Merge pull request #34 from codebridger/dev

Fix self-healing of stale auth token on translate and UI improvements in console-crane

Author: navidshad

CHANGELOG-DEV.md

@@ -1,3 +1,25 @@
+## [1.14.1-dev.2](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/compare/v1.14.1-dev.1...v1.14.1-dev.2) (2026-06-08)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* self-heal stale auth token on translate instead of failing ([6ef3766](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/commit/6ef3766e482c0c97476b4d8aac59fe2f92f7376b))
+
+## [1.14.1-dev.1](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/compare/v1.14.0...v1.14.1-dev.1) (2026-06-08)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **console-crane:** align bundle selector height with the Save button ([cf057a0](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/commit/cf057a095e85ac7d55824cafe5f06eeb2568d06a)), closes [#86exw6kme](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/issues/86exw6kme)
+* **console-crane:** isolate modal from host-page color/flex CSS leaks ([2b89736](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/commit/2b89736bcb6664f2ecb82ba902ef1bb5a83dcc61)), closes [#86exw6kme](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/issues/86exw6kme)
+
+# [1.14.0-dev.2](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/compare/v1.14.0-dev.1...v1.14.0-dev.2) (2026-06-08)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **console-crane:** isolate modal from host-page color/flex CSS leaks ([2b89736](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/commit/2b89736bcb6664f2ecb82ba902ef1bb5a83dcc61)), closes [#86exw6kme](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/issues/86exw6kme)
+
 # [1.14.0-dev.1](https://github.com/codebridger/subturtle-extension-apps/compare/v1.13.0...v1.14.0-dev.1) (2026-06-08)
 
 

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "subturtle-extension",
-  "version": "1.14.0",
+  "version": "1.14.1-dev.2",
   "private": true,
   "scripts": {
     "dev": "webpack --watch",

