+ "details": "## Summary\n\n`Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` does not correctly reject `javascript:` URIs when the scheme is split by HTML entity-encoded control characters such as ` ` (carriage return), ` ` (line feed), or `	` (tab).\n\n## Details\n\nThe `allowed_uri?` method strips literal control characters before decoding HTML entities. Payloads like `java script:alert(1)` survive the control character strip, then ` ` is decoded to a carriage return, producing `java\\rscript:alert(1)`.\n\nNote that the Loofah sanitizer's default `sanitize()` path is **not affected** because Nokogiri decodes HTML entities during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI protocol. This issue only affects direct callers of the `allowed_uri?` string-level helper when passing HTML-encoded strings.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that call `Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` to validate user-controlled URLs and then render approved URLs into `href` or other browser-interpreted URI attributes may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS).\n\nThis only affects Loofah `2.25.0`.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to Loofah >= `2.25.1`.\n\n## Credit\n\nResponsibly reported by HackOne user @smlee.",
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