GitHub - badchars/cloud-audit-mcp: Cloud security audit tools for AI agents — AWS, Azure, GCP misconfiguration detection via MCP. 38 tools, 60+ checks. The agent finds vulns, not you.

Cloud security audit tools for AI agents.

Prowler gives you a 200-page PDF.
This gives your AI agent direct access to cloud APIs — it reads, correlates, and fixes.

The Problem • How It's Different • Quick Start • What The AI Can Do • Tools • Checks • Architecture

The Problem

Cloud security tools haven't changed in a decade. You run Prowler, wait 30 minutes, get a 200-page report, and then you have to read it, understand it, prioritize it, and fix it. Every. Single. Time.

Traditional workflow:
  prowler aws --compliance cis_3.0       →  200 findings, 40 pages
  you read the report                    →  2 hours
  you figure out what matters            →  30 minutes
  you write the fix commands             →  1 hour
  you run them                           →  30 minutes
  ─────────────────────────────────────
  Total: 4+ hours of your time

cloud-audit-mcp eliminates the human bottleneck. Your AI agent calls the cloud APIs directly, understands what it finds, chains checks together, and tells you exactly what to fix — in seconds.

With cloud-audit-mcp:
  You: "Check my AWS account for critical misconfigurations and fix them"

  Agent: → calls aws_check_s3_public, aws_check_iam_policies, aws_check_ec2_imds...
         → correlates: "This Lambda has admin role AND secrets in env vars"
         → prioritizes: "3 critical, 5 high — here's the impact of each"
         → "Run these 3 commands to fix the critical ones"

How It's Different

Every existing tool is designed for humans to read reports. cloud-audit-mcp is designed for AI agents to take action.

	Prowler / ScoutSuite / CloudSploit	cloud-audit-mcp
Interface	CLI → static report (PDF/HTML/JSON)	MCP → AI agent calls tools in real-time
Intelligence	Run all checks, dump results	Agent picks which checks to run based on context
Correlation	None — each finding is isolated	Agent chains findings: "This public S3 + this Lambda role = data exfil path"
Remediation	Generic advice	Agent generates exact CLI commands for your resources
Follow-up	Re-run the entire scan	Agent re-checks the specific resource after fix
Multi-cloud	Separate tools per cloud	Unified interface — AWS + Azure + GCP in one conversation
Scope	Compliance-focused (CIS benchmarks)	Offensive-focused — privilege escalation paths, credential exposure, attack chains

Specific comparisons with popular tools

Tool	Stars	What it does	What it can't do
Prowler	11k	500+ CIS/compliance checks for AWS/Azure/GCP/K8s	Static report, no AI integration, no finding correlation
ScoutSuite	6k	Multi-cloud audit with HTML dashboard	Offline report, no real-time interaction, ~100 checks
CloudSploit	3k	150+ checks across 6 clouds	Plugin-per-check, no cross-check intelligence
Steampipe	7k	SQL queries against cloud APIs, 1500+ controls	Requires SQL knowledge, no autonomous analysis
Cartography	3k	Neo4j graph of cloud resources + relationships	Requires Neo4j/Cypher, no predefined security checks
Trivy	24k	Container/IaC/cloud vulnerability scanner	Primarily CVE scanning, limited misconfig checks

All of these are excellent tools. cloud-audit-mcp doesn't replace them — it fills a gap none of them address: giving an AI agent direct, interactive access to cloud security checks.

Quick Start

Install

git clone https://github.com/badchars/cloud-audit-mcp.git
cd cloud-audit-mcp
bun install

Connect to your AI agent

Claude Code

claude mcp add cloud-audit bun run /path/to/cloud-audit-mcp/src/index.ts

Claude Desktop

Add to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "cloud-audit": {
      "command": "bun",
      "args": ["run", "/path/to/cloud-audit-mcp/src/index.ts"],
      "env": {
        "AWS_PROFILE": "your-profile"
      }
    }
  }
}

Cursor / Windsurf / other MCP clients

Same JSON config format. Point the command to your installation path.

Set up cloud credentials

The MCP server uses your existing cloud credentials. No extra API keys needed.

