chore(security): dependency-review, invisible-char detection, and least-privilege workflow permissions (#782) (#783)

* deps: updating security posture in ci

* deps: addressing feedback

---------

Co-authored-by: Naved  Merchant <naved.merchant@gmail.com>

Author: edelauna

.github/workflows/cli-release.yml

@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ on:
         type: boolean
         default: false
 
+# Least privilege: the release job escalates to contents: write via its own
+# job-level permissions block.
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
 jobs:
   # Build CLI for each platform.
   build:

.github/workflows/code-qa.yml

@@ -9,7 +9,56 @@ on:
     merge_group:
         types: [checks_requested]
 
+# Least privilege: every job below escalates only where it needs to.
+permissions:
+    contents: read
+
 jobs:
+    dependency-review:
+        runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+        # Only meaningful for PRs — validates the dependency diff of the pull
+        # request against GitHub's advisory database before merge.
+        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
+        steps:
+            - name: Checkout code
+              uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+              with:
+                  # This job never pushes — don't persist the GITHUB_TOKEN.
+                  persist-credentials: false
+            - name: Dependency review
+              uses: actions/dependency-review-action@a1d282b36b6f3519aa1f3fc636f609c47dddb294 # v5.0.0
+
+    invisible-chars:
+        runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+        # Reject invisible / homoglyph Unicode that GitHub's diff UI renders
+        # invisibly and most editors hide. These compile fine, which is the
+        # risk: identifier-splitting, string-literal injection, and the
+        # "Trojan Source" bidi-override attack (U+202A-U+202E). Scanning raw
+        # bytes catches them in strings, identifiers, and comments alike.
+        steps:
+            - name: Checkout code
+              uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+              with:
+                  # This job never pushes — don't persist the GITHUB_TOKEN.
+                  persist-credentials: false
+            - name: Reject invisible / homoglyph Unicode
+              run: |
+                  # zero-width (U+200B-200F), word joiner (U+2060), BOM (U+FEFF),
+                  # bidi overrides (U+202A-202E), soft hyphen (U+00AD).
+                  # Covers source, release-adjacent executable scripts
+                  # (*.sh / *.cjs / *.cts / *.mts), and the executable shell
+                  # blocks inside GitHub workflow/action YAML.
+                  if grep -rnP '[\x{200B}-\x{200F}\x{202A}-\x{202E}\x{2060}\x{FEFF}\x{00AD}]' \
+                      --include='*.ts' --include='*.tsx' --include='*.js' --include='*.mjs' \
+                      --include='*.cjs' --include='*.cts' --include='*.mts' --include='*.sh' \
+                      --include='*.yml' --include='*.yaml' \
+                      --exclude-dir=node_modules --exclude-dir=dist --exclude-dir=out \
+                      --exclude-dir=coverage --exclude-dir=.turbo --exclude-dir=.vinxi \
+                      src webview-ui packages apps .github; then
+                      echo "::error::Found invisible or homoglyph Unicode characters (zero-width / bidi-override / BOM / soft hyphen)"
+                      exit 1
+                  fi
+
     check-translations:
         runs-on: ubuntu-latest
         steps:

.github/workflows/codeql.yml

@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ on:
   schedule:
     - cron: '24 19 * * 3'
 
+# Least privilege: the analyze job escalates to security-events: write via its
+# own job-level permissions block.
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
 jobs:
   analyze:
     name: Analyze (${{ matrix.language }})

.github/workflows/e2e.yml

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ on:
     merge_group:
         types: [checks_requested]
 
+permissions:
+    contents: read
+
 jobs:
     e2e-mock:
         runs-on: ubuntu-latest

.github/workflows/marketplace-publish.yml

@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ on:
       - "v*.*.*"
   workflow_dispatch:
 
+# Least privilege: publish-stable escalates to contents: write via its own
+# job-level permissions block.
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
 jobs:
   check-pr-approval:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest

.github/workflows/release-validation.yml

@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ on:
             - "releases/**"
             - ".github/workflows/release-validation.yml"
 
+permissions:
+    contents: read
+
 jobs:
     validate-release:
         runs-on: ubuntu-latest

.vscode/settings.json

@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
 		"dist": true // set this to false to include "dist" folder in search results
 	},
 	// Turn off tsc task auto detection since we have the necessary tasks as npm scripts
-	"typescript.tsc.autoDetect": "off",
-	"vitest.disableWorkspaceWarning": true
+	"js/ts.tsc.autoDetect": "off",
+	// Surface invisible (zero-width) and ambiguous/homoglyph Unicode in the
+	// editor. Pairs with the code-qa.yml invisible-chars CI check.
+	"editor.unicodeHighlight.invisibleCharacters": true,
+	"editor.unicodeHighlight.ambiguousCharacters": true
 }

packages/config-eslint/base.js

@@ -39,6 +39,15 @@ export const config = [
 					caughtErrorsIgnorePattern: "^_",
 				},
 			],
+			// Reject irregular whitespace (incl. zero-width space U+200B and
+			// BOM U+FEFF) in identifiers and between tokens. This rule does NOT
+			// catch bidi-override, ZWJ/ZWNJ, or word-joiner characters; the CI
+			// invisible-chars job in code-qa.yml is the authoritative defense
+			// for the full Trojan Source character set across all files.
+			"no-irregular-whitespace": [
+				"error",
+				{ skipStrings: true, skipComments: false, skipRegExps: true, skipTemplates: false },
+			],
 		},
 	},
 ]