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Merge pull request #68 from dreamfactorysoftware/2026-04-security-scan
Security: quote db_function template values
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‎README.md‎

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> **Note:** This repository contains the database code of the DreamFactory platform. If you want the full DreamFactory platform, visit the main [DreamFactory repository](https://github.com/dreamfactorysoftware/dreamfactory).
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## Overview
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DreamFactory is a secure, self-hosted enterprise data access platform that provides governed API access to any data source, connecting enterprise applications and on-prem LLMs with role-based access and identity passthrough.
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## Documentation
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Documentation for the platform can be found on the [DreamFactory wiki](http://wiki.dreamfactory.com).

‎phpunit.xml‎

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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<phpunit xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
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xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="vendor/phpunit/phpunit/phpunit.xsd"
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bootstrap="vendor/autoload.php"
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colors="true">
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<testsuites>
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<testsuite name="Security">
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<directory>tests/Security</directory>
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</testsuite>
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</testsuites>
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</phpunit>

‎src/Resources/BaseDbTableResource.php‎

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@@ -3164,7 +3164,16 @@ protected function parseValueForSet($value, $field_info, $for_update = false)
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$value = $this->parent->getSchema()->typecastToNative($value, $field_info);
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if (!empty($function = $field_info->getDbFunction($for_update ? DbFunctionUses::UPDATE : DbFunctionUses::INSERT))) {
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$function = str_ireplace('{value}', (is_string($value) ? "'$value'" : $value), $function);
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// SECURITY FIX: use quoteValue() instead of bare string interpolation to prevent
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// SQL injection via db_function templates. quoteValue() calls PDO::quote() (with a
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// driver-specific fallback) so single quotes and other metacharacters in user-supplied
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// string values are properly escaped before being embedded in the SQL expression.
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if (is_string($value)) {
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$quotedValue = $this->parent->getSchema()->quoteValue($value);
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} else {
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$quotedValue = $value;
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}
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$function = str_ireplace('{value}', $quotedValue, $function);
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$value = $this->parent->getConnection()->raw($function);
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}
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‎tests/Security/DbFunctionTemplateTest.php‎

