Fix SpEL injection (potential RCE) in DsSpelExpressionProcessor#767
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Fix SpEL injection (potential RCE) in DsSpelExpressionProcessor#767
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Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/baomidou/dynamic-datasource/sessions/db0ccd4f-03f6-4326-8c42-5d5f0a35961a Co-authored-by: huayanYu <16700837+huayanYu@users.noreply.github.com>
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[WIP] Fix SpEL injection vulnerability in dynamic-datasource
Fix SpEL injection (potential RCE) in DsSpelExpressionProcessor
Mar 31, 2026
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@copilot 正确的修改方案应该提供开关，默认禁用，手动配置了允许则保持原样，用户应该自己意识到手动开启后带来的危险。 |
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/baomidou/dynamic-datasource/sessions/c4f1a2e2-7b0c-4023-b77b-c0a660bd855f Co-authored-by: huayanYu <16700837+huayanYu@users.noreply.github.com>
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To restore the original (unrestricted) behavior, users explicitly set: spring:
datasource:
dynamic:
aop:
allowed-spel-type-access: trueWarning Firewall rules blocked me from connecting to one or more addresses (expand for details)I tried to connect to the following addresses, but was blocked by firewall rules:
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Pull request overview
Hardens SpEL evaluation in DsSpelExpressionProcessor to reduce the risk of SpEL injection leading to RCE when resolving datasource keys, and exposes an opt-out configuration flag to restore legacy (unsafe) behavior.
Changes:
- Add a default “restricted” mode that blocks SpEL
T(...)type references andnewconstructor expressions during datasource key evaluation. - Introduce
allowedSpelTypeAccessconfiguration (properties + auto-configuration wiring) to opt back into the original unrestricted behavior. - Add unit tests validating default blocking behavior and opt-in behavior.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 6 out of 6 changed files in this pull request and generated 4 comments.
Show a summary per file
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| dynamic-datasource-spring/src/main/java/com/baomidou/dynamic/datasource/processor/DsSpelExpressionProcessor.java | Adds restricted SpEL evaluation mode and an opt-out setter. |
| dynamic-datasource-spring-boot-common/src/main/java/com/baomidou/dynamic/datasource/spring/boot/autoconfigure/DynamicDatasourceAopProperties.java | Adds allowedSpelTypeAccess property for configuration binding. |
| dynamic-datasource-spring-boot-starter/src/main/java/com/baomidou/dynamic/datasource/spring/boot/autoconfigure/DynamicDataSourceAopConfiguration.java | Wires the new property into DsSpelExpressionProcessor (Boot 2 line). |
| dynamic-datasource-spring-boot3-starter/src/main/java/com/baomidou/dynamic/datasource/spring/boot/autoconfigure/DynamicDataSourceAopConfiguration.java | Wires the new property into DsSpelExpressionProcessor (Boot 3 line). |
| dynamic-datasource-spring-boot4-starter/src/main/java/com/baomidou/dynamic/datasource/spring/boot/autoconfigure/DynamicDataSourceAopConfiguration.java | Wires the new property into DsSpelExpressionProcessor (Boot 4 line). |
| dynamic-datasource-spring-boot3-starter/src/test/java/com/baomidou/dynamic/datasource/common/v3/DsSpelExpressionProcessorSecurityTest.java | Adds tests covering restricted default behavior and opt-in behavior. |
Comment on lines
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| if (!allowedSpelTypeAccess) { | ||
| // Prevent SpEL injection: block T(...) type references and new instance creation | ||
| context.setTypeLocator(typeName -> { | ||
| throw new EvaluationException("Type access is not allowed in DS SpEL expressions: " + typeName); | ||
| }); | ||
| context.setConstructorResolvers(Collections.emptyList()); | ||
| } |
| * Set to true only if your application genuinely requires such expressions and you | ||
| * fully understand the security risk. | ||
| */ | ||
| private Boolean allowedSpelTypeAccess = false; |
Comment on lines
+61
to
+71
| // T(...) type references must be blocked to prevent SpEL injection / RCE | ||
| assertThrows(EvaluationException.class, () -> | ||
| processor.doDetermineDatasource(invocation, "T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('id')") | ||
| ); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| @Test | ||
| void newInstanceExpressionShouldBeBlockedByDefault() { | ||
| // new Type(...) constructor invocations must also be blocked | ||
| assertThrows(EvaluationException.class, () -> | ||
| processor.doDetermineDatasource(invocation, "new java.lang.ProcessBuilder('id').start()") |
Comment on lines
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| // new Type(...) constructor invocations must also be blocked | ||
| assertThrows(EvaluationException.class, () -> | ||
| processor.doDetermineDatasource(invocation, "new java.lang.ProcessBuilder('id').start()") |
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DsSpelExpressionProcessorevaluated@DSannotation values usingStandardEvaluationContextwith no restrictions, allowingT(java.lang.Runtime)type references and constructor expressions to execute arbitrary code if an attacker-controlled value reached the SpEL evaluator.Changes
DsSpelExpressionProcessor.java: Harden theStandardEvaluationContextbefore evaluation (enabled by default, opt-out via configuration):TypeLocatorto throwEvaluationExceptionon any type lookup — blocksT(...)expressionsnew SomeClass(...)expressions@beanName), parameter access (#param), and property traversal (#obj.field) are unaffectedallowedSpelTypeAccessfield (defaultfalse) andsetAllowedSpelTypeAccess(boolean)setter allow users to explicitly opt in to the original unrestricted behaviorDynamicDatasourceAopProperties.java: NewallowedSpelTypeAccessproperty (defaultfalse) exposed asspring.datasource.dynamic.aop.allowed-spel-type-access. Set totrueto restore the original behavior — only do this if you fully understand the security implications.DynamicDataSourceAopConfiguration.java(Spring Boot 2, 3, and 4 variants): WireallowedSpelTypeAccessfrom properties intoDsSpelExpressionProcessor.DsSpelExpressionProcessorSecurityTest: Unit tests confirming#paramresolution still works, thatT(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('id')andnew java.lang.ProcessBuilder('id').start()both throwEvaluationExceptionby default, and that settingallowedSpelTypeAccess=truelifts the restriction.Warning
Setting
spring.datasource.dynamic.aop.allowed-spel-type-access=truerestores the original unrestricted SpEL evaluation and exposes your application to SpEL injection / RCE if datasource key expressions can be influenced by untrusted input. Only enable this if you genuinely needT(...)ornewexpressions and accept the risk.