|
1 | | -# COW Invariants (Stable Theory Contract) |
| 1 | +# System Invariants (Stable Theory Contract) |
2 | 2 |
|
3 | | -This document defines the non-negotiable behavioral invariants for the Copy-on-Write (COW) pipeline. It is a contract for code review and release safety, not a design tutorial. |
| 3 | +This document defines the non-negotiable behavioral invariants for the DEXBot2 system. It is a contract for code review and release safety, not a design tutorial. |
4 | 4 |
|
5 | 5 | ## Scope |
6 | 6 |
|
7 | | -- Applies to COW planning, projection, reconciliation, commit, and fund accounting flows. |
8 | | -- Primary modules: `modules/order/utils/validate.ts`, `modules/order/manager.ts`, `modules/order/accounting.ts`, `modules/order/working_grid.ts`. |
| 7 | +- **COW Pipeline**: planning, projection, reconciliation, commit, and fund accounting flows. |
| 8 | +- **Sync Engine**: fill history sync, open-order sync, orphan detection, cache vs chain consistency. |
| 9 | +- **Maintenance Runtime**: pipeline gating, illegal-state handling, cooldown semantics, dust ordering. |
| 10 | +- **Grid & Reconcile**: price-level uniqueness, dust detection scope, reconcile cancel semantics. |
| 11 | +- **Batch & Pipeline**: stale handling, retry gating, stale-flag cleanup. |
| 12 | +- **Fund Registry**: cross-bot allocation invariants. |
| 13 | +- **Subscriptions**: health watchdog, silent-death detection. |
9 | 14 |
|
10 | | -## Invariants |
| 15 | +## Invariant Prefixes |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | +| Prefix | Subsystem | |
| 18 | +|--------|-----------| |
| 19 | +| `INV-COW` | COW pipeline | |
| 20 | +| `INV-REC` | Reconcile | |
| 21 | +| `INV-PROJ` | Projection | |
| 22 | +| `INV-ID` | Order identity | |
| 23 | +| `INV-ACC` | Accounting / fund tracking | |
| 24 | +| `INV-DUST` | Dust health | |
| 25 | +| `INV-SYNC` | Sync engine | |
| 26 | +| `INV-MAINT` | Maintenance runtime | |
| 27 | +| `INV-GRID` | Grid structure | |
| 28 | +| `INV-RECON` | Reconcile layer | |
| 29 | +| `INV-BATCH` | Batch / pipeline | |
| 30 | +| `INV-PIPE` | Pipeline signals | |
| 31 | +| `INV-STATE` | State / lifecycle | |
| 32 | +| `INV-REG` | Fund registry | |
| 33 | +| `INV-SUB` | Subscriptions | |
| 34 | +| `INV-BOOT` | Bootstrap / resync | |
| 35 | +| `INV-UPDATE` | On-chain updates | |
| 36 | + |
| 37 | +--- |
| 38 | + |
| 39 | +## COW Pipeline |
11 | 40 |
|
12 | 41 | - `INV-COW-001` Master immutability until commit |
13 | 42 | - The master grid must not be mutated during planning/execution prep. |
@@ -42,43 +71,336 @@ This document defines the non-negotiable behavioral invariants for the Copy-on-W |
42 | 71 | - Committed chain/grid totals derive only from on-chain orders (`ACTIVE`/`PARTIAL` with `orderId`) and their projected sizes. |
43 | 72 | - Virtual orders contribute only to virtual pools, not committed chain totals. |
44 | 73 |
|
45 | | -- `INV-ACC-002` Fund invariant consistency |
46 | | - - Tracked totals must remain consistent with blockchain totals within configured tolerance. |
| 74 | +- `INV-ACC-002` Fund invariant consistency (INVARIANT 1) |
| 75 | + - Tracked totals must remain consistent with blockchain totals within `FUND_INVARIANT_PERCENT_TOLERANCE`. |
| 76 | + - `Total = Free + Committed` must hold per side. |
