Gate morph_edit_file mentions in system prompt and bash hint on MORPH_API_KEY presence

Author: alexylon

src/repl/conversation.rs

@@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ impl ConversationHistory {
             "- When creating or editing code, use the write_file tool"
         };
 
+        let write_scope_tools = if has_morph {
+            "write_file, edit_file, and morph_edit_file"
+        } else {
+            "write_file and edit_file"
+        };
+
         let mut system_text = format!(
             r#"You are Sofos, an AI coding assistant. You have access to tools that allow you to:
 {}
@@ -72,7 +78,7 @@ Prefer read-only commands and dry-runs; if a potentially destructive action seem
 
 Outside Workspace Access (three separate scopes, each prompted independently):
 - Read scope: read_file and list_directory can access absolute or ~/ paths. If not pre-configured, the user is prompted to allow access and can optionally remember the decision.
-- Write scope: write_file, edit_file, and morph_edit_file can write to absolute or ~/ paths. The user is prompted for Write access separately from Read.
+- Write scope: {} can write to absolute or ~/ paths. The user is prompted for Write access separately from Read.
 - Bash scope: bash commands can reference absolute or ~/ paths. The user is prompted for Bash path access. Use absolute paths (not ..) for external directories.
 - All three scopes are independent — Read access does not grant Write or Bash access.
 - When accessing external paths, just use the absolute or ~/ path directly. If not yet allowed, the user will be prompted interactively.
@@ -105,7 +111,8 @@ Your goal is to help users with coding tasks efficiently and accurately.
 Always use the metric system for all measurements. If the user uses other units, convert them and answer in metric.
 Show imperial units only when the user explicitly asks for them."#,
             features.join("\n"),
-            edit_instruction
+            edit_instruction,
+            write_scope_tools
         );
 
         // Append custom instructions if provided

src/tools/bashexec.rs

@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ pub struct BashExecutor {
     workspace: PathBuf,
     /// Whether interactive prompts (stdin) are available
     interactive: bool,
+    /// Whether `morph_edit_file` is exposed (drives error-message hints)
+    has_morph: bool,
     /// Session-scoped temporary permissions (not persisted to config)
     session_allowed: Arc<Mutex<HashSet<String>>>,
     session_denied: Arc<Mutex<HashSet<String>>>,
@@ -98,10 +100,11 @@ pub struct BashExecutor {
 }
 
 impl BashExecutor {
-    pub fn new(workspace: PathBuf, interactive: bool) -> Result<Self> {
+    pub fn new(workspace: PathBuf, interactive: bool, has_morph: bool) -> Result<Self> {
         Ok(Self {
             workspace,
             interactive,
+            has_morph,
             session_allowed: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashSet::new())),
             session_denied: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashSet::new())),
             bash_path_session_allowed: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashSet::new())),
@@ -634,10 +637,15 @@ impl BashExecutor {
         if command_without_stderr_redirect.contains('>')
             || command_without_stderr_redirect.contains(">>")
         {
+            let edit_hint = if self.has_morph {
+                "edit_file/morph_edit_file"
+            } else {
+                "edit_file"
+            };
             return format!(
                 "Command '{}' contains output redirection ('>' or '>>')\n\
-                 Hint: Use write_file tool to create or edit_file/morph_edit_file to modify files. Note: '2>&1' is allowed.",
-                command
+                 Hint: Use write_file tool to create or {} to modify files. Note: '2>&1' is allowed.",
+                command, edit_hint
             );
         }
 
@@ -804,7 +812,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn test_safe_commands() {
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
 
         // Note: These tests check the command structure safety only
         // Actual permission checking is done by PermissionManager
@@ -825,7 +833,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn test_unsafe_command_structures() {
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
 