# AWS — any of these:
aws configure                              # interactive setup
export AWS_PROFILE=my-profile              # named profile
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=...               # explicit keys

# Azure
export AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID=...           # required
az login                                   # interactive login (recommended)
# or: AZURE_TENANT_ID + AZURE_CLIENT_ID + AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET

# GCP
export GCP_PROJECT_ID=my-project           # required
gcloud auth application-default login      # interactive login (recommended)
# or: GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS=/path/to/key.json

Start auditing

You: "Check my AWS account for critical security issues"

That's it. The agent handles the rest.

What The AI Can Do

Targeted Security Audit

You: "I'm worried about data exposure in our S3 buckets and Lambda functions"

Agent: → aws_check_s3_public
         Found 2 public buckets: "staging-assets" and "client-uploads"
       → aws_check_s3_objects
         "client-uploads" contains 847 .sql files and 12 .pem files
       → aws_check_lambda_env
         Lambda "process-uploads" has DATABASE_URL with plaintext credentials
       → "Critical: Your upload pipeline has public S3 + Lambda with DB creds.
          An attacker could download SQL dumps AND get your database password.
          Fix: 1) Block public access  2) Move creds to Secrets Manager"

Multi-Cloud Posture Review

You: "Audit all three cloud accounts and give me the top 10 issues"

Agent: → cloud_run_all {provider: "aws"}     (13 checks)
       → cloud_run_all {provider: "azure"}   (13 checks)
       → cloud_run_all {provider: "gcp"}     (8 checks)
       → cloud_audit_summary
       → cloud_audit_report
       → "34 total findings across 3 clouds.
          Top 3 critical:
          1. AWS: IAM policy allows privilege escalation via CreatePolicyVersion
          2. Azure: SQL Server firewall allows 0.0.0.0/0
          3. GCP: 4 instances have cloud-platform scope (full API access)"

Privilege Escalation Detection

You: "Can anyone escalate privileges in our AWS account?"

Agent: → aws_check_iam_policies
         Found PassRole + CreateFunction combo on role "dev-deploy-role"
         Found CreatePolicyVersion on user "ci-bot"
       → aws_check_lambda_permissions
         "ci-bot" has UpdateFunctionCode on all Lambda functions
       → "Two escalation paths:
          1. dev-deploy-role can create a Lambda with any role → admin
          2. ci-bot can inject code into any Lambda AND create policy versions
          Both should be restricted immediately."

Pre-Pentest Cloud Recon

You: "We have a pentest next week. What would an attacker find?"

Agent: → aws_check_ec2_imds        → 12 instances with IMDSv1 (SSRF → creds)
       → aws_check_ec2_snapshots   → 3 unencrypted public snapshots
       → aws_check_api_gateway     → 7 endpoints with no auth
       → aws_check_secrets_manager → 1 secret with Principal: "*"
       → "Attacker's likely path: public API Gateway → SSRF on EC2 →
          IMDSv1 credential theft → access SecretsManager secret →
          pivot to production database. Priority fixes: IMDSv2 + API auth"

Azure Container Security

You: "Check our Azure container infrastructure"

Agent: → azure_check_acr       → Admin user enabled on 2 registries
       → azure_check_functions → 3 Function Apps with anonymous auth
       → azure_check_keyvault  → Key Vault allows all networks
       → azure_check_webapp    → SCM basic auth enabled, 5 connection strings with passwords
       → "Your container supply chain is exposed:
          ACR admin creds can push malicious images,
          Functions run without auth, and Key Vault is network-open."

GCP Kubernetes Audit

You: "How secure are our GKE clusters?"

Agent: → gcp_check_kubernetes   → Legacy ABAC enabled, no Workload Identity
       → gcp_check_metadata     → 8 nodes with cloud-platform scope
       → gcp_check_iam_keys     → 3 SA keys older than 365 days
       → gcp_check_iam_delegation → Token Creator role on 2 SAs
       → "Your GKE setup has multiple escalation paths:
          Pods use node SA with full cloud-platform scope → can access all GCP APIs.
          Workload Identity not configured → any pod can steal node credentials.
          Recommendation: Enable Workload Identity + restrict scopes."