47 | 77 | - False violations due to ideal-size projection overstatement are prohibited. |
48 | 78 |
|
| 79 | +- `INV-ACC-003` Cross-bot fund registry invariant (INVARIANT 3) |
| 80 | + - Shared-account per-bot commitment must not exceed the bot's proportional share of chain balance. |
| 81 | + - Checked with widened tolerance `max(PERCENT_TOLERANCE * 3, 0.15)`. |
| 82 | + - Registry failure logs a warning, not a silent skip. |
| 83 | + |
49 | 84 | - `INV-DUST-001` Dust health gating parity |
50 | 85 | - Dust health thresholding applies consistently to both CREATE and rotation destination holes. |
51 | 86 |
|
| 87 | +--- |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | +## Sync Engine |
| 90 | + |
| 91 | +- `INV-SYNC-001` Drift-refetch for partial fill correctness |
| 92 | + - `isEffectivelyFull` must not unconditionally trust cached `rawOnChain.for_sale`. |
| 93 | + - When cached `for_sale` is smaller than the grid's own size (drift signal), refetch from chain via `readSingleOrder`. |
| 94 | + - `isEffectivelyFull` requires either: chain-confirmed empty (refetch returned null), grid also at 0, or the other side rounding to 0. |
| 95 | + - The legacy `newSizeInt <= 0` fast-path is forbidden. |
| 96 | + |
| 97 | +- `INV-SYNC-002` No TTL-based chain refetch |
| 98 | + - Chain is only consulted on a drift signal (cache < grid size). |
| 99 | + - Time-based TTL refetches are prohibited — a stale-but-consistent cache is still correct. |
| 100 | + |
| 101 | +- `INV-SYNC-003` Drift refetch null = chain-confirmed empty |
| 102 | + - When drift refetch returns null from `readSingleOrder`, the order is authoritatively gone. |
| 103 | + - The sync engine must treat this as a chain-confirmed empty, not a connection failure. |
| 104 | + |
| 105 | +- `INV-SYNC-004` Orphan adoption rejects duplicate price levels |
| 106 | + - Pass-2 fallback adoption must check whether an active grid order of the same type already exists at the same price (within `calculatePriceTolerance` using `Math.max(size)`). |
| 107 | + - If a duplicate exists, the orphan is NOT adopted; it is pushed to `unmatchedChainOrders` for chain cancel. |
| 108 | + - Size is irrelevant — any duplicate violates the one-order-per-price-level invariant. |
| 109 | + |
| 110 | +- `INV-SYNC-005` Fill queue back-pressure |
| 111 | + - Subscription callbacks must not push fills beyond `MAX_INCOMING_FILL_QUEUE`. |
| 112 | + - Rejected fills must leave subscription cursors retryable; the queue must remain unchanged. |
| 113 | + - Back-pressure must not start a consumer for rejected fills. |
| 114 | + |
| 115 | +- `INV-SYNC-006` syncFromOpenOrders acquires fill-processing lock |
| 116 | + - `syncFromOpenOrders` acquires `_fillProcessingLock` by default. |
| 117 | + - Callers already inside the lock must pass `fillLockAlreadyHeld=true`. |
| 118 | + - Direct call sites without the lock contract are prohibited. |
| 119 | + |
| 120 | +- `INV-SYNC-007` Authoritative sync preserves fetched free balances |
| 121 | + - `synchronizeWithChain` must not double-deduct already-locked funds from fetched `buyFree`/`sellFree`. |
| 122 | + - After authoritative open-order sync, `checkFundDriftAfterFills` must return `isValid=true`. |
| 123 | + |
| 124 | +--- |
| 125 | + |
| 126 | +## Maintenance Runtime |
| 127 | + |