         // Test structural safety issues (not permission-based)
         assert!(!executor.is_safe_command_structure("echo hello > file.txt"));
@@ -838,7 +846,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn test_path_traversal_blocked() {
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
 
         assert!(!executor.is_safe_command_structure("cat ../file.txt"));
         assert!(!executor.is_safe_command_structure("ls ../../etc"));
@@ -851,7 +859,7 @@ mod tests {
     fn test_absolute_paths_pass_structural_check() {
         // Absolute paths are no longer blocked by is_safe_command_structure.
         // They are handled by check_bash_external_paths which asks the user.
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
 
         assert!(executor.is_safe_command_structure("/bin/ls"));
         assert!(executor.is_safe_command_structure("cat /etc/passwd"));
@@ -864,7 +872,7 @@ mod tests {
         use tempfile;
 
         let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(), false, false).unwrap();
 
         let result = executor.execute("seq 1 2000000");
 
@@ -897,7 +905,7 @@ ask = []
         )
         .unwrap();
 
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(), false, false).unwrap();
 
         // Even without creating the file, permission check should block before execution
         let result = executor.execute("cat ./test/secret.txt");
@@ -912,7 +920,7 @@ ask = []
 
     #[test]
     fn test_safe_git_commands() {
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
 
         // Safe read-only git commands
         assert!(executor.is_safe_command_structure("git status"));
@@ -987,7 +995,7 @@ ask = []
 
     #[test]
     fn test_dangerous_git_commands() {
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
 
         // Remote operations (data leakage risk)
         assert!(!executor.is_safe_command_structure("git push"));
@@ -1050,7 +1058,7 @@ ask = []
 
     #[test]
     fn test_git_commands_in_chains() {
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
 
         // Safe commands in chains
         assert!(executor.is_safe_command_structure("git status && git log"));
@@ -1066,7 +1074,7 @@ ask = []
 
     #[test]
     fn test_error_messages_are_informative() {
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
 
         let reason = executor.get_git_rejection_reason("git push origin main");
         assert!(reason.contains("git push origin main"));
@@ -1078,7 +1086,7 @@ ask = []
     fn test_tilde_paths_pass_structural_check() {
         // Tilde paths are no longer blocked by is_safe_command_structure.
         // They are handled by check_bash_external_paths which asks the user.
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
 
         assert!(executor.is_safe_command_structure("ls ~/tmp"));
         assert!(executor.is_safe_command_structure("cat ~/file.txt"));
@@ -1094,7 +1102,7 @@ ask = []
         // way to prompt, so the executor returns a clear error pointing
         // at the interactive-mode requirement.
         let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(), false, false).unwrap();
 
         for cmd in &[
             "git checkout main",
@@ -1131,7 +1139,7 @@ ask = []
         // The error message mentions the dangerous-op reason, not the
         // interactive-confirmation hint.
         let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(), false, false).unwrap();
 
         for cmd in &["git checkout -f main", "git checkout -b new-branch"] {
             let result = executor.execute(cmd);
@@ -1155,7 +1163,7 @@ ask = []
         // `check_bash_external_path`, which deny in non-interactive mode
         // when no grant is configured.
         let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(), false, false).unwrap();
 
         let result = executor.execute("grep --include=/etc/passwd pattern .");
 
@@ -1172,7 +1180,7 @@ ask = []
 
     #[test]
     fn test_session_scoped_permissions_persist() {
-        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
 
         // Simulate adding a command to session_allowed
         {
@@ -1201,7 +1209,7 @@ ask = []
 
     #[test]
     fn test_session_permissions_shared_across_clones() {
-        let executor1 = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false).unwrap();
+        let executor1 = BashExecutor::new(PathBuf::from("."), false, false).unwrap();
         let executor2 = executor1.clone();
 
         // Add permission via executor1

src/tools/mod.rs

@@ -281,10 +281,11 @@ impl ToolExecutor {
             }
         };
 
+        let has_morph = morph_client.is_some();
         Ok(Self {
             fs_tool: FileSystemTool::new(workspace.clone())?,
             code_search_tool,
-            bash_executor: BashExecutor::new(workspace, interactive)?,
+            bash_executor: BashExecutor::new(workspace, interactive, has_morph)?,
             morph_client,
             mcp_manager,
             safe_mode,