This is a draft. It will change. If you have views about how it should change, let me know.

One thing is certain: this is too much to get through in a quarter.

Modal Realism and Possible Worlds

Required:

Lewis, David. 1973. Counterfactuals. London: Blackwell. (Selection)
Lewis, David. 1986. Chapters 1 and 2 of On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Yagisawa, Takashi. 1992. "Possible Worlds as Shifting Domains." Erkenntnis, 36(1):83 – 101. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20012391
Bricker, Phillip. 2001. Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality. In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, ed. Gerhard Preyer and Frank Siebelt, 27–55. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. http://www.umass.edu/philosophy/PDF/Bricker/Island_Universes.pdf
McDaniel, Kris. 2006. “Modal Realisms.” Philosophical Perspectives 20: 303–331. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00109.x
Dorr, Cian. 2010. “How to Be a Modal Realist.” http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0257/papers/ModalRealism.pdf

Optional:

Salmon, Nathan. 1988. “Review of On the Plurality of Worlds by David Lewis.” The Philosophical Review 97 (apr): 237–244. http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/stable/2185263
Bricker, Phillip. 1996. “Isolation and Unification: The Realist Analysis of Possible Worlds.” Philosophical Studies 84 (December 01): 225–238. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00354488
Divers, John. 2002. Chapter 6 of Possible Worlds. Routledge, London.
Parsons, J. 2007. "Is Everything a World?" Philosophical Studies, 134:165–181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9078-z
Sanson, David. "Worlds Enough for Junk." http://files.davidsanson.com/research/worlds-enough-for-junk.pdf

Alternatives to Modal Realism and Possible Worlds

Required:

Stalnaker, Robert. 1976. “Possible Worlds.” Noûs 10: 65–75. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214477
Plantinga, Alvin. 1976. “Actualism and Possible Worlds.” Theoria 42: 139–160. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1976.tb00681.x
Lewis, David. 1986. Chapter 3 of On the Plurality of Worlds.
Fine, Kit. 2003. "The Problem of Possibilia." In The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. Dean Zimmerman and Michael J. Loux, 161–179. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in his Modality and Tense. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001/acprof-9780199278701-chapter-7

Optional:

Adams, Robert M. 1974. “Theories of Actuality.” Noûs 8 (Sep): 211–231. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2214751
Fine, Kit. 1977. "Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants." In Worlds, Times and Selves, 116–168. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Reprinted in his Modality and Tense. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001/acprof-9780199278701-chapter-5
Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Selections)
Rosen, Gideon. 1990. “Modal Fictionalism.” Mind 99: 327–354. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2255102
Sanson, David. “Maximal Possibilities.” http://files.davidsanson.com/research/maximal-possibilities.pdf

Required:

Lewis, David. 1968. “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophy 65: 113–126. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024555
Lewis, David. 1971. “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies.” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (apr): 203–211. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024902
Lewis, David. 1986. Chapter 4 of On the Plurality of Worlds.
Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Selections)
Divers, John. 2002. Chapter 8 of Possible Worlds.
Sider, Ted. 2006. “Beyond the Humphrey Objection.” http://www.tedsider.org/papers/counterpart_theory.pdf
McGlone, Michael. 2008. “The Humphrey Objection and the Problem of De Re Modality.” http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~mmcglone/The%20Humphrey%20Objection%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20De%20Re%20Modality.pdf
Dorr, Cian. 2005. “Propositions and Counterpart Theory.” Analysis 65: 210–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/65.3.210

Optional:

Hazen, Allen. 1979. “Counterpart-Theoretic Semantics for Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophy 76 (jun): 319–338. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025472
Fine, Kit. 1989. The Problem of De Re Modality. In Themes from Kaplan, ed. J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, 197–272. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in his Modality and Tense. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001/acprof-9780199278701-chapter-3

Divers, J. 1999. “A Genuine Realist Theory of Advanced Modalizing.” Mind 108: 217–240. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/108.430.217 http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/108/430/217
Parsons, Josh. 2007. “Against Advanced Modalizing.” http://www.otago.ac.nz/philosophy/Staff/JoshParsons/papers/against-advanced2.pdf
Stone, Jim. 2009. “Why Counterpart Theory and Modal Realism are Incompatible.” Analysis 69: 650–653. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp101
Conee, Earl. 2011. “Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and The Possibility of Multiversal Rectitude.” Analysis 71: 680–684. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr098

Required:

Fine, Kit. 1994a. “Essence and Modality.” Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1–16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2214160
Fine, Kit. 2002. The Varieties of Necessity. In Conceivability and Possibility, ed. Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne, 253–282. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in his Modality and Tense. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001/acprof-9780199278701-chapter-8 in his Modality and Tense.
Rosen, Gideon. 2006. "The Limits of Contingency." in Identity And Modality, ed. Fraser MacBride, 13–39. Oxford University Press.
Correia, Fabrice. 2011. "On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00436.x

Optional:

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