fix critical severity security issue in
e2e/helpers/environment/service-managers/mysql-manager.ts.Vulnerability
V-001e2e/helpers/environment/service-managers/mysql-manager.ts:187Description: The MySQL manager constructs shell commands using string concatenation with user-controlled database names, allowing command injection via shell metacharacters.
Evidence
Exploitation scenario: An attacker who controls the database parameter can inject shell commands.
Scanner confirmation: multi_agent_ai rule
V-001flagged this pattern.Production code: This file is in the production codebase, not test-only code.
Threat Model Context
This is a Node.js library - vulnerabilities affect downstream consumers who use this package.
Changes
e2e/helpers/environment/service-managers/mysql-manager.tsVerification
Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security