[LTS 9.2] CVE-2026-23060, CVE-2026-31431, CVE-2026-31677 #1167
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jira VULN-181879 cve-pre CVE-2026-31431 commit-author Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com> commit 62397b4 commit-source centos-stream-9 The AF_ALG interface fails to unmark the end of a Scatter/Gather List (SGL) when chaining a new af_alg_tsgl structure. If a sendmsg() fills an SGL exactly to MAX_SGL_ENTS, the last entry is marked as the end. A subsequent sendmsg() allocates a new SGL and chains it, but fails to clear the end marker on the previous SGL's last data entry. This causes the crypto scatterwalk to hit a premature end, returning NULL on sg_next() and leading to a kernel panic during dereference. Fix this by explicitly unmarking the end of the previous SGL when performing sg_chain() in af_alg_alloc_tsgl(). Fixes: 8ff5909 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations") Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
jira VULN-181879 cve CVE-2026-31431 commit-author Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> commit a664bf3 commit-source centos-stream-9 This mostly reverts commit 72548b0 except for the copying of the associated data. There is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the AD directly. Fixes: 72548b0 ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst") Reported-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
jira VULN-182989 cve CVE-2026-31677 commit-author Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com> commit 8eceab1 commit-source centos-stream-9 Make af_alg_get_rsgl() limit each RX scatterlist extraction to the remaining receive buffer budget. af_alg_get_rsgl() currently uses af_alg_readable() only as a gate before extracting data into the RX scatterlist. Limit each extraction to the remaining af_alg_rcvbuf(sk) budget so that receive-side accounting matches the amount of data attached to the request. If skcipher cannot obtain enough RX space for at least one chunk while more data remains to be processed, reject the recvmsg call instead of rounding the request length down to zero. Fixes: e870456 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management") Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
jira VULN-182989 cve-bf CVE-2026-31677 commit-author Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> commit 31d0015 commit-source centos-stream-9 When page reassignment was added to af_alg_pull_tsgl the original loop wasn't updated so it may try to reassign one more page than necessary. Add the check to the reassignment so that this does not happen. Also update the comment which still refers to the obsolete offset argument. Reported-by: syzbot+d23888375c2737c17ba5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e870456 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert.xu@redhat.com>
…SN spec jira VULN-175567 cve CVE-2026-23060 commit-author Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> commit 2397e92 commit-source centos-stream-9 authencesn assumes an ESP/ESN-formatted AAD. When assoclen is shorter than the minimum expected length, crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt() can advance past the end of the destination scatterlist and trigger a NULL pointer dereference in scatterwalk_map_and_copy(), leading to a kernel panic (DoS). Add a minimum AAD length check to fail fast on invalid inputs. Fixes: 104880a ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD interface") Reported-By: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Signed-off-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
…e decryption jira VULN-181879 cve CVE-2026-31431 commit-author Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> commit e024941 commit-source centos-stream-9 commit-note CentOS attributes this to CVE-2026-31431 but it fixes the same code commit as CVE-2026-23060. I defaulted to the centos attribution for consistency with our upstream. When decrypting data that is not in-place (src != dst), there is no need to save the high-order sequence bits in dst as it could simply be re-copied from the source. However, the data to be hashed need to be rearranged accordingly. Reported-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Fixes: 104880a ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD interface") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Thanks, Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
jira VULN-181879 cve-bf CVE-2026-31431 commit-author Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> commit 1f48ad3 commit-source centos-stream-9 The src SG list offset wasn't set properly when decrypting in-place, fix it. Reported-by: Wolfgang Walter <linux@stwm.de> Fixes: e024941 ("crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