| 128 | +- `INV-MAINT-001` Pipeline in-flight defers maintenance |
| 129 | + - When `isPipelineEmpty` returns `isEmpty=false` (batch in-flight, recovery in-flight, or broadcasting active), `checkSpreadCondition` and `checkGridHealth` must be skipped. |
| 130 | + - Pipeline signals (`batchInFlight`, `recoveryInFlight`, `broadcasting`) must be passed to `isPipelineEmpty`. |
| 131 | + |
| 132 | +- `INV-MAINT-002` Illegal state abort |
| 133 | + - When `consumeIllegalStateSignal` returns a non-null signal, the maintenance cycle must: |
| 134 | + - Trigger immediate recovery sync (`_triggerStateRecoverySync`). |
| 135 | + - Skip persistence (`_persistAndRecoverIfNeeded`) in the same cycle. |
| 136 | + - Skip remaining maintenance steps (spread checks). |
| 137 | + - Arm one maintenance cooldown cycle (`_maintenanceCooldownCycles = 1`). |
| 138 | + |
| 139 | +- `INV-MAINT-003` Maintenance cooldown |
| 140 | + - After a hard-abort (illegal state), the next maintenance cycle must skip all checks (spread, health, etc.). |
| 141 | + - Cooldown is exactly one cycle; normal checks resume on the subsequent cycle. |
| 142 | + - Cooldown must not stack or compound. |
| 143 | + |
| 144 | +- `INV-MAINT-004` Maintenance idle gate |
| 145 | + - Maintenance must wait for a quiet window with no fill queue, sync, or batch activity (`BLOCKCHAIN_SETTLE_DELAY_MS`). |
| 146 | + - Recent activity tracking covers: fill queueing, fill processing completion, COW batch start/end, open-order sync, periodic fetches. |
| 147 | + |
| 148 | +- `INV-MAINT-005` Dust-first ordering |
| 149 | + - Dust partials default to `DUST_CANCEL_DELAY_SEC` (30s). |
| 150 | + - Grid resync and structural maintenance must be deferred until dust timers complete, plus an additional blockchain settle delay before retrying reset work. |
| 151 | + |
| 152 | +--- |
| 153 | + |
| 154 | +## Grid Structure |
| 155 | + |
| 156 | +- `INV-GRID-001` One-to-one order mapping |
| 157 | + - One grid slot = at most one on-chain order. No two chain orders may map to the same grid slot. |
| 158 | + - Sync engine tracks `matchedGridOrderIds` through both sync passes and skips already-matched slots. |
| 159 | + - Surplus orders (matched count > `activeOrders.buy/sell` targets) are flagged for cancellation. |
| 160 | + |
| 161 | +- `INV-GRID-002` One order per price level |
| 162 | + - The active grid must have at most one on-chain order per (type, price) pair. |
| 163 | + - Duplicate price levels are a structural violation — the sync engine must reject orphan adoption at a duplicate price, and the reconcile layer must cancel offenders on chain. |
| 164 | + - Size is irrelevant; any duplicate violates this invariant. |
| 165 | + |
| 166 | +- `INV-GRID-003` Interior dust detection at duplicate price levels |
| 167 | + - Interior partials (not top-of-window) are eligible for dust detection if they share a price level with an ACTIVE sibling. |
| 168 | + - Top-of-window partials remain always eligible. |
| 169 | + - Two PARTIALs sharing a price with no active sibling do not qualify (left to rebalancer). |
| 170 | + |
| 171 | +--- |
| 172 | + |
| 173 | +## Reconcile |
| 174 | + |
| 175 | +- `INV-RECON-001` Reconcile cancels duplicate chain orders unconditionally |
| 176 | + - When an unmatched order is within `looseTolerance` of an active grid order, it must be cancelled on chain via `_cancelChainOrder` with `releaseUntrackedFunds: true`. |
