-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 4.6k
Expand file tree
/
Copy pathevaluateTerminalCommandSecurity.ts
More file actions
1309 lines (1167 loc) · 30.8 KB
/
evaluateTerminalCommandSecurity.ts
File metadata and controls
1309 lines (1167 loc) · 30.8 KB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
import { parse } from "shell-quote";
import { ToolPolicy } from "./types.js";
/**
* Token types from shell-quote
*/
interface ShellOperator {
op: string; // '||', '&&', '|', ';', '>', '>>', '<', '&'
}
interface GlobPattern {
op: "glob";
pattern: string;
}
interface CommentToken {
comment: string;
}
type ParsedToken = string | ShellOperator | GlobPattern | CommentToken;
interface CommandSubstitutionScan {
hasSubstitution: boolean;
commands: string[];
}
/**
* Evaluates the security policy for a terminal command.
*
* This function uses shell-quote for proper tokenization, then implements
* defense-in-depth security validation for terminal commands.
*
* @param basePolicy The base policy configured for the tool
* @param command The command string to evaluate
* @returns The security policy to apply: 'disabled', 'allowedWithPermission', or 'allowedWithoutPermission'
*/
export function evaluateTerminalCommandSecurity(
basePolicy: ToolPolicy,
command: string | null | undefined,
): ToolPolicy {
// If tool is already disabled, keep it disabled
if (basePolicy === "disabled") {
return "disabled";
}
// Handle null/undefined/empty commands
if (!command || typeof command !== "string") {
return basePolicy;
}
// Normalize command for analysis
const normalizedCommand = command.trim();
if (normalizedCommand === "") {
return basePolicy;
}
try {
// Split on line breaks to handle multi-line commands
// Newlines are command separators in shells, similar to semicolons
const commandLines = normalizedCommand.split(/\r?\n|\r/);
// If there are multiple lines, evaluate each separately
if (commandLines.length > 1) {
let mostRestrictivePolicy: ToolPolicy = basePolicy;
for (const line of commandLines) {
const trimmedLine = line.trim();
// Skip empty lines
if (trimmedLine === "") {
continue;
}
// Parse and evaluate this line
const tokens = parse(trimmedLine);
const linePolicy = evaluateTokensSecurity(
tokens,
basePolicy,
trimmedLine,
);
// Track the most restrictive policy
mostRestrictivePolicy = getMostRestrictive(
mostRestrictivePolicy,
linePolicy,
);
// If we found a disabled command, return immediately
if (mostRestrictivePolicy === "disabled") {
return "disabled";
}
}
return mostRestrictivePolicy;
}
// Single line command - parse and evaluate normally
const tokens = parse(normalizedCommand);
// Evaluate security of the parsed tokens
return evaluateTokensSecurity(tokens, basePolicy, normalizedCommand);
} catch (error) {
// If parsing fails, be conservative and require permission
console.error("Failed to parse command:", error);
return "allowedWithPermission";
}
}
/**
* Checks if a token is a shell operator
*/
function isOperator(token: ParsedToken): token is ShellOperator {
return typeof token === "object" && "op" in token && token.op !== "glob";
}
/**
* Checks if a token is a glob pattern
*/
function isGlob(token: ParsedToken): token is GlobPattern {
return typeof token === "object" && "op" in token && token.op === "glob";
}
/**
* Checks if a token is a comment
*/
function isComment(token: ParsedToken): token is CommentToken {
return typeof token === "object" && "comment" in token;
}
/**
* Evaluates the security of parsed shell tokens, handling variable expansion
*/
function evaluateTokensSecurity(
tokens: ParsedToken[],
basePolicy: ToolPolicy,
originalCommand: string,
): ToolPolicy {
// Check for empty strings that might indicate variable expansion
