We should consider phasing out secstr for our own "secured memory" implementation, with full support for other primitives for isolating memory pages to support different OSes:
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Linux - typical support for mlock and zeroing, but also thinking MFD_SECRET_*, as posed here to further isolate sensitive memory from kernel space and even cache. Have not seen a merge upstream to a new revision yet, but interesting to think about.
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macOS - mlock again, but also potentially pushing support for Secure Enclave storage, which will requiring signing rather than our current symmetric encryption.
-
Windows - CryptProtectMemory and SecureZeroMemory for explicit zeroing.
Backing to other native "keyring" implementations (Credential Manager, macOS Keychain) are also interesting and provides security and isolation for free(-ish).
We should consider phasing out
secstrfor our own "secured memory" implementation, with full support for other primitives for isolating memory pages to support different OSes:Linux - typical support for
mlockand zeroing, but also thinkingMFD_SECRET_*, as posed here to further isolate sensitive memory from kernel space and even cache. Have not seen a merge upstream to a new revision yet, but interesting to think about.macOS -
mlockagain, but also potentially pushing support for Secure Enclave storage, which will requiring signing rather than our current symmetric encryption.Windows -
CryptProtectMemoryandSecureZeroMemoryfor explicit zeroing.Backing to other native "keyring" implementations (Credential Manager, macOS Keychain) are also interesting and provides security and isolation for free(-ish).