Tools Reference (38 tools)

AWS (13 tools)

Tool	Service	Checks	Severity
`aws_check_s3_public`	S3	Block Public Access, bucket policy, ACL	CRITICAL
`aws_check_s3_objects`	S3	Sensitive files (.pem, .sql, .env, backups)	CRITICAL
`aws_check_iam_policies`	IAM	Privilege escalation paths, dangerous combos	CRITICAL
`aws_check_ec2_imds`	EC2	IMDSv1 enabled (credential theft via SSRF)	CRITICAL
`aws_check_ec2_snapshots`	EC2	Unencrypted / publicly shared EBS snapshots	CRITICAL
`aws_check_ec2_security_groups`	EC2	0.0.0.0/0 ingress on dangerous ports	HIGH
`aws_check_lambda_env`	Lambda	Secrets in environment variables	CRITICAL
`aws_check_lambda_permissions`	Lambda	UpdateFunctionCode, event source risks	HIGH
`aws_check_ecr_images`	ECR	Image scan findings, scan configuration	HIGH
`aws_check_secrets_manager`	Secrets Manager	Over-permissive resource policies	HIGH
`aws_check_dynamodb`	DynamoDB	Encryption settings, stream exposure	HIGH
`aws_check_api_gateway`	API Gateway	Endpoints without authentication	HIGH
`aws_check_sagemaker`	SageMaker	Internet access, root access, encryption	HIGH

Azure (13 tools)

Tool	Service	Checks	Severity
`azure_check_storage_public`	Storage	Public blob access, container access level	CRITICAL
`azure_check_storage_sas`	Storage	Long-lived SAS tokens, shared key access	HIGH
`azure_check_automation`	Automation	Hardcoded creds in runbooks, DSC plaintext, unencrypted vars	CRITICAL
`azure_check_vm_network`	VM / NSG	Management ports (SSH/RDP/WinRM) exposed to internet	CRITICAL
`azure_check_vm_encryption`	VM	Unencrypted OS and data disks	HIGH
`azure_check_vm_identity`	VM	Over-privileged managed identities, IMDS exposure	CRITICAL
`azure_check_ad_consent`	Entra ID	OAuth consent settings, secrets in descriptions	HIGH
`azure_check_logic_apps`	Logic Apps	SSRF via managed identity + HTTP triggers	CRITICAL
`azure_check_functions`	Functions	Anonymous auth, Key Vault reference injection	CRITICAL
`azure_check_keyvault`	Key Vault	Permissive access policies, network exposure	MEDIUM
`azure_check_acr`	Container Registry	Admin user enabled, image secrets	HIGH
`azure_check_sql`	SQL Database	SQL auth mode, firewall 0.0.0.0 rules	CRITICAL
`azure_check_webapp`	App Service	SCM basic auth, connection string creds, deployment packages	HIGH

GCP (8 tools)

Tool	Service	Checks	Severity
`gcp_check_gcs_public`	Cloud Storage	allUsers / allAuthenticatedUsers IAM bindings	CRITICAL
`gcp_check_gcs_objects`	Cloud Storage	SA key files, sensitive data in buckets	CRITICAL
`gcp_check_metadata`	Compute Engine	Startup script secrets, cloud-platform scope, legacy metadata	CRITICAL
`gcp_check_iam_keys`	IAM	SA key age, user-managed key audit	HIGH
`gcp_check_iam_delegation`	IAM	SA impersonation chains, Token Creator abuse	CRITICAL
`gcp_check_iam_compute`	IAM	setMetadata permission (SSH key injection)	HIGH
`gcp_check_kubernetes`	GKE	Legacy ABAC, Workload Identity, privileged pods, network policy	CRITICAL
`gcp_check_gcr`	Container Registry	Public access, suspicious images	HIGH

Meta (4 tools)

Tool	Description
`cloud_list_checks`	List all available checks, filterable by provider / severity / priority
`cloud_run_all`	Run all checks for a provider in one call
`cloud_audit_summary`	Aggregate findings by status, provider, severity
`cloud_audit_report`	Generate markdown or JSON report from session findings

Check Registry (60+ checks)

Every check maps to industry standards where applicable.