| 177 | + - Cancelled IDs are filtered out of `unmatchedParsed` to prevent reprocessing. |
| 178 | + - No size guard — any duplicate at the same price is a violation. |
| 179 | + - `SUSPECTED_DUPLICATE_TOLERANCE_FLOOR` (absolute price floor) is removed — only `tolerance * SUSPECTED_DUPLICATE_TOLERANCE_MULTIPLIER` is used. |
| 180 | + |
| 181 | +- `INV-RECON-002` Rebalance must not convert on-chain slots to SPREAD via CREATE |
| 182 | + - `performSafeRebalance` must not emit `CREATE` actions that convert existing on-chain slots into SPREAD orders. |
| 183 | + - On-chain mid-slot must keep its BUY/SELL type before commit. |
| 184 | + |
| 185 | +- `INV-RECON-003` Extreme placement ordering |
| 186 | + - BUY placements must use nearest available free slots first (ascending price). |
| 187 | + - SELL placements must use nearest available free slots first (descending price). |
| 188 | + |
| 189 | +--- |
| 190 | + |
| 191 | +## Batch / Pipeline |
| 192 | + |
| 193 | +- `INV-BATCH-001` Illegal state batch abort |
| 194 | + - When `executeBatch` throws `ILLEGAL_ORDER_STATE`, the caller must: |
| 195 | + - Return `abortedForIllegalState: true`. |
| 196 | + - Trigger one immediate recovery sync. |
| 197 | + - Arm one maintenance cooldown cycle. |
| 198 | + |
| 199 | +- `INV-BATCH-002` Stale-only cancel fast path |
| 200 | + - When a cancel-only batch fails with "order does not exist" (stale), the handler must: |
| 201 | + - Virtualize the slot (`state = VIRTUAL`, `orderId = null`, `size = 0`, `rawOnChain = null`). |
| 202 | + - Return `stale: true`. |
| 203 | + - NOT trigger a recovery sync. |
| 204 | + - Track the stale order id in `_staleCleanedOrderIds` to prevent double-credit. |
| 205 | + - Preserve manager index validity. |
| 206 | + |
| 207 | +- `INV-BATCH-003` "Cannot deduct" → recovery sync |
| 208 | + - When `executeBatch` throws "Cannot deduct all or more from order than order contains", the handler must: |
| 209 | + - Return `recoveredBySync: true`, `reason: 'ORDER_SIZE_DRIFT'`. |
| 210 | + - Trigger one recovery sync. |
| 211 | + - NOT virtualize the slot. |
| 212 | + - Preserve `orderId` until sync reconciles it. |
| 213 | + - NOT mark the order as stale-cleaned. |
| 214 | + |
| 215 | +--- |
| 216 | + |
| 217 | +## Pipeline Signals |
| 218 | + |
| 219 | +- `INV-PIPE-001` Stale correction entry removal |
| 220 | + - `correctOrderPriceOnChain` must remove the entry from `ordersNeedingPriceCorrection` in ALL exit paths: success, skip (updateOrder returns null), and error. |
| 221 | + - Use `try`/`catch`/`finally` with `.filter()` removal only in `finally`. |
| 222 | + |
| 223 | +- `INV-PIPE-002` Throw-safe grid divergence corrections |
| 224 | + - `updateGridFromBlockchainSnapshot` called from `applyGridDivergenceCorrections` must be wrapped in try/catch that clears `_gridSidesUpdated` on failure. |
| 225 | + - A throw must not leave `_gridSidesUpdated` permanently set, which would block the next tick. |
| 226 | + |
| 227 | +--- |
| 228 | + |
| 229 | +## State / Lifecycle |
| 230 | + |
| 231 | +- `INV-STATE-001` Bootstrap suppresses invariant checks |
| 232 | + - While `isBootstrapping()` is true, `_verifyFundInvariants` must be suppressed. |
