Update python-workflow.yml

.github/workflows/python-workflow.yml

@@ -1,44 +1,42 @@
-name: CI
+# .github/workflows/ci-vulnerable.yml
+name: CI (VULNERABLE EXAMPLE)
 
 on:
-  pull_request:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions:  # added using https://github.com/step-security/secure-repo
-  contents: read
-  id-token: write
+  pull_request_target:
+    types: [opened, reopened, synchronize]
 
 jobs:
   build:
+    # Runs with the base repository's context on PRs, including from forks
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
 
+    # Overly broad permissions allow write actions against the repo
+    permissions:
+      contents: write        # dangerous on pull_request_target
+      pull-requests: write   # also risky
+
+    env:
+      # Secrets are available in this context and will be reachable by attacker-controlled code
+      NPM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
+      GH_TOKEN:  ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+
     steps:
-    - name: Harden Runner
-      uses: step-security/harden-runner@446798f8213ac2e75931c1b0769676d927801858 # v2.10.0
-      with:
-        policy: Test-policy
-
-    - name: Checkout repository
-      uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-
-    - name: Set up Python 3.11
-      uses: actions/setup-python@42375524e23c412d93fb67b49958b491fce71c38 # v5.4.0
-      with:
-        python-version: 3.11
-
-    - name: Install dependencies
-      run: |
-        pip install -r requirements.txt
-
-    - name: Echo
-      run: echo "213" > README.md
-
-    - name: Get changed files
-      id: changed-files
-      uses: tj-actions/changed-files@v35
-
-    - name: List all changed files
-      run: |
-        for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do
-          echo "$file was changed"
-        done
+      - name: Checkout PR code (DANGEROUS)
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          # Explicitly pulls the contributor's fork and branch (attacker-controlled)
+          repository: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name }}
+          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
+          # Leaves write-capable credentials in the repo working copy
+          persist-credentials: true
+
+      - name: Install deps
+        run: npm ci
+
+      - name: Build
+        run: npm run build
+
+      - name: Publish artifact (runs with write token)
+        run: |
+          echo "Pretend we publish or tag a release here"
+          # Attacker-controlled code above can already run with write and secrets