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#2 (behaviour): eql_v3.min/max on ste_vec_entry now ignore non-orderable
(oc-less) entries instead of letting an oc-less STRICT seed pin a wrong
extremum. ore_cllw(entry) is NULL without an oc term, so the naive
ore_cllw(value) < ore_cllw(state) was NULL whenever the running extremum was
oc-less. The sfuncs skip oc-less candidates and replace an oc-less seed, the
same way the ore_cllw btree NULL-filters such rows. New test
jsonb_entry_int4_aggregate_ignores_oc_less_entries feeds a forged hm-only entry
in the SEED position and asserts the correct orderable extremum.
#3a (coverage): v3_jsonb_blocker_return_types_match_native pins each
jsonb_blocked% function's return type to the native operator it shadows
(#> jsonb, #>> text, -/#-/|| jsonb), and v3_jsonb_blocked_composed_expression_raises
asserts composed exprs resolve and raise 'is not supported' (not 'operator does
not exist') — guarding aa13065's blocker-return-type fix.
#3b (coverage): ore_block_comparison_operators_declare_correct_selectivity (T11)
pins ore_block_u64_8_256 <> to neqsel/neqjoinsel with no HASHES, and = to
eqsel/eqjoinsel/HASHES.
Snapshots: matrix_jsonb_entry_tests 54->55, v3_jsonb_tests 72->74. CHANGELOG:
note oc-less entries are ignored by entry min/max.
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: CHANGELOG.md
+1-1Lines changed: 1 addition & 1 deletion
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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Each entry that ships in a published release links to the PR that introduced it.
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-**Per-domain `MIN` / `MAX` aggregates for the encrypted-domain family.**`eql_v3.min(eql_v3.<T>_ord)` / `eql_v3.max(eql_v3.<T>_ord)` (and the `_ord_ore` twin) are generated for every ord-capable scalar variant, giving type-safe extrema on domain-typed columns — comparison routes through the variant's `<` / `>` operator (ORE block term, no decryption). The aggregates are declared `PARALLEL = SAFE` with a combine function (the state function itself — min/max are associative), so PostgreSQL can use partial/parallel aggregation on large `GROUP BY` workloads. Why: the new domain types previously had no equivalent of the composite-type aggregates. The existing `eql_v2.min(eql_v2_encrypted)` / `eql_v2.max(eql_v2_encrypted)` aggregates are **retained** and continue to work on `eql_v2_encrypted` columns; the per-domain aggregates are additive and coexist with them. ([#239](https://github.com/cipherstash/encrypt-query-language/pull/239))
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- **`eql_v3.text` encrypted-domain family (`text`, `text_eq`, `text_match`, `text_ord`, `text_ord_ore`).** Adds equality (`=` / `<>` via HMAC), match (`@>` / `<@` via a new self-contained `eql_v3.bloom_filter` SEM index term), and ORE ordering (`<` `<=` `>` `>=`, `min` / `max`) for encrypted text, at parity with EQL v2 text — generated from the `text` row in `eql-scalars::CATALOG` by the same materializer as the `eql_v3.int4` reference. `text` is the first scalar to add a new index `Term` (`Bloom`) and the first non-integer, unbounded ordered kind (lexicographic pivots, hand-written `impl ScalarType`). Index via a functional index on the `eql_v3.eq_term` / `eql_v3.ord_term` / `eql_v3.match_term` extractors, not an operator class on the domain. Why: brings searchable encrypted text to the namespaced, `eql_v2`-free `eql_v3` surface. Match is exposed as bloom-filter containment on the `text_match` domain — deliberately *not* SQL `LIKE` (no wildcard/anchoring; probabilistic ngram containment) — and never backs equality (which always routes through `Hm`). ([#260](https://github.com/cipherstash/encrypt-query-language/pull/260))
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- **Self-contained `eql_v3` schema + standalone `release/cipherstash-encrypt-v3.sql` installer.** The `eql_v3` encrypted-domain surface no longer depends on `eql_v2` at runtime: it now owns its own copies of the searchable-encrypted-metadata (SEM) index-term types — `eql_v3.hmac_256` and `eql_v3.ore_block_u64_8_256` (with its btree operator class) — so the `eql_v3.eq_term` / `eql_v3.ord_term` extractors return `eql_v3` types and no `eql_v2.<symbol>` appears anywhere in the v3 SQL. The whole v3 surface relocated under a single `src/v3/` tree (`src/v3/sem/` for the hand-written SEM types, `src/v3/scalars/` for the generated domain families). A new build variant ships the `eql_v3` schema on its own as `release/cipherstash-encrypt-v3.sql`, installable into a database with no `eql_v2` present; a CI gate greps that artifact and its dependency closure to keep it `eql_v2`-free. Why: a clean foundation for the per-scalar encrypted-domain model to stand alone, ahead of it replacing the `eql_v2_encrypted` composite column type. This is additive — a new schema and a new artifact — and leaves `eql_v2` byte-for-byte unchanged. ([#255](https://github.com/cipherstash/encrypt-query-language/pull/255))
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-**`eql_v3.min` / `eql_v3.max` aggregates over `eql_v3.ste_vec_entry`.** SteVec document entries extracted at a selector (`doc -> 'sel'`) can now be aggregated like ordered scalars: `eql_v3.min(doc -> 'sel')` / `eql_v3.max(...)` return the entry with the smallest / largest ordered leaf. Ordering routes through the entry's `oc` (CLLW ORE) term via `eql_v3.ore_cllw` — the same comparator the entry `<` / `<=` / `>` / `>=` operators use, not the scalar Block-ORE `ord_term`. Declared `PARALLEL = SAFE` with a combine function (the state function itself), so partial / parallel aggregation is available on large `GROUP BY` workloads. Why: brings encrypted-JSONB entry ordering to parity with the scalar encrypted-domain families' `MIN` / `MAX`, and lets the shared scalar behaviour matrix cover entry aggregation. Additive — the document and entry comparison surface is otherwise unchanged. ([#267](https://github.com/cipherstash/encrypt-query-language/pull/267))
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- **`eql_v3.min` / `eql_v3.max` aggregates over `eql_v3.ste_vec_entry`.** SteVec document entries extracted at a selector (`doc -> 'sel'`) can now be aggregated like ordered scalars: `eql_v3.min(doc -> 'sel')` / `eql_v3.max(...)` return the entry with the smallest / largest ordered leaf. Ordering routes through the entry's `oc` (CLLW ORE) term via `eql_v3.ore_cllw` — the same comparator the entry `<` / `<=` / `>` / `>=` operators use, not the scalar Block-ORE `ord_term`. Only `oc`-carrying entries are orderable: an entry without an `oc` term (`eql_v3.ore_cllw` returns NULL) is non-orderable and is ignored by the aggregate — the same way the `eql_v3.ore_cllw` btree NULL-filters such rows — so a mix of `oc`-carrying and `oc`-less entries yields the extremum of the orderable subset rather than a corrupted result. Declared `PARALLEL = SAFE` with a combine function (the state function itself), so partial / parallel aggregation is available on large `GROUP BY` workloads. Why: brings encrypted-JSONB entry ordering to parity with the scalar encrypted-domain families' `MIN` / `MAX`, and lets the shared scalar behaviour matrix cover entry aggregation. Additive — the document and entry comparison surface is otherwise unchanged. ([#267](https://github.com/cipherstash/encrypt-query-language/pull/267))
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