const hasEmptyStrings = tokens.some((t) => typeof t === "string" && t === "");
if (hasEmptyStrings) {
// Check if original command has legitimate empty quotes
const hasEmptyQuotes =
originalCommand.includes('""') || originalCommand.includes("''");
// Check for variable patterns
const hasVariablePatterns = /\$[\w{]/.test(originalCommand);
if (!hasEmptyQuotes || hasVariablePatterns) {
// Variable expansion detected - evaluate both interpretations
// 1. Evaluate with empty strings as-is
const policyWithEmpty = evaluateTokens(
tokens,
basePolicy,
originalCommand,
);
// 2. Evaluate without empty strings
const tokensWithoutEmpty = tokens.filter((t) => t !== "");
const policyWithoutEmpty =
tokensWithoutEmpty.length > 0
? evaluateTokens(tokensWithoutEmpty, basePolicy, originalCommand)
: basePolicy;
// Variable expansion always requires at least permission
return getMostRestrictive(
policyWithEmpty,
policyWithoutEmpty,
"allowedWithPermission",
);
}
}
// Normal evaluation for commands without variable expansion
return evaluateTokens(tokens, basePolicy, originalCommand);
}
/**
* Core token evaluation logic
*/
function evaluateTokens(
tokens: ParsedToken[],
basePolicy: ToolPolicy,
originalCommand: string,
): ToolPolicy {
let mostRestrictivePolicy = basePolicy;
let currentCommand: string[] = [];
for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
const token = tokens[i];
// Skip comments - they don't affect execution
if (isComment(token)) {
continue;
}
// Check if token is an operator
if (isOperator(token)) {
// Evaluate the current command before the operator
if (currentCommand.length > 0) {
const commandPolicy = evaluateSingleCommand(
currentCommand,
originalCommand,
);
mostRestrictivePolicy = getMostRestrictive(
mostRestrictivePolicy,
commandPolicy,
);
// If we found a disabled command, return immediately
if (mostRestrictivePolicy === "disabled") {
return "disabled";
}
}
// Reset for next command
currentCommand = [];
// Handle pipe operator specially - check if piping to dangerous command
if ((token as ShellOperator).op === "|") {
const pipePolicy = evaluatePipeChain(tokens, i);
mostRestrictivePolicy = getMostRestrictive(
mostRestrictivePolicy,
pipePolicy,
);
if (mostRestrictivePolicy === "disabled") {
return "disabled";
}
}
} else if (isGlob(token)) {
// Handle glob patterns
currentCommand.push(token.pattern);
} else if (typeof token === "string") {
currentCommand.push(token);
}
}
// Evaluate any remaining command
if (currentCommand.length > 0) {
const commandPolicy = evaluateSingleCommand(
currentCommand,
originalCommand,
);
mostRestrictivePolicy = getMostRestrictive(
mostRestrictivePolicy,
commandPolicy,
);
}
// Also check for command substitution in the original command
// (shell-quote doesn't parse these as separate tokens)
const commandSubstitutions = scanCommandSubstitutions(originalCommand);
if (commandSubstitutions.hasSubstitution) {
for (const subCmd of commandSubstitutions.commands) {
const nestedPolicy = evaluateTerminalCommandSecurity(basePolicy, subCmd);
mostRestrictivePolicy = getMostRestrictive(
mostRestrictivePolicy,
nestedPolicy,
);
if (mostRestrictivePolicy === "disabled") {
return "disabled";
}
}
// Command substitution itself is risky
if (mostRestrictivePolicy === "allowedWithoutPermission") {
mostRestrictivePolicy = "allowedWithPermission";
}
}
// Check for obfuscation patterns
if (hasObfuscationPatterns(originalCommand)) {
mostRestrictivePolicy = getMostRestrictive(
mostRestrictivePolicy,
"allowedWithPermission",
);
}
return mostRestrictivePolicy;
}
/**
* Returns the most restrictive policy from multiple policies
*/
function getMostRestrictive(...policies: ToolPolicy[]): ToolPolicy {
if (policies.some((p) => p === "disabled")) {
return "disabled";