AWS — 19 checks

ID	Check	Severity	Priority	References
S3-001	Public bucket access (ACL + policy + Block Public Access)	CRITICAL	P0	CIS 2.1.4, NIST AC-3
S3-002	Sensitive objects in S3 (SSH keys, SQL dumps)	CRITICAL	P0	OWASP Cloud-2
S3-003	Bucket name leaks account ID	LOW	P2
IAM-001	Policy version privilege escalation	CRITICAL	P0	MITRE T1098
IAM-002	Dangerous permission combos (PassRole+CreateFunction)	CRITICAL	P0	Rhino Security
IAM-003	Lambda execution roles with admin access	HIGH	P1	CIS 1.16
EC2-001	IMDSv1 enabled (SSRF → credential theft)	CRITICAL	P0	CIS 5.6, MITRE T1552.005
EC2-002	Unencrypted / publicly shared EBS snapshots	CRITICAL	P0	CIS 2.2.1
EC2-003	Security groups with 0.0.0.0/0 ingress	HIGH	P1	CIS 5.1-5.3
LAMBDA-001	Secrets in Lambda environment variables	CRITICAL	P0	MITRE T1552.001
LAMBDA-002	UpdateFunctionCode permission	CRITICAL	P0	Rhino Security
LAMBDA-003	Event source mapping as invocation bypass	HIGH	P1	Rhino Security
ECR-001	Image scan findings	CRITICAL	P0	OWASP Cloud-3
ECR-002	Image scanning configuration	MEDIUM	P2	OWASP Cloud-3
SM-001	Over-permissive secret access policies	HIGH	P1	CIS 2.4
DYNAMO-001	DynamoDB encryption settings	HIGH	P1	NIST SC-28
DYNAMO-002	DynamoDB streams data flow	HIGH	P1
APIGW-001	API endpoints without authentication	HIGH	P1	OWASP Cloud-8
SAGE-001	SageMaker notebook access + root	HIGH	P1

Azure — 24 checks

ID	Check	Severity	Priority	References
STOR-001	Public blob access enabled	CRITICAL	P0	CIS 3.2, ASB NS-2
STOR-002	Container public access level	CRITICAL	P0	CIS 3.2
STOR-003	Long-lived SAS tokens	HIGH	P1	CIS 3.7
AUTO-001	Hardcoded credentials in runbooks	HIGH	P1
AUTO-002	DSC configuration plaintext passwords	CRITICAL	P0
AUTO-003	Unencrypted automation variables	HIGH	P1
VM-001	Management ports exposed (SSH/RDP/WinRM)	CRITICAL	P0	CIS 6.1-6.2
VM-002	Unencrypted VM disks	HIGH	P1	CIS 7.2
VM-004	Over-privileged managed identities	CRITICAL	P0	ASB PA-1
VM-005	IMDS token theft exposure	HIGH	P1	MITRE T1552.005
AAD-001	Secrets in AD object descriptions	HIGH	P1
AAD-002	User consent settings (OAuth phishing)	HIGH	P1	ASB IM-1
LOGIC-001	SSRF via managed identity	CRITICAL	P0
FUNC-001	Anonymous auth on Functions	CRITICAL	P0	CIS 9.1
FUNC-002	Key Vault reference injection	MEDIUM	P2
KV-001	Overly permissive Key Vault access	MEDIUM	P2	CIS 8.3
KV-002	Key Vault network unrestricted	MEDIUM	P2	CIS 8.4
ACR-001	Admin user enabled	HIGH	P1	CIS
ACR-002	Secrets in container images	HIGH	P1
SQL-001	SQL authentication enabled	HIGH	P1	CIS 4.4
SQL-002	Overly permissive firewall rules	CRITICAL	P1	CIS 6.3
WEBAPP-001	SCM basic auth enabled	MEDIUM	P2	CIS 9.1
WEBAPP-002	Connection strings with credentials	HIGH	P1
WEBAPP-003	Deployment packages in accessible storage	MEDIUM	P2

