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πŸ›‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in URL interpolation#255

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πŸ›‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in URL interpolation#255
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sentinel/fix-path-traversal-13559895342011619317

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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
πŸ’‘ Vulnerability: Path traversal vulnerability when substituting variables in URLs using encodeURIComponent which does not escape dots (.). This could allow attackers to traverse directories by providing inputs like ../.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could manipulate API paths to access unintended endpoints or files.
πŸ”§ Fix: Added explicit .replace(/\./g, '%2E') after calling encodeURIComponent() during URL variable interpolation in src/tooling/composite-executor.ts and src/mcp/mcp-server.ts. This ensures that dots are properly encoded and treated as part of the segment rather than path traversal directives.
βœ… Verification: Ran npm run test ensuring the relevant security tests pass and no functionality breaks. Also added a journal entry in .jules/sentinel.md documenting this finding.


PR created automatically by Jules for task 13559895342011619317 started by @davidruzicka

Co-authored-by: davidruzicka <14172985+davidruzicka@users.noreply.github.com>
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codecov Bot commented Apr 19, 2026

Codecov Report

βœ… All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
βœ… All tests successful. No failed tests found.

πŸ“’ Thoughts on this report? Let us know!

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πŸ’‘ Codex Review

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Reviewed commit: fde96ee4bf

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Comment thread src/mcp/mcp-server.ts
const val = String(value);
return val.includes('/') ? encodeURIComponent(val) : val;
// URL-encode slashes and dots to prevent path traversal when interpolating path parameters
return (val.includes('/') || val.includes('.')) ? encodeURIComponent(val).replace(/\./g, '%2E') : val;
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P1 Badge Reject dot-segment path params before URL assembly

Encoding dots to %2E here does not stop traversal for . or .. inputs, because the URL parser used by request construction (fetch/WHATWG URL in HttpClient.requestInternal) normalizes %2E and %2E%2E path segments before sending the request. With an attacker-controlled path parameter like id: "..", the resolved path can still collapse from /users/%2E%2E/profile to /profile, so this fix leaves the traversal primitive reachable; these segment values need to be explicitly rejected (and the same logic applies to the analogous change in CompositeExecutor.resolvePath).

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