| title | Readings |
|---|---|
| layout | 863s2012 |
| section | readings |
This is a draft. It will change. If you have views about how it should change, let me know.
One thing is certain: this is too much to get through in a quarter.
Required:
- Lewis, David. 1973. Counterfactuals. London: Blackwell. (Selection)
- Lewis, David. 1986. Chapters 1 and 2 of On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Yagisawa, Takashi. 1992. "Possible Worlds as Shifting Domains." Erkenntnis, 36(1):83 – 101. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20012391
- Bricker, Phillip. 2001. Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality. In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, ed. Gerhard Preyer and Frank Siebelt, 27–55. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. http://www.umass.edu/philosophy/PDF/Bricker/Island_Universes.pdf
- McDaniel, Kris. 2006. “Modal Realisms.” Philosophical Perspectives 20: 303–331. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00109.x
- Dorr, Cian. 2010. “How to Be a Modal Realist.” http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0257/papers/ModalRealism.pdf
Optional:
- Salmon, Nathan. 1988. “Review of On the Plurality of Worlds by David Lewis.” The Philosophical Review 97 (apr): 237–244. http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/stable/2185263
- Bricker, Phillip. 1996. “Isolation and Unification: The Realist Analysis of Possible Worlds.” Philosophical Studies 84 (December 01): 225–238. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00354488
- Divers, John. 2002. Chapter 6 of Possible Worlds. Routledge, London.
- Parsons, J. 2007. "Is Everything a World?" Philosophical Studies, 134:165–181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9078-z
- Sanson, David. "Worlds Enough for Junk." http://files.davidsanson.com/research/worlds-enough-for-junk.pdf
Required:
- Stalnaker, Robert. 1976. “Possible Worlds.” Noûs 10: 65–75. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214477
- Plantinga, Alvin. 1976. “Actualism and Possible Worlds.” Theoria 42: 139–160. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1976.tb00681.x
- Lewis, David. 1986. Chapter 3 of On the Plurality of Worlds.
- Fine, Kit. 2003. "The Problem of Possibilia." In The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. Dean Zimmerman and Michael J. Loux, 161–179. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in his Modality and Tense. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001/acprof-9780199278701-chapter-7
Optional:
- Adams, Robert M. 1974. “Theories of Actuality.” Noûs 8 (Sep): 211–231. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2214751
- Fine, Kit. 1977. "Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants." In Worlds, Times and Selves, 116–168. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Reprinted in his Modality and Tense. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001/acprof-9780199278701-chapter-5
- Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Selections)
- Rosen, Gideon. 1990. “Modal Fictionalism.” Mind 99: 327–354. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2255102
- Sanson, David. “Maximal Possibilities.” http://files.davidsanson.com/research/maximal-possibilities.pdf
Required:
- Lewis, David. 1968. “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophy 65: 113–126. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024555
- Lewis, David. 1971. “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies.” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (apr): 203–211. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024902
- Lewis, David. 1986. Chapter 4 of On the Plurality of Worlds.
- Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Selections)
- Divers, John. 2002. Chapter 8 of Possible Worlds.
- Sider, Ted. 2006. “Beyond the Humphrey Objection.” http://www.tedsider.org/papers/counterpart_theory.pdf
- McGlone, Michael. 2008. “The Humphrey Objection and the Problem of De Re Modality.” http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~mmcglone/The%20Humphrey%20Objection%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20De%20Re%20Modality.pdf
- Dorr, Cian. 2005. “Propositions and Counterpart Theory.” Analysis 65: 210–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/65.3.210
Optional:
- Hazen, Allen. 1979. “Counterpart-Theoretic Semantics for Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophy 76 (jun): 319–338. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025472
- Fine, Kit. 1989. The Problem of De Re Modality. In Themes from Kaplan, ed. J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, 197–272. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in his Modality and Tense. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001/acprof-9780199278701-chapter-3
- Divers, J. 1999. “A Genuine Realist Theory of Advanced Modalizing.” Mind 108: 217–240. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/108.430.217 http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/108/430/217
- Parsons, Josh. 2007. “Against Advanced Modalizing.” http://www.otago.ac.nz/philosophy/Staff/JoshParsons/papers/against-advanced2.pdf
- Stone, Jim. 2009. “Why Counterpart Theory and Modal Realism are Incompatible.” Analysis 69: 650–653. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp101
- Conee, Earl. 2011. “Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and The Possibility of Multiversal Rectitude.” Analysis 71: 680–684. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr098
Required:
- Fine, Kit. 1994a. “Essence and Modality.” Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1–16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2214160
- Fine, Kit. 2002. The Varieties of Necessity. In Conceivability and Possibility, ed. Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne, 253–282. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in his Modality and Tense. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001/acprof-9780199278701-chapter-8 in his Modality and Tense.
- Rosen, Gideon. 2006. "The Limits of Contingency." in Identity And Modality, ed. Fraser MacBride, 13–39. Oxford University Press.
- Correia, Fabrice. 2011. "On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00436.x
Optional:
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