}
if (policies.some((p) => p === "allowedWithPermission")) {
return "allowedWithPermission";
}
return "allowedWithoutPermission";
}
/**
* Evaluates a pipe chain for dangerous patterns
*/
function evaluatePipeChain(
tokens: ParsedToken[],
startIdx: number,
): ToolPolicy {
// Look at what comes after the pipe
let nextCommandStart = startIdx + 1;
// Skip any additional operators
while (
nextCommandStart < tokens.length &&
isOperator(tokens[nextCommandStart])
) {
nextCommandStart++;
}
if (nextCommandStart >= tokens.length) {
return "allowedWithoutPermission";
}
// Get the command after the pipe
const nextCommand: string[] = [];
for (
let i = nextCommandStart;
i < tokens.length && !isOperator(tokens[i]);
i++
) {
const token = tokens[i];
if (isComment(token)) {
continue;
} else if (isGlob(token)) {
nextCommand.push(token.pattern);
} else if (typeof token === "string") {
nextCommand.push(token);
}
}
if (nextCommand.length > 0) {
const command = nextCommand[0].toLowerCase();
// Check for dangerous pipe destinations
const dangerousPipeCommands = [
"sh",
"bash",
"zsh",
"python",
"perl",
"ruby",
"node",
];
if (dangerousPipeCommands.includes(command)) {
return "allowedWithPermission";
}
// Check for network exfiltration
if (
command === "curl" ||
command === "wget" ||
command === "nc" ||
command === "netcat"
) {
return "allowedWithPermission";
}
}
return "allowedWithoutPermission";
}
/**
* Evaluates a single command (array of tokens)
*/
function evaluateSingleCommand(
commandTokens: string[],
originalCommand: string,
): ToolPolicy {
if (commandTokens.length === 0) {
return "allowedWithoutPermission";
}
// The first token is the command
const baseCommand = commandTokens[0].toLowerCase();
const args = commandTokens.slice(1);
// Check for critical commands that should always be disabled
if (isCriticalCommand(baseCommand, args)) {
return "disabled";
}
// Handle variable expansion patterns
if (baseCommand.startsWith("$")) {
// Command is a variable - could be anything, so require permission
return "allowedWithPermission";
}
// Check for high-risk commands that require permission
if (isHighRiskCommand(baseCommand, args, originalCommand)) {
return "allowedWithPermission";
}
// Check for safe commands
if (isSafeCommand(baseCommand, args)) {
return "allowedWithoutPermission";
}
// Default: unknown commands require permission
return "allowedWithPermission";
}
/**
* Checks if a command is critical and should always be disabled
*/
function isCriticalCommand(baseCommand: string, args: string[]): boolean {
// System destruction commands - check if base command starts with mkfs
if (baseCommand.startsWith("mkfs")) {
return true;
}
// Check for dangerous rm patterns - even if rm is hidden in a variable
// Combine all tokens to check for dangerous patterns
const allTokens = [baseCommand, ...args];
const hasRf =
allTokens.some(
(arg) =>
arg === "-rf" ||
arg === "-fr" ||
(arg.startsWith("-") && arg.includes("r") && arg.includes("f")),
) ||
(allTokens.includes("-r") && allTokens.includes("-f")) ||
(allTokens.includes("--recursive") && allTokens.includes("--force"));
const hasDangerousPath = allTokens.some(
(arg) =>
arg === "/" ||
arg === "/*" ||
arg === "~" ||
arg === "~/*" ||
arg === "/usr" ||
arg === "/etc" ||
arg === "/bin" ||
arg === "/sbin" ||
arg.startsWith("/usr/") ||
arg.startsWith("/etc/") ||
arg.startsWith("/bin/") ||
arg.startsWith("/sbin/"),
);
// If we have rm flags with dangerous paths, it's critical regardless of command
if (hasRf && hasDangerousPath) {
return true;
}
// Check for explicit rm command with additional critical paths
if (baseCommand === "rm") {
// Check for deletion of critical system files (even without -rf)
const criticalPaths = [
"/etc/passwd",