src/common/helper/auth-recovery.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+import { authentication } from "@modular-rest/client";
+import { sendMessage } from "./massage";
+import { StoreUserTokenMessage } from "../types/messaging";
+import { debug, error, warn } from "./log";
+
+/**
+ * Auth-recovery helper — the three pieces of "self-heal a dead session token"
+ * live together here because they're only ever useful as a unit:
+ *
+ *   isAuthError(err)   — is this failure a stale/invalid token?
+ *   reauthAnonymously()— if so, how do we recover a session?
+ *   withAuthRetry(run) — the policy that wires the two: retry once on recovery.
+ *
+ * Why this matters: anonymous users get purged server-side, so a token
+ * persisted in chrome.storage.sync can outlive its user and start returning
+ * "User not found" on every call — leaving the user stuck (e.g. on
+ * "Translation failed") with no way out short of a full reload.
+ */
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Detection
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * We can only inspect the *body* the server sent, never the HTTP status:
+ * modular-rest's HTTPClient.request discards `error.response.status` and
+ * re-throws only `error.response.data` wrapped as `{ hasError, error }`
+ * (node_modules/@modular-rest/client/dist/class/http.js). So detection is
+ * string-based against the response body.
+ *
+ * Two thrown shapes reach callers:
+ *   - functionProvider.run re-throws the raw server body, e.g. "User not found".
+ *   - dataProvider.* let the wrapper through, e.g. { hasError, error: "..." }.
+ * extractMessage flattens both into one searchable string.
+ *
+ * The patterns below were derived from the actual modular-rest server source
+ * (auth middleware → JWT verify → user lookup), not guessed. On every
+ * auth-gated route (/function/run, /data-provider/*) the server reports auth
+ * failures via Koa `ctx.throw`, so the BODY is a bare string: either the thrown
+ * message, or — when the message is undefined — Koa's default reason phrase.
+ * Verified failure → body mapping:
+ *   - token valid but user row purged   → 412 "User not found"
+ *   - missing / empty Authorization     → 401 "authentication is required"
+ *   - lacks permission                  → 403 "access denied"
+ *   - invalid/expired/wrong-sig/malformed token → 412 "Precondition Failed"
+ *       ^ the jwt reason ("jwt expired" / "invalid signature" / "jwt malformed")
+ *         is SWALLOWED server-side: JWT.verify rejects with the message as a
+ *         *string*, so `err.message` is undefined and ctx.throw(412, undefined)
+ *         falls back to Koa's reason phrase. "Precondition Failed" is therefore
+ *         the ONLY on-the-wire signal for the most common stale-token case —
+ *         and on these routes a bare "precondition failed" body can only come
+ *         from the auth middleware (validation 412s carry a JSON body instead),
+ *         so matching it does not risk a false positive.
+ *
+ * NOTE: /user/login & /user/loginAnonymous failures arrive as
+ * {status:"error", e:{}} (the Error serializes to {} — message lost). Those are
+ * deliberately NOT matched: login is an explicit user action and must not be
+ * silently retried as anonymous. If the upstream server stops swallowing the
+ * jwt message, the raw jsonwebtoken phrases below will start matching too.
+ */
+const AUTH_ERROR_PATTERNS = [
+  // Bare-string bodies the server emits via ctx.throw on auth-gated routes.
+  "user not found", // 412 — token valid, user row purged (the reported bug)
+  "authentication", // 401 "authentication is required" (missing/empty header)
+  "access denied", // 403 — authenticated but lacks permission
+  "precondition failed", // 412 — invalid/expired/wrong-sig token (reason swallowed)
+
+  // Raw jsonwebtoken messages — reach the client verbatim via /verify/token,
+  // and would reach the auth path too if the server stops swallowing them.
+  "jwt expired",
+  "jwt malformed",
+  "jwt not active",
+  "invalid signature",
+  "invalid token",
+  "jwt", // catch-all for other jsonwebtoken phrases ("jwt must be provided", …)
+
+  // Defensive nets — not emitted by this server today, but cheap and guard the
+  // modular-rest client's own throws / intermediary proxies / gateways.
+  "unauthorized",
+  "forbidden",
+  "token doesn't", // client-side: "Token doesn't find on local machine"
+];
+
+function extractMessage(err: unknown, depth = 0): string {
+  if (err == null || depth > 3) return "";
+  if (typeof err === "string") return err;
+  if (typeof err === "number" || typeof err === "boolean") return String(err);
+  if (typeof err === "object") {
+    const o = err as Record<string, unknown>;
+    // The fields modular-rest / our own throws use to carry a message.
+    return [o.error, o.message, o.detail, o.reason, o.e, o.status]
+      .map((v) => extractMessage(v, depth + 1))
+      .filter(Boolean)
+      .join(" ");
+  }
+  return "";
+}
+
+/**
+ * True when the error body matches a known auth/token-failure phrase.
+ *
+ * Deliberately conservative: business errors ("limit reached", "not enough
+ * credit") must NOT match, or we'd needlessly churn a perfectly good session
+ * — and a registered user could get silently degraded to anonymous.
+ */
+export function isAuthError(err: unknown): boolean {
+  const text = extractMessage(err).toLowerCase();
+  if (!text) return false;
+  return AUTH_ERROR_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => text.includes(pattern));
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Recovery
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Establish a fresh anonymous session and persist its token to the background
+ * so every bundle on the page reuses it. Returns true once a usable session is
+ * in place.
+ *
+ * Persisting matters: subsequent mounts (other bundles on the same page, the
+ * popup, page reloads) reuse this token instead of each calling