jira VULN-181879 cve-bf CVE-2026-31431 commit-author Yucheng Lu <kanolyc@gmail.com> commit - commit-source-sha 5db6ef9 commit-source centos-stream-9, cryptodev authencesn requires either a zero authsize or an authsize of at least 4 bytes because the ESN encrypt/decrypt paths always move 4 bytes of high-order sequence number data at the end of the authenticated data. While crypto_authenc_esn_setauthsize() already rejects explicit non-zero authsizes in the range 1..3, crypto_authenc_esn_create() still copied auth->digestsize into inst->alg.maxauthsize without validating it. The AEAD core then initialized the tfm's default authsize from that value. As a result, selecting an ahash with digest size 1..3, such as cbcmac(cipher_null), exposed authencesn instances whose default authsize was invalid even though setauthsize() would have rejected the same value. AF_ALG could then trigger the ESN tail handling with a too-short tag and hit an out-of-bounds access. Reject authencesn instances whose ahash digest size is in the invalid non-zero range 1..3 so that no tfm can inherit an unsupported default authsize. Fixes: f15f05b ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn> Tested-by: Yuhang Zheng <z1652074432@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yucheng Lu <kanolyc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
jira VULN-181879 cve-bf CVE-2026-31431 commit-author Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> commit 3d14bd4 The check for the minimum receive buffer size did not take the tag size into account during decryption. Fix this by adding the required extra length. Reported-by: syzbot+aa11561819dc42ebbc7c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Daniel Pouzzner <douzzer@mega.nu> Fixes: d887c52 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> (cherry picked from commit 3d14bd4) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira VULN-181879 cve-bf CVE-2026-31431 commit-author Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com> commit 5aa58c3 AF_ALG AEAD AIO requests currently use the socket-wide IV buffer during request processing. For async requests, later socket activity can update that shared state before the original request has fully completed, which can lead to inconsistent IV handling. Snapshot the IV into per-request storage when preparing the AEAD request, so in-flight operations no longer depend on mutable socket state. Fixes: d887c52 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com> Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn> Co-developed-by: Luxing Yin <tr0jan@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Luxing Yin <tr0jan@lzu.edu.cn> Tested-by: Yucheng Lu <kanolyc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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================================================================================
* DELTA DIFFERENCES - code changes that differ between the patches *
================================================================================
--- b/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -207,13 +208,72 @@
/* Use the RX SGL as source (and destination) for crypto op. */
rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg;
- err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, rsgl_src,
- ctx->aead_assoclen);
- if (err)
- goto free;
+ if (ctx->enc) {
+ /*
+ * Encryption operation - The in-place cipher operation is
+ * achieved by the following operation:
+ *
+ * TX SGL: AAD || PT
+ * | |
+ * | copy |
+ * v v
+ * RX SGL: AAD || PT || Tag
+ */
+ err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src,
+ areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, processed);
+ if (err)
+ goto free;
+ af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, NULL, 0);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Decryption operation - To achieve an in-place cipher
+ * operation, the following SGL structure is used:
+ *
+ * TX SGL: AAD || CT || Tag
+ * | | ^
+ * | copy | | Create SGL link.
+ * v v |
+ * RX SGL: AAD || CT ----+
+ */
+
+ /* Copy AAD || CT to RX SGL buffer for in-place operation. */
+ err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src,
+ areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, outlen);
+ if (err)
+ goto free;
+
+ /* Create TX SGL for tag and chain it to RX SGL. */
+ areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, processed,
+ processed - as);
+ if (!areq->tsgl_entries)
+ areq->tsgl_entries = 1;
+ areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl),
+ areq->tsgl_entries),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!areq->tsgl) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free;
+ }
+ sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries);
+
+ /* Release TX SGL, except for tag data and reassign tag data. */
+ af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, areq->tsgl, processed - as);
+
+ /* chain the areq TX SGL holding the tag with RX SGL */
+ if (usedpages) {
+ /* RX SGL present */
+ struct af_alg_sgl *sgl_prev = &areq->last_rsgl->sgl;
+
+ sg_unmark_end(sgl_prev->sg + sgl_prev->npages - 1);
+ sg_chain(sgl_prev->sg, sgl_prev->npages + 1,
+ areq->tsgl);
+ } else
+ /* no RX SGL present (e.g. authentication only) */
+ rsgl_src = areq->tsgl;
+ }
/* Initialize the crypto operation */
- aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tsgl_src,
+ aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, rsgl_src,
areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used, ctx->iv);
aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm);
################################################################################
! REJECTED PATCH2 HUNKS - could not be compared; manual review needed !