| 233 | + - Suppression covers `recalculateFunds` and `_updateOrder` trigger paths. |
| 234 | + |
| 235 | +- `INV-STATE-002` Recovery validation not masked by bootstrap |
| 236 | + - `_performStateRecovery` must detect drift even when `isBootstrapping()` is true. |
| 237 | + - Bootstrap suppression of invariant checks must not also suppress recovery validation. |
| 238 | + |
| 239 | +- `INV-STATE-003` Grid resize respects budget after capping |
| 240 | + - BUY allocation must not exceed calculated budget after `_recalculateGridOrderSizesFromBlockchain` capping. |
| 241 | + |
| 242 | +--- |
| 243 | + |
| 244 | +## Fund Registry |
| 245 | + |
| 246 | +- `INV-REG-001` Cross-bot allocation ≤ proportional share |
| 247 | + - Per-bot committed amounts (sum of on-chain orders) must not exceed `totalChainBalance × allocatedPercent`. |
| 248 | + - Violation triggers a warning-level log entry (not silent), with tolerance `max(PERCENT_TOLERANCE * 3, 0.15)`. |
| 249 | + - Registry registration is pre-flight + atomic; all bots register before any starts. |
| 250 | + - Release happens in `DEXBot.shutdown`. |
| 251 | + |
| 252 | +- `INV-REG-002` Async-locked registry writes |
| 253 | + - All `fund_registry` mutations (register, update, release) must hold an async lock. |
| 254 | + - Concurrent writes from multiple bots sharing the same account must be serialized. |
| 255 | + |
| 256 | +--- |
| 257 | + |
| 258 | +## Subscriptions |
| 259 | + |
| 260 | +- `INV-SUB-001` Subscription health watchdog |
| 261 | + - A periodic timer (`SUBSCRIPTION_HEALTH_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS`) must check `lastNoticeAt` per subscription. |
| 262 | + - If silence exceeds `SUBSCRIPTION_SILENT_THRESHOLD_MS`, trigger `resubscribeEntry('healthcheck')`. |
| 263 | + - `reconnecting` flag must guard against concurrent resubscribe calls. |
| 264 | + |
| 265 | +--- |
| 266 | + |
| 267 | +## Broadcast |
| 268 | + |
| 269 | +- `INV-BROADCAST-001` BROADCAST_DEADLINE graceful recovery |
| 270 | + - On `BroadcastUncertainError`, the bot must: |
| 271 | + - Retry once with a fresh deadline window (`_executeWithRetryOnUncertain`). |
| 272 | + - Skip retry when `err.partialOnChainState` is true (pair-mode grouped execution). |
| 273 | + - After retry expiry, reconcile with `fillLockAlreadyHeld=true` to avoid AsyncLock deadlock. |
| 274 | + - Daemon broadcast retries are configurable via `CREDENTIAL_DAEMON_BROADCAST_RETRIES`. |
| 275 | + |
| 276 | +- `INV-BROADCAST-002` Deadlock-free reconcile after uncertain broadcast |
| 277 | + - `_reconcileAfterUncertainBroadcast` must pass `fillLockAlreadyHeld=true` because `_fillProcessingLock` is already held by the fill-processing call chain. |
| 278 | + - AsyncLock is not reentrant; a second `acquire()` would queue forever. |
| 279 | + |
| 280 | +--- |
| 281 | + |
| 282 | +## Constants & Precision |
| 283 | + |
| 284 | +- `INV-CONST-001` All magic numbers centralized in `constants.ts` |
| 285 | + - Hardcoded fallbacks in runtime code are prohibited. |
| 286 | + - Every timing value, limit, and threshold must have a named constant. |
| 287 | + |
| 288 | +- `INV-PREC-001` Precision helpers throw on invalid precision |
| 289 | + - `formatAmountByPrecision` and `formatSizeByOrderType` must throw when precision is undefined. |
| 290 | + - Silent fallback to `DEFAULT_ASSET_PRECISION (8)` is prohibited. |