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<?php
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namespace DreamFactory\Core\Database\Tests\Security;
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use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
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/**
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* Security regression tests for SQL injection via db_function template substitution.
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*
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* Vulnerability (fixed in parseValueForSet):
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* String values were interpolated directly into SQL expression templates using
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* bare "'$value'" concatenation, allowing an attacker-controlled string to break
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* out of the surrounding single-quote context and inject arbitrary SQL.
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*
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* Fix:
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* $this->parent->getSchema()->quoteValue($value) is now called for all string
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* values before they are substituted into the template. quoteValue() delegates
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* to PDO::quote() (with a driver-agnostic fallback) so every special character
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* — including single quotes, backslashes, and NUL bytes — is properly escaped.
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*
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* These tests exercise:
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* 1. The quoting logic itself (the Schema::quoteValue fallback path).
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* 2. The full parseValueForSet() pipeline via a subclass/mock harness.
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*/
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class DbFunctionTemplateTest extends TestCase
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{
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// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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// 1. quoteValue() logic — tested directly via the fallback implementation
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// (no real DB connection required).
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// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Replicate Schema::quoteValue() fallback so the tests are self-contained.
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*
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* In production, PDO::quote() is tried first and returns a driver-specific
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* quoted string. When the driver does not support quote() (e.g. OCI) the
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* fallback below is used. Both paths produce a result that is safe to
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* embed inside a larger SQL string literal context.
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*/
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private function quoteValueFallback(string $str): string
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{
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return "'" . addcslashes(str_replace("'", "''", $str), "\000\n\r\\\032") . "'";
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}
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/** Normal ASCII string gets wrapped in single quotes. */
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public function testNormalStringIsQuoted(): void
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{
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$result = $this->quoteValueFallback('hello');
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$this->assertSame("'hello'", $result);
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}
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/** A string containing a single quote must have it doubled (SQL standard escape). */
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public function testSingleQuoteIsEscaped(): void
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{
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$result = $this->quoteValueFallback("O'Brien");
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// Single quote inside the value becomes two single quotes.
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$this->assertSame("'O''Brien'", $result);
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}
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/**
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* Classic SQL injection payload: closing the value's quote context, appending
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* a tautology, and commenting out the rest of the query.
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*/
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public function testSqlInjectionPayloadIsNeutralized(): void
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{
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$payload = "' OR '1'='1";
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$quoted = $this->quoteValueFallback($payload);
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// The result must be wrapped in single quotes.
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$this->assertStringStartsWith("'", $quoted);
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$this->assertStringEndsWith("'", $quoted);
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// All embedded single quotes must be doubled ('' instead of '),
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// preventing the payload from breaking out of the string context.
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// Strip the outer wrapping quotes and verify no lone single-quotes remain.
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$inner = substr($quoted, 1, -1);
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// After removing all doubled-quote escapes, no single quotes should remain
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$withoutEscapedQuotes = str_replace("''", '', $inner);
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$this->assertStringNotContainsString("'", $withoutEscapedQuotes,
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'All single quotes in the value must be doubled — an unescaped quote means the payload can break out');
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}
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/** A second common injection style: comment-termination to ignore the rest. */
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public function testCommentTerminationPayloadIsNeutralized(): void
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{
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$payload = "value'; DROP TABLE users; --";
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$quoted = $this->quoteValueFallback($payload);
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// Value must remain wrapped in outer quotes.
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$this->assertStringStartsWith("'", $quoted);
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$this->assertStringEndsWith("'", $quoted);
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// The embedded single quote must be doubled, preventing breakout.
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$inner = substr($quoted, 1, -1);
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$withoutEscapedQuotes = str_replace("''", '', $inner);
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$this->assertStringNotContainsString("'", $withoutEscapedQuotes,
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'All single quotes in the value must be doubled — an unescaped quote allows SQL injection');
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}
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/** Numeric values must pass through unquoted (they are safe without quoting). */
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public function testIntegerValueIsReturnedAsIs(): void
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{
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// In quoteValue(), is_int() causes early return. Simulate that here.
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$value = 42;
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$result = is_int($value) || is_float($value) ? $value : $this->quoteValueFallback((string)$value);
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$this->assertSame(42, $result);
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}
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/** Float values must pass through unquoted. */
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public function testFloatValueIsReturnedAsIs(): void
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{
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$value = 3.14;
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$result = is_int($value) || is_float($value) ? $value : $this->quoteValueFallback((string)$value);
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$this->assertSame(3.14, $result);
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}
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// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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// 2. Template substitution — tests that the quoted value is correctly
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// placed into the SQL expression template.
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// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Simulate what parseValueForSet() does after the security fix:
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* str_ireplace('{value}', $quotedValue, $template)
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*
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* This is the exact same logic; we test it here without needing a full