################################################################################
--- b/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include <crypto/if_alg.h>
-#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -72,7 +71,7 @@
struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk);
struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
struct crypto_aead *tfm = pask->private;
- unsigned int i, as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
+ unsigned int as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
struct af_alg_async_req *areq;
struct af_alg_tsgl *tsgl, *tmp;
struct scatterlist *rsgl_src, *tsgl_src = NULL;
@@ -182,64 +177,7 @@
/* Use the RX SGL as source (and destination) for crypto op. */
rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl;
- if (ctx->enc) {
- /*
- * Encryption operation - The in-place cipher operation is
- * achieved by the following operation:
- *
- * TX SGL: AAD || PT
- * | |
- * | copy |
- * v v
- * RX SGL: AAD || PT || Tag
- */
- memcpy_sglist(areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, tsgl_src,
- processed);
- af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, NULL, 0);
- } else {
- /*
- * Decryption operation - To achieve an in-place cipher
- * operation, the following SGL structure is used:
- *
- * TX SGL: AAD || CT || Tag
- * | | ^
- * | copy | | Create SGL link.
- * v v |
- * RX SGL: AAD || CT ----+
- */
-
- /* Copy AAD || CT to RX SGL buffer for in-place operation. */
- memcpy_sglist(areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, tsgl_src, outlen);
-
- /* Create TX SGL for tag and chain it to RX SGL. */
- areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, processed,
- processed - as);
- if (!areq->tsgl_entries)
- areq->tsgl_entries = 1;
- areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl),
- areq->tsgl_entries),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!areq->tsgl) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto free;
- }
- sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries);
-
- /* Release TX SGL, except for tag data and reassign tag data. */
- af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, areq->tsgl, processed - as);
-
- /* chain the areq TX SGL holding the tag with RX SGL */
- if (usedpages) {
- /* RX SGL present */
- struct af_alg_sgl *sgl_prev = &areq->last_rsgl->sgl;
- struct scatterlist *sg = sgl_prev->sgt.sgl;
-
- sg_unmark_end(sg + sgl_prev->sgt.nents - 1);
- sg_chain(sg, sgl_prev->sgt.nents + 1, areq->tsgl);
- } else
- /* no RX SGL present (e.g. authentication only) */
- rsgl_src = areq->tsgl;
- }
+ memcpy_sglist(rsgl_src, tsgl_src, ctx->aead_assoclen);
/* Initialize the crypto operation */
aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, rsgl_src,
@@ -242,7 +180,7 @@
}
/* Initialize the crypto operation */
- aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, rsgl_src,
+ aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tsgl_src,
areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, ctx->iv);
aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm);
================================================================================
* CONTEXT DIFFERENCES - surrounding code differences between the patches *
================================================================================
--- b/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -28,5 +28,4 @@
#include <crypto/if_alg.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
-#include <crypto/null.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
@@ -69,6 +69,6 @@
- struct aead_tfm *aeadc = pask->private;
- struct crypto_aead *tfm = aeadc->aead;
- struct crypto_sync_skcipher *null_tfm = aeadc->null_tfm;
+ struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk);
+ struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = pask->private;
unsigned int i, as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
struct af_alg_async_req *areq;
struct af_alg_tsgl *tsgl, *tmp;
@@ -210,7 +184,7 @@
*/
/* Use the RX SGL as source (and destination) for crypto op. */
- rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg;
+ rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl;
if (ctx->enc) {
/*
@@ -223,10 +197,8 @@
* v v
* RX SGL: AAD || PT || Tag
*/
- err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src,
- areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, processed);
- if (err)
- goto free;
+ memcpy_sglist(areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, tsgl_src,
+ processed);
af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, NULL, 0);
} else {
/*
@@ -240,11 +212,8 @@
* RX SGL: AAD || CT ----+
*/
- /* Copy AAD || CT to RX SGL buffer for in-place operation. */
- err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src,
- areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, outlen);
- if (err)
- goto free;
+ /* Copy AAD || CT to RX SGL buffer for in-place operation. */
+ memcpy_sglist(areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, tsgl_src, outlen);
/* Create TX SGL for tag and chain it to RX SGL. */
areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, processed,
@@ -267,10 +236,10 @@
if (usedpages) {
/* RX SGL present */
struct af_alg_sgl *sgl_prev = &areq->last_rsgl->sgl;
+ struct scatterlist *sg = sgl_prev->sgt.sgl;
- sg_unmark_end(sgl_prev->sg + sgl_prev->npages - 1);
- sg_chain(sgl_prev->sg, sgl_prev->npages + 1,
- areq->tsgl);
+ sg_unmark_end(sg + sgl_prev->sgt.nents - 1);
+ sg_chain(sg, sgl_prev->sgt.nents + 1, areq->tsgl);
} else
/* no RX SGL present (e.g. authentication only) */
rsgl_src = areq->tsgl;
@@ -279,5 +248,5 @@
/* Initialize the crypto operation */
aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, rsgl_src,
- areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used, ctx->iv);
+ areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, ctx->iv);
aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm);
@@ -478,4 +447,4 @@
- struct crypto_aead *tfm = aeadc->aead;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = pask->private;
unsigned int ivlen = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL, 0);
--- b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
@@ -310,7 +359,7 @@
struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk);
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = pask->private;
af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL, 0);
sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
- sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len);
- af_alg_release_parent(sk);
+ if (ctx->state)
+ sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->state, crypto_skcipher_statesize(tfm));
================================================================================
* DELTA DIFFERENCES - code changes that differ between the patches *
================================================================================
--- b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
@@ -82,14 +82,8 @@
* If more buffers are to be expected to be processed, process only
* full block size buffers.
*/
- if (ctx->more || len < ctx->used) {
- if (len < bs) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto free;
- }
-
+ if (ctx->more || len < ctx->used)
len -= len % bs;
- }
/*
* Create a per request TX SGL for this request which tracks the
################################################################################
! REJECTED PATCH2 HUNKS - could not be compared; manual review needed !
################################################################################
--- b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
@@ -130,6 +130,11 @@
* full block size buffers.
*/
if (ctx->more || len < ctx->used) {
+ if (len < bs) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free;
+ }
+
len -= len % bs;
cflags |= CRYPTO_SKCIPHER_REQ_NOTFINAL;
}
================================================================================
* CONTEXT DIFFERENCES - surrounding code differences between the patches *
================================================================================
--- b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@
* full block size buffers.
*/
- if (ctx->more || len < ctx->used)
+ if (ctx->more || len < ctx->used) {
len -= len % bs;
-
- /*
- * Create a per request TX SGL for this request which tracks the
+ cflags |= CRYPTO_SKCIPHER_REQ_NOTFINAL;
+ }
================================================================================
* CONTEXT DIFFERENCES - surrounding code differences between the patches *
================================================================================
--- b/crypto/authencesn.c
+++ b/crypto/authencesn.c
@@ -275,6 +253,6 @@
u32 tmp[2];
int err;
cryptlen -= authsize;
- if (req->src != dst) {
+ if (req->src != dst)
================================================================================
* DELTA DIFFERENCES - code changes that differ between the patches *
================================================================================
--- b/crypto/authencesn.c
+++ b/crypto/authencesn.c
@@ -164,10 +164,7 @@
authenc_esn_request_complete(areq, err);
}
-static int crypto_authenc_esn_copy_sg(struct aead_request *req,
- struct scatterlist *src,
- struct scatterlist *dst,
- unsigned int len)
+static int crypto_authenc_esn_copy(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int len)
{
struct crypto_aead *authenc_esn = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_authenc_esn_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc_esn);
@@ -176,16 +173,11 @@
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(skreq, ctx->null);
skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, aead_request_flags(req),
NULL, NULL);
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, src, dst, len, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, req->src, req->dst, len, NULL);
return crypto_skcipher_encrypt(skreq);
}
-static int crypto_authenc_esn_copy(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int len)
-{
- return crypto_authenc_esn_copy_sg(req, req->src, req->dst, len);
-}
-
static int crypto_authenc_esn_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *authenc_esn = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
@@ -245,7 +237,6 @@
struct scatterlist *dst = req->dst;
u8 *ihash = ohash + crypto_ahash_digestsize(auth);
u32 tmp[2];
- int err;
if (!authsize)
goto decrypt;
@@ -255,11 +246,8 @@
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(tmp, dst, 4, 4, 0);
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(tmp + 1, dst, assoclen + cryptlen, 4, 0);
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(tmp, dst, 0, 8, 1);
- } else {
- err = crypto_authenc_esn_copy(req, assoclen);
- if (err)
- return err;
- }
+ } else
+ memcpy_sglist(dst, src, assoclen);
if (crypto_memneq(ihash, ohash, authsize))
return -EBADMSG;
@@ -308,8 +296,13 @@
if (assoclen < 8)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!authsize)
- goto tail;
+ cryptlen -= authsize;
+
+ if (req->src != dst) {
+ err = crypto_authenc_esn_copy(req, assoclen + cryptlen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
cryptlen -= authsize;
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, req->src, assoclen + cryptlen,
@@ -327,10 +320,7 @@
src = scatterwalk_ffwd(areq_ctx->src, src, 8);
dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(areq_ctx->dst, dst, 4);
- err = crypto_authenc_esn_copy_sg(req, src, dst,
- assoclen + cryptlen - 8);
- if (err)
- return err;
+ memcpy_sglist(dst, src, assoclen + cryptlen - 8);
dst = req->dst;
}
################################################################################
! REJECTED PATCH2 HUNKS - could not be compared; manual review needed !
################################################################################
--- b/crypto/authencesn.c
+++ b/crypto/authencesn.c
@@ -268,10 +274,8 @@
if (assoclen < 8)
return -EINVAL;
- cryptlen -= authsize;
-
- if (req->src != dst)
- memcpy_sglist(dst, req->src, assoclen + cryptlen);
+ if (!authsize)
+ goto tail;
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, req->src, assoclen + cryptlen,
authsize, 0);
================================================================================
* CONTEXT DIFFERENCES - surrounding code differences between the patches *
================================================================================
--- b/crypto/authencesn.c
+++ b/crypto/authencesn.c
@@ -225,10 +204,9 @@
- crypto_ahash_alignmask(auth) + 1);
+ u8 *ohash = areq_ctx->tail;
unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen - authsize;
unsigned int assoclen = req->assoclen;
struct scatterlist *dst = req->dst;
u8 *ihash = ohash + crypto_ahash_digestsize(auth);
u32 tmp[2];
-
if (!authsize)
goto decrypt;
@@ -281,11 +254,8 @@
cryptlen -= authsize;
- if (req->src != dst) {
- err = crypto_authenc_esn_copy(req, assoclen + cryptlen);
- if (err)
- return err;
- }
+ if (req->src != dst)
+ memcpy_sglist(dst, req->src, assoclen + cryptlen);
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, req->src, assoclen + cryptlen,
authsize, 0);
================================================================================
* DELTA DIFFERENCES - code changes that differ between the patches *
================================================================================
--- b/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@
/* Initialize the crypto operation */
aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tsgl_src,
- areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used, iv);
+ areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used, ctx->iv);
aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm);
################################################################################
! REJECTED PATCH2 HUNKS - could not be compared; manual review needed !
################################################################################
--- b/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -193,7 +199,7 @@
/* Initialize the crypto operation */
aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tsgl_src,
- areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, ctx->iv);
+ areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, iv);
aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm);
================================================================================
* CONTEXT DIFFERENCES - surrounding code differences between the patches *
================================================================================
--- b/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -69,5 +69,5 @@
- struct crypto_aead *tfm = aeadc->aead;
- struct crypto_sync_skcipher *null_tfm = aeadc->null_tfm;
+ struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = pask->private;
unsigned int as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
struct af_alg_async_req *areq;
struct scatterlist *rsgl_src, *tsgl_src = NULL;
@@ -208,7 +184,7 @@
/* Initialize the crypto operation */
aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tsgl_src,
- areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used, ctx->iv);
+ areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, ctx->iv);
aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm);This is an automated interdiff check for backported commits. |
JIRA PR Check Results3 commit(s) with issues found: Commit
|
|
✅ Validation checks completed successfully View full results: https://github.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree/actions/runs/25199053980 |
PlaidCat
changed the title
kemotaha
approved these changes
May 1, 2026
Contributor
Yeah, this is not a CVE. It shold have been tagged with cve-bf CVE-2026-31431. Since we have this in 9.6 and 9.4, I won't change it. No big deal. |
roxanan1996
approved these changes
May 1, 2026
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Sourced from:
#1165
CVE Remediation evidence
Summary
This PR has been automatically created after successful completion of all CI stages.
Commit Message(s)
Test Results
✅ Build Stage
✅ Boot Verification
✅ Kernel Selftests
✅ LTP Results
x86_64 newly passing:
aarch64 newly passing:
🤖 This PR was automatically generated by GitHub Actions
Run ID: 25191448600