+ * /user/loginAnonymous and stranding the previous anonymous user — which the
+ * server then 412s / "User not found"s on the next call. The write goes to
+ * chrome.storage.sync (cross-context) via the background script.
+ *
+ * Callers:
+ *   1. modular-rest.ts loginWithLastSession's fallback — first-session
+ *      bootstrap when no valid stored token exists.
+ *   2. withAuthRetry (via recoverSession) — a previously-valid token went stale
+ *      mid-session.
+ *
+ * SINGLE-FLIGHT: concurrent callers are coalesced into ONE /user/loginAnonymous
+ * and all reuse its token. This is essential — when a stored token is dead, a
+ * page typically fires several failing requests at once (the word-detail modal
+ * runs a simple + a detailed translation plus bundle look-ups together), and
+ * without coalescing each one would mint and strand its own anonymous user,
+ * producing the "constant loginAnonymous calls" storm. A re-auth that starts
+ * after the in-flight one settles is a fresh login (the guard resets).
+ *
+ * modular-rest.ts is the one that additionally refreshes the reactive isLogin
+ * ref via updateIsLogin after calling this.
+ */
+let inflightReauth: Promise<boolean> | null = null;
+
+export function reauthAnonymously(): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (inflightReauth) return inflightReauth;
+  inflightReauth = performAnonymousReauth().finally(() => {
+    inflightReauth = null;
+  });
+  return inflightReauth;
+}
+
+async function performAnonymousReauth(): Promise<boolean> {
+  try {
+    await authentication.loginAsAnonymous();
+    debug("Subturtle anonymous login succeeded", authentication.isLogin);
+
+    const token = authentication.getToken;
+    if (token) {
+      try {
+        await sendMessage(new StoreUserTokenMessage(token));
+      } catch (err) {
+        error(
+          "Subturtle: persisting anonymous token to background failed",
+          err
+        );
+      }
+    }
+
+    return authentication.isLogin;
+  } catch (err) {
+    // Raw console.error (not the [Subturtle]-prefixing helper) to preserve the
+    // exact message the anon-fallback has always logged — pinned by
+    // tests/auth-anon-flow.test.ts.
+    console.error("Subturtle anonymous login failed", err);
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Recovery strategy (late-bound)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * The recovery withAuthRetry runs when it sees an auth error. Defaults to the
+ * bare reauthAnonymously (fresh anon token only). modular-rest.ts overrides it
+ * at init via setSessionRecovery with a system-wide recovery that ALSO tears
+ * the dead session down (logout broadcast + profile/isLogin/analytics reset)
+ * before re-establishing anonymous — see modular-rest.ts `recoverSession`.
+ *
+ * Late binding (rather than importing logout from the plugin) is deliberate:
+ *   - the plugin already imports reauthAnonymously from THIS module, so a
+ *     direct back-import would be circular; and
+ *   - this module must stay side-effect-free so translate.service — and the
+ *     many UI components importing it — don't drag the plugin's content-script
+ *     side effects (GlobalOptions, chrome listeners, …) into their import graph
+ *     or tests. The plugin is loaded by every bundle, so the override is always
+ *     applied in production; code paths that never load it (some unit tests)
+ *     fall back to the bare anonymous recovery, which is sufficient there.
+ */
+let sessionRecovery: () => Promise<boolean> = reauthAnonymously;
+
+export function setSessionRecovery(recover: () => Promise<boolean>): void {
+  sessionRecovery = recover;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Single-flight wrapper around the installed recovery. A burst of failing
+ * requests (the word-detail modal fires several at once) must trigger ONE
+ * recovery, not one per request — otherwise the registered-user path would run
+ * logout() repeatedly and the anonymous path would still funnel through the
+ * (already coalesced) reauthAnonymously. All concurrent failures await the same
+ * recovery and then each retries its own call.
+ */
+let inflightRecovery: Promise<boolean> | null = null;
+
+function recoverOnce(): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (inflightRecovery) return inflightRecovery;
+  inflightRecovery = Promise.resolve(sessionRecovery()).finally(() => {
+    inflightRecovery = null;
+  });
+  return inflightRecovery;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Retry policy
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Run a modular-rest call and, if it fails because the session token is
+ * stale/invalid, recover the session and retry the call once.
+ *
+ * Reusable across services — any call that depends on a valid session token
+ * can wrap itself in this to self-heal a dead token instead of surfacing a
+ * hard failure:
+ *
+ *   import { withAuthRetry } from "@/common/helper/auth-recovery";
+ *   const data = await withAuthRetry(() => functionProvider.run({ ... }));
+ *
+ * Recovery is whatever setSessionRecovery installed (system-wide logout +
+ * anonymous re-auth in production). A registered user whose token is genuinely
+ * dead is cleanly downgraded to anonymous across the extension.
+ *
+ * Guarantees:
+ *   - Only retries auth-shaped errors (isAuthError is conservative), so genuine
+ *     failures — network, rate limit, business errors — surface unchanged.
+ *   - Retries at most ONCE, and only if recovery actually produced a usable
+ *     session, so it can never loop.
+ */
+export async function withAuthRetry<T>(run: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+  try {
+    return await run();
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (!isAuthError(err)) throw err;
+
+    warn(
+      "Request hit an auth error; recovering session and retrying once.",
+      err
+    );
+
+    const recovered = await recoverOnce();
+    if (!recovered) throw err;
+
+    return await run();
+  }
+}