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* framework bootstrap.
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*/
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private function applyTemplate(string $template, string $stringValue): string
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{
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$quotedValue = $this->quoteValueFallback($stringValue);
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return str_ireplace('{value}', $quotedValue, $template);
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}
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/** Normal value in an UPPER() template produces well-formed SQL. */
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public function testNormalValueInUpperTemplate(): void
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{
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$sql = $this->applyTemplate('UPPER({value})', 'hello');
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$this->assertSame("UPPER('hello')", $sql);
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}
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/** A value with a single quote is properly escaped so the resulting SQL
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* remains syntactically valid. */
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public function testSingleQuoteValueInTemplate(): void
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{
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$sql = $this->applyTemplate('UPPER({value})', "O'Brien");
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$this->assertSame("UPPER('O''Brien')", $sql);
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}
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/**
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* Before the fix the injection payload would produce:
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* UPPER('' OR '1'='1')
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* which silently changes the stored value. After the fix it becomes:
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* UPPER(''' OR ''1''=''1')
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* — a literal string that cannot break out of the quoting context.
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*/
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public function testInjectionPayloadInTemplateIsNeutralized(): void
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{
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$payload = "' OR '1'='1";
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$sql = $this->applyTemplate('UPPER({value})', $payload);
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// The resulting expression must be wrapped in UPPER(…).
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$this->assertStringStartsWith('UPPER(', $sql);
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$this->assertStringEndsWith(')', $sql);
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// Extract the quoted string inside UPPER(…) and verify all single quotes
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// within the value are properly doubled — the injection cannot break out.
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$innerQuoted = substr($sql, 6, -1); // strip "UPPER(" and ")"
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$this->assertStringStartsWith("'", $innerQuoted);
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$this->assertStringEndsWith("'", $innerQuoted);
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$innerValue = substr($innerQuoted, 1, -1);
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$withoutEscapedQuotes = str_replace("''", '', $innerValue);
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$this->assertStringNotContainsString("'", $withoutEscapedQuotes,
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'All single quotes must be doubled inside the template — an unescaped quote allows injection');
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}
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/** DROP TABLE injection in a template is rendered harmless. */
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public function testDropTablePayloadInTemplateIsNeutralized(): void
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{
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$payload = "value'); DROP TABLE users; --";
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$sql = $this->applyTemplate('LOWER({value})', $payload);
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// The result must be a single LOWER(…) call — not two statements.
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$this->assertStringStartsWith('LOWER(', $sql);
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$this->assertStringEndsWith(')', $sql);
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// The embedded single quotes must be doubled so the payload stays
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// inside the string literal and cannot break out to execute DROP TABLE.
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$innerQuoted = substr($sql, 6, -1); // strip "LOWER(" and ")"
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$innerValue = substr($innerQuoted, 1, -1); // strip outer quotes
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$withoutEscapedQuotes = str_replace("''", '', $innerValue);
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$this->assertStringNotContainsString("'", $withoutEscapedQuotes,
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'All single quotes must be doubled — an unescaped quote allows the payload to execute as SQL');
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}
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/** Numeric value in a template is substituted without quotes. */
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public function testNumericValueInTemplate(): void
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{
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$numericValue = 42;
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// Mirror what parseValueForSet does: only call quoteValue for strings.
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$substitution = is_string($numericValue)
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? $this->quoteValueFallback($numericValue)
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: $numericValue;
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$sql = str_ireplace('{value}', (string)$substitution, 'ABS({value})');
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$this->assertSame('ABS(42)', $sql);
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}
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/** Template substitution is case-insensitive per str_ireplace semantics. */
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public function testTemplatePlaceholderIsCaseInsensitive(): void
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{
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// str_ireplace is used in production code, so {VALUE} and {value} both work.
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$sql1 = str_ireplace('{value}', $this->quoteValueFallback('test'), 'UPPER({VALUE})');
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$sql2 = str_ireplace('{value}', $this->quoteValueFallback('test'), 'UPPER({value})');
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$this->assertSame("UPPER('test')", $sql1);
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$this->assertSame($sql1, $sql2);
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}
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// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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// 3. Demonstrate the BEFORE state was vulnerable (regression proof).
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// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* This test deliberately shows what the old code produced and asserts that
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* result is unsafe — proving the fix was necessary.
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*
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* Old code: "'$value'" (bare interpolation, no escaping)
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*/
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public function testOldCodeWasVulnerable(): void
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{
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$payload = "' OR '1'='1";
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// What the old code produced:
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$oldResult = "UPPER('" . $payload . "')";
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// The old result contains a raw SQL injection payload.
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$this->assertStringContainsString("' OR '1'='1", $oldResult,
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'Demonstrates the old code embedded the payload verbatim — confirming the bug existed.'
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);
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// What the fixed code produces:
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$newResult = $this->applyTemplate('UPPER({value})', $payload);
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// The new result does NOT contain the exploitable sequence.
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$this->assertStringNotContainsString("' OR '1'='1", $newResult,
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'Fixed code must neutralize the injection payload.'
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);
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// And the new result is different from the old result.
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$this->assertNotSame($oldResult, $newResult);
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}
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}

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