"/etc/shadow",
"/etc/sudoers",
"/etc/hosts",
"/boot/",
"/sys/",
"/proc/",
"/dev/",
"/bin/",
"/sbin/",
"/usr/bin/",
"/usr/sbin/",
"/lib/",
"/lib64/",
];
if (args.some((arg) => criticalPaths.some((path) => arg.includes(path)))) {
return true;
}
}
// Windows destructive commands
if (baseCommand === "del") {
const hasRecursive = args.includes("/s") && args.includes("/q");
const hasSystemDrive = args.some(
(arg) => arg.toLowerCase().includes("c:\\") || arg.includes("c:/"),
);
if (hasRecursive || hasSystemDrive) {
return true;
}
}
if (baseCommand === "format" || baseCommand === "cipher") {
return true;
}
// dd command (disk destroyer)
if (baseCommand === "dd") {
if (
args.some(
(arg) =>
arg.includes("of=/dev/") ||
arg.includes("of=/dev/sda") ||
arg.includes("of=/dev/disk"),
)
) {
return true;
}
}
// Privilege escalation
const privEscCommands = ["sudo", "su", "doas", "runas", "gsudo", "psexec"];
if (privEscCommands.includes(baseCommand)) {
return true;
}
// Permission modification with dangerous flags
if (baseCommand === "chmod") {
if (
args.some(
(arg) =>
arg === "777" ||
arg === "776" ||
arg === "775" ||
arg === "+s" ||
arg === "u+s" ||
arg === "g+s",
)
) {
return true;
}
}
if (baseCommand === "chown") {
if (args.some((arg) => arg.includes("root"))) {
return true;
}
}
// Windows permission changes
if (baseCommand === "icacls") {
if (
args.some(
(arg) =>
arg.toLowerCase().includes("everyone:f") ||
arg.includes("*s-1-1-0:(oi)(ci)f"), // Everyone SID
)
) {
return true;
}
}
if (baseCommand === "takeown") {
return true;
}
// Kernel and system modification
const kernelCommands = [
"insmod",
"modprobe",
"rmmod",
"iptables",
"ip6tables",
"nftables",
];
if (kernelCommands.includes(baseCommand)) {
return true;
}
// Eval and exec commands
if (baseCommand === "eval" || baseCommand === "exec") {
return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Checks if command is a package manager install
*/
function isHighRiskPackageManager(
baseCommand: string,
args: string[],
): boolean {
const packageManagers = [
"npm",
"yarn",
"pnpm",
"pip",
"pip3",
"gem",
"cargo",
"go",
"apt",
"apt-get",
"yum",
"dnf",
"zypper",
"pacman",
"brew",
"choco",
"scoop",
"winget",
];
if (packageManagers.includes(baseCommand)) {
// Check for install/add subcommands
const installCommands = ["install", "add", "i"];
if (args.length > 0 && installCommands.includes(args[0])) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Checks if command is a network tool
*/
function isHighRiskNetworkTool(baseCommand: string): boolean {
const networkTools = [
"curl",
"wget",
"nc",
"netcat",
"ncat",
"telnet",
"ssh",
"scp",
"rsync",
"ftp",
"sftp",
"tftp",
"socat",
];
return networkTools.includes(baseCommand);
}
/**
* Checks if command is a script interpreter
*/
function isHighRiskScriptInterpreter(
baseCommand: string,
args: string[],
): boolean {
const scriptInterpreters = [
"sh",
"bash",
"zsh",
"fish",
"ksh",
"csh",
"tcsh",
"dash",
"python",
"python3",
"python2",
"ruby",
"perl",
"php",
"node",
"nodejs",
"deno",
"bun",
"lua",
"tcl",
"powershell",
"pwsh",
];
if (scriptInterpreters.includes(baseCommand)) {
// Allow interpreter --help and --version
if (
args.length === 1 &&
(args[0] === "--help" || args[0] === "--version")
) {
return false;
}
// Allow interpreter -c for inline commands (we'll check the command content)
if (args.includes("-c")) {
// For now, require permission for any -c usage
return true;
}
// If executing a file, require permission
if (args.length > 0) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Checks if command is direct script execution
*/
function isHighRiskDirectScript(baseCommand: string): boolean {
return (
baseCommand.startsWith("./") ||
baseCommand.endsWith(".sh") ||