GCP — 17 checks

ID	Check	Severity	Priority	References
GCS-001	Public bucket access (allUsers/allAuthenticatedUsers)	CRITICAL	P0	CIS 5.1
GCS-002	SA keys in storage buckets	CRITICAL	P0	OWASP Cloud-2
GCS-003	Sensitive files in buckets	HIGH	P1
META-001	Startup script secrets	CRITICAL	P0	MITRE T1552.001
META-002	Instance with cloud-platform scope	CRITICAL	P0	CIS 4.2
META-003	Metadata concealment not enabled	HIGH	P1	CIS 4.9
IAM-001g	Service account key audit	HIGH	P1	CIS 1.3-1.4
IAM-002g	Delegation chain detection	CRITICAL	P0	Rhino Security
IAM-003g	Token Creator role abuse	HIGH	P1	Rhino Security
IAM-004g	setMetadata permission (SSH key injection)	CRITICAL	P0	Rhino Security
K8S-001	Default SA with cluster-admin	CRITICAL	P0	CIS K8s 5.1
K8S-002	Privileged containers allowed	CRITICAL	P0	CIS K8s 5.2
K8S-003	Secure Boot on node pools	HIGH	P1	CIS K8s 4.2
K8S-004	SA token automount	MEDIUM	P2	CIS K8s 5.1.6
GCR-001	Unexpected/hidden images in GCR	HIGH	P1

Architecture

cloud-audit-mcp/
├── src/
│   ├── index.ts                 Entry point + ToolContext builder
│   ├── types/
│   │   └── index.ts             CheckResult, Severity, ToolDef, ToolContext
│   ├── protocol/
│   │   ├── mcp-server.ts        MCP server (stdio transport)
│   │   └── tools.ts             38 tool definitions (Zod schemas)
│   ├── aws/                     13 tools, 10 files
│   │   ├── client.ts            Lazy SDK factory (cached per region)
│   │   ├── s3.ts                S3-001, S3-002, S3-003
│   │   ├── iam.ts               IAM-001, IAM-002, IAM-003
│   │   ├── ec2.ts               EC2-001, EC2-002, EC2-003
│   │   ├── lambda.ts            LAMBDA-001, LAMBDA-002, LAMBDA-003
│   │   ├── ecr.ts               ECR-001, ECR-002
│   │   ├── secrets.ts           SM-001
│   │   ├── dynamodb.ts          DYNAMO-001, DYNAMO-002
│   │   ├── apigw.ts             APIGW-001
│   │   └── sagemaker.ts         SAGE-001
│   ├── azure/                   13 tools, 11 files
│   │   ├── client.ts            DefaultAzureCredential factory
│   │   ├── storage.ts           STOR-001, STOR-002, STOR-003
│   │   ├── automation.ts        AUTO-001, AUTO-002, AUTO-003
│   │   ├── vm.ts                VM-001, VM-002, VM-004, VM-005
│   │   ├── ad.ts                AAD-001, AAD-002
│   │   ├── logic.ts             LOGIC-001
│   │   ├── functions.ts         FUNC-001, FUNC-002
│   │   ├── keyvault.ts          KV-001, KV-002
│   │   ├── acr.ts               ACR-001, ACR-002
│   │   ├── sql.ts               SQL-001, SQL-002
│   │   └── webapp.ts            WEBAPP-001, WEBAPP-002, WEBAPP-003
│   ├── gcp/                     8 tools, 6 files
│   │   ├── client.ts            ADC factory
│   │   ├── storage.ts           GCS-001, GCS-002, GCS-003
│   │   ├── metadata.ts          META-001, META-002, META-003
│   │   ├── iam.ts               IAM-001g, IAM-002g, IAM-003g, IAM-004g
│   │   ├── kubernetes.ts        K8S-001, K8S-002, K8S-003, K8S-004
│   │   └── gcr.ts               GCR-001
│   └── meta/                    4 tools
│       ├── list-checks.ts       Check registry (60+ entries)
│       ├── summary.ts           Finding aggregation
│       ├── report.ts            Markdown/JSON report generation
│       └── run-all.ts           Run all provider checks
└── knowledge/                   Security check knowledge base (8 files)