| 291 | + - `floatToBlockchainInt` throws on undefined precision — callers must guarantee precision is available before calling. |
| 292 | + |
| 293 | +--- |
| 294 | + |
52 | 295 | ## Test Mapping |
53 | 296 |
|
| 297 | +### COW Pipeline |
54 | 298 | - `INV-COW-001`, `INV-COW-002` |
55 | 299 | - `tests/test_cow_master_plan.ts` (`COW-001`, `COW-002`) |
56 | 300 | - `tests/test_cow_commit_guards.ts` |
57 | | - |
58 | 301 | - `INV-REC-001` |
59 | 302 | - `tests/test_cow_master_plan.ts` (`COW-016`) |
60 | | - |
61 | 303 | - `INV-PROJ-001` |
62 | 304 | - `tests/test_cow_master_plan.ts` (`COW-012`, `COW-013`, `COW-014`) |
63 | | - |
64 | 305 | - `INV-PROJ-002` |
65 | 306 | - `tests/test_cow_master_plan.ts` (`COW-018`, `COW-018c`) |
66 | | - |
67 | 307 | - `INV-PROJ-003` |
68 | 308 | - `tests/test_cow_master_plan.ts` (`COW-018b`) |
69 | | - |
70 | 309 | - `INV-DUST-001` |
71 | 310 | - `tests/test_cow_master_plan.ts` (`COW-017`) |
72 | 311 |
|
| 312 | +### Accounting / Fund Tracking |
| 313 | +- `INV-ACC-001`, `INV-ACC-002` |
| 314 | + - `tests/test_funds.ts` |
| 315 | + - `modules/order/accounting.ts:472-594` (`_verifyFundInvariants`) |
| 316 | +- `INV-ACC-003` |
| 317 | + - `modules/order/accounting.ts:534-583` (cross-bot INVARIANT 3) |
| 318 | + |
| 319 | +### Sync Engine |
| 320 | +- `INV-SYNC-001`, `INV-SYNC-002`, `INV-SYNC-003` |
| 321 | + - `tests/test_sync_fill_drift_refetch.ts` (5 sub-cases) |
| 322 | + - `tests/test_ghost_order_fix.ts` |
| 323 | +- `INV-SYNC-004` |
| 324 | + - `tests/test_sync_logic.ts` (`testOrphanAtDuplicatePriceLevelIsNotAdopted`) |
| 325 | +- `INV-SYNC-005` |
| 326 | + - `tests/test_patch17_invariants.ts` (`testFillCallbackAppliesQueueBackPressure`) |
| 327 | +- `INV-SYNC-006` |
| 328 | + - `tests/test_sync_lock_routing.ts` |
| 329 | +- `INV-SYNC-007` |
| 330 | + - `tests/test_resync_invariants.ts` (Case 5) |
| 331 | + |
| 332 | +### Maintenance Runtime |
| 333 | +- `INV-MAINT-001` |
| 334 | + - `tests/test_patch17_invariants.ts` (`testPipelineInFlightDefersMaintenance`) |
| 335 | +- `INV-MAINT-002`, `INV-MAINT-003` |
| 336 | + - `tests/test_patch17_invariants.ts` (`testIllegalStateAbortResyncAndCooldown`) |
| 337 | +- `INV-MAINT-004`, `INV-MAINT-005` |
| 338 | + - `tests/test_dust_rebalance_logic.ts` |
| 339 | + |
| 340 | +### Grid Structure |
| 341 | +- `INV-GRID-001` |
| 342 | + - `modules/order/sync_engine.ts` (one-to-one mapping via `matchedGridOrderIds`) |
| 343 | + - `tests/test_sync_logic.ts` (surplus order cancellation) |
| 344 | +- `INV-GRID-002` |
| 345 | + - `modules/order/sync_engine.ts:804` (duplicate price level rejection) |
| 346 | + - `modules/order/grid_reconcile.ts` (duplicate chain order cancel) |
| 347 | +- `INV-GRID-003` |
| 348 | + - `tests/test_dust_rebalance_logic.ts` (`testInteriorDustWithDuplicatePriceLevel`, `testInteriorDustAdjacentGridLevelNotEligible`) |
| 349 | + |
| 350 | +### Reconcile |
| 351 | +- `INV-RECON-001` |
| 352 | + - `modules/order/grid_reconcile.ts` (unconditional duplicate cancel) |
| 353 | +- `INV-RECON-002` |
| 354 | + - `tests/test_patch17_invariants.ts` (`testRoleAssignmentBlocksOnChainSpreadConversion`) |
| 355 | +- `INV-RECON-003` |
| 356 | + - `tests/test_patch17_invariants.ts` (`testExtremePlacementOrdering`) |
| 357 | + |