baseCommand.endsWith(".py") ||
baseCommand.endsWith(".rb") ||
baseCommand.endsWith(".pl") ||
baseCommand.endsWith(".ps1") ||
baseCommand.endsWith(".bat") ||
baseCommand.endsWith(".cmd")
);
}
/**
* Checks if command modifies environment variables
*/
function isHighRiskEnvironmentModifier(
baseCommand: string,
args: string[],
): boolean {
if (
baseCommand === "export" ||
baseCommand === "setx" ||
baseCommand === "set"
) {
// Check for dangerous environment variables
const dangerousVars = [
"PATH",
"LD_PRELOAD",
"LD_LIBRARY_PATH",
"PYTHONPATH",
"NODE_PATH",
"PERL5LIB",
"RUBYLIB",
];
if (args.some((arg) => dangerousVars.some((v) => arg.includes(v)))) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Checks if command is process management
*/
function isHighRiskProcessCommand(baseCommand: string): boolean {
const processCommands = ["kill", "killall", "pkill", "taskkill", "pskill"];
return processCommands.includes(baseCommand);
}
/**
* Checks if command is system service management
*/
function isHighRiskSystemService(baseCommand: string): boolean {
return (
baseCommand === "systemctl" ||
baseCommand === "service" ||
baseCommand === "launchctl" ||
baseCommand === "sc"
);
}
/**
* Checks if command is file operation to sensitive location
*/
function isHighRiskFileOperation(baseCommand: string, args: string[]): boolean {
if (baseCommand === "mv" || baseCommand === "cp" || baseCommand === "copy") {
const sensitiveLocations = [
"/etc/",
"/usr/",
"/bin/",
"/sbin/",
"c:\\windows",
"c:\\program",
];
if (
args.some((arg) =>
sensitiveLocations.some((loc) => arg.toLowerCase().includes(loc)),
)
) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Checks if rm command is high risk (but not critical)
*/
function isHighRiskRmCommand(baseCommand: string, args: string[]): boolean {
if (baseCommand === "rm") {
const hasRf = args.some((arg) => arg === "-rf" || arg === "-fr");
const hasCriticalPath = args.some((arg) =>
["/etc/", "/usr/", "/bin/", "/sbin/"].some((path) => arg.includes(path)),
);
if (!hasRf && !hasCriticalPath) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Checks if command is archive extraction to system directories
*/
function isHighRiskArchiveExtraction(
baseCommand: string,
args: string[],
): boolean {
if (
baseCommand === "tar" ||
baseCommand === "unzip" ||
baseCommand === "7z"
) {
const hasSystemExtraction = args.some((arg, idx) => {
// Check for -C /path or -d /path patterns
if (
(arg === "-C" || arg === "-d" || arg === "-o") &&
idx < args.length - 1
) {
const nextArg = args[idx + 1];
return nextArg.startsWith("/") || nextArg.startsWith("C:\\");
}
// Check for -C/path patterns
return (
arg.startsWith("-C/") || arg.startsWith("-d/") || arg.startsWith("-o/")
);
});
if (hasSystemExtraction) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Checks if command is container/orchestration tool
*/
function isHighRiskContainerCommand(baseCommand: string): boolean {
const containerCommands = [
"docker",
"podman",
"kubectl",
"helm",
"terraform",
"vagrant",
];
return containerCommands.includes(baseCommand);
}
/**
* Checks if command is cloud CLI
*/
function isHighRiskCloudCLI(baseCommand: string): boolean {
const cloudCommands = ["aws", "gcloud", "az", "oci", "ibmcloud"];
return cloudCommands.includes(baseCommand);
}
/**
* Checks if command is user/group management
*/
function isHighRiskUserCommand(baseCommand: string): boolean {
const userCommands = [
"useradd",
"usermod",
"userdel",
"groupadd",
"passwd",
"chpasswd",
];
return userCommands.includes(baseCommand);
}
/**
* Checks if command is scheduled task
*/
function isHighRiskScheduledTask(baseCommand: string): boolean {
return (
baseCommand === "crontab" ||
baseCommand === "at" ||
baseCommand === "schtasks"
