Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 2: Code injection#152
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ajay-dhangar merged 1 commit intomainfrom Dec 27, 2025
Merged
Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 2: Code injection#152ajay-dhangar merged 1 commit intomainfrom
ajay-dhangar merged 1 commit intomainfrom
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Great job, @ajay-dhangar! 🎉 Thank you for submitting your pull request to CodeHarborHub. We appreciate your contribution and enthusiasm! Our team will review it soon. If you have any questions or need further assistance, feel free to reach out. Thanks for contributing!
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Potential fix for https://github.com/codeharborhub/tutorial/security/code-scanning/2
To fix the problem, we should stop interpolating the untrusted
github.event.issue.bodydirectly into the shell script and instead pass it via an environment variable, then read it using native shell syntax ($ISSUE_BODY). This avoids GitHub Actions expression injection in the shell context while preserving existing behavior.Concretely, in the
Check for Security and Truststep (lines 43–49), we will:env:section that setsISSUE_BODY: ${{ github.event.issue.body }}.issue_body="$ISSUE_BODY"(or just use$ISSUE_BODYdirectly) instead ofissue_body="${{ github.event.issue.body }}".We will leave the logic of the checks unchanged. No additional imports or external tools are needed, and no other steps in the file are modified.
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