| 358 | +### Batch / Pipeline |
| 359 | +- `INV-BATCH-001` |
| 360 | + - `tests/test_patch17_invariants.ts` (`testIllegalBatchAbortArmsMaintenanceCooldown`) |
| 361 | +- `INV-BATCH-002` |
| 362 | + - `tests/test_patch17_invariants.ts` (`testSingleStaleCancelBatchUsesStaleOnlyFastPath`) |
| 363 | +- `INV-BATCH-003` |
| 364 | + - `tests/test_patch17_invariants.ts` (`testCannotDeductTriggersRecoverySyncInsteadOfVirtualizing`) |
| 365 | + |
| 366 | +### Pipeline Signals |
| 367 | +- `INV-PIPE-001` |
| 368 | + - `modules/order/utils/order.ts` (correction entry removal via finally) |
| 369 | +- `INV-PIPE-002` |
| 370 | + - `modules/order/utils/system.ts` (try/catch wrapping grid divergence) |
| 371 | + |
| 372 | +### State / Lifecycle |
| 373 | +- `INV-STATE-001`, `INV-STATE-002` |
| 374 | + - `tests/test_resync_invariants.ts` (Cases 1-4) |
| 375 | +- `INV-STATE-003` |
| 376 | + - `tests/test_patch17_invariants.ts` (`testGridResizeRespectsBudgetAfterCap`) |
| 377 | + |
| 378 | +### Fund Registry |
| 379 | +- `INV-REG-001`, `INV-REG-002` |
| 380 | + - `modules/fund_registry.ts` |
| 381 | + - `modules/order/accounting.ts:534-583` |
| 382 | + |
| 383 | +### Subscriptions |
| 384 | +- `INV-SUB-001` |
| 385 | + - `modules/bitshares-native/subscriptions.ts` (health watchdog) |
| 386 | + - `tests/test_native_subscriptions.ts` |
| 387 | + |
| 388 | +### Broadcast |
| 389 | +- `INV-BROADCAST-001`, `INV-BROADCAST-002` |
| 390 | + - `modules/dexbot_class.ts` (`_executeWithRetryOnUncertain`, `_reconcileAfterUncertainBroadcast`) |
| 391 | + |
| 392 | +--- |
| 393 | + |
73 | 394 | ## Review Checklist (Quick Use) |
74 | 395 |
|
75 | | -For any COW/accounting change, reviewers should verify: |
| 396 | +For any change touching these subsystems, reviewers should verify: |
76 | 397 |
|
77 | | -- Does it preserve `INV-PROJ-002` for on-chain PARTIAL orders? |
78 | | -- Does it avoid non-rotation size UPDATE leakage in reconcile (`INV-REC-001`)? |
79 | | -- Does it keep virtual/on-chain accounting separation (`INV-ACC-001`)? |
80 | | -- Does it preserve atomic commit semantics (`INV-COW-001`, `INV-COW-002`)? |
81 | | -- Are corresponding regression tests added/updated? |
| 398 | +- **COW/Accounting**: preserves `INV-PROJ-002` for on-chain PARTIAL orders; avoids non-rotation size UPDATE leakage (`INV-REC-001`); keeps virtual/on-chain separation (`INV-ACC-001`); preserves atomic commit (`INV-COW-001`, `INV-COW-002`). |
| 399 | +- **Sync Engine**: does not reintroduce `newSizeInt <= 0` fast-path (`INV-SYNC-001`); does not add TTL-based refetch (`INV-SYNC-002`); orphan adoption checks price-level uniqueness (`INV-SYNC-004`). |
| 400 | +- **Maintenance**: pipeline signals are passed to `isPipelineEmpty` (`INV-MAINT-001`); illegal-state abort arms cooldown (`INV-MAINT-002/003`). |
| 401 | +- **Reconcile**: duplicate chain orders at same price are cancelled unconditionally (`INV-RECON-001`); no CREATE-based spread conversion of on-chain slots (`INV-RECON-002`). |
| 402 | +- **Batch**: stale-only cancel uses fast path without recovery sync (`INV-BATCH-002`); "cannot deduct" triggers sync, not virtualization (`INV-BATCH-003`). |
| 403 | +- **Are corresponding regression tests added/updated?** |
82 | 404 |
|
83 | 405 | ## Change Policy |
84 | 406 |
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