Fix/stored xss#3362
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…ismatch - Add data/cookie_storage to DATA_FILE_GLOBS so --fresh removes it - Catch SystemExit in auth_svc when file_svc._read() fails to decrypt stale cookie_storage; regenerate session key instead of crashing - Add tests: DATA_FILE_GLOBS membership + stale cookie recovery Fixes crash when switching between --insecure and secure mode after PR apache#3264 introduced persistent session cookies. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Pull request overview
This PR hardens the Abilities write-path by validating technique_name server-side in AbilityApiManager._validate_ability_data, addressing a stored XSS vector where HTML/script characters could previously be persisted via the v2 abilities API.
Changes:
- Add a
technique_nameallowlist regex validation in_validate_ability_datato reject HTML/script characters. - Minor whitespace/formatting adjustments in
ability_api_manager.py.
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| # letters, digits, spaces, hyphens, underscores, parentheses, | ||
| # slashes, dots, commas, colons, and ampersands. | ||
| # Excludes < > " ' ; which are not present in any ATT&CK technique name. | ||
| technique_name_validator = re.compile(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9\s\-_()/.,&:]+$') |
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| raise JsonHttpBadRequest(f'Invalid technique_name "{data["technique_name"]}". technique_name can only ' | ||
| 'contain alphanumeric characters, spaces, hyphens, underscores, ' | ||
| 'parentheses, slashes, dots, commas, colons, and ampersands.') |
| def __init__(self, data_svc, file_svc): | ||
| super().__init__(data_svc=data_svc, file_svc=file_svc) | ||
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Description
Adds server-side input validation for the
technique_namefield inAbilityApiManager._validate_ability_data.Previously,
technique_namewas accepted as an unconstrained string whileidandtacticwere both validated against an alphanumeric allowlist. This inconsistency allowed HTML/script
characters to be stored via
POST /api/v2/abilitiesandPUT /api/v2/abilities/{id},contributing to a stored XSS vulnerability in the Debrief plugin's technique graph.
A regex allowlist (
^[a-zA-Z0-9\s\-_()/.,&:]+$) is applied totechnique_nameon write,rejecting values containing
< > " ' ;while accepting all legitimate ATT&CK technique names.Related to: fix/technique-name-xss in mitre/debrief.
Type of change
How Has This Been Tested?
POST /api/v2/abilitieswithtechnique_namecontaining HTML (e.g."><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>) now returns HTTP 400.Command and Scripting InterpreterOS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadowExploitation for Privilege EscalationMan-in-the-MiddleChecklist: