diff --git a/.changeset/fail-closed-children-redaction.md b/.changeset/fail-closed-children-redaction.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0adfd9bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/fail-closed-children-redaction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+"@treecrdt/auth": patch
+---
+
+Reject scoped `children(parent)` projections when convergence requires an out-of-scope operation that cannot yet be represented without revealing restricted data.
diff --git a/packages/treecrdt-auth/src/internal/cose-cwt-auth.ts b/packages/treecrdt-auth/src/internal/cose-cwt-auth.ts
index 066c4d21..e970b47e 100644
--- a/packages/treecrdt-auth/src/internal/cose-cwt-auth.ts
+++ b/packages/treecrdt-auth/src/internal/cose-cwt-auth.ts
@@ -616,13 +616,39 @@ export function createTreecrdtCoseCwtAuth(opts: TreecrdtCoseCwtAuthOptions): Syn
         // For `children(parent)` we still need to hide ops for nodes outside scope
         // (e.g. excluded private roots) so peers cannot discover them by syncing the parent's children.
         switch (op.kind.type) {
-          case 'insert':
-          case 'payload':
+          case 'insert': {
+            const allowed = await allowNode(nodeIdToBytes16(op.kind.node), requiredStructure);
+            if (
+              !allowed &&
+              'children' in ctx.filter &&
+              op.kind.parent !== bytesToHex(ctx.filter.children.parent)
+            ) {
+              throw new Error(
+                'children(parent) projection requires an out-of-scope causal dependency',
+              );
+            }
+            out.push(allowed);
+            break;
+          }
           case 'move':
+          case 'payload':
           case 'delete':
-          case 'tombstone':
-            out.push(await allowNode(nodeIdToBytes16(op.kind.node), requiredStructure));
+          case 'tombstone': {
+            const allowed = await allowNode(nodeIdToBytes16(op.kind.node), requiredStructure);
+            if (!allowed && 'children' in ctx.filter) {
+              // A move can be indexed by its old parent after the node has already left the
+              // authorized subtree; deletes/tombstones are also indexed by their pre-change
+              // parent. Likewise, a descendant payload can defensively restore an ancestor and
+              // therefore appear in that ancestor's parent filter. Omitting any of these leaves a
+              // stale projection; sending it reveals out-of-scope data. Until the wire protocol
+              // has redacted remove/restore records, reject the whole filtered read.
+              throw new Error(
+                'children(parent) projection requires redaction for an out-of-scope dependency',
+              );
+            }
+            out.push(allowed);
             break;
+          }
           default: {
             const _exhaustive: never = op.kind;
             throw new Error(`unknown op kind: ${String((_exhaustive as any)?.type)}`);
diff --git a/packages/treecrdt-auth/tests/auth.test.ts b/packages/treecrdt-auth/tests/auth.test.ts
index 434fd60e..9e9ab61b 100644
--- a/packages/treecrdt-auth/tests/auth.test.ts
+++ b/packages/treecrdt-auth/tests/auth.test.ts
@@ -1659,7 +1659,7 @@ test('auth: syncOnce rejects filter(children) when capability scope does not mat
   void bPk;
 });
 
-test('auth: filterOutgoingOps hides move/delete/tombstone for excluded subtrees', async () => {
+test('auth: outgoing scope hides all-filter ops and rejects unsafe children projections', async () => {
   const docId = 'doc-auth-filter-outgoing-exclude';
   const root = '0'.repeat(32);
 
@@ -1819,6 +1819,54 @@ test('auth: filterOutgoingOps hides move/delete/tombstone for excluded subtrees'
   for (const i of [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]) {
     expect(allowed?.[i]).toBe(false);
   }
+
+  // A children filter is a convergent operation projection, so silently hiding an indexed
+  // removal/dependency would leave stale state. Once the public node has crossed into the
+  // excluded subtree, these operations require a redacted wire representation and must reject the
+  // whole projection until that representation exists.
+  parentByNodeHex.set(publicNode, privateRoot);
+  const childrenContext = {
+    docId,
+    purpose: 'reconcile' as const,
+    filter: { children: { parent: nodeIdToBytes16(root) } },
+    capabilities: receiverCaps ?? [],
+  };
+  const boundaryOps: Operation[] = [
+    makeOp(senderPk, 11, 11, {
+      type: 'move',
+      node: publicNode,
+      newParent: privateRoot,
+      orderKey: orderKeyFromPosition(0),
+    }),
+    makeOp(senderPk, 12, 12, { type: 'delete', node: publicNode }),
+    makeOp(senderPk, 13, 13, { type: 'tombstone', node: publicNode }),
+    makeOp(senderPk, 14, 14, {
+      type: 'payload',
+      node: publicNode,
+      payload: new Uint8Array([4]),
+    }),
+  ];
+  for (const boundaryOp of boundaryOps) {
+    await expect(authSender.filterOutgoingOps?.([boundaryOp], childrenContext)).rejects.toThrow(
+      /requires redaction/i,
+    );
+  }
+
+  const insertUpsertLeavingScope = makeOp(senderPk, 15, 15, {
+    type: 'insert',
+    parent: privateRoot,
+    node: publicNode,
+    orderKey: orderKeyFromPosition(0),
+  });
+  await expect(
+    authSender.filterOutgoingOps?.([insertUpsertLeavingScope], childrenContext),
+  ).rejects.toThrow(/out-of-scope causal dependency/i);
+
+  // A descendant op can be selected by children(root) because it defensively restores a direct
+  // child. Omitting it is also unsafe, even though its own node is outside the readable scope.
+  await expect(authSender.filterOutgoingOps?.([ops[3]!], childrenContext)).rejects.toThrow(
+    /out-of-scope causal dependency/i,
+  );
 });
 
 test('auth: delegated capability token can be verified via issuer-signed proof', async () => {