Design Decisions

Decision	Choice	Why
1 tool per service	38 tools, not 60+	LLM can pick the right tool without overwhelm
Uniform CheckResult	Same format across all clouds	Agent can compare and correlate across providers
Session findings store	In-memory array on ToolContext	Accumulate findings → summarize → report in one conversation
Lazy client init	SDK clients created on first use	No cold start penalty for unused providers
Offensive focus	Privilege escalation, credential exposure, attack chains	CIS compliance tools already exist — this finds what attackers find
Default credentials	AWS profiles, Azure CLI, gcloud ADC	Zero extra configuration — use what's already set up
Error → CheckResult	SDK errors become ERROR status, never crash	Agent sees all results, decides what matters

How It Works

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        AI Agent                               │
│                                                               │
│  "Check S3 for public access"                                │
│         │                                                     │
│         ▼                                                     │
│  ┌─────────────┐    ┌──────────────┐    ┌──────────────┐     │
│  │  MCP Client  │───▶│  MCP Server  │───▶│  Tool Router │     │
│  │  (stdio)     │    │  (38 tools)  │    │  (Zod valid) │     │
│  └─────────────┘    └──────────────┘    └──────┬───────┘     │
│                                                 │             │
│         ┌───────────────────┬───────────────────┤             │
│         ▼                   ▼                   ▼             │
│  ┌─────────────┐    ┌─────────────┐    ┌─────────────┐      │
│  │  AWS Module  │    │ Azure Module│    │  GCP Module  │      │
│  │  (SDK v3)    │    │  (ARM SDK)  │    │  (Cloud SDK) │      │
│  └──────┬──────┘    └──────┬──────┘    └──────┬──────┘      │
│         │                   │                   │             │
│         ▼                   ▼                   ▼             │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐     │
│  │              CheckResult[] (uniform format)          │     │
│  │  { checkId, severity, status, resource, remediation }│     │
│  └──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘     │
│                         │                                     │
│                         ▼                                     │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐     │
│  │           Findings Store (session-scoped)            │     │
│  │  → cloud_audit_summary → cloud_audit_report          │     │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘     │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Related Projects

Project	Description
hackbrowser-mcp	Browser-based security testing MCP (39 tools, Firefox, injection testing)
recon0	Bug bounty recon pipeline

Limitations

Read-only — does not modify cloud resources (by design)
Requires existing cloud credentials (AWS profiles, Azure CLI, gcloud ADC)
Azure AD checks (AAD-001, AAD-002) require Microsoft Graph API (stubbed)
GCP IAM checks use REST API calls (not all exposed via SDK)
Session findings are in-memory only (lost on restart)

For authorized security testing and cloud posture assessment only.
Always ensure you have proper authorization before auditing cloud accounts.

MIT License • Built with Bun + TypeScript • Part of Agentic AI for Offensive Cybersecurity

Name		Name	Last commit message	Last commit date
Latest commit History 2 Commits
.github		.github
knowledge		knowledge
src		src
.gitignore		.gitignore
CLAUDE.md		CLAUDE.md
LICENSE		LICENSE
README.md		README.md
package.json		package.json
tsconfig.json		tsconfig.json

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Cloud security audit tools for AI agents.

The Problem

How It's Different

Quick Start

Install

Connect to your AI agent

Set up cloud credentials

Start auditing

What The AI Can Do

Targeted Security Audit

Multi-Cloud Posture Review

Privilege Escalation Detection

Pre-Pentest Cloud Recon

Azure Container Security

GCP Kubernetes Audit

Tools Reference (38 tools)

AWS (13 tools)

Azure (13 tools)

GCP (8 tools)

Meta (4 tools)

Check Registry (60+ checks)

Architecture

Design Decisions

How It Works

Related Projects

Limitations

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Cloud security audit tools for AI agents.

The Problem

How It's Different

Quick Start

Install

Connect to your AI agent

Set up cloud credentials

Start auditing

What The AI Can Do

Targeted Security Audit

Multi-Cloud Posture Review

Privilege Escalation Detection

Pre-Pentest Cloud Recon

Azure Container Security

GCP Kubernetes Audit

Tools Reference (38 tools)

AWS (13 tools)

Azure (13 tools)

GCP (8 tools)

Meta (4 tools)

Check Registry (60+ checks)

Architecture

Design Decisions

How It Works

Related Projects

Limitations

About

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