π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in URL interpolation#255
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in URL interpolation#255davidruzicka wants to merge 1 commit into
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Co-authored-by: davidruzicka <14172985+davidruzicka@users.noreply.github.com>
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| const val = String(value); | ||
| return val.includes('/') ? encodeURIComponent(val) : val; | ||
| // URL-encode slashes and dots to prevent path traversal when interpolating path parameters | ||
| return (val.includes('/') || val.includes('.')) ? encodeURIComponent(val).replace(/\./g, '%2E') : val; |
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Reject dot-segment path params before URL assembly
Encoding dots to %2E here does not stop traversal for . or .. inputs, because the URL parser used by request construction (fetch/WHATWG URL in HttpClient.requestInternal) normalizes %2E and %2E%2E path segments before sending the request. With an attacker-controlled path parameter like id: "..", the resolved path can still collapse from /users/%2E%2E/profile to /profile, so this fix leaves the traversal primitive reachable; these segment values need to be explicitly rejected (and the same logic applies to the analogous change in CompositeExecutor.resolvePath).
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Path traversal vulnerability when substituting variables in URLs using
encodeURIComponentwhich does not escape dots (.). This could allow attackers to traverse directories by providing inputs like../.π― Impact: Attackers could manipulate API paths to access unintended endpoints or files.
π§ Fix: Added explicit
.replace(/\./g, '%2E')after callingencodeURIComponent()during URL variable interpolation insrc/tooling/composite-executor.tsandsrc/mcp/mcp-server.ts. This ensures that dots are properly encoded and treated as part of the segment rather than path traversal directives.β Verification: Ran
npm run testensuring the relevant security tests pass and no functionality breaks. Also added a journal entry in.jules/sentinel.mddocumenting this finding.PR created automatically by Jules for task 13559895342011619317 started by @davidruzicka