);
}
/**
* Checks if command is Windows registry/system configuration
*/
function isHighRiskWindowsRegistry(baseCommand: string): boolean {
return (
baseCommand === "reg" ||
baseCommand === "regedit" ||
baseCommand === "regsvr32"
);
}
/**
* Checks if command is Windows management tool
*/
function isHighRiskWindowsManagement(baseCommand: string): boolean {
return (
baseCommand === "wmic" || baseCommand === "net" || baseCommand === "netsh"
);
}
/**
* Checks if command is security/certificate tool
*/
function isHighRiskSecurityTool(baseCommand: string): boolean {
return baseCommand === "certutil" || baseCommand === "bitsadmin";
}
/**
* Checks if command is source/dot command
*/
function isHighRiskSourceCommand(baseCommand: string): boolean {
return baseCommand === "source" || baseCommand === ".";
}
/**
* Checks if command manipulates history
*/
function isHighRiskHistoryManipulation(
baseCommand: string,
args: string[],
): boolean {
if (baseCommand === "history" && args.includes("-c")) {
return true;
}
if (baseCommand === "unset" && args.some((arg) => arg.includes("HIST"))) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Checks if command is DNS tool (exfiltration risk)
*/
function isHighRiskDNSTool(baseCommand: string): boolean {
return (
baseCommand === "dig" ||
baseCommand === "nslookup" ||
baseCommand === "host"
);
}
/**
* Checks if command is macOS specific high risk
*/
function isHighRiskMacOSCommand(baseCommand: string, args: string[]): boolean {
if (
baseCommand === "defaults" &&
args.some((arg) => arg.includes("/Library/"))
) {
return true;
}
if (baseCommand === "pmset" || baseCommand === "csrutil") {
return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Checks if a command is high risk and requires permission
*/
function isHighRiskCommand(
baseCommand: string,
args: string[],
originalCommand: string,
): boolean {
// Check each category of high risk commands
if (isHighRiskPackageManager(baseCommand, args)) return true;
if (isHighRiskNetworkTool(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskScriptInterpreter(baseCommand, args)) return true;
if (isHighRiskDirectScript(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskEnvironmentModifier(baseCommand, args)) return true;
if (baseCommand === "alias") return true;
if (isFunctionDefinition([baseCommand, ...args], originalCommand))
return true;
if (isHighRiskProcessCommand(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskSystemService(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskFileOperation(baseCommand, args)) return true;
if (isHighRiskRmCommand(baseCommand, args)) return true;
if (isHighRiskArchiveExtraction(baseCommand, args)) return true;
if (isHighRiskContainerCommand(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskCloudCLI(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskUserCommand(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskScheduledTask(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskWindowsRegistry(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskWindowsManagement(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskSecurityTool(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskSourceCommand(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskHistoryManipulation(baseCommand, args)) return true;
if (isHighRiskDNSTool(baseCommand)) return true;
if (isHighRiskMacOSCommand(baseCommand, args)) return true;
return false;
}
/**
* Checks if a command is safe and can be auto-approved
*/
function isSafeCommand(baseCommand: string, args: string[]): boolean {
// Information commands
const infoCommands = [
"ls",
"dir",
"pwd",
"whoami",
"id",
"hostname",
"uname",
"date",
"uptime",
"df",
"du",
"free",